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VAT and Sales Tax - Case Laws
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2024 (3) TMI 1134
Recovery of dues - Attachment of assets - dues of MVAT Authorities’ have charge in priority to the secured creditors or not - HELD THAT:- A plain reading of Section 26-E would show that once a secured creditor registers its security interest (under Section 26-B), notwithstanding any other law in force, the debts owed to the secured creditor shall be paid in priority over all other debts including taxes payable to the State Government. The “registration of security interest” referred to in Section 26-E of the SARFAESI Act, is the registration of such interest with CERSAI under Section 26-B.
The formulation of the two provisions in the SARFAESI Act and the MVAT Act respectively, is a conscious policy choice of balancing of interests of competing creditors who have finite assets to pursue in enforcing recovery of their claims. Dues owed to banks, if not paid, can have a harsher and wider adverse social impact. A collapse of banks would not only hurt the interests of various depositors but also inflict a wider deleterious impact on other segments of the economy. Potentially, it would be tax-payers’ funds that would have to be infused into the banks to bail them out to avoid such adverse social impact. On the other hand, if the banks are given a priority in recovery, and in the process, the secured assets are sold without hindrance to an auction purchaser, such asset would continue to be put to economic use, which would also generate tax revenues. In addition, other assets that are not the subject matter of a security interest registered prior in time can continue to be proceeded against in enforcement proceedings to recover tax dues.
The issue at hand has been extensively analysed in the case of Jalgaon Janta Sahakari Bank [2022 (9) TMI 163 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT]. Examining multiple fiscal statutes that create a statutory charge over assets of an assessee and their interplay with Section 26-E of the SARFAESI Act where such assessee has created a security interest in favour of secured creditors, the Full Bench of this Court held that where Section 26-E is attracted, the position in law is not that dues owed to a department of the State Government would have to be paid first. The Full Bench repelled exactly the same argument we were presented with – that Section 26-E only provides a “priority” but does not actually create a “first charge”, whereas provisions akin to Section 37 of the MVAT Act create a first charge. The Full Bench held that the secured creditor whose security interest is registered with CERSAI prior in time, would get precedence over the dues owed to the State. The Full Bench ruled that such a formulation is a conscious choice made by the legislature.
The assertion of the MVAT Authorities that they had priority over secured creditors was totally misconceived and without basis in law. Statutory authorities enforcing law must necessarily refrain from conducting themselves in a manner that conflicts with the law declared by a Full Bench of a constitutional court. There are no hesitation in declaring that none of the attachment orders can result in the MVAT Authorities stealing a march in priority over the registered security interest enjoyed by the Petitioner-led consortium of banks.
The impugned attachment orders of the MVAT Authorities dated 24th February, 2022, 7th April, 2022 (issued to the Borrower) and 31st July, 2023 (issued to the Petitioner) would not confer any priority over the registered security interest enjoyed by the Petitioner-led consortium banks over the Secured Assets - The Petitioner has the first priority in respect of enforcement against the Secured Assets by reason of Section 26-E and having a prior registration of the security interest with CERSAI. The Petitioner is therefore entitled to enforce such security interest enjoying priority over the MVAT Authorities.
Petition allowed.
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2024 (3) TMI 1033
Rate of the State sales tax on silk fabrics - taxable at 4% or 12%? - demand made for the period between 15th January 2000 and 31st March 2000 - HELD THAT:- During the said period, silk fabric was a part of Schedule I of the DST Act, on which sales tax was leviable at the rate of 12%. Sections 14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act were deleted by Act No. 18 of 2017. Section 14, before its deletion, declared certain goods specified therein as of special importance in inter-state trade or commerce. Until 11th May 1968, item (xi) was incorporated in Section 14, which covered the item of “silk sarees”. However, with effect from 11th May 1968, the said item was deleted by Act No. 19 of 1968.
Section 15(1) of the CST Act, as existed during the period for which the impugned assessment was made, provided that the local sales tax rate on declared goods should not exceed 4% of the sale or purchase price of such goods. So long as the silk fabric was a part of the list of declared goods under Section 14 of the CST Act, the sales tax levy under the DST Act could not have exceeded 4% in view of Section 15(1) of the CST Act. However, silk fabric was deleted from the list contained in Section 14 of the CST Act, effective 11 May 1968. Therefore, during the relevant period for which the impugned assessment order was issued, as silk fabric was not a part of the list under Section 14, there was no embargo on levying sales tax on silk fabric at a rate exceeding 4%. Therefore, the argument based on Section 15(1) of the CST Act will not help the appellant.
