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2020 (8) TMI 909
Robery and attempt to murder - Recovery of prohibited buttondar knife from the appellant and his co-accused - conviction under Section 394 of IPC - HELD THAT:- Mere production of photocopy of an OPD card and statement of mother on affidavit have little, if any, evidentiary value. In order to successfully claim defence of mental unsoundness under Section 84 of IPC, the accused must show by preponderance of probabilities that he/she suffered from a serious-enough mental disease or infirmity which would affect the individual’s ability to distinguish right from wrong - Further, it must be established that the accused was afflicted by such disability particularly at the time of the crime and that but for such impairment, the crime would not have been committed. The reasons given by the High Court for disbelieving these defences are thus well reasoned and unimpeachable.
Regardless thereto and given the ingrained principles of our criminal law jurisprudence which mandates that substantive justice triumph limitations of procedure, this Court on 22.07.2020 tried to enquire into the mental health of the appellant, by requesting the learned Additional Solicitor General to get the appellant mentally examined. However, notwithstanding such efforts, the appellant who had been granted bail by this Court earlier, is untraceable.
Given such inability of the appellant to establish juvenility or insanity, raise any doubt regarding guilt; and considering the detailed reasons accorded by the High Court, the reliable testimony of twelve witnesses as well as the leniency shown in sentencing, there are no reasons to interfere with the impugned order(s) - appeal dismissed.
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2020 (8) TMI 883
Seeking for issue of Writ of Mandamus - initiation of action with regard to the destruction of residential building and other properties of Accused-Vikas Dubey and to safeguard the life of the Accused - conflict of interest - HELD THAT:- The entire basis for making the allegations as contained in the miscellaneous petition is an Article relied on by the Petitioner said to have been published in the newspaper. There is no other material on record to confirm the truth or otherwise of the statement made in the newspaper. In our view this Court will have to be very circumspect while accepting such contentions based only on certain newspaper reports. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly held that the newspaper item without any further proof is of no evidentiary value. The said principle laid down has thereafter been taken note in several public interest litigations to reject the allegations contained in the petition supported by newspaper report.
In the case on hand, the Petitioner is a lawyer by profession who practices in Mumbai and has come up by way of Public Interest Litigation. Therefore, the allegations of bias made by him against the members of the Commission merely on the basis of newspaper reports and nothing more, are liable to be rejected outright.
The Petitioner herein is an advocate who practices law in Mumbai, Maharashtra and is in no way connected to the incident in question which took place in U.P. However, the petition filed by him in public interest was accepted and the Commission of Inquiry consisting of persons who had held high position has been constituted. The enquiry held would be in public domain and the Petitioner has already been granted the liberty of participating therein. The report of the enquiry is ordered to be filed in the petitions which were filed before this Court. Therefore, there would be sufficient safeguard to the manner in which the inquiry would be held - the Petitioner has been raising unnecessary apprehensions and repeated applications are being filed which in fact is hampering the process of inquiry.
The instant petition/application is without any merit and the same is accordingly dismissed.
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2020 (8) TMI 866
Decree of recovery of possession of the suit premises - Refusal of relief of possession especially when the Lower Appellate Court granted relief of mesne profits till delivery of possession - entitlement to a declaration in respect of half of the suit property overlooking the pleadings and the documents of title - substantial question of law or not - burden of proof - HELD THAT:- To be “substantial”, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way - To be a question of law “involved in the case”, there must be first, a foundation for it laid in the pleadings, and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact, arrived at by Courts of facts, and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case.
Where no such question of law, nor even a mixed question of law and fact was urged before the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court, as in this case, a second appeal cannot be entertained - Whether a question of law is a substantial one and whether such question is involved in the case or not, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The paramount overall consideration is the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and the impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.
The First Appellate Court examined the evidence on record at length, and arrived at a reasoned conclusion, that the Appellant-Defendant was owner of a part of the suit premises and the Respondent-Plaintiff was owner of the other part of the suit premises. This finding is based on cogent and binding documents of title, including the registered deeds of conveyance by which the respective predecessors-in-interest of the Appellant-Defendant and Respondent-Plaintiff had acquired title over the suit premises. There was no erroneous inference from any proved fact. Nor had the burden of proof erroneously been shifted.
