2025 (5) TMI 2165 - HC - Indian Laws

Condonation of the delay of 444 days in filing the appeal - sufficient cause for delay or not - power of the court to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 - rigour attached to consideration of an application under Section 5 should be applied when it involves property law or not - HELD THAT - In Raheem Shah and another Vs Govindh Singh and Others 2023 (7) TMI 1385 - SC ORDER the Supreme Court held that in civil litigation the substantial dispute must be adjudicated and the delay must be condoned. Though in the aforesaid decision the delay was not substantial inasmuch as it was only 52 days it is inclined to think that the principle laid down by the Supreme Court can be applied with equal force in the facts of this case. In Collector Land Acquisition Anantnag and another vs MST Katiji nad others 1987 (2) TMI 61 - SUPREME COURT the Supreme Court stressed the need for a liberal and justiceoriented approach while considering the condonation of delay. In Bivchandra Shankar More Vs Balu Gangaram More and Others 2019 (5) TMI 1695 - SUPREME COURT the Supreme Court stressed the requirement of a justice-oriented approach of the court to put an end to a civil litigation and held that the word sufficient cause should be given a liberal construction so as to advance sustainable justice. When the order of the District Court dismissing the application for condonation of delay is seen it becomes irresistible to conclude that the District Court erred egregiously in not adopting a liberal approach. It cannot be disputed that the respondents are yet to acquire an indefeasible right over the property since the final decree is yet to be passed. It must be remembered that the final decree is not immune from challenge through the known process of law. It may be true as contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the averments in the application for condonation of delay may not have inspired confidence in the mind of the court while considering the same - Considering the fact that the issue raised in the first appeal being the validity of Ext.B1 settlement deed it was only appropriate that the District Court considered the application for condonation of delay in a more pragmatic rather than in a pedantic manner as now done. This Court finds that interest of justice demands that one opportunity be granted to the appellants to contest the supplementary preliminary decree on merits - Appeal disposed off.

Summary

The core legal questions considered by the Court in this judgment are:

1. Whether the first appellate court was justified in dismissing the appeal without considering the merits, particularly without evaluating the authenticity and validity of the settlement deed (Ext.B1) which was alleged to be clouded with suspicious circumstances.

2. Whether the principles under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, governing the condonation of delay, were correctly applied by the courts below, especially in the context of a 444-day delay in filing the appeal.

3. Whether the courts below were correct in accepting the settlement deed (Ext.B1) and ignoring the respondent's claim of ownership by adverse possession and ouster of other family members.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis

1. Validity of the Settlement Deed (Ext.B1) and Merits of the Appeal

The appellants challenged the first appellate court's refusal to consider the merits of the appeal, particularly the validity of Ext.B1, a settlement deed executed by the appellants' deceased mother in favor of the respondents. The appellants contended that this deed was executed under suspicious and surreptitious circumstances and that supervening factors invalidated its authenticity. The first appellate court dismissed the appeal on the ground of delay without examining these contentions.

The Court noted that the preliminary decree had been passed in the partition suit, and subsequently, a supplementary preliminary decree was passed allotting the mother's share to the first respondent based on the settlement deed. The appellants filed the appeal against this supplementary decree after a delay of 444 days.

The Court emphasized that before the passing of the final decree, multiple preliminary decrees can be passed as per Rule 230 of the Kerala Civil Rules of Practice, 1971. Therefore, the passing of the preliminary decree does not confer an indefeasible right on the respondents. The devolution of rights through the settlement deed is open to challenge by the appellants through the legal process. The Court found that the first appellate court erred in curtailing the appellants' right to challenge the settlement deed by dismissing the appeal without considering its merits.

2. Application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Condonation of Delay

The appellants sought condonation of delay of 444 days in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The District Court dismissed the application, holding that the delay was not sufficiently explained, partly because the appellants failed to produce passports to substantiate their claim that they were abroad and unable to consult regarding the appeal. The District Court also noted that the appellants had actively participated in the final decree application, which undermined their explanation for the delay. The District Court relied on a Supreme Court decision to support its strict approach.

On appeal, this Court examined the principles governing condonation of delay under Section 5, referencing authoritative Supreme Court decisions which advocate a liberal and justice-oriented approach. The Court cited the following key precedents:

• Raheem Shah and another Vs Govindh Singh and others: The Supreme Court held that substantial disputes in civil litigation must be adjudicated and delay condoned.
• Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another vs MST Katiji and others: Emphasized a liberal and justice-oriented approach in condoning delay.
• Bivchandra Shankar More Vs Balu Gangaram More and others: Held that "sufficient cause" under Section 5 should be given a liberal construction to advance sustainable justice.
• B.Madhuri Goud Vs B.Damodhar Reddy: Recognized the elastic and flexible nature of "sufficient cause" to prevent substantive rights from being defeated merely on grounds of delay.
• N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy: Clarified that limitation rules are meant to prevent dilatory tactics but not to destroy rights; they balance the need for promptness with justice.

The Court found that the District Court failed to adopt this liberal approach. It held that the respondents had not acquired an indefeasible right over the property since the final decree was yet to be passed and was challengeable. The Court further observed that while the appellants' explanation for delay may not have been fully convincing, this alone should not have prevented the condonation of delay. Instead, the court could have imposed costs on the appellants to compensate the respondents.

3. Acceptance of the Settlement Deed and Respondents' Claim of Ownership

The respondents claimed ownership of the entire property by virtue of the settlement deed and contended that other family members had lost their rights by ouster and adverse possession. The appellants challenged this claim, asserting that the settlement deed was invalid and that the respondents' claim should not have been accepted without proper adjudication.

The Court noted that the validity of the settlement deed and the competing claims of ownership were substantive issues that required adjudication on merits. The first appellate court's dismissal of the appeal without considering these issues was inappropriate. The Court stressed that the settlement deed's authenticity and the respondents' claim could be tested only through proper legal proceedings, which had not yet taken place.

Conclusions on Issues

The Court concluded that the first appellate court erred in dismissing the appeal without considering the merits, particularly the validity of the settlement deed. The Court also held that the District Court erred in not adopting a liberal approach in condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The respondents had not acquired an indefeasible right merely by the passing of the preliminary decree, and the appellants were entitled to challenge the decree on merits.

Significant Holdings

The Court set aside the order dismissing the application for condonation of delay and the final judgment dismissing the appeal. It restored the appeal to the District Court's files subject to the appellants paying costs of Rs.7,500/- to each respondent within three weeks. Upon payment of costs and production of receipts, the District Court was directed to restore and consider the appeal on merits expeditiously, preferably within two months.

The Court stayed all further proceedings for passing the final decree until the appeal was decided, clarifying that the execution court could still proceed with the final decree application.

Key legal reasoning preserved verbatim includes:

"The expression 'sufficient cause' used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serves the ends of justice. No hard-and-fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years courts have repeatedly observed that a liberal approach needs to be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated only on the ground of delay."

"Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time."

The Court emphasized that the interest of justice demands a pragmatic approach rather than a pedantic one, especially in civil litigation involving property rights, where substantive disputes should be adjudicated rather than defeated on procedural grounds.