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Income Tax - High Court - Case Laws
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1990 (10) TMI 40
Account Books ... ... ... ... ..... t be said that the professions which we have mentioned such as street hawkers, ordinary pan sellers, etc., belong to the same category or class of persons as advocates, doctors and engineers. Therefore, there is no vice of discrimination if they are treated separately and distinctly. Within that profession, a further classification is made, viz., those who earn more than Rs. 25,000 and those who earn less than Rs. 25,000. Those who earn more than Rs. 25,000 are required to maintain books of account. Therefore, we do not see any unreasonableness in such classification. However, it is rightly pointed out by Mr. S. P. Bhat, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the vice of discrimination, if at all it was there, has been eliminated since by inserting rule 6F in the Income-tax Rules by which such a financial limit has been imposed on the professions enumerated in sub-section (1) of section 44AA of the Act as well. Therefore, there is no merit in this petition. It is rejected.
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1990 (10) TMI 39
Assessment, Representative Assessee, Trustee ... ... ... ... ..... unable to accept the contentions canvassed on behalf of the assessee and we find ourselves in disagreement with the view taken by the Tribunal and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. We, therefore, answer the questions referred to us in the negative and hold that the assessee is not entitled to the concessional rate of tax and should be subjected to the maximum marginal rate of tax under section 164(1) of the said Act for the relevant assessment year. Reference answered accordingly with no order as to costs. A copy of this judgment should be sent under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Ahmedabad Bench, Ahmedabad. At this stage, learned counsel for the assessee prays for a certificate of fitness under section 261 of the said Act. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, this case is not a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court. We, therefore, reject the prayer of learned counsel.
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1990 (10) TMI 38
Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... n it also appears that this fact was communicated by the Estate Duty Department to the Collector, Kanpur, through letter dated February 7, 1980. If so, we fail to understand how the recovery proceedings can still be continued against the petitioner. Learned standing counsel for the Government says that the petitioner has also got to pay the recovery charges. In this case, it would be seen that the tax recovery certificate itself is dated January 22, 1980, and the petitioner paid the entire duty on February 2, 1980. Whether, in such circumstances, any recovery charges are leviable is doubtful, particularly when the notice of demand in pursuance of the recovery certificate itself appears to have been issued on March 10, 1980. Be that as it may, that is not in issue before us. If any separate notice for collection charges is issued, it shall be open to the petitioner to dispute the same or question the same according to law. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed. No costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 37
Depreciation, Plant ... ... ... ... ..... cluded in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue by the decision of this court in Income-tax Reference No. 74 of 1978 disposed of on September 12, 1990 (S. K. Tulsi and Sons v. CIT 1991 187 ITR 685 1990 UPTC 1105. It may be mentioned that, in this case too, the cinema is located in a well-constructed building fitted with all the necessary fittings and furniture, etc. Accordingly, the question referred is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 36
Chemical Works, Depreciation, New Industrial Undertaking, Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... removal of tannin is described as a chemical, catechu is not described as a chemical. No authority is also cited for holding that catechu is a chemical. We make it clear that we should not be understood as expressing any opinion on the question whether catechu is a chemical or not. We are merely pointing the defect in the approach or the reasoning of the Tribunal. Since the very approach adopted by the Tribunal is wrong, we are inclined to remit question No. 2 back to the Tribunal for fresh determination in the light of the principles indicated hereinabove. Since we have dealt with questions Nos. 1 and 2 on merits, it is unnecessary to go into question No. 3.-Question No. 3 merely pertains to the merits of the decision of the Tribunal. For the above reasons, question No. 1 is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Question No. 2 is remitted for reconsideration. We decline to answer question No. 3 as it is unnecessary. No costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 35
Estate Duty, HUF ... ... ... ... ..... perty Act, 1937. The Supreme Court explained that, by virtue of the provisions of the said Act, widow steps into the shoes of her husband though having a limited estate and, therefore, when she dies, her interest passed to her heirs. The said decision, in our opinion, has no relevance whatsoever to the facts of the present case. This is not a case where the death of Dr. Bhargava took place at a time when the 1937 Act was in force. The simple question in this case is whether, on the date of death of Dr. Bhargava, his wife had Any share in the Hindu undivided family property. The answer can only be in the negative. The wife had no share nor could she sue for any such share. The Tribunal was, therefore, right in holding that, on the death of Dr. Bhargava, the entire interest in the Hindu undivided family property passed to his heirs in full. The question is, accordingly, answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Department and against the accountable person. No costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 34
Appeal To AAC, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... in the earlier part of our judgment, we propose to agree with the law laid down in the later decision of this court in the case of ITO v. Vinod Krishna Som Prakash 1979 117 ITR 594. Lastly, it may be pointed out that, for taking the view that an appeal lies to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against an order passed by the Income-tax Officer, we also derive support from the book The Law and Practice of Income-tax by N. A. Palkhivala and S. A. Palkhivala, Volume 1, Eighth Edition 1990, where, at page 1499, the learned author has also opined that an appeal under clause (g) (which was formerly clause j) and now amended) lies from an order of the assessing authority rejecting an application for registration on the ground that the said application was barred by time. In view of the above discussion, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Department with costs of Rs. 250 (rupees two hundred fifty only) payable to the assessee by the Department.
