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2016 (8) TMI 826 - HC - Companies LawBreach of principles of natural justice - non-observance of Principles of Natural Justice - whether CLB did not give any opportunity to make submissions to the appellant on the main company petition? - Held that:- Not only the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is without there being any factual foundation but the same is not genuine because if the appellant consciously did not make any submission in the main company petition when main company petition as well as company application were heard simultaneously, no complaint can be made at the later stage that there is breach of Principles of Natural Justice. Apart from the above, in a matter of complaint of breach of principles of natural justice, it is by now well settled that unless the breach is satisfactorily demonstrated before the Court, the Court may decline to entertain such complaint. As per the observations made by us hereinabove, when we have found that considering the facts and circumstances, the exercise of the discretion by the CLB cannot be said to be unreasonable or perverse or by committing ex facie error on the face of the record, no useful purpose would be served in entertaining the complaint for breach of principles of natural justice though otherwise such a complaint is not genuine and not supported by any statement of fact in the memorandum of appeal nor any ground raised for such purpose save and except the oral submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant during the course of hearing. Hence, we find that contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. There is considerable force in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that respondent no. 2 by virtue of Section 15(2) of the University Act, is entitled to the office as Chancellor for his lifetime but, even by interim order dated 26.4.2016, this Court has not prohibited him from functioning as the Chancellor but what has been directed was that, any hindrance or interference in the administration of the University should not be created. Therefore, lawful exercise of the power as per the University Act by the Chancellor was not prohibited but, any hindrance or interference in the administration of the University which otherwise not permissible in law was prohibited in order to see that the educational activity of the University may not suffer. The question may remain as to whether CLB ought to have passed any interim order pending the conclusion of the proceedings before Civil Court or until the appellant approaches before the Civil Court. We would have addressed such question but it appears to us that since no motion was made in the proceedings in the Company Petition before the CLB, we need not express any view. In any case, proceedings of main Company Petition are still pending before CLB, if any contingency arises in law, CLB is not precluded from passing the interim order save and except on the point for which it has found that the appropriate adjudication should be made before Civil Court. As such, until the party approaches before the Civil Court, appropriate interim order could have been considered by CLB but, in our view, when no motion was made before CLB, all such aspects shall be a mere academic exercise but, suffice it to observe that as and when such contingency arises in law, the parties may move before CLB or may be before Civil Court as the case may be and at that stage, rights and contentions of both the sides would remain open. We do not find that the decision of CLB is against any law or is based on any irrelevant material or omission to consider the relevant material. Thus the appeal fails
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