The second Schedule of the ADE Act provides that during each financial year, each State shall be paid a certain percentage of net proceeds of the additional duties levied and collected during the financial year in respect of the goods described in column (3) of Schedule I. However, no additional duty was made payable on silk fabric under the ADE Act. The proviso makes it clear that notwithstanding the ADE Act, there is no bar on the States levying sales tax - the argument that as silk fabric formed a part of Schedule I of the ADE Act, it disentitled the State Government from levying sales tax is fallacious and cannot be accepted.
The High Court has noted that its Co-ordinate Bench in the case of MR. TOBACCO PVT. LTD. VERSUS UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [2006 (1) TMI 567 - DELHI HIGH COURT] upheld the validity of notification dated 31st March 2000 issued under the DST Act.
There are no error in the view taken by the Delhi High Court in the impugned judgment - Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
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2024 (3) TMI 1032
Settlement of dues - determination of tax liability under the M.P. Sales Tax Act, M.P. Vat Tax Act, Central Sales Tax Act and Entry Tax Act - HELD THAT:- It is informed that proceedings under the SICA Act were concluded by the order passed by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) on 28.01.2024. A copy of the order dated 28.01.2014 is placed and it evidences that the issue relating to the tax claim by the State of Madhya Pradesh has attained finality.
In view of the representation of the Government of Madhya Pradesh in the above referred order of BIFR that the Company had settled their dues, followed by the final direction of the BIFR, that Government need not attend further hearings, nothing remains for consideration in these appeals.
Appeal disposed off.
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2024 (3) TMI 1031
Review petition - Issuance of sales certificate with regard to the sales tax dues - Registration of a Sale Certificate issued in favor of one party for a property purchased in an auction held by another party under the SARFAESI Act. - HELD THAT:- Reliance placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and Another v/s. N Raju Reddiar and Another [1996 (12) TMI 348 - SUPREME COURT] wherein the Supreme Court has deprecated the practice of litigants engaging a fresh set of Advocates to file and also argue matters in Review proceedings, without obtaining the consent of the Advocate who had appeared at the original stage.
In the above case, the Supreme Court dismissed the Review Petition with exemplary costs - the present case is not different and would completely fall in the nature of the proceedings which have been deprecated by the Supreme Court in the above judgement.
The Review Petition is accordingly dismissed with costs of Rs. 50,000/- to be deposited by the Petitioner, within a period of four weeks from today, with the Maharashtra Legal Services Authority. In the event, if such costs are not deposited, the Maharashtra Legal Services Authority shall take further steps to recover the said costs as arrears of land revenue.
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2024 (3) TMI 973
Reduction of turnover - cement imported from outside the State of U.P. - Rule 9 of the Value Added Tax Rules - HELD THAT:- Upon perusal of the order of Tribunal it is patently clear that the goods were imported from outside the State of U.P. and were used in one project in the State of U.P. There does not appear to be any perversity in the finding of the Tribunal with regard to the above factum. Such being the case, Rule 9 (1)(e) of the Rules would definitely apply and the petitioner would be entitled to the benefit thereunder.
The general rule of law in taxing statutes is that in case of any doubt the benefit should be given to the assessee. However, in case of exemption and deduction to be given, a stricter approach may be followed, as per catena of judgments of the Supreme Court, to examine whether the assessee is eligible for such benefit. In the present case, there is no factual dispute of goods having been imported from outside the State of U.P. and, therefore, the assessee clearly qualifies for the said benefit.
The question of law is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Department - Application dismissed.
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2024 (3) TMI 972
Violation of principles of natural justice - impugned order does not take into consideration the reply submitted by the petitioner and is a cryptic order - HELD THAT:- The observation in the impugned order dated 23.12.2023 is not sustainable for the reasons that the reply filed by the petitioner is a detailed reply. Proper Officer had to at least consider the reply on merits and then form an opinion whether the reply is not clear and unsatisfactory. He merely held that the reply is not clear and satisfactory which ex-facie shows that the Proper Officer has not applied his mind to the reply submitted by the petitioner.
Further, if the Proper Officer was of the view that reply was unsatisfactory and further details were required, the same could have been specifically sought from the petitioner. However, the record does not reflect that any such opportunity was given to the petitioner to clarify its reply or furnish further documents/details.
