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2013 (7) TMI 1224
... ... ... ... ..... the investigation was tainted and the prosecution insupportable. 63. Applying the above ratio in Pala Singh to the case on hand, while pointing out the delay in the forwarding of the FIR to the Magistrate, no prejudice was said to have been caused to the Appellants by virtue of the said delay. As far as the commencement of the investigation is concerned, our earlier detailed discussion discloses that there was no dearth in that aspect. In such circumstances we do not find any infirmity in the case of the prosecution on that score. In fact the above decision was subsequently followed in Sarwan Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, Anil Rai v. State of Bihar and Aqeel Ahmad v. State of U.P. 31. Having regard to our above conclusions, we do not find any merit in these appeals. The appeals fail and the same are dismissed. 32. The Appellants are on bail. The bail bonds stand cancelled and they shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the remaining part of sentence, if any.
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2013 (7) TMI 1222
... ... ... ... ..... , who never moved before any court of law and had to retire on attaining the age of superannuation, they shall not be entitled for arrears of salary. However, in view of Regulation 31 they will deem to have continued in service up to the age of 60 years. In their case, the Appellants shall treat the age of superannuation at 60 years, fix the pay accordingly and re-fix the retirement benefits like pension, gratuity etc. On such calculation, they shall be entitled for arrears of retirement benefits after adjusting the amount already paid. (c) The arrears of salary and arrears of retirement benefits should be paid to such employees within four months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. 39. The judgment passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench dated 29th July, 2010 and other impugned judgments stand modified to the extent above. The appeals are disposed of with aforesaid observation and directions. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2013 (7) TMI 1218
... ... ... ... ..... id not look into all these aspects and mandated the appellate authority to pass orders imposing a specific penalty only. This direction of the High Court is, accordingly, set aside and the matter is remitted back to the appellate authority to take a decision imposing appropriate penalty on the Respondents herein. We are confident that the mitigating circumstances pointed out by the Respondents herein would be given due consideration by the appellate authority, keeping in view the ratio of Rajendra Yadav's case as well. It would be open to the Respondents herein to make representation in this behalf to the appellate authority on the basis of which the Respondents want to contend that they should be given same treatment as meted out to other three employees. Such a representation will be given 15 days from today. Appellate Authority shall pass appropriate orders deciding the appeals afresh within 2 months from today. 19. Appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms. No costs.
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2013 (7) TMI 1217
... ... ... ... ..... of the Division Bench in relying upon Balbir Singh s case for enhancing the value, we only modify the rate fixed by the Division Bench to a sum of Rs.50,000/- per bigha instead of Rs.42,000/- per bigha. With the modification only in respect to the rate per bigha, in all other respects the Division Bench decision deserves to be confirmed. We however, do not find any merit in the claim of the appellants for claiming any further enhancement beyond the sum of Rs.50,000/- per bigha, in as much as there was absolutely no legally acceptable material in support of any such claim. 16. The appeals stand partly allowed by enhancing the compensation from Rs.42,000/- per bigha as determined by the Division Bench of the High Court to a sum of Rs.50,000/- per bigha, in respect of both categories of land. With the above modification in the rate of land value, the appeals stand partly allowed. Needless to add that appellants would be entitled for consequential benefits as per the law, if any.
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2013 (7) TMI 1214
... ... ... ... ..... t, where a sum of Rs. 9,968.49/- was available. Both put together a sum of Rs. 20,887.93/- was available and therefore, even after the purchase of the third item of the suit schedule property, the first Respondent had a further sum available with him. The trial Court has also noted that except the ipse dixit of D.W.2 and 3 that a sum of Rs. 10,000/- was paid to the first Respondent by way of gift at the time of marriage of the first Respondent with his daughter, there was no other evidence to support and provide credence to the said version. Unfortunately, the Division Bench of the High Court completely omitted to examine the above material piece of evidence, which was considered in detail by the trial Court, while decreeing the suit. 41. In the light of our above conclusions, the judgment of the Division Bench cannot be sustained. The appeal stands allowed and the judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court shall stand restored.