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1990 (10) TMI 33
Record, Revision By Commissioner, Valuation Report ... ... ... ... ..... record of any proceeding and such record is not confined only to the assessment order. Where any proceeding is initiated in the course of the assessment proceeding having a relevant and material bearing on the assessment to be made and the result of such proceeding was not available with the Incometax Officer before the completion of the assessment, but the result came subsequently, the revising authority is entitled to look into such material as it forms part of the assessment records of the particular assessment year. An assessment made without considering the valuation report for which proceeding had already been initiated in the course of an assessment proceeding is not a proper assessment and such assessment is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. For the reasons aforesaid, the question in this reference is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J. -I agree.
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1990 (10) TMI 32
Capital Gains, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... in this view, we hold that the second proviso to section 54E(1) of the Income-tax Act, inserted with effect from April 1, 1984, is only clarificatory in nature, that, in the case of compulsory acquisition of property under the statute, for the purpose of section 54E(1) of the Act, it is sufficient if the investment in specified assets is made within six months from the date of receipt of the compensation amount. We further hold that the second proviso to subsection (1) of section 54E should take effect from the date of enforcement of section 54E of the Act and it is applicable to the original compensation as also to the enhanced compensation received for the acquisition. In the light of the above, we hold that the learned single judge was justified in quashing exhibit P-1 and directing the Income-tax Officer to rework the benefit available to the assessee in the light of the observations contained in his judgment. This writ appeal is without merit. It is dismissed in limine.
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1990 (10) TMI 31
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ssee was under no obligation under the lease agreement dated April 23, 1940, and under section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act to restore the land leased to it to its original condition and that, therefore, the question of any liability for restoration charges on estimate being allowed as revenue expenditure under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, would not arise. Accordingly, the first question is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary to answer question No. 2. Needless to mention, while giving effect to our judgment under section 260(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Tribunal will consider whether and to what extent the assessee is under an obligation to restore the land leased to it to its original condition in terms of the new lease agreement dated May 7, 1971, and if so, whether and to what extent the restoration charges on estimate can be allowed as revenue expenditure. No order as to costs.
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1990 (10) TMI 30
Income, Special Allowance ... ... ... ... ..... allowance granted to the assessee either to meet his personal expenses at the place where the duties of his office or employment of profit are ordinarily performed by him or at a place where he ordinarily resides or to compensate him for the increased cost of living. The above sub-sections extend the scope of the term income so as to include the special allowances and benefits mentioned in these special clauses. Considered in the light of the above new provisions, we have to hold that the allowance given to the assessee for meeting the refreshment expenses during office hours is taxable as income. We answer the question referred to this court in the negative and hold that the allowance towards expenditure on refreshments is income and is taxable. The question is decided in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1990 (10) TMI 29
Appeal To AAC, Appeal To Tribunal, Firm, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... tinuation of registration under section 184(7) of the Act before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and, as such, the second appeal before the Tribunal is obviously competent. So far as question No. 2 is concerned, whether there was sufficient cause justifying the delay in filing the declaration in Form No. 12, it is essentially a question of fact unless any perversity in a legal sense is shown. In the present case, the Department has nowhere asserted that the Tribunal, while accepting the plea of reasonable cause of the assessee, has based its findings on any irrelevant or extraneous considerations. Under the circumstances, I answer both the questions in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Department. Since none has appeared on behalf of the assessee, there shall be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Assistant Registrar of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal B Bench, Patna, in terms of section 260 of the Act.
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1990 (10) TMI 28
Appeal To AAC, Firm, Status ... ... ... ... ..... is a matter concerning the status of the firm, and, as such, where the firm objects to the status under which it is assessed, the order complained of can be subjected to an appeal under section 246(c) of the Act. This view of mine is fully supported by the views taken by this court in a series of cases, namely, in the case of Madhur Jalpan v. CIT 1983 143 ITR 351 (Patna), in the case of CIT v. Manuram Babulal 1986 158 ITR 5 (Patna), in the case of CIT v. Gyanchand Bedi 1987 163 ITR 693 (Patna) and in the case of CIT v. M. N. Ghosh and Sons 1987 167 ITR 125 (Patna). For the reasons stated above, both the questions referred to above are answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Since none has appeared for the assessee, there shall be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to the Assistant Registrar, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, B Bench, Patna, in terms of section 260 of the Act. G. G. SOHANI C. J. -I agree.
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1990 (10) TMI 27
Representative Assessee, Trusts ... ... ... ... ..... page 1, line 40). If it be so, can the power under section 34 of the Act (revisional jurisdiction) be invoked at all ? The decision of the Supreme Court in Commr. of Agri. I. T. v. Lucy Kochuvareed 1976 103 ITR 799 is a pointer in this regard. That aspect has not been borne in mind at all. It seems that the Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax was not definite or clear about his jurisdiction or power to pass the revisional order . Therefore, we decline to answer the question referred to this court but, at the same time, direct the Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, Trivandrum, to restore the revisional proceedings to file for the year 1969-70 and dispose of the matter in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained hereinabove. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, Trivandrum, under section 60(6) of the Agricultural Income-tax Act.
