|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21081 to 21100 of 22262 Records
More information of case laws are visible to the Subscriber of a package i.e:-
Party Name, Court Name, Date of Decision, Full Text of Headnote and Decision etc.
-
1961 (7) TMI 55
Whether the expression "cooked food" used in certain notifications issued under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 (U.P. Act 15 of 1948) can be construed as including within its meaning "biscuits" also?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The High Court of Allahabad has in an earlier case in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Jassu Ram Bakery Dealer [1976 (8) TMI 131 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] held that biscuit was not cooked food. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh has also taken the same view in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh v. Shri Ballabhdas Ishwardas [1965 (4) TMI 104 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT] thus we approve of the views expressed in the aforesaid decisions.
-
1961 (7) TMI 47
Whether the notification issued by respondent 1 on October 24, 1953, was valid, and item 27 in the list notified brought the articles in question within the mischief of the Sales Tax Act and so the petitioners were not entitled to any writ as claimed by them?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The first condition is that the impugned law must be one which is made by the Legislature of a State which obviously means a State which came into existence under and after the Constitution; and that shows that the impugned law must be a law made by the Legislature of a State subsequent to the Constitution. This condition is satisfied in the present case because the impugned notification has been issued by virtue of the authority delegated to respondent 1 by Act 30 of 1950 and this Act was passed after the Constitution was adopted.
The declaration made by the Act was intended to be prospective in operation and it would affect laws made after the commencement of the Act, and that clearly must mean that if a law had been passed prior to the com- mencement of the Act, and it authorised the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of certain commodities its validity cannot be challenged on the ground that the said commodities have been subsequently declared by the Act to be essential for the life of the community. The impugned notification with which we are concerned and the Act under which it has been issued are thus outside the purview of section 3 of the Act
-
1961 (7) TMI 45
Whether on the construction of the agreement dated the 4th June, 1942, between the assessee Messrs Rohtas Industries Ltd. Dalmia Nagar (along with 3 other manufacturing companies) and the Cement Marketing Company of India Ltd., the cement delivered, despatched or consigned by the assessee to the Cement Marketing Company of India Ltd., or to their order or in accordance with their directions are sales to the latter within the meaning of the Bihar Sales Tax Act (Bihar Act VI of 1944)?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As agreeing with the view of the High Court, that clause 24 does not qualify the legal effect of the other important clauses of the agreement, and that the cement delivered, despatched or consigned by the manufacturing companies to the Marketing Company or to its orders or in accordance with its directions was sold by the manufacturing companies to the Marketing Company and the sale was liable to be taxed under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944.
-
1961 (7) TMI 8
Whether the transfer of the case papers in regard to the appellant's assessment for the year 1952-53 had been validly effected by what he described as a notification passed in that behalf
Whether Lalji is liable to pay the tax on the income in question?
Held that:- It would be idle for the appellant to contend that the proceedings had been validly transferred to any Income-tax Officer in Bombay. That being so, it follows that the proceedings are properly pending before the first respondent and the notice issued by him is valid and legal. In our opinion, therefore, there is no substance in the question of jurisdiction raised by the appellant.
We do not think that Mr. Nambiar would be justified in resisting the enquiry which is proposed to be held by respondent No. 1 in pursuance of the impugned notice issued by him against the appellant. Under these circumstances we do not propose to deal with the point of law sought to be raised by Mr. Nambiar.
All objections which Lalji may have to raise against his alleged liability would undoubtedly have to be considered in the said proceedings. Proceedings against Chhotalal may also be taken by the Income-tax Officer and continued and concluded, but until the proceedings against Lalji are finally determined no assessment order should be passed in the proceedings taken against Chhotalal. If in the proceedings taken against Lalji it is finally decided that it is Lalji who is responsible to pay tax for the income in question it may not become necessary to make any order against Chhotalal. If, however, in the said proceedings Lalji is not held to be liable to pay tax or it is found that Lalji is liable to pay tax along with Chhotalal it may become necessary to pass appropriate orders against. Chhotalal. When we suggested to the learned counsel that we propose to make an order on these lines they all agreed that this would be a fair and reasonable order to make in the present proceedings. Appeal dismissed.
-
1961 (7) TMI 7
Whether the dividend income of ₹ 54,307 is to be assessed in the hands of the assessee, the Hindu undivided family ?