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2013 (7) TMI 1213
... ... ... ... ..... ution failed to explain the grievous injuries found on the person of Gobardhan and Munshi - Accused herein. 10. This Court has laid down sufficient guidelines for interference by the superior court against the order of acquittal. In exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances to interfere and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the Accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. 11. We have considered and examined the matter most minutely. Applying the parameters of interference against the order of acquittal, we are of the considered opinion that no interference is called for. This appeal lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2013 (7) TMI 1212
... ... ... ... ..... lable warrants having been withdrawn, the Petitioner shall personally escort Respondent No. 7 and Anand from India to the USA. 32. With these observations, the judgment of the High Court is upheld and the Criminal Appeals No. 934-936 of 2013 @ SLP (Crl.) Nos. 10606-10608 of 2010 are hereby dismissed. 33. Before parting with this order, we may also notice here that the Respondent (husband) filed a Criminal Appeal No. 937 of 2013 @ SLP (Crl.) No. 3335 of 2012, challenging the order dated 23rd December, 2011 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. As noticed earlier, the aforesaid order was passed in the criminal petition filed by the Respondent husband, seeking quashing of the criminal complaint filed by the Appellant/wife against the Respondent himself and his parents under Sections 498-A, 506 of Indian Penal Code and Sections 4 & 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Since no arguments were advanced in the aforesaid matter, let this appeal be listed for arguments separately.
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2013 (7) TMI 1206
... ... ... ... ..... after his birth defendant no. 2 could have alienated the property only as Karta for legal necessity. It is nobody’s case that defendant no. 2 executed the sale deeds and release deed as Karta for any legal necessity. Hence, the sale deeds and the release deed executed by Gulab Singh to the extent of entire coparcenary property are illegal, null and void. However, in respect of the property which would have fallen in the share of Gulab Singh at the time of execution of sale-deeds and release deed, the parties can work out their remedies in appropriate proceeding. In view of what we have observed above, the view taken by the lower appellate court as affirmed by the High Court is erroneous in law. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court as affirmed by the High Court and restore that of the trial court with the liberty aforementioned. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2013 (7) TMI 1192
... ... ... ... ..... ut it was recorded in full. Mr. Sanjanwala, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents, on the other hand, submits that the law laid down in Nitinbhai Saevatilal Shah and Anr. v. Manubhai Manjibhai Panchal and Anr. (AIR 2011 SC 3076) (supra) be followed. 4. We have perused the notes of evidence which are produced on record. They clearly show that the evidence in this case was recorded in full and not in a summary manner. That being so, we cannot but accept the sub-mission of Mr. Ahmadi. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we allow this appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court and direct the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mehsana, to proceed hereafter from the stage where it is pending now. As far as the application of the Respondents for adding some other person to the complaint is concerned, we are not inclined to accept that. It is for the complainant to decide as to against which party it wants to proceed. That application will stand rejected.
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2013 (7) TMI 1191
... ... ... ... ..... employees, officers, representatives of people and other high dignitaries continue to stay in the residential accommodation provided by the Government of India though they are no longer entitled to such accommodation. Many of such persons continue to occupy residential accommodation commensurate with the office(s) held by them earlier and which are beyond their present entitlement. The unauthorized occupants must recollect that rights and duties are correlative as the rights of one person entail the duties of another person similarly the duty of one person entails the rights of another person. Observing this, the unauthorized occupants must appreciate that their act of overstaying in the premise directly infringes the right of another. No law or directions can entirely control this act of disobedience but for the self realization among the unauthorized occupants. The matter is disposed of with the above terms and no order is required in I. As for impleadment and intervention.
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2013 (7) TMI 1181
Conflict of opinion in the decisions of two Two-Judge Benches and Three-Judge Bench - Powers of the Session Court u/s 209 of Crpc - Court of original jurisdiction - issue of summons u/s 193 - committal order passed by the learned Magistrate - This matter was initially directed to be heard by a Bench of Three-Judges in view of the conflict of opinion in the decisions of two Two-Judge Benches, When the matter was taken up for consideration by the Three-Judge Bench, it was brought to the notice of the court that two other decisions had a direct bearing on the question sought to be determined. Ranjit Singh's case disapproved the observations made in Kishun Singh's case, which was to the effect that the Session Court has power under Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Code to take cognizance of an offence and summon other persons whose complicity in the commission of the trial could prima facie be gathered from the materials available on record. According to the decision in Kishun Singh's case, the Session Court has such power under Section 193 of the Code. On the other hand, in Ranjit Singh's case, it was held that from the stage of committal till the Session Court reached the stage indicated in Section 230 of the Code, that Court could deal only with the accused referred to in Section 209 of the Code and there is no intermediary stage till then enabling the Session Court to add any other person to the array of the accused.