The order cannot be sustained, and the matter is liable to be remitted to the Proper Officer for re-adjudication. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 23.12.2023 is set aside. The matter is remitted to the Proper Officer for re-adjudication - the impugned order records that petitioner’s reply is not satisfactory. The Proper Officer is directed to intimate to the petitioner details/documents, as maybe required to be furnished by the petitioner.
Petition disposed off.
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2024 (3) TMI 909
Violation of principles of natural justice - Validity of assessment order - bills to indicate that no form 'C' was ever issued not considered - erroneous observation that sale took place - no opportunity of hearing has been accorded to the revisionist at any stage by the authorities.
Revisionist was having three copies of the bills in his bill book which has not been appreciated by the competent authority - HELD THAT:- Perusal of the assessment order dated 24.03.2011 would indicate that the version of the revisionist has been considered by the assessing authority and he has observed that he himself has examined the bill book upon being produced by the revisionist but the bill book is not having the original bill contained in the bill book. Thus, the said ground is rejected. Incidentally, this finding of the bill book having been examined by the Authority has not been denied anywhere by the revisionist upon filing of either the first appeal or the second appeal.
The learned Tribunal has erroneously observed in the judgment dated 14.12.2012 that sale took place with respect to bill no. 107 dated 01.01.2008 and bill no.121 dated 30.01.2008 of which all three copies are available in the bill book as per the list of sales produced before the Tax Assessing Authority - HELD THAT:- No denial to the said finding has been given by the revisionist while filing the instant revision of the said sales being indicated in the list of sales produced before the Assessing Authority. As such, the said ground is rejected.
No opportunity of hearing has been accorded to the revisionist - HELD THAT:- The said ground is also misconceived considering that the assessment order dated 24.03.2011 has been passed after issuing notice to the revisionist and thereafter the revisionist had ample opportunity while filing the first and second appeal of rebutting the specific finding that had been given by the assessing authority which he himself failed to do - while considering the revision filed by the revisionist and even considering the grounds as raised by the learned counsel for the revisionist, no perversity or illegality emerges and consequently no case for interference is made out.
The instant revision as well as the connected revision is dismissed at the admission stage.
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2024 (3) TMI 845
Maintainability of petition - availability of alternative remedy - Constitutionality of the certain provisions of the Odisha Entry Tax Act, 1999 - HELD THAT:- The pre-deposit made by the appellant during the pendency of the Writ Petition(s) shall continue till the disposal of the Writ Petition(s).
Appeal disposed off.
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2024 (3) TMI 844
Jurisdiction Of Authorities - Imposition of entry tax on Indian Made Foreign Liquor ('IMFL') - not placed item in the schedule to the New Act - replacement of the New Act as earlier Act has been declared ultra virus by the High Court - liability non est in law - HELD THAT:- It is clear that the provisional assessment was done as per the earlier Act of 2000 while final assessment has been done under the New Act. The Appellate Authority while passing the order dated December 31, 2022 has not considered the arguments placed by the petitioner with regard to the absence of goods in question in the schedule. It is to be noted that if the goods in question are not in the schedule of the New Act, the authorities had no jurisdiction whatsoever to impose entry tax on the same. This question is going to the very root of the matter and the authority should have considered and answered the same.
Thus, the orders passed are bereft of any reason with regard to imposition of entry tax on IMFL that is not even an item in the schedule to the New Act.
Thus, impugned orders are unreasoned and have been passed in a non speaking manner. Accordingly, the impugned order dated December 31, 2022 is quashed and set aside. The instant writ petition is allowed.
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2024 (3) TMI 843
Direction to make pre-deposit under section 73(5) of the GVAT Act as a condition to proceed with the matters on merits filed under section 73 of the GVAT Act - HELD THAT:- In case of M/s. Aims Biotech, when the Tribunal was passing the order dated 05.04.2022 without reference to the order passed in M/s. Nirman Life Science, neither the appellant nor learned advocate for the respondents have drawn attention of the Tribunal with regard to the order passed in case of the appellant - Tribunal has also imposed the cost of Rs. 6000/- upon the appellant while passing aforesaid order.
The impugned order passed by the Tribunal is also quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded back to the First Appellate Authority for fresh hearing to determine the pre-deposit as per section 73 of the GVAT Act. First Appellate Authority shall hear both the appeals of M/s. Aims Biotech as well as M/s. Nirman Life Science together within a period of two months from the date of receipt of copy of this order after deposit of the cost of Rs. 6000/- by the assessee in each case.
