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Companies Law - High Court - Case Laws
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2020 (2) TMI 1659
Declaration, perpetual injunction and possession - edifice of the suit is constructed on the premise that the suit properties were owned by Kalpita Builders Private Limited and could have been alienated only with the consent of two Directors or the majority of Directors - HELD THAT:- Section 430 is brought into force with effect from 01st June, 2016, vide Notification No. SO 1934(E), dated 01.06.2016. The submission of the plaintiff, that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred, is on the premise that in view of the coming into force of Section 430, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred, since the NCLT is empowered to deal with and decide the issues framed by the trial Court.
It is not even the case of the plaintiff that the Civil Court did not have the jurisdiction to decide the suit. Indeed, the plaintiff invited the Civil Court to decide the legality and validity of the sale deeds executed by Respondent No.1 in favour of Respondents No.2 to 19 and agreement to sell in favour of defendant no.20. The submission is, that the amended provisions of the Act came into force during the pendency of the appeal and, therefore, the appellate Court ceased to have jurisdiction over the matter - the provisions, on which the plaintiff is heavily relying, came into effect from 01.06.2016. Even according to the plaintiff, the Civil Court did have the jurisdiction when the suit came to be decided. If this be so, the fact that Section 430 of the Act has come into effect during the pendency of the appeal, would not necessitate return of the appeal for being presented before the NCLT.
Petition dismissed.
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2020 (2) TMI 1532
Permission to transfer the monies payable to the workmen, to the Provident Fund Commissioner concerned - HELD THAT:- The monies are required by the workmen now. Their need is immediate. Therefore, respondent no. 2 is directed to pursue the matter with HDFC Bank to ascertain the status of the investments as well as to see as to how the same could be statutorily transferred to the Provident Fund Commissioner at the earliest for disbursal to the workmen. Respondent no. 2 shall also follow up with UCO Bank and RBI apropos the amount of ₹ 30 crores alongwith interest accrued. An affidavit of compliance shall be filed by respondent nos. 2 and 3 before the next date.
There is no threat of the eviction of the workmen from their current places of residence. No further orders are required in this regard.
List on 25.03.2020.
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2020 (2) TMI 1529
Demand of differential premium - Execution of lease agreement with the petitioners in respect of subject property - formal/non-formal transfer - whether the Respondents were justified in demanding the payment of 30% Differential Premium when they had decided to transfer the subject property in favour of Petitioner No.1? - HELD THAT:- It is clear that the Corporation was aware that the subject property was transferred from M/s. Lanvin Textile Mills to Petitioner No.2 as Promoter of the Proposed Private Limited Company. In this transfer, the Differential Premium, as demanded, was already paid to the satisfaction of the Corporation.
The Respondents had agreed to transfer the subject property in favour of Petitioner No.2 describing him as Promoter of Proposed Private Limited. As per their directions, Petitioner No.1 Company was formed. Therefore, transferring the plot from the Proposer of a Private Limited Company i.e. from Petitioner No.2 to the incorporated Private Limited Company i.e. Petitioner No.1, would definitely fall within the category of ‘formal transfer’ - The circular dated 12.5.1998 does not mention that the formal transfer can be only between the original allottee and the transferee.
The transfer from Petitioner No.2 to Petitioner No.1 was in the nature of ‘formal transfer’ and hence as per their own circular dated 12.5.1998, the Respondents are not entitled to demand and recover 30% of the Differential Premium. The said amount, arrived at by making adjustment towards the payment already made, amounted to ₹ 27,69,400/- is deposited by the Petitioners in this Court. Therefore, they are entitled to withdraw the same with accrued interest if any.
The Petitioners are permitted to withdraw the amount of ₹ 27,69,400/- deposited in this Court with accrued interest if any - Petition disposed off.
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2020 (2) TMI 1410
Disqualification of Directors - Deactivation of DIN - Striking off the name of the Company from the Register of the Companies - non filing of annual returns for a continuous period of three years - Section 248(1) of the Companies Act 2013 - vires of the proviso under Section 167(2)(a) of the Act which was inserted to the Companies (Amendment Act 2017) - HELD THAT:- Identical issue decided in the case of KHUSHRU DORAB MADAN VERSUS UNION OF INDIA [2020 (1) TMI 1212 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] where it was held that In the present writ petition, the three financial years 2014-2015, 2015-16 and 2016-17 have been completed and since annual returns / financial statements have not been filed, disqualification automatically follows and when disqualification is incurred, deactivation of Director Identification Number also automatically follows. The DIN number can exist only during the life time of post of Directorship and not for the entire life of the individual. Issuing a prior notice would be of no avail and would only be an empty formality since the provision of law is clear on this aspect.