Held that:- The question here is one of interpretation only and that interpretation must be based on the terms of the section. The fiction enacted by the legislature must be restricted by the plain terms of the statute. Nor do we see how it can be said that the interpretation put on section 23A that it is confined to a shareholder registered in the books of the company defeats the very purpose of the section. The section will still apply to shareholders of the company and to their income will be added the notional income determined under section 23A.
Highr court correctly answered the question in favour of assessee by concluding that in respect of an income which was deemed to be distributed under the provisions of section 23A, the section in terms provided that the proportionate share of the shareholders in such distribution should be included in their income ; and as the Hindu undivided family was not and could not be a registered shareholder of the company, the amount in question could not be treated as the income of the Hindu undivided family under the provisions of that section. Appeal dismissed.
-
1961 (7) TMI 6
Whether in computing the profits and gains of the appellant, the remuneration paid to the agents was deductible under rule 3(2)(ix)?
Held that:- The existence of a rule seems to obliterate the frontiers between legislative, judicial and executive exercise of the power of a State, such as we understand it. There being no invariable use of a clear-cut legislative language, each general order emanating from the sovereign Ruler and promulgated in the same manner as any other rule and having its roots in a resolution of the Cabinet must be regarded as one binding upon the subject. This is the purport of the decisions of this court, and the present case falls in line with those which have been previously decided. There is nothing in the content, the character or the nature of these notifications, which would put them on a level lower than the Rules, which had been earlier promulgated. Appeal dismissed.
-
1961 (7) TMI 5
... ...
... ... ..... was regarded as personal and private expenditure, and the other half, as for administration. Such a rough and ready test is not possible in this case. The three sections have been made advisedly. Section (A) deals with expenditure over the army section (B), with expenditure over the official retinue and section (C), with expenses in the palace. Even if section (C) contains some items of expenditure on administration, such items are incapable of being disentangled from the rest, and unless there is clear proof, the assessee cannot claim the deduction. The expenditure under section (B), on the other hand, is clearly one connected with the administration of the land, and ought to have been allowed. We accordingly answer the first question by saying that Rs. 37,681-13-6 should be allowed as deduction, in addition to the deductions already granted. The appeal is partly allowed, and in the circumstances, the parties shall bear their own costs in this court. Appeal partly allowed.
-
1961 (7) TMI 4
Whether the Hyderabad Income-tax Act is ultra vires in so far as it seems to levy a tax on jagirs and samasthans ?
Whether the sum of ₹ 14,390 and ₹ 38,079 or a part thereof could be allowed as revenue deduction under section 14(5)(a) or 14(5)(b) of the Hyderabad Income-tax Act ?
Held that:- The Nizam could withhold his assent to a law contrary to the Ain if he chose ; but once he assented to it, the law derived its vitality, not from the act of the Legislative Assembly but from the act of the Nizam. It could not be questioned any more than a Firman issued by the Nizam. The Income-tax Act must, therefore, be regarded as binding upon those affected by its terms, and the question whether it could be introduced in the Legislative Assembly hardly arises. It must be regarded as a law emanating from His Exalted Highness the Nizam, the supreme legislator in the State, whose laws promulgated in any manner were binding upon the subject. The High Court correctly answered question against the appellant.
The High Court put the burden of proof somewhat strictly upon the assessee. The Tribunal, though it gave no reasons, hold that the expenses were incurred in relation to the management. The conclusion is based on some evidence. These expenses fall within clause (a) of section 14(5) as expenditure in connection with land or its administration, and they amounted to ₹ 26,057 in the year 1358 Fasli. For the year. 1357 Fasli, the amount debatable to these items from ₹ 14,390 will have to be determined. The evidence before us is not sufficient to state the exact amount. In favour of assessee. Appeal partly allowed.
-
1961 (7) TMI 3
Whether in the circumstances of this case where the Income-tax Officer, District III(2), separately assessed the business run in the name of Brijlal Nandkishore as belonging to a partnership firm consisting of Brijlal and Nandkishore, the Income-tax Officer, Non-Companies E.P.T. District, can assess the income from the same business in the hands of the assessee ?
Held that:- no special circumstances exist, on which the appellants can claim to come to this court against the decision of the Tribunal, by-passing the decision of the High Court on the question referred and the refusal of the High Court to call for a statement of the case from the Tribunal on questions which the Tribunal refused to refer to the High Court. The appeals are, therefore, within the rulings of this court in Chandi Prasad Chokhani v. State of Bihar [1961 (4) TMI 4 - SUPREME Court] and Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax,[1961 (4) TMI 5 - SUPREME Court] and must be regarded as incompetent. Appeal dismissed.