HELD THAT:- the Session Courts has jurisdiction on committal of a case to it, to take cognizance of the offences of the persons not named as offenders but whose complicity in the case would be evident from the materials available on record. Hence, even without recording evidence, upon committal under Section 209, the Session Judge may summon those persons shown in column 2 of the police report to stand trial along with those already named therein. Consequent upon our aforesaid decision, the view taken by the Referring Court is accepted and it is held that the decision in the case of Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar [1993 (1) TMI 304 - SUPREME COURT] and not the decision in Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab [1998 (9) TMI 696 - SUPREME COURT]and lays down the law correctly in respect of the powers of the Session Court after committal of the case to it by the learned Magistrate under Section 209 Crpc.
The matter is remitted to the Three-Judge Bench to dispose of the pending Criminal Appeals in accordance with the views expressed by the court in this judgment.
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2013 (7) TMI 1178
Whether the Respondent turned hostile under coercion of accused person, can seek an application for re- examination U/s 313 Crpc after five months of his examination in trial court - The trial Court disallowed the applications of the Respondents filed u/s 311 of the Crpc, to re-examine PW-9, the informant. The High Court directed the trial Court to allow the 2nd Respondent to examine himself as a witness on a specified date by its order dated 9.12.2010. HELD THAT:- The appeal, therefore, succeeds. The order impugned dated 9.12.2010, passed by the High Court is set aside. The order of the trial Court stands restored. The trial Court shall proceed with the trial. The stay granted by this Court in the order dated 7.3.2011, stands vacated. The trial Court shall proceed with the trial from the stage it was left and conclude the same expeditiously, preferably within three months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.
The permission of the Court u/s 311 Code of Crpc for his re-examination by merely alleging that on the earlier occasion he turned hostile under coercion and threat meted out to him at the instance of the Appellant and other accused. It was quite apparent that the complaint, which emanated at the instance of the Appellant based on the subsequent incident, which resulted in the registration of the FIR, seem to have weighed with the second Respondent to come forward with the present application u/s 311 Crpc, by way of an afterthought. If really there was a threat to his life at the instance of the Appellant and the other accused, as rightly noted by the Court below, it was not known as to why there was no immediate reference to such coercion and undue influence meted out against him at the instance of the Appellant, when he had every opportunity to mention the same to the learned trial Judge or to the police officers or to any prosecution agency.
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2013 (7) TMI 1172
... ... ... ... ..... there is anything repugnant in the subject or context so as to come to the conclusion that the plural will not include the singular. We have examined the use of the plural word "persons" from that angle and we do not find that there is anything repugnant in the subject or context so that it may not be read as singular. It is worth mentioning here that Sub-section (b) of Section 43A(1) of the Act has also used the plural expression "leases" and if we accept the reasoning of the High Court, the aforesaid provision shall cover only such cases where there is more than one lease. This, in our opinion, will defeat the very purpose of the Act. 12. Thus, the impugned judgment of the High Court is vulnerable on both the counts and, hence, cannot be sustained. 13. In the result, the appeal is allowed, impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the Tribunal is restored. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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2013 (7) TMI 1170
... ... ... ... ..... ve petition does not mean that this Court has affirmed the judgment or the action impugned therein. The order rejecting the special leave petition at the threshold without detailed reasons does not constitute any declaration of law or a binding precedent. This submission is, therefore, rejected. 31. In the ultimate analysis, we are of the view that the opinion formed by the Screening Committee in both these cases which is endorsed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Recruitment), Delhi, that both the Respondents are not suitable for being appointed in the Delhi Police Force does not merit any interference. It is legally sustainable. The Tribunal and the High Court, in our view, erred in setting aside the order of cancellation of the Respondents' candidature. In the circumstances, the appeals are allowed. The orders of the Delhi High Court impugned in both the appeals are set aside. The cancellation of candidature of the Respondents-Mehar Singh and Shani Kumar is upheld.
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2013 (7) TMI 1169
... ... ... ... ..... 2007 SC 1721. 12. Dr. Nirmal Kumar Gupta (PW.18), deposed that 100% burnt patient can also be in a fit mental and physical condition to give statement. Dr. V.K. Deewan (PW.14), who performed the postmortem of deceased Guddi, deposed that she was completely burnt and the burn injuries were anti-mortem. She had died due to Asphyxia, due to burn injuries, her death was homicidal. In view thereof, both the courts below were of the considered opinion that the Appellant was responsible for causing the death of Guddi, deceased. 13. The defence taken by the Appellant that she had gone out of her house to provide water to the buffalo has been disbelieved by the Court. As the incident occurred in the house of the Appellant, and she was present therein at the relevant time, she could have furnished the explanation as to how and under what circumstances Guddi died. The matter was within her special knowledge. 14. In view of the above, the appeal lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.