Petition is dismissed.
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2020 (2) TMI 1371
Maintainability of petition - availability of alternate remedy of appeal - It is contended that the learned Judge/Member is sitting in the First Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal and, therefore, he is not able to take up the matters which are listed before the Bench II of the National Company Law Tribunal - HELD THAT:- We do not propose to interfere with the orders of the learned Single Judge on the issue of maintainability. However, we hope and trust that the National Company Law Tribunal would entertain the application and pass orders within a period of two weeks from today, so that the matter can be proceeded ahead.
Appeal disposed off.
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2020 (2) TMI 1369
Non-Banking Company - non-compliance of the provisions of Section 58A(6) of Companies Act - It is the contention of the petitioner that the 1st petitioner Company is exempted under Section 58A(7) of the Companies Act - HELD THAT:- The 1st petitioner Company is a Public Limited Company registered under the Companies Act 1956. The Company was initially incorporated as M/s.Viswpriya Financial Services and Securities Pvt Ltd on 13.05.1991 and later converted to Public Limited Company on 03.09.1997. The 1st petitioner company was at that time managed by the second petitioner. The second petitioner was himself the Chairman and Managing Director and in default, the person responsible for the affairs of the 1st petitioner company.
The 1st petitioner Company was a non-Banking Financial Company at the time of issuance of impugned advertisement and therefore, it would be liable for punishment under 58A(6)(a)(i) and the other petitioners, who are officers are liable under Section 58A(6)(b) of the Companies Act. The trial Court also after considering the entire materials has framed charges for the offence under Section 58A(6)(a)(i) as against the 1st petitioner Company and under Section 58A(6)(b) for the 2nd petitioner. Now, whether the Registrar of Companies can file the complaint for prosecuting the petitioners and whether the allegation against the petitioners falls under Section 58A(2)(b) and punishable under Section 58A(6), are the matters for trial, after recording the evidence - Though the trial Court after taking into consideration framed the charge, the petitioner has not challenged that order but once again filed a petition invoking Section 482 Cr.P.C. This Court in VISWAPRIYA FINANCE SERVICES & SECURITIES LTD. VERSUS REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES [2001 (6) TMI 784 - HIGH COURT OF MADRAS], on the very same issues had already decided that only the trial Court has to consider all the facts from the materials available and whether the petitioner will come under exemption under Section 58A and 58A(2)b and punishable under Section 58A(6) of the act, has to be decided after recording the evidence.
Once this Court has already decided the issues, cannot reopen its own decision.
Since the matter is pending from 2013, the trial Court is directed to complete the trial and dispose of the case in accordance with law within a period of four months from the date of receipt of copy of this order - Petition dismissed.
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2020 (2) TMI 1337
Permission for withdrawal of petition - Maintainability of petition - availability of equally efficacious alternative remedy available of approaching the National Company Law Tribunal - Sections 241, 242 read with Section 430 of the Companies Act, 2013 - HELD THAT:- The petitioner seeks leave to withdraw the petition with liberty to approach the NCLT in terms of Section 244 of the Companies Act, 2013, while also reserving the right to take such remedies as may be available in law, in case NCLT refuses to grant waiver to the petitioner under subsection 244 of the Companies Act, 2013.
The petition is dismissed as withdrawn with liberty as prayed for.
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2020 (2) TMI 1325
Initiation of proceedings u/s 206 (1) of the Companies Act, 1956 - HELD THAT:- This Court is of the considered view that this writ petition can be disposed of directing the respondents to proceed with the enquiry initiated against the petitioner under Section 206(1) of the Act by duly taking into consideration the explanation submitted by the petitioner company and conclude the enquiry as expeditiously as possible, preferably, within a period of six months, from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
Petition disposed off.