The appeals are accordingly disposed of.
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2024 (3) TMI 791
Levy of penalty u/s 54(1)(2) of the U.P. VAT Act, 2008 - men-rea on the part of the assessee is an essential pre-requisite condition for imposition of penalty or not - penalty can be imposed upon assessment is made on the basis of Best Judgement Assessment or not - imposition of penalty of 7 times the total tax imposed towards alleged concealed turnover was justified when the express provision of Section 54(1)(2) of the Act provides for imposition of a maximum penalty of 3 times of concealed turnover.
HELD THAT:- A perusal of Section 28(2) of the Act 2008 would indicate that where after examination of books, accounts and other records referred to in Section 28(1) of the Act, 2008 the assessing authority is satisfied about correctness of sale or purchase or both, it may the assess the amount of tax payable by the dealer - A further perusal of Section 28(2) of the Act 2008 indicates that the power of assessment of the amount of tax payable by the dealer on such turnover and for determining the amount of input tax credit admissible to the dealer has been given to the assessing authority and further where the assessing authority is of the opinion that turnover of sale or purchase or both disclosed by the dealer is not worthy of credence it may determine to the best of its judgement the turnover of sale or purchase or both and assess the tax payable on such turnover.
The assessment order dated 30.10.2010 would indicate that the same has been passed considering the provisions of Section 28(2) of the Act, 2008 on the basis of best of its judgement meaning thereby that it is an assessment which has been made by the assessing authority.
The jurisdiction of the assessing authority while taking recourse to the "best judgement assessment" is well settled. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of State of Kerala vs C. Velukutty [1965 (12) TMI 32 - SUPREME COURT], The Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta v. Padamchand Ramgopal [1970 (4) TMI 2 - SUPREME COURT], M/s Joharmal Murlidhar and co. v. Agricultural Income Tax Officer, Assam and others [1970 (8) TMI 5 - SUPREME COURT] and Shri S. M. Hasan, S.T.O. Jhansi and another v. M/s New Gramophone House, Jhansi [1975 (9) TMI 177 - SUPREME COURT], has categorically held that while assessing on the basis of "best judgement" the assessing authority has to make the assessment honestly and on the basis of intelligent well grounded estimate rather than pure surmises i.e. the assessment so made while taking recourse to the "best judgement assessment" should be on reasonable guess based upon the material available before the assessing authority.
The order of penalty passed under Section 54(1)(2) of the Act, 2008 is based on the order of the assessing authority as passed under Section 28(2) of the Act, 2008. The assessment order under Section 28(2) of the Act, 2008 is on the basis of well grounded estimate or reasonable guess as held by Hon'ble Supreme Court meaning thereby that the said order does not indicate the willful attempt to defeat or circumvent the tax law to reduce the tax liability. Once the sine qua non to imposition of penalty is evasion of payment of tax and for evasion there has to be a willful act consequently the Court will have to examine as to whether there has been willful act on the part of the revisionist in evasion of tax.
The revisionist has already paid the tax as assessed after modification by the learned Tribunal vide the order dated 22.06.2016. At no stage is there any finding of any willful evasion of tax by the revisionist or a finding of there being any deliberate attempt on the part of the revisionist in avoiding the payment of tax. It is for the authorities to specifically prove the evasion of payment of tax on the part of the revisionist where the evasion has been defined as a willful attempt i.e. the authorities would have to prove a willful attempt on the part of the revisionist to evade tax. In absence thereto the order imposing penalty on the revisionist based on the assessment order passed under Section 28(2) of 2008 cannot be said to fall within the ambit of any of the eventualities as provided under Section 54(1)(2) of the Act 2008 more particularly it cannot be considered to be an evasion of payment of tax by the dealer / revisionist so as to attract the penalty as has been imposed on the revisionist.
The judgement and order dated 06.04.2021 passed by learned Commercial Tax Tribunal, Lucknow in Second Appeal No. 50 of 2017 is set aside - revision allowed.