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2013 (7) TMI 1165
... ... ... ... ..... For all these reasons, we are of the opinion that both the husband and wife are domicile of India and, hence, shall be covered by the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. As on fact, we have found that both the husband and wife are domicile of India, and the Act will apply to them, other contentions raised on behalf of the parties, are rendered academic and we refrain ourselves to answer those. 29. In the result, we do not find any merit in the appeal and it is dismissed accordingly but without any order as to costs. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 487 OF 2007 30. In view of our decision in Civil Appeal No. 4629 of 2005 (Sondur Gopal v. Sondur Rajini) holding that the petition filed by the Appellant for judicial separation and custody of the children is maintainable, we are of the opinion that the writ petition filed by the Respondent for somewhat similar relief is rendered infructuous. On this ground alone, we allow this appeal and dismiss the writ petition filed by the Respondent.
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2013 (7) TMI 1162
... ... ... ... ..... ding availability of the original record or other evidence before the Investigating Agency shows that the delay caused due to inaction on the part of the Respondent. Therefore, in our view, keeping investigation pending for further period will be futile as the Respondent including Directorate for the State Literacy Programme is not sure whether original records can be procured for investigation and to bring home the charges. Considering the fact that delay in the present case is caused by the Respondent, the constitutional guarantee of a speedy investigation and trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is thereby violated and as the Appellant has already been exonerated in the departmental proceedings for identical charges, keeping the case pending against the Appellant for investigation, is unwarranted, the FIR deserves to be quashed. 34. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the FIR No. 10/2000 lodged in Police Station, Dausa as against the Appellant is hereby quashed.
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2013 (7) TMI 1155
... ... ... ... ..... ss-examination has made it clear that in spite of his best persuasion, none of them were willing to become a witness. Therefore, he could not examine any independent witness. Section 114 of the Act 1872 gives rise to the presumption that every official act done by the police was regularly performed and such presumption requires rebuttal. The legal maxim omnia praesumuntur rite it dowee probetur in contrarium solenniter esse acta i.e., all the acts are presumed to have been done rightly and regularly, applies. When acts are of official nature and went through the process of scrutiny by official persons, a presumption arises that the said acts have regularly been performed. In view of the above, the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants in this regard, are held to be without any substance. 30. In view of the above, the appeal does not present special features warranting any interference by this court. Appeal is devoid of any merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2013 (7) TMI 1137
... ... ... ... ..... d by the parties under Section 54 of the Act as also the cross objections. The parties shall be free to urge all points in support of their respective cause and the High Court shall decide the matter uninfluenced by the observations contained in this judgment. 36. Maruti Udyog Limited shall be free to file an appropriate application before the High Court for its impleadment or grant of leave to act as intervener in the appeals filed by the parties. If such an application is filed, the same shall be decided on its own merits. 37. The State Government/HSIIDC shall pay the balance of compensation determined by the High Court, i.e., ₹ 37,40,000 - ₹ 28,15,356 ₹ 9,24,644 per acre to the landowners and/or their legal representatives along with all statutory benefits within a period of four months from today. The payment shall be made to the landowners and/or their legal representatives by following the procedure laid down in the interim orders passed by this Court.
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2013 (7) TMI 1133
... ... ... ... ..... Superintendent of Post Office was delivered on 22.5.2012 then we have no option but to hold that the notice issued by the office of Respondent No. 1 was delivered to the addressee on 22.5.2012, i.e., one day after the date fixed for hearing. 19. As a corollary to the above findings, it must be held that order dated 12.6.2012 passed by Respondent No. 1 is vitiated due to violation of the rule of audi alteram partem and is liable to be set aside. 20. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order as also order dated 12.6.2012 passed by Respondent No. 1 are set aside and the matter is remitted to Respondent No. 1 for fresh disposal of the application filed by Respondent No. 3 for grant of certificate for unilateral execution of conveyance. Respondent No. 1 shall make an endeavour to decide the application of Respondent No. 3 within a period of three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this judgment without being influenced by order dated 12.6.2012.
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