-
1961 (5) TMI 67
... ...
... ... ..... in view of its acceptance of the respondent's preliminary point, did not consider the question whether the inquiry had been made by the Collector in strict compliance with the provisions of the section, and whether the previous sanction of the State Government was obtained before he made the said order. In the affidavit failed in support of the petition in the High Court there is no specific allegation that no such inquiry has been made or that no such sanction has been obtained. Nor did the counsel for the appellant raise the said question in the arguments before the High Court. In the circumstances we do not think that this Court is justified in allowing the respondent to raise the said question for the first time before us. We, therefore, reject this plea. 13. In the result we set aside the order of the High Court and allow the appeal. But, in the circumstances of this case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs here and in the High Court. 14. Appeal allowed.
-
1961 (5) TMI 64
... ...
... ... ..... he period for making the award would be extended by the Court. 23. I also do not consider it necessary to decide in this case as to when arbitrators can be said to enter on the reference or what is meant by 'their being called upon to act' by notice under r. 3 of the First Schedule. I simply not that I agree with the view expressed in Iossifoglu v. Coumantaros (1941) 1 K.B. 396. that arbitrators enter upon a reference as soon as they have accepted their appointment and have communicated with each other about the reference. This is a stage earlier than their starting the proceedings in the presence of the parties or under some peremptory order compelling them to conclude the hearing ex parte. 'Calling upon the arbitrators to act' does include asking the arbitrators to enter on the reference but may also include asking them to do anything in connection with the reference except asking them to do the routine acts connected with the enquiry. 24. Appeal dismissed.
-
1961 (5) TMI 62
... ...
... ... ..... rnment. There is no provision in the Act empowering the State Government to give any such instructions to the Consolidation Officer; nor does any provision of the Act confer on the State Government any power to make rules or issue notifications to deprive owners of land of any part thereof or to direct the Consolidation Officer as to how he should exercise his statutory duties. Any such rule would be repugnant to the provisions of the Act. That apart, no such statutory rule empowering the State Government to issue such instructions has been placed before us. Both here as well as in the High Court, learned counsel appearing for the State has not been able to sustain the validity of such instructions on any legal basis. The order of the appropriate officers confirming the 'scheme on the basis of the said instructions was obviously illegal and, therefore, was rightly set aside by the High Court. In the result, the, appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1961 (5) TMI 61
... ...
... ... ..... he Act. I do not think that there would be a danger of such simultaneous exercise of the power to investigate by two officers. The offence will have to be registered at the police station within the limits of the jurisdiction of which the offence has taken place. Thereafter it would be investigated into by the officer at whose instance it was registered. If that officer happens to be a station-house officer the special police officer may take out the investigation from his hands or allow him to continue it. If the offence is registered at the instance of the special police officer, the station-house officer would be bound to know of it from the station-house records and would stay his hands. Upon this view, therefore, I would allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and of the Magistrate and remit the case to the latter for being dealt with according to law. By COURT In accordance with the opinion of the majority, this appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
-
1961 (5) TMI 59
... ...
... ... ..... ions in r. 53 on the ground that they are ultra vires s. 11, there being no maximum fee prescribed by the State Government, and (ii) the provisions in rr. 65, 66 and 67 on the ground that they are ultra vires the provisions in s. 5(a) read with the proviso in s. 4(2) succeeds. As however we have held that the market in this case has not been properly established, the market committee cannot enforce any of the provisions of the Act or the rules or the bye-laws framed by it and cannot issue licences till the market is properly established in law. We therefore allow the petition partly and direct the respondents not to enforce any of the provisions of the Act, the rules and the bye-laws against the petitioners with respect to the market till a market is properly established in law for this area under s. 5AA and not to levy any fees under s. 11 till the maximum is prescribed under the Rules. In the circumstances we order parties to bear their own costs. Petition allowed in part.
-
1961 (5) TMI 58
... ...