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2024 (3) TMI 790
Violation of principles of natural justice or not - petitioner failed to respond to the show cause notice or avail of an opportunity of personal hearing - Validity of assessment order - HELD THAT:- The documents on record include the show cause notice dated 23.02.2023. The said notice offered a personal hearing to the petitioner. Therefore, the respondents cannot be faulted for the petitioner failing to avail of such opportunity. At the same time, it is noticeable that the impugned order does not make reference to the earlier reply issued by the petitioner in February 2020. It is also noticeable that a sum of Rs. 4,55,013.70 was appropriated from the petitioner's bank account in the Punjab National Bank as against the total amount due of Rs. 4,52,341/- under the impugned assessment order. Therefore, at this juncture, revenue interest is fully secured. In these circumstances, the impugned order calls for interference solely with a view to provide an opportunity to the petitioner.
The impugned assessment order is quashed and the matter is remanded for reconsideration. The petitioner is permitted to submit a reply to the show cause notice dated 23.02.2023 within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order - Petition disposed off by way of remand.
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2024 (3) TMI 587
Levy of VAT on royalty on which Service Tax has already been paid - It is the respondent’s contention that the assessment orders dated 29 March, 2019 and 31 March, 2020 could not have been passed by the Assessing officer at Mazgaon jurisdiction and in fact such orders ought to have been passed by the Assessing Officer at the Kalyan jurisdiction - HELD THAT:- Insofar as the period which was spent by the petitioner in pursuing the present proceedings are concerned, which is the period from 11 November, 2022 till the passing of this order, the petitioners would be entitled to avail of the benefit under the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act - Insofar as the period of limitation for filing the statutory appeal is concerned, all contentions of the respondents in regard to any issue of limitation and more particularly on the question that the assessment orders dated 2 March, 2017 and 7 June, 2017 were not served in September, 2022 but earlier thereto, we keep open the contentions of the parties.
Needless to observe that for the period 2010-11, 2011-12 in respect of which assessment orders dated 29 March, 2019 and 31 March, 2020 are sought to be withdrawn, the petitioners would be entitled to file statutory appeal as permissible in law within a period of six weeks from today. If so filed, let the appeals be decided without an objection as to limitation and on merits.
Petition disposed off.
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2024 (3) TMI 487
Levy of interest on late payment of profession tax - requirement to deduct the profession tax from the salaries and wages of the employees - time limit for filing return and payment of profession tax under the Andhra Pradesh Tax on Professions, Trades, Callings and Employments Act, 1987 - interest for delayed payment of tax - HELD THAT:- In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Himachal Techno Engineers [2010 (7) TMI 875 - SUPREME COURT] one of the questions which arose was that “whether the period of three months can be counted as 90 days” while answering, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that, considering Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 and also the definition of ‘month’ as defined in Section 3 (35) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 that the legislature had the choice of describing the periods of time in the same units, that is, to describe the periods as “three months” and “one month” respectively or by describing the periods as “ninety days” and “thirty days” respectively. It did not do so. Therefore, the legislature did not intend that the period of three months used in sub-section (3) to be equated to 90 days, nor intended that the period of thirty days to be taken as one month - The Hon’ble Apex Court clearly held that a ‘month’ does not refer to a period of thirty days, but refers to the actual period of a calendar month.
The present case pertains to the period prior to the amendment in Rule 12 by which a specific date i.e., on or before 10th day of the month succeeding the month for which the return has to be filed, has been specified.
The further submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner based on the amendment in the year 2011 is that it ‘the amendment’, fortifies that there was no date prescribed prior to the amendment and consequently, the same has been specified by way of amendment and consequently, there would be no liability for payment of interest. The said submission also deserves rejection. Even if there was no specified date, as has now been incorporated in Rule 12, it cannot be said that there was no date prescribed for filing return or/and payment of tax - Now in view of the amendment of Rule 12 (1) the said period is ‘on or before 10th day of the month succeeding the month for which the return has to be filed’.
From the aforesaid provisions of Sections 4, 5, 7, 11, 12 of the Act 1987; the Rules 12 unamended (as the present case is prior to amendment), 13, 24 of the Rules 1987 and Form-V, it is evident that the liability for payment of interest on tax is on the assessee, if the assessee does not deduct the tax at the time of payment of salary or wages. Liability would also be if after deducting, the assessee fails to pay the tax as required by or under the Act. Such liability was monthly liability for payment of tax and filing of returns. This liability to pay the interest is in addition to the amount of profession tax if the same was not paid on monthly basis i.e., up to the last date of the succeeding month for which the return had to be filed.
There are no substance in the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no liability to make payment of interest, as there was no time specified for payment of professional tax - the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality.
Petition dismissed.
