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2016 (1) TMI 287 - HC - CustomsImposition of anti-dumping duty on Acrylonitrile Butadiene Rubber (NBR) imported from Korea RP. - Levy of anti-dumping duty on imports of Phenol. - Method and procedure - Period of review - Held that:- India is a signatory to Article VI of GATT and the said Agreement of 1994. In pursuance of the same, amendments were made in the said Act (customs Tariff Act, 1975) in 1995 and, inter alia, new section 9A was inserted. The said rules have been framed in exercise of powers conferred by section 9A(6) of the said Act. Therefore, when we consider, inter alia, section 9A of the said Act and the provisions of the said Rules, the conclusions outlined in G.M. Exports (2015 (9) TMI 1162 - SUPREME COURT) would come into play. It follows that if any of the said rules are vague or ambiguous then recourse could be had to the said Agreement as a legitimate aid to construction and any such ambiguity could be resolved in favour of a meaning that is consistent with the provisions of the said Agreement. Furthermore,if there be any difference between the language employed in the said rule and a corresponding provision of the said Agreement, the former is to be construed in the same sense as that of the said Agreement. Now, Article 11.4 of the said Agreement inter alia stipulates that the review contemplated under Article 11 shall be carried out expeditiously and shall “normally” be concluded within 12 months of the date of initiation of the review. Rule 23(2) of the said rules is modelled on Article 11.4 of the said Agreement. Thus, while construing rule 23(2) if any ambiguity is noticed, the same can be resolved by having recourse to Article 11.4. The use of the word “normally” in Article 11.4 is of great significance. It means that the review under Article 11 is to be completed expeditiously and “normally” within 12 months but that is not an inflexible period. Considered in this light, and to bring the provisions of rule 23(2) in harmony with Article 11.4, rule 23(2) would have to be read as – any review initiated under sub-rule (1) shall “normally” be concluded within a period not exceeding twelve months from the date of initiation of such review. And, when the first proviso of rule 17(1) is applied (with necessary changes) to the case of a review it becomes immediately clear that the period of 12 months can be further extended by the Central Government in its discretion by 6 months but only if special circumstances exist. Such a construction would be in keeping with the conclusions enumerated in G.M. Exports (supra). That being the case, we hold that the Central Government has the power to grant an extension of 6 months for concluding a review. We, however, are making it clear once again that we have not examined and were not called upon to examine whether this power has been exercised legitimately. The provision of extension of time contained in the first proviso to rule 17(1) can be pressed into service for extending the time of 12 months for concluding a review under rule 23(2) because of the mutatis mutandis prescription in rule 23(3). As such, the writ petitions are liable to be dismissed and they are dismissed - Decided against the appellants.
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