The second question of law, that is, the question of whether the First Appellate Court was right in holding that the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration of title in respect of half of the suit property, has, as observed above, been decided in favour of the Respondent Plaintiff, based on pleadings and evidence. The conclusion of the First Appellate Court, of the entitlement of the Respondent Plaintiff to a declaration in respect of his half share in the suit property does not warrant interference in a second appeal - The first question framed by the High Court, that is, the question of whether the Lower Court /Appellate Court was right in refusing the Respondent Plaintiff relief of possession, when the Appellate Court had granted mesne profits to the Respondent Plaintiff, is based on the erroneous factual premises that the First Appellate Court had granted mesne profits to the Respondent Plaintiff, which the First Appellate Court had not done.
The High Court erred in law in proceeding to allow possession to the Respondent-Plaintiff on the ground that the Appellant-Defendant had not taken the defence of adverse possession, ignoring the well established principle that the Plaintiff’s claim to reliefs is to be decided on the strength of the Plaintiff’s case and not the weakness, if any, in the opponent’s case - the Appellant-Defendant claimed the right of ownership of the suit property on the basis of a deed of conveyance, executed over 75 years ago. The Appellant- Defendant has claimed continuous possession since the year 1966 on the strength of a deed of release executed by his father. In other words, the Appellant-Defendant has claimed to be in possession of the suit premises, as owner, for almost 28 years prior to the institution of suit.
When no substantial question of law is formulated, but a Second Appeal is decided by the High Court, the judgment of the High Court is vitiated in law.
The judgment and order of the High Court under appeal is set aside - Appeal allowed.
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2020 (8) TMI 863
Interpretation of law - admission and continuation in postgraduate medical degree courses - HELD THAT:- It is directed that the doctors who are already undergoing the postgraduate degree courses on the basis of being successful in the original writ petition filed in the High Court at Calcutta shall not be disturbed from pursuing the said course. The same direction shall also cover successful medical students who have already undertaken admission in postgraduate medical degree courses following the applicable admission process and are pursuing their postgraduate studies in the States of Gujarat, Haryana, Kerala, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu.
Application disposed off.
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2020 (8) TMI 858
Arbitration proceedings - Foreign Final Award - the extent to which HSBC could be said to have a strong prima facie case in the enforcement proceedings Under Section 48 which are pending before the Bombay High Court? - whether irreparable prejudice would be caused to HSBC if protective orders were not issued in its favour, and generally, whether the balance of convenience tilts in its favour and to what extent?
HELD THAT:- Where arbitral proceedings are ongoing, such proceedings become invalid the moment legal proceedings upon the whole of the subject matter of the reference have been commenced between all the parties to the reference and a notice thereof has been given to the arbitrators or umpire. As against this, Sections 5, 8 and 16 of the 1996 Act reflect a completely new approach to arbitration, which is that when a judicial authority is shown an arbitration Clause in an agreement, it is mandatory for the authority to refer parties to arbitration bearing in mind the fact that the arbitration Clause is an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract and that, therefore, a decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void does not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.
There can be no doubt whatsoever after reading the issues and some of the material findings in the Foreign Final Award that the issues raised and answered are the subject matter of civil as opposed to criminal proceedings. The fact that a separate criminal proceeding was sought to be started and may have failed is of no consequence whatsoever - a reading of the Foreign Final Award in this case would show that a strong prima facie case has indeed been made out as the Award holds the BBC transaction as a basis on which the contract was entered into and the USD 60 million paid by HSBC, which would clearly fall within fraudulent inducement to enter into a contract Under Section 17 of the Contract Act. Such a contract would be voidable at the instance of HSBC. Also, the findings on the siphoning off of monies that were meant to be allocated for the performance of the BBC contract would attract the tort of deceit. The measure of damages for such fraudulent misrepresentation is not the difference between the value of the shares on the date of making the contract and the value HSBC would have received, if it had resold those shares in the market, after the purchase.
The matter is remanded to the ADJ, Mohali for fresh disposal in accordance with law.
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2020 (8) TMI 852
Entitlement to compensation in excess of what was stipulated in the Apartment Buyers Agreement - delay in handing over the possession of the residential flats - Reimbursement of taxes and interest charged to the flat purchasers - Deficiency in providing amenities - Levy of electricity charges by the developer - Failure to construct the club house - whether the flat buyers are constrained by the stipulation contained in Clause 14 of ABA providing compensation for delay at the rate of ₹ 5 per square feet per month?