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2024 (3) TMI 445
Exemption granted on turnovers relating to Bottle breakage charges and Levy of Rental Charges at 5% on bottles and craters - HELD THAT:- When the bottles travels from the manufacturer to wholesaler and the retailer, the active possession of bottles and crates are in the hands of sellers. The Tribunal found fault with the revisional authority analysis that generally all lease transactions will be for a specified period. However, Section 5-E of the Act provides for unspecified period and the appeal was allowed to that extent.
There is no question of law framed by the petitioner for entertaining the Tax Revision Case. An order of remand for re-assessing the factual possession cannot be considered as an erroneous decision on the question of law. As seen from the order of the Tribunal, the Tribunal has not decided on any issue on the question of law. It has fairly considered the issues before it and passed the orders partly allowing the appeal and remanding back to the Revisional Authority.
There is no question of law framed by the petitioner for entertaining the Tax Revision Case. An order of remand for re-assessing the factual possession cannot be considered as an erroneous decision on the question of law. As seen from the order of the Tribunal, the Tribunal has not decided on any issue on the question of law. It has fairly considered the issues before it and passed the orders partly allowing the appeal and remanding back to the Revisional Authority.
The Tax Revision Cases are dismissed.
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2024 (3) TMI 444
Validity of assessment orders in respect of assessment years 2007-08 to 2014-15 - freight not reported and goods sold with under value - petitioner contended that the computation in respect of freight charges in the notice under reply is not based on any material evidence, but entirely based on assumptions and presumptions - Whether proceedings relating to assessment years 2007-08 to 2010-11 are barred by limitation? - HELD THAT:- Under Section 27(1) of the TNVAT Act, the limitation period in respect of escaped assessment is six years from the date of assessment. Section 22(2) deals with deemed assessment. The principal clause prescribes that there will be deemed assessment on the 31st October of the succeeding year to the relevant assessment year - Admittedly, assessment orders were not issued in these cases pursuant to returns being filed. Since the proviso applies to these cases, as regards assessment years 2007-08 to 2010-11, limitation should be computed from 01.07.2012. If so computed, the assessments relating to the above mentioned orders are within the six year period of limitation because re-assessment proceedings were initiated pursuant to notice dated 12.08.2016.
In the impugned assessment orders, the assessing officer has applied a flat rate per consignment based on the State from which the consignments were delivered to the petitioner. For instance, as regards the State of Gujarat, the freight charges per consignment was fixed at Rs. 1,00,000/-. As regards the State of Rajasthan, it was fixed at Rs. 80,000/-. The assessment orders also record the petitioner's contention that about 13 consignments from Gujarat were of the value below Rs. 50,000/- per consignment. Effectively, the freight charges determined by the assessing officer were twice the value of the consignment as regards those 13 consignments. Similarly, the petitioner has pointed out that six consignments were below the value of Rs. 1,00,000/-. Once again, the freight charges determined by the assessing officer is slightly more than the value of consignment as regards these six consignments. These illustrations demonstrate that the assessing officer did not determine the alleged suppressed freight charges on a rational basis. Hence, the assessment orders as regards assessment years 2007-08 to 2013-14 warrant interference.
With regard to this assessment year, the petitioner had filed a rectification petition which was disposed of by order dated 05.06.2020. In the notice dated 12.08.2016, the suppressed turnover with regard to freight was specified as Rs. 89,31,520/-. As against this, in the rectification order, the assessing officer has determined the suppressed freight charges as Rs. 13,17,651/- and computed tax on that basis. It also appears that some additional factors were taken into consideration in the rectification order.
The impugned assessment orders are quashed and these matters are remanded for re-consideration - petition disposed of by way of remand.
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2024 (3) TMI 400
Condonation of delay in filing rectification application - Refusal to entertain the rectification application of the petitioner on the ground that the same was time barred - attachment of bank account - HELD THAT:- It is to be noted that the Supreme Court in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation [2022 (1) TMI 385 - SC ORDER] allowed the limitation to be extended till February 28, 2022.
The petitioner, in the present case, has filed the application on March 11, 2022, that is, only 11 days after the end of the above period. Furthermore, petitioner’s case is that it was not made aware of the order dated March 18, 2017 and it came to know about the said order only on September 14, 2021 when its bank account was attached.