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2020 (2) TMI 1131
Winding up process - Dissolution of PRJ Enterprisers Ltd (in liquidation) - discharge of Official Liquidator as its Liquidator - It is submitted that the Official Liquidator is not seized of any other moveable/immoveable property of the company (in Liqn) and there are no recoverable assets in the hands of the Official Liquidator and that no fruitful purpose will be served in continuing the present liquidation proceedings. - HELD THAT:- Reliance placed in the decision of Supreme Court in the case of MEGHAL HOMES (P.) LTD. VERSUS SHREE NIWAS GIRNI KK. SAMITI [2007 (8) TMI 447 - SUPREME COURT] where it was held that When the affairs of the Company had been completely wound up or the court finds that the Official Liquidator cannot proceed with the winding up of the Company for want of funds or for any other reason, the court can make an order dissolving the Company from the date of that order. This puts an end to the winding up process.
The liquidation proceedings deserve to be brought to an end - Application allowed.
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2020 (2) TMI 1080
Oppression and mismanagement - transfer of shares - section 111A of the erstwhile Companies Act, 1956 - HELD THAT:- Though it was argued that the petitioner had become a deemed public limited company, and therefore it was not open to grant of relief under Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956 and only petition under Section 111A of the Companies Act, 1956 ought to have been filed, it is evident that as per sub clause (14) to Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956, company means a private company and includes a private company which had become a public company by virtue of Section 43 A of the said Act. Therefore, the company petition filed by the 1st respondent before the Company Law Board was proper - The erstwhile management of the 2nd respondent company who were the shareholders of the 2nd respondent company had decided to offload the entire share in favour of the appellant and his family which was recorded in a Board Meeting dated 20.4.1992 of the 2nd respondent company under the chairmanship of the 3rd respondent herein.
From a reading of the records of the case it is evident that though the erstwhile Board of Directors of the 2nd respondent company had decided to offload the entire share in the 2nd respondent company in favour of the appellant and his family and that the 3rd respondent was authorised to do all that was necessary to implement the decision taken by the Board of Directors on 20.4.1992, the 1st respondent had failed to cooperate in this regard - It is evident when the 3rd respondent approached with the proposal to offload the shares in favour of the appellant and his family to the 1st respondent when the company was still occupying the 1st respondent’s premises and therefore the 1st respondent did not wish to part with the 500 shares at that time. Thus, he has exercised the rights over the shares. He has also indicated that he was willing to transfer the shares to the appellant if the 3rd respondent agreed to pay the consideration agreed between them.
Under Section 27 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 where any goods are sold by a person who is not owner of the goods and who sells them without authority or without the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods by his conduct can precluded from denying the sellers authority to sell - there is no dispute that the 1st respondent was in Board of the 2nd respondent Company which decided to sell the shares to the appellant and his family members pursuant to the decision taken by the erstwhile Board of directors of the 1st respondent company on 20.4.1992.
The private dispute between the 1st and the 3rd respondent regarding the amount to be paid inter se has remained unsettled. Since the 3rd respondent failed to pay the amount, the 1strespondent has refused to part with 500 shares. Therefore, the transfer of shares to the appellant with the help of duplicate shares cannot be sustained. The 3rd respondent could not transfer 500 shares of the 1st respondent to Shri Girish Chimanlal Parikh. Therefore, the 1st respondent was justified in filing the said company petition before the Company Law Board by the 1st Respondent - there are no reasons to interfere with the impugned order of the Company Law Board. Further, the issue of duplicate shares also accompanied a letter of indemnity from the 3rd respondent to indemnify the 2nd respondent company on account of any adverse orders/consequences arising out of issue of duplicate shares. Therefore, it is for the appellant and the 2nd respondent to work out their remedy against the 3rd respondent.
Appeal dismissed.
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2020 (2) TMI 1079
Auction - Recall of the confirmation of sale of the property - reopening of the sale - rights of the Appellant arising out of the acceptance of its bid for the purchase of the property - HELD THAT:- The Company Court was not justified in passing the impugned order dated 25.07.2019, whereby the bid of ₹ 23 crores of prospective buyer (Respondent No.3) was accepted, thereby setting aside the earlier order dated 06.09.2018, accepting the bid of the Appellant. The Company Court failed to take into consideration that vide the aforesaid order dated 06.09.2018, the OL was directed to hand over the possession of the property once the entire bid amount was paid by the Appellant. On the date of passing of the impugned order dated 25.07.2019, the entire amount stood deposited and the transaction stood concluded. No doubt, the bid of Respondent No.3 would result in realizing an amount of ₹ 1.16 crores (approx.) more for the property in question and that would enure to the benefit of the creditors of the company. At the same time, one cannot lose sight of the fact that the appellant would be entitled to refund of the amount deposited with interest accrued thereon. Thus, the OL would lose the interest on the amount deposited by the Appellant upto 09.04.2019. Moreover, financial gain that may result, cannot be the sole criteria for deviating from the sale process.