HELD THAT:- The flat purchasers invested hard earned money. It is only reasonable to presume that the next logical step is for the purchaser to perfect the title to the premises which have been allotted under the terms of the ABA. But the submission of the developer is that the purchaser forsakes the remedy before the consumer forum by seeking a Deed of Conveyance. To accept such a construction would lead to an absurd consequence of requiring the purchaser either to abandon a just claim as a condition for obtaining the conveyance or to indefinitely delay the execution of the Deed of Conveyance pending protracted consumer litigation.
The developer in the present case has undertaken to provide a service in the nature of developing residential flats with certain amenities and remains amenable to the jurisdiction of the Consumer Fora. Consequently, we are unable to subscribe to the view of the NCDRC that flat purchasers who obtained possession or executed Deeds of Conveyance have lost their right to make a claim for compensation for the delayed handing over of the flats.
Club House - HELD THAT:- Since permission of BDA has still not been received legal action is contemplated again. The developer has produced photographs depicting the amenities which have been provided within the precincts of the club house. Membership fees for the club are stated to have been received in the account of the RWA and not in the account of the developer. The position which has been stated before the court has not been disputed by counsel for the Appellants. Hence, it is found that there has been no breach by the developer of the obligation to provide a constructed facility of a club for the RWA.
Other Amenities - HELD THAT:- A flat purchaser who invests in a flat does so on an assessment of its potential. The amenities which the builder has committed to provide impinge on the quality of life for the families of purchasers and the potential for appreciation in the value of the flat. The representation held out by the developer cannot be dismissed as chaff. True, in a situation such as the present it may be difficult for the court to quantify the exact nature of the compensation that should be provided to the flat buyers. The general appreciation in land values results in an increase in the value of the investment made by the buyers. Difficulties in determining the measure of compensation cannot however dilute the liability to pay. A developer who has breached a clear representation which has been made to the buyers of the amenities which will be provided to them should be held accountable to the process of law. To allow the developer to escape their obligation would put a premium on false assurances and representations made to the flat purchasers. Hence, in factoring in the compensation which should be provided to the flat buyers who are concerned in the present batch of appeals, we would necessarily have to bear this issue in mind.
Tax - HELD THAT:- The developer has offered an explanation of why as a result of pending litigation, the dues towards works contract tax were not paid earlier. Indeed, if they were paid earlier, the purchasers would have been required to reimburse their proportionate share of taxes earlier as well. No part of the penalty imposed on the developer has been passed on to the purchasers. In view of the terms of the ABA and the explanation which has been submitted by the developer, there is no deficiency of service in regard to the demand of interest payable on the tax which was required to be deposited with the revenue.
Electricity - HELD THAT:- The NCDRC has upheld the collection of the charges towards electricity based on the terms of the ABA. There is no infirmity in the finding of the NCDRC, which is based on the provisions contained in Clause 23(b) of the ABA. The charges recovered are not contrary to what was specified in the contract between the parties.
Parking - HELD THAT:- The ABA contained a break-up of the total price of the apartment. Parking charges for exclusive use of earmarked parking spaces were separately included in the break-up. The parking charges were revealed to the flat buyers in the brochure. The charges recovered are in terms of the agreement - The demand of parking charges is in terms of the ABA and hence it is not possible to accede to the submission that there was a deficiency of service under this head.
The dismissal of the complaint by the NCDRC was erroneous. The flat buyers are entitled to compensation for delayed handing over of possession and for the failure of the developer to fulfil the representations made to flat buyers in regard to the provision of amenities - Appeal allowed.
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2020 (8) TMI 848
Seeking sanction of modification of a Scheme under the provisions of Section 91 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 - HELD THAT:- From the records of the case, particularly the order dated 20.8.1970 of sub division of plot number 473 B and the award of the arbitrator, it is patently clear that the name of Pune Municipal Commissioner was at no point of time reflected as holder of the private road. There is no whisper as to how the road came to be shown as in possession of Pune Municipal Commissioner nor of the procedure adopted for effecting changes, if any, in the property records - On perusal of the documents, there can be no doubt at all that the road in question measuring 444.14 sqm. never belonged to the Pune Municipal Corporation. In the property records, there was no private road. There were three plots 473 B1, B2, B3 and 473 B4 shown as vacant land held by the owners of all the three adjacent plots.