... ... ..... ion by ’enactments like s. 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Having consented to have the controversy between the parties resolved by reference to arbitration through Court, the. defendant deprived himself of the right to question the authority of the Court to refer the matter to arbitration or of the arbitrator to render the award. It is clear, therefore, that the defendant is estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court to entertain the suit and to make the reference to the arbitrator. He is equally estopped from challenging the authority of the arbitrator to render the award. In our opinion this conclusion is sufficient to dispose of the appeal. It, is not, therefore, necessary to determine the other points in controversy, including the question whether The Decrees and Orders Validating Act, 1936 (Act V of 1936) had the effect of validating what otherwise may have been invalid. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1961 (5) TMI 57
... ...
... ... ..... pplications for joint enquiry when each case rested on the same and similar basis and each of the applications included land included in a larger part of land acquired at one time. He also took into consideration that the separation of the applications of Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram would involve various difficulties in matters of income-tax. He therefore used his discretion and ordered the application to be proceeded with jointly. In view of our opinion on the main point, we do not consider it necessary to interpret the rules and decide whether the joint application was maintainable or not. The fact remains that Labhu Ram and Nathu Ram made a joint claim and got a joint decree against the State for compensation. The frame of the appeal is to be with reference to the nature of the decree challenged. We therefore see no force in this appeal and dismiss it with costs. This order will govern the other connected appeals, viz., Civil Appeals Nos. 636 to 641 of 1957. Appeal dismissed.
-
1961 (5) TMI 54
Indian Limitation Act for condonation of one day's delay in filing an appeal, the question arose whether the appellant had to explain his con- duct during the whole period prescribed for filing the appeal or he has to explain the delay between the last day for filing the appeal and the date on which the appeal was actually filed. Section 5 of the Limitation Act lays down that an appeal may be admitted after the period of limitation if the appellant shows sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal "within such period". - Held, that it would be irrelevant to invoke general considerations such as diligence of the appellant in construing the words of s.5. The expression "within such period" does not mean during such period and the failure of the appellant to account for his non-diligence during the whole period of limitation does not disqualify him from praying for condonation of delay.
-
1961 (5) TMI 53
Levy, charge or collect any sales tax on transactions of what the petitioners characterised as hire-purchase agreements
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. There is no doubt that the agreement in question does contain not only a contract of bailment simpliciter but also an element of sale, which element has been seized upon by the legislature for the purpose of subjecting a transaction like that to the sales tax.
To consider the contention under head (3), namely, that though the Parliament may have had the power to tax something which was not strictly speaking a "sale", the law is open to the attack that it discriminates against traders in Delhi inasmuch as, it is further contended, such a law has not been made applicable to the whole of India. In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention because no proper foundation was laid in the pleadings for supporting such a contention.
Hire-purchase transactions have been included within the definition of "sale" for the purpose of Central sales tax, and this definition has become applicable throughout India, and it cannot, therefore, be said that the State of Delhi, and now the Union Territory of Delhi, has been selected for hostile discrimination,therefore, there is no substance in the contention that the extended definition of "sale" in the main statute infringes Article 14 of the Constitution.
-
1961 (5) TMI 5
Whether certified copies of statements recorded or orders passed by the income-tax authorities were admissible in evidence under section 65 of the Evidence Act to prove the contents of those documents?
Held that:- The Subordinate Judge expressly recorded in the proceeding dated November 18, 1955, that he did " not mean to say that certified copy of the document will not be admissible in evidence at the time of the trial of the suit if the said certified copy is otherwise found to be admissible in evidence. Appeal dismissed.
-
1961 (5) TMI 4
Whether on the facts of the case a loss of ₹ 22,981 is allowable in computing the income of the assessee chargeable to the excess profits tax ?
Held that:- As to the first ground, it seems clear to us that under the third proviso to section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940, where the profits etc. of a part of the firm's business accrued or arose at Bhatinda, that part of the business shall for the purpose of the said section be deemed to be a separate business. The High Court was in error in thinking that the third proviso to section 5 of the Excess Profits Tax Act did not touch the question which the High Court had to answer. On the contrary, we think that the proviso answers the question against the assessee.
We agree that if the income did not arise or accrue in Bhatinda but the whole of it arose in Delhi, the third proviso would have no application. If, however, part of the income etc. arose in Bhatinda, then that part of the business was a separate business for the purposes of the Excess Profits Tax Act and the losses incurred at Bhatinda could not be taken into account. We are of the view that, on the facts found, the answer to the question must be in favour of the appellant and against the assessee. Civil Appeal be allowed.
............
|