There are nothing improper in the conduct of the Appellant. Much has been said about the fact that after having been unsuccessful in the first round, the Appellant had by its conduct waived its objection to the re-bidding of the property. There are no waiver on the part of the Appellant. In the appeal proceedings, the Court found the action to be premature in as much, as, it was observed that the order impugned in the first appeal had only called upon Respondent No.3 to make a bid and therefore the matter had not attained finality.
Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.
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2020 (2) TMI 918
Beneficial interest in the shares held by JFL/Defendant No.3 - subscription of shares on discharge of the obligations arising under agreement - grant of Permanent Injunction restraining Defendant No.2 either himself or through Defendant No.3 from in any manner interfering with the peaceful possession of the Plaintiff in the property - Mandatory Injunction directing Defendant No.3 to submit its declaration under Section 89 of the Companies Act 2013.
HELD THAT:- Section 89 of the 2013 Act, which was not in force on 7th August, 2013 when beneficial interest in favour of plaintiff is claimed to be created in the shares of ATPL held by JFL, is pari materia to Section 187C of the 1956 Act save for a change of language in Section 89(8) from the wording of Section 187C(6). While Section 187C(6) provided consequences of non declaration “under the forgoing provisions” and which I have hereinabove interpreted as including declaration by the company under Section 187C(4), Section 89(8) provides consequences of non-declaration by the beneficial owner only. I have considered, whether on default by company, in this case ATPL, to file return under Section 89(6) and on the plea of the plaintiff of having made a declaration, the plaintiff is entitled to maintain the suit, but am unable to hold so.
The records required to be maintained by a company qua beneficial interest in shares, are public records, open to inspection by all and the conduct of the plaintiff, of inspite of such declaration being not made, keeping quite till now, speaks volumes of natural course of human conduct. The plaintiff had option under Section 59 of the 2013 Act to apply for rectification of register of members, but failed to exercise the said option. The claim of beneficial ownership of shares of ATPL, even otherwise stands on the edifice of beneficial ownership of HRLIPL and which is unsustainable under Section 187C(6).
The right of the plaintiff even if any, as beneficial owner of shares in the name of Samta Khinda in HRLIPL or shares in the name of JFL in ATPL could be only to exercise rights as a shareholder and not otherwise. It is not the plea of the plaintiff that the plaintiff as shareholder exercised any such rights or even made any attempt to exercise such rights. On the contrary this suit is only to retain possession of immovable property of ATPL. The plaintiff, even as beneficial owner of shares of ATPL in name of JFL, is not entitled to hold possession of immovable property of ATPL, unless permitted by resolution of Board of Director of ATPL. Though the plaintiff pleads such resolution but has not filed the same. In any case, this suit is not for declaration of existence of any such resolution of the Board of Directors of ATPL.
I have already hereinabove while describing the documents dated 28th September, 2011 and 7th August, 2013, expressed doubts as to the authenticity thereof. The non-compliance of the statutory provisions which bar the plaintiff from claiming any rights as claimed in the present suit, only confirm the said doubts.
I am therefore unable to find the plaintiff, on the pleaded case, to have a cause of action for the reliefs claimed and rather find the suit as aforesaid to be barred by law - Suit dismissed.
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2020 (2) TMI 639
Dismissal of suit - suit dismissed on the ground that the cause of action of the suit is barred under the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - HELD THAT:- The Code of 2016 deals not only with corporate entities but also with individuals. Therefore, Section 231 of the Code of 2016 takes into account a situation where the proceeding may be pending under the Code of 2016 against an individual also. Section 231 of the Code of 2016 is in Part-5 dealing with miscellaneous matters. Section 231 encompasses both a situation where there is an insolvency proceeding against a corporate entity as also against a person who is not a corporate entity. Section 231 of the Code of 2016 also prescribes a bar on the Civil Courts to assume jurisdiction in respect of any matter in which, the Adjudicating Authority or the Board is empowered by or under the Code of 2016 to pass any order - In view of the provisions of Sections 63 and 231 of the Code of 2016, the instant suit is barred by law.