The Municipal Corporation was never shown as owner of the vacant plot or of any private road. Even assuming that there was any policy decision to have an approach road to every plot, it was incumbent upon the authorities concerned to acquire the land. On the other hand, the scheme clearly records that the same was based on entries in property records, and the award of the arbitrator.
The right to property may not be a fundamental right any longer, but it is still a constitutional right Under Article 300A and a human right - In view of the mandate of Article 300A of the Constitution of India, no person is to be deprived of his property save by the authority of law. The Appellant trust cannot be deprived of its property save in accordance with law.
The High Courts exercising their jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, not only have the power to issue a Writ of Mandamus or in the nature of Mandamus, but are duty bound to exercise such power, where the Government or a public authority has failed to exercise or has wrongly exercised discretion conferred upon it by a Statute, or a rule, or a policy decision of the Government or has exercised such discretion malafide, or on irrelevant consideration - In all such cases, the High Court must issue a Writ of Mandamus and give directions to compel performance in an appropriate and lawful manner of the discretion conferred upon the Government or a public authority.
In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, in the light of admissions, on the part of the Respondent authorities that the private road measuring 414 sq. was private property never acquired by the Pune Municipal Corporation or the State Government, the Respondents had a public duty Under Section 91 to appropriately modify the scheme and to show the private road as property of its legitimate owners, as per the property records in existence, and or in the award of the Arbitrator - the Bombay High Court erred in law in dismissing the Writ Petition with the observation that the land in question had vested Under Section 88 of the Regional and Town Planning Act.
Appeal allowed.
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2020 (8) TMI 841
Condonation of delay of 45 days in filing application - interpretation of Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - HELD THAT:- Chapter XII of the Act is a beneficial legislation intended at protecting the rights of victims affected in road accidents. Moreover, the Act is a selfcontained code in itself which provides procedures for filing claims, for passing of award and for preferring an appeal. Even, the limitations for preferring the remedies are contained in the code itself.
The interpretation of a beneficial legislation must be remedial and must be in furtherance with the purpose which the statute seeks to serve. The aforesaid view has been reiterated by this court on multiple occasions wherein this court has highlighted the importance acknowledging legislative intention while interpreting the provisions of the statute.
Section 173 provides that, any person aggrieved by the award passed by the Tribunal may approach the High Court within ninety days. However, the second proviso states that the High Court “may” still entertain such appeal even after the expiry of ninety days, if the appellant satisfies the Court that there exists sufficient reason behind the delay - Ordinarily, the word “may” is not a word of compulsion. [Justice G.P. Singh in Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 14th Edn.,page 519] It is an enabling word and it only confers capacity, power or authority and implies discretion.
Undoubtedly, the statute has granted the Courts with discretionary powers to condone the delay, however at the same time it also places an obligation upon the party to justify that he was prevented from abiding by the same due to the existence of “sufficient cause”. Although there exists no strait jacket formula for the Courts to condone delay, but the Courts must not only take into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of case but also the conduct of the parties. The concept of reasonableness dictates that, the Courts even while taking a liberal approach must weigh in the rights and obligations of both the parties. When a right has accrued in favour of one party due to gross negligence and lackadaisical attitude of the other, this Court shall refrain from exercising the aforesaid discretionary relief.
The delay of 45 days has been properly explained by the appellants, which was on account of illness of the wife of Appellant No.1. It was not appropriate on the part of the High Court to dismiss the appeal merely on the ground of delay of short duration, particularly in matters involving death in motor accident claims. Moreover, in the present case no mala fide can be imputable against the appellants for filing the appeal after the expiry of ninety days.
Matter remanded for fresh consideration on merits - petition allowed by way of remand.
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2020 (8) TMI 827
Interplay between the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 - Whether in respect of offences falling under chapter IV of the Act, a FIR can be registered Under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the case investigated or whether Section 32 of the Act supplants the procedure for investigation of offences under Code of Criminal Procedure and the taking of cognizance of an offence Under Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure?
HELD THAT:- It is concluded that:-
I. In regard to cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act, in view of Section 32 of the Act and also the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Police Officer cannot prosecute offenders in regard to such offences. Only the persons mentioned in Section 32 are entitled to do the same.
II. There is no bar to the Police Officer, however, to investigate and prosecute the person where he has committed an offence, as stated Under Section 32(3) of the Act, i.e., if he has committed any cognizable offence under any other law.