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1990 (10) TMI 26
Estate Duty, Gift ... ... ... ... ..... m part of the statement of the case nor is it available in the paper book. A perusal of the terms of the gift deed is absolutely essential to interpret its impact to pronounce as to how far section 10 and section 33(1)(o) of the Estate Duty Act are applicable or not, in the instant case. Since we are not in a position to give a satisfactory and precise answer to the questions referred to this court in the absence of the basic document which should have been forwarded by the Appellate Tribunal, we decline to answer the questions referred to this court. We hereby direct the Appellate Tribunal to forward an appropriate statement of the case along with a true copy of the gift deed dated September 30, 1962, which was interpreted by the Appellate Tribunal in reaching the conclusion it did. The reference is answered as above. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1990 (10) TMI 25
Carry Forward, Developement Rebate, Unabsorbed Development Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... e, the carry forward of unabsorbed development rebate is not dependent on any quantification by the Income-tax Officer by way of making an assessment for that assessment year. The amount of deduction which is admissible can be ascertained by reference to the books of account maintained by the assessee while the assessment is being made for the year in which the deduction is actually being allowed. In my view, the Tribunal has rightly held that the assessee was entitled to the deduction in question for the assessment year in question. In the result, my answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative, i.e., against the Department and in favour of the assessee. The answer to question No. 2 is in the negative, i.e., again against the Department and in favour of the assessee. On the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this order be remitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna Bench, under the seal of this court. G. G. SOHANI C. J. -I agree.
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1990 (10) TMI 24
Agricultural Income Tax, Time Limit For Returns ... ... ... ... ..... r is certainly liable to pay the amount. Looking at the entire facts of the case, it looks as if the income-tax authorities have unnecessarily granted too much lenience and went into prolonged correspondence with the petitioner and the Government to realise what is legitimately due to them. It looks as if they proceeded on the footing that there was a moratorium and hence they should not take coercive steps. The petitioner should thank them for the undue lenience shown to it. The petitioner is certainly bound to pay the amount as it constitutes liability of the taken-over company. It should be remembered that the assets and liabilities of the fourth respondent have vested in the petitioner-company. The petitioner is not entitled to any relief in this original petition. In the result, the original petition is dismissed as devoid of merit. Respondents Nos. 1 to 3 are entitled to their costs. The fourth respondent shall bear its own costs. The advocate s fee fixed at Rs. 1,500.
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1990 (10) TMI 22
Offences And Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... nd in so far as she is concerned all these criminal miscellaneous petitions shall stand allowed. In so far as the offence under section 276C(1) of the Act is concerned, the prosecution against petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 also shall stand quashed in C. C. Nos. 140, 141 and 142 of 1985, referable to Crl. M. P. Nos. 7309, 7313 and 7311 of 1985, respectively. In respect of the other offences in the same calendar cases, as far as petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned the prosecutions shall survive. The prosecutions in C. C. Nos. 158 and 159 of 1985, referable to Crl, M. P. Nos. 7315 and 7317 of 1985, respectively, against the petitioners have to be maintained and the trials will have to be proceeded with. The offences under the Indian Penal Code have their foundation on the offences committed under the Income-tax Act and naturally trials for those offences will also have to be proceeded with. Thus, the petitions shall stand partly allowed in accordance with the details aforestated.
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1990 (10) TMI 21
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... ... ..... must be answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. The only contention raised before the Tribunal on behalf of the Revenue was that the expenditure claimed by the assessee on account of payment of interest on loans was not justified and as the assessee was not entitled to claim that deduction, the assessee must be held to have concealed his income. The Tribunal, however, held, after appreciating the material on record, that it was not a case of concealment of income. In view of this finding by the Tribunal, it must be held that the Tribunal was justified in cancelling the penalty for the assessment year 1969-70. My answer to the question referred to this court, therefore, is in the affirmative and against the Revenue. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. Let a copy of this judgment be sent by the Registry of this court to the Assistant Registrar, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna. G. C. BHARUKA J. - I agree.
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1990 (10) TMI 20
Agricultural Income Tax, Time Limit For Returns ... ... ... ... ..... d section 269UL of the Act also will not apply in so far as the court auction sale is concerned. It is in these circumstances that the contention put forward by learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be said to be sustainable. Having regard to the chequered career of the case, it is manifest that the instant proceedings appear to have been instituted to prolong the proceedings so as to defeat the second respondent from obtaining the fruits of the decree. Even at the time when the petitioner filed W. P. No. 5146 of 1988, Chapter XX-C of the Act was in the statute book. The petitioner ought and might have raised and asked for similar reliefs in the above writ petition. Having failed to do so, the petitioner is not entitled to seek for the relief as prayed for in this writ petition. In these circumstances there are no merits in the above case warranting interference by this court with the impugned proceedings. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. No costs.
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