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2015 (11) TMI 140 - HC - Indian LawsJurisdiction of In-charge Chief Metropolitan Magistrate - Application under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act - Held that:- Under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, the bank / financial institution is to approach a pre-existing court already constituted under the provisions of the CrPC, 1973. It is well settled that the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate, as the case may be, whilst deciding an Application under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, acts in a very limited jurisdiction and does not adjudicate any lis between the bank and the borrower. His jurisdiction is invoked only for the limited purpose of seeking his assistance in taking the possession of the secured assets. This assistance would be rendered to the banks/financial institutions subject to them complying with the conditions and stipulations set out in section 14. The argument canvassed on behalf of the Petitioners that the In-charge Chief Metropolitan Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain the Applications filed by the Respondent Banks under section 14, is wholly without merit. - This doctrine, which is now well established, propounds that the acts of officers “de-facto” performed by them within the scope of their assumed official authority, in the interest of public or third persons and not for their own benefit, are generally as valid and binding, as if they were the acts of officers “de-jure”. This doctrine is founded on good sense, sound policy and practical expedience. It is aimed at the prevention of public and private mischief and the protection of public and private interest. It avoids unnecessary confusion and needless chaos. Even though an illegal appointment may be set aside and a proper appointment may be made, but the acts of those who hold office “de-facto” are not so easily undone and may have lasting repercussions and confusing sequels, if attempted to be undone. Otherwise, as soon as the Judge pronounces a judgment, a litigation may be commenced for a declaration that the judgment is void because the Judge is not a Judge. This is exactly the case before us. Hence, the rule against collateral attack on the validity of judicial appointments cannot be permitted in such a fashion. We, therefore, find that even assuming that the In-charge Chief Metropolitan Magistrate did not have the actual authority, or was not clothed with the powers to entertain an Application under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, by applying the “de-facto” doctrine, it would make no difference in the present case. - even if the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate’s order of 4th February, 2012 was held to be in excess of exercise of its powers, the orders passed pursuant thereto by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate ought not to have been set aside in view of the “de-facto” doctrine that has now been well settled and evolved in larger public interest. We, therefore, with great humility, find ourselves unable to agree with the decision of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Manjudevi R Somani [2013 (4) TMI 742 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] - No merit in these Writ Petitions.
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