III. Having regard to the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also the mandate of Section 32 of the Act and on a conspectus of powers which are available with the Drugs Inspector under the Act and also his duties, a Police Officer cannot register a FIR Under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in regard to cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act and he cannot investigate such offences under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
IV. Having regard to the provisions of Section 22(1)(d) of the Act, we hold that an arrest can be made by the Drugs Inspector in regard to cognizable offences falling under Chapter IV of the Act without any warrant and otherwise treating it as a cognizable offence. He is, however, bound by the law as laid down in D.K. Basu [1996 (12) TMI 350 - SUPREME COURT] and to follow the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure.
V. It would appear that on the understanding that the Police Officer can register a FIR, there are many cases where FIRs have been registered in regard to cognizable offences falling under Chapter IV of the Act. We find substance in the stand taken by learned Amicus Curiae and direct that they should be made over to the Drugs Inspectors, if not already made over, and it is for the Drugs Inspector to take action on the same in accordance with the law. We must record that we are resorting to our power Under Article 142 of the Constitution of India in this regard.
VI. Further, we would be inclined to believe that in a number of cases on the understanding of the law relating to the power of arrest as, in fact, evidenced by the facts of the present case, police officers would have made arrests in regard to offences under Chapter IV of the Act. Therefore, in regard to the power of arrest, we make it clear that our decision that Police Officers do not have power to arrest in respect of cognizable offences under Chapter IV of the Act, will operate with effect from the date of this Judgment.
VII. We further direct that the Drugs Inspectors, who carry out the arrest, must not only report the arrests, as provided in Section 58 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but also immediately report the arrests to their superior Officers.
Appeal dismissed.
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2020 (8) TMI 571
Interpretation of Statute - Right of Daughter in the property of her parents etc. - Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as amended by Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 - right of a coparcener in the property - retrospective and retroactive statute - HELD THAT:- In view of the provisions contained in Section 6 when a coparcener is survived by a female heir of Class I or male relative of such female, it was necessary to ascertain the share of the deceased, as such, a legal fiction was created. The Explanation I provided legal fiction of partition as if it had taken place immediately before his death, notwithstanding whether he had the right to claim it or not. However, a separated Hindu could not claim an interest in the coparcenary based on intestacy in the interest left by the deceased - The amended provisions of Section 6(1) provide that on and from the commencement of the Amendment Act, the daughter is conferred the right. Section 6(1)(a) makes daughter by birth a coparcener "in her own right" and "in the same manner as the son." Section 6(1)(a) contains the concept of the unobstructed heritage of Mitakshara coparcenary, which is by virtue of birth. Section 6(1)(b) confers the same rights in the coparcenary property "as she would have had if she had been a son". The conferral of right is by birth, and the rights are given in the same manner with incidents of coparcenary as that of a son and she is treated as a coparcener in the same manner with the same rights as if she had been a son at the time of birth. Though the rights can be claimed, w.e.f. 9.9.2005, the provisions are of retroactive application; they confer benefits based on the antecedent event, and the Mitakshara coparcenary law shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter as a coparcener. At the same time, the legislature has provided savings by adding a proviso that any disposition or alienation, if there be any testamentary disposition of the property or partition which has taken place before 20.12.2004, the date on which the Bill was presented in the Rajya Sabha, shall not be invalidated.
The prospective statute operates from the date of its enactment conferring new rights. The retrospective statute operates backward and takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws. A retroactive statute is the one that does not operate retrospectively. It operates in futuro. However, its operation is based upon the character or status that arose earlier. Characteristic or event which happened in the past or requisites which had been drawn from antecedent events. Under the amended Section 6, since the right is given by birth, that is an antecedent event, and the provisions operate concerning claiming rights on and from the date of Amendment Act.
The effect of the amendment is that a daughter is made coparcener, with effect from the date of amendment and she can claim partition also, which is a necessary concomitant of the coparcenary. Section 6(1) recognises a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara law. The coparcenary must exist on 9.9.2005 to enable the daughter of a coparcener to enjoy rights conferred on her. As the right is by birth and not by dint of inheritance, it is irrelevant that a coparcener whose daughter is conferred with the rights is alive or not. Conferral is not based on the death of a father or other coparcener. In case living coparcener dies after 9.9.2005, inheritance is not by survivorship but by intestate or testamentary succession as provided in substituted Section 6(3).