Suit dismissed.
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2020 (2) TMI 479
Whether respondent No.3-Mr. Himanshu Patwa, director of Nak Engineering Company Private Limited, knowingly and intentionally had sworn false affidavits in Notices of Motion so as to say that respondent No.2-Company was the successor of respondent No.1Firm under Part IX of the Companies Act, 1956 which tantamounts to giving or fabricating false evidence at any stage of judicial proceedings?
HELD THAT:- The answer is in the affirmative for the reasons to follow.
It is quite clear that after having gone through the entire material on record, prima facie opinion can be formed that an inquiry needs to be initiated into an offence/s referred to in clause (b) of sub section (i) of section 195 Cr. P.C. It must be noted that an inquiry contemplated in sub section (i) is not for finding whether the respondents are guilty or not but it is restricted only to the extent as to whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to inquire into the offence which appears to have been committed.
The learned trial Judge has erred not only in fact but also in law to take into consideration the true scope and ambit of Part IX of the Companies Act, 1956 as well as clause (b) of sub section (i) of Section 565 of the said Act by reaching an erroneous conclusion in the impugned order. The impugned order, therefore needs to be quashed and set aside and as such, it stands quashed and set aside.
Thus, there is a prima facie case and deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance. There is an adequate foundation for framing a charge. It is, therefore, expedient in the interest of justice that there should be a complaint - impugned order set aside - appeal allowed.
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2020 (2) TMI 407
Approval of the proposed Scheme of Compromise and Arrangement - Mobilisation of funds - HELD THAT:- When a company is ordered to be wound up, the assets of it are put in possession of the Official Liquidator. The assets become custodia legis. The follow-up, in the absence of a revival of the company, is the realisation of the assets of the company by the Official Liquidator and distribution of the proceeds to the creditors, workers and contributories of the company ultimately resulting in the death of the company by an order under Section 481 of the Act, being passed. But, nothing stands in the way of the Company Court, before the ultimate step is taken or before the assets are disposed of, to accept a scheme or proposal for revival of the Company. In that context, the court has necessarily to see whether the scheme contemplates revival of the business of the company, makes provisions for paying off creditors or for satisfying their claims as agreed to by them and for meeting the liability of the workers in terms of Section 529 and Section 529A of the Act. Of course, the court has to see to the bona fides of the scheme and to ensure that what is put forward is not a ruse to dispose of the assets of the company in liquidation.
In the present case, the Scheme as a whole is just, fair and reasonable. There is no violation of any statutory provisions. It is in the interest of justice that the Scheme is approved subject to supervision of this court through a retired Judge of this Court.
The scheme is approved - application allowed.
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2020 (2) TMI 406
Bail application - investigation by SFIO - Section 212 (6)(ii) of the Companies Act, 2013 - HELD THAT:- The present bail application has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and keeping in mind the proposition of law that economic offences constitute a class part and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail and since these kind of offences cause irreparable harm to the economic system and, therefore, required to be considered seriously.
Perusal of Section 212 (7) of the Companies Act, 2013 reveals that limitation on granting bail is in addition to the Limitation provided under Section 439 Cr.P.C. This court has now to decide the bail application in the light of the provisions of bail enunciated in the Companies Act as well as Cr.P.C. This court has, thus, to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that petitioner is not guilty of the offences alleged against him and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. It is a settled law that at the time of consideration of bail application, it is neither necessary nor desirable to weigh the evidence meticulously to arrive at a positive finding as to whether or not the accused has committed offence. What is to be seen is whether there is reasonable ground for believing that accused is not guilty of the offence(s) he is charged with.
