2019 (4) TMI 154 - SC - Indian Laws

Dishonor of cheque - insufficiency of funds - repayment of borrowed amount - Section 138 of NI Act - existence of legally enforceable debt or not - rebuttal of presumption - preponderance of probabilities - Held that - Section 139 of the Act mandates that it shall be presumed unless the contrary is proved that the holder of a cheque received it in discharge in whole or in part of a debt or liability. The expression unless the contrary is proved indicates that the presumption under Section 139 of the Act is rebuttable. Terming this as an example of a reverse onus clause the three Judge Bench of this Court in Rangappa 2010 (5) TMI 391 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA held that in determining whether the presumption has been rebutted the test of proportionality must guide the determination. The standard of proof for rebuttal of the presumption under Section 139 of the Act is guided by a preponderance of probabilities. The first appellate court held that the presumption under Section 139 of the Act stood rebutted and that the defence stood probabalised. From the judgment of the High Court the significant aspect of the case which stands out is that there has been no appreciation of the evidence or even a reference to the reasons furnished by the first appellate court. Having regard to the law laid down by the three Judge Bench in Rangappa (supra) the appellant duly rebutted the presumption under Section 139 of the Act. His defence that there was an absence of a legally enforceable debt was rendered probable on the basis of the material on record. Consequently the order of acquittal passed by the first appellate court was justified - Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Legally enforceable debt under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
2. Rebuttal of presumption under Section 139 of the Act.
3. Appreciation of evidence by the appellate courts.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Legally Enforceable Debt under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881:
The respondent-complainant alleged that the appellant issued a cheque for Rs. 5 lakhs on 09 March 2005 towards the discharge of a liability of Rs. 15 lakhs, borrowed in February 2004. The cheque was dishonored due to insufficient funds when presented on 23 March 2005 and again on 14 July 2005. The appellant denied the existence of a legally enforceable debt, asserting that the cheque was misused by the complainant. The Trial court initially acquitted the appellant, but on remand, convicted him. The High Court upheld the conviction but reduced the fine.

2. Rebuttal of Presumption under Section 139 of the Act:
Section 139 of the Act presumes that the holder of a cheque received it in discharge of a debt or liability unless proven otherwise. The appellant argued that he had not borrowed Rs. 15 lakhs from the complainant and that the cheque was issued under an assurance of obtaining a loan from a financial institution. The appellant's defense was that the complainant misused blank cheques obtained under the pretext of securing a housing loan. The first appellate court found the appellant's defense probable, noting inconsistencies in the complainant's statements regarding the loan amount and the absence of evidence for the alleged payment.

3. Appreciation of Evidence by the Appellate Courts:
The first appellate court acquitted the appellant, citing the complainant's failure to prove the source of funds for the alleged loan and inconsistencies in his testimony. The High Court, however, reversed the acquittal without adequately addressing the evidence or the reasons provided by the first appellate court. It relied on the judgment in "Rangappa Versus Sri Mohan" (2010) 11 SCC 441, which held that the presumption under Section 139 can be rebutted by a preponderance of probabilities. The Supreme Court criticized the High Court's judgment for lacking an appreciation of evidence and valid reasons to overturn the first appellate court's findings.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court concluded that the appellant successfully rebutted the presumption under Section 139, rendering his defense probable. The order of acquittal by the first appellate court was justified. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the appellant's acquittal.