Effect of enlargement of daughter's rights - HELD THAT:- As per the Mitakshara law, no coparcener has any fixed share. It keeps on fluctuating by birth or by death. It is the said principle of administration of Mitakshara coparcenary carried forward in statutory provisions of Section 6. Even if a coparcener had left behind female heir of Class I or a male claiming through such female Class I heir, there is no disruption of coparcenary by statutory fiction of partition. Fiction is only for ascertaining the share of a deceased coparcener, which would be allotted to him as and when actual partition takes place. The deemed fiction of partition is for that limited purpose. The classic Shastric Hindu law excluded the daughter from being coparcener, which injustice has now been done away with by amending the provisions in consonance with the spirit of the Constitution - There can be a sole surviving coparcener in a given case the property held by him is treated individual property till a son is born. In case there is a widow or daughter also, it would be treated as joint family property. If the son is adopted, he will become a coparcener. An adoption by a widow of a deceased coparcener related to the date of her husband's death, subject to saving the alienations made in the intermittent period.
Acquisition of Rights in Coparcenary Property - HELD THAT:- As a matter of fact, in substance, there is a divergence of opinion in Prakash v. Phulavati and Danamma [2015 (10) TMI 2761 - SUPREME COURT] with respect to the aspect of living daughter of a living coparcener. In the latter case, the proposition of the living daughter of a living coparcener was not dealt with specifically. However, the effect of reasons given in para 23 had been carried out to logical end by giving an equal share to the daughter.
Partition and Effect of Statutory Fiction - HELD THAT:- Once the constitution of coparcenary changes by birth or death, shares have to be worked out at the time of actual partition. The shares will have to be determined in changed scenario. The severance of status cannot come in the way to give effect to statutory provision and change by subsequent event. The statutory fiction of partition is far short of actual partition, it does not bring about the disruption of the joint family or that of coparcenary is a settled proposition of law. For the reasons mentioned above, we are also of the opinion that mere severance of status by way of filing a suit does not bring about the partition and till the date of the final decree, change in law, and changes due to the subsequent event can be taken into consideration.
When the proviso to unamended Section 6 of the Act of 1956 came into operation and the share of the deceased coparcener was required to be ascertained, a deemed partition was assumed in the lifetime of the deceased immediately before his death. Such a concept of notional partition was employed so as to give effect to Explanation to Section 6. The fiction of notional partition was meant for an aforesaid specific purpose. It was not to bring about the real partition. Neither did it affect the severance of interest nor demarcated the interest of surviving coparceners or of the other family members, if any, entitled to a share in the event of partition but could not have claimed it. The entire partition of the coparcenary is not provided by deemed fiction; otherwise, coparcenary could not have continued which is by birth, and the death of one coparcener would have brought an end to it. Legal fiction is only for a purpose it serves, and it cannot be extended beyond.
It is apparent that the right of a widow to obtain an equal share in the event of partition with the son was not deprived under old Section 6. Unamended Section 6 provided that the interest of a coparcener could be disposed of by testamentary or intestate succession on happening of exigency under the proviso. Under the old law before 1956 devise by a coparcener of Hindu Mitakshara family property was wholly invalid. Section 3
What has been recognised as partition by the legislation Under Section 6, accordingly, rights are to be worked out. This Court consistently held in various decisions mentioned above that when the rights are subsequently conferred, the preliminary decree can be amended, and the benefit of law has to be conferred. Hence, we have no hesitation to reject the effect of statutory fiction of proviso to Section 6 - If a daughter is alive on the date of enforcement of the Amendment Act, she becomes a coparcener with effect from the date of the Amendment Act, irrespective of the date of birth earlier in point of time.
Section 6(5) - HELD THAT:- The intendment of amended Section 6 is to ensure that daughters are not deprived of their rights of obtaining share on becoming coparcener and claiming a partition of the coparcenary property by setting up the frivolous defence of oral partition and/or recorded in the unregistered memorandum of partition. The Court has to keep in mind the possibility that a plea of oral partition may be set up, fraudulently or in collusion, or based on unregistered memorandum of partition which may also be created at any point of time. Such a partition is not recognized Under Section 6(5) - It is settled law that family arrangements can be entered into to keep harmony in the family.
There is a general presumption that every Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved. It is open even if one coparcener has separated, to the non-separating members to remain joint and to enjoy as members of a joint family. No express agreement is required to remain joint. It may be inferred from how their family business was carried on after one coparcener was separated from them. Whether there was a separation