There are serious allegations against the petitioner regarding manipulation and fabrication of financial documents by way of which, the fund was siphoned off to other companies and therefore, it cannot be held that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that accused is not guilty of the offences alleged against him - in view of the allegations appearing on record and active participation of the petitioner in alleged commission of the offence i.e. in fabrication of documents in opening LCs and discounting of the same, manipulation of accounts and siphoning of the funds worth several crores and keeping in mind the fact that all fraudulent activities were allegedly planned in advance and executed carefully and with deliberate design and further taking overall view of the matter, it is difficult to hold that petitioner will not commit any offence under the Act while on bail.
On the basis of allegations appearing on record, it cannot be held that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty of the offences alleged against him and that he is not likely to commit any offence under the Act while on bail and thus, twin conditions for grant of bail as envisaged under Section 212(6) (ii) are not satisfied.
This court is of the opinion that offences alleged against the petitioner are serious in nature which involve fraud to the tune of several crores and the offence being an economic one which affects the economy of the nation, the petitioner is not entitled for bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C. - Petition dismissed - decided against petitioner.
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2020 (2) TMI 401
Quashing of FIR - allegation is that the accused persons have with an intention and conspiracy planned to cheat the people and after opening branch offices and collecting money from the customers they have fled away with some of ₹ 5 Crores approximately - HELD THAT:- Matter referred to the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court for consideration:
Whether sub-section (2) of Section 50 of the Bihar Self Supporting Co-operative Societies Act, 1996 may be interpreted to mean and understand that the words “other legal proceedings” occurring thereunder create a bar in lodgment of a first information report against the co-operative society registered under the said Act, its Director(s), Officer(s), Manager(s) or a member of the society and that it would also cover “the criminal proceeding” against them?
Let the records be placed before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for referring the aforesaid questions to the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court.
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2020 (2) TMI 300
Maintainability of petition - alternate equally efficacious remedy of filing an appeal - sections 32 and 61 of the IBC - HELD THAT:- In the present case, to consider the grievance of the petitioners that the impugned order is a nullity and the contra version that it is not a nullity, but at best vitiated by a irregularity, we would be required to go through the facts in detail. On the records being summoned and perused by us, we realised that there is indeed a serious factual dispute. A Writ Court would ordinarily abstain from going into and deciding such disputes, when parties are not prejudiced and the law provides for an appeal. In IBC, the (NCLAT) Appellate Authority is empowered to consider and decide all questions of fact and law. No general rule can be said to be laid down in the judgments brought to our notice. We do not think that we should, therefore, entertain the present petition.
The preliminary objection raised to the maintainability of the Writ Petition and proceed to dismiss it on the ground that the petitioners have alternate and equally efficacious remedy of filing on Appeal to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal and in that appeal, it can raise all grounds, including the one raised in the Memo of the present petition.
The original record and proceedings be returned by the Registry to the advocate appearing for the Union of India.
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2020 (2) TMI 295
Winding up of company - inability to pay the admitted debts - HELD THAT:- The law regarding scope and ambit of the Company Court whhile exercising jurisdiction under Section 433(e)(f), 434 and 439 of the Companies Act has been summed up by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of IBA HEALTH (I) (P.) LTD. VERSUS INFO-DRIVE SYSTEMS SDN. BHD. [2010 (9) TMI 229 - SUPREME COURT], wherein it has been held that where there is a substantial dispute as to the liability and obligation, petition for winding up should not be entertained. It was observed that, a dispute to be substantial and genuine, has to be bona fide and not spurious.
The issue raised in this petition pertains to the liability of the respondent company and not the inter se liability of the two groups over their right on the shares of the respondent company. The respondent company is a legal entity and an existing company within the meaning of Companies Act, 1956. The claim in this petition is against the respondent company and not the DCBL group or the BW group, as the case could be - the respondent company cannot deny its liability to pay the dues of the petitioner firm by seeking refuge under clause 14.15.1 of the agreement dated 16/01/2012.
Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly the fact that there is an ongoing dispute between the DCBL and the BW Group pertaining to the implementation of share holders agreement, the respondent company is granted 60 (sixty) days’ time, with effect from the date of this order, to discharge its admitted debt by paying the amount of ₹ 1,77,03,540.68 to the writ petitioner - It is made clear that in the event of failure on the part of the respondent company to make full and final payment of ₹ 1,77,03,540.68 to the writ petitioner within the time frame provided by this Court, necessary order as per law shall be issued for advertising the petition.
Let this petition be listed again, after 60(sixty) days, for necessary orders.
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