Without going into hyper technicality with regard to period of limitation, this Court keeping in mind the Supreme Court judgment for extension of period of limitation and the fact that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to Section 31 of the VAT Act is of the view that the delay in filing the rectification application should be condoned. In light of the same, the order dated April 6, 2022 passed by the Tribunal is quashed and set aside with a direction upon the Tribunal to hear the rectification application of the petitioner on merit and decide the same within four months from date.
Petition allowed.
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2024 (3) TMI 225
Condonation of delay in filing appeal - sufficient cause for condoning the delay or not - HELD THAT:- The High Court has not been convinced by the reasons stated for seeking condonation of delay and hence has dismissed the appeals on that ground.
The High Court has also considered the case of the appellants on merits and has simply extracted the findings of the Tribunal and has observed that there was no illegality or perversity in the said findings. Without going into the question as to whether the respondent was entitled to exemption under Section 11(1)(i) of Haryana Special Economic Zone Act, 2005 (HSEZ Act) and particularly after the amendment made to the said provision.
These petitions disposed off by observing that the High Court was right in dismissing the applications seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeals and consequently the appeals on that ground only.
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2024 (3) TMI 224
Validity of orders of assessments under the Puducherry Value Added Tax Act, 2007 - challenge on the premise that the same has been completed without even issuing a show cause notice to the petitioner contrary to Section 24 of the Act which provides that no assessment shall be made without the grant of reasonable opportunity and thus a nullity - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- This Court is conscious of the fact that writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not be entertained normally if statutory remedy is available. However, existence of alternate remedy is not an embargo or an absolute bar to exercise power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but a self-imposed restriction and the following circumstances viz., violation of principles of natural justice or lack of jurisdiction or error apparent on the face of the record are some of the exceptions carved out to the rule of alternate remedy for exercise of discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The impugned orders are made in violation of principles of natural justice and thus falls within the exceptions carved out to the rule of alternate remedy for entertaining writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
While this Court is conscious of the fact that though law of limitation does not strictly apply to the writ petitioner, nevertheless Courts would be loathe in permitting writ petitions after inordinate and unexplained delay or laches. Though the same by itself may not be an absolute impediment to exercise judicial discretion and rendering of substantial Justice. From a reading of the extract from the affidavit filed by the petitioner this Court is satisfied with the explanation for the delay in approaching this Court. Importantly, the orders having been made in complete disregard to the mandate contained in Section 24 of the Act, the impugned orders of assessment are a nullity and thus liable to be set aside. The petitioner would treat the impugned orders of assessment as show cause notice and submit its objections within a period of 4 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and the Respondents shall proceed to complete the assessment within a further period of 12 weeks from the date of receipt of objections.
In the event the petitioner fails to submit its objections within the period stipulated herein i.e., 4 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, the orders of assessment will stand restored and it shall be open to the Respondents to proceed in accordance with law.
The writ petition disposed off.
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2024 (3) TMI 223
Rectification of error - assessments deemed to have been completed in terms of Section 22(2) of the TNVAT Act, 2006 as amended vide Act No.23 of 2012 with effect from 19.06.2012 - It is the case of the petitioner that the impugned notices issued seeking to revise the assessment on 04.11.2020 for the respective assessment years were time-barred.
HELD THAT:- Since the monthly returns filed by the petitioner under Section 21 of the TNVAT Act, 2006 read with Rule 7 of the TNVAT Rules, 2007 were incorrect, the respondent was entitled to pass orders dated 24.12.2020 to the best of his judgement after the completion of the year in terms of Section 22 (4) of the TNVAT Act, 2006 - There is no limitation prescribed for passing order under Section 22(4) of the TNVAT Act, 2006. The language adopted in Section 22(4) of the TNVAT Act, 2006 merely indicates that the assessment order has to be passed after the completion of that year. It would imply that such assessment orders have to be passed within the reasonable period.
Assessment orders cannot be passed long after the expiry of the limitation prescribed under Section 27 of the TNVAT Act, 2006, had the petitioner filed proper monthly returns in time with all the particulars as was required for completing the assessment.
The Impugned Assessment Orders dated 24.12.2020 and Impugned Notices dated 20.12.2021 for Assessment Year 2011-2012 and for Assessment Year 2012-2013 challenged in W.P.No.513 of 2022 and W.P.No. 516 of 2022 are liable to be quashed. There is no merits in challenge to Assessment Orders dated 24.12.2020 and Impugned Notices dated 20.12.2021 for the Assessment Year 2013-2014 - Petition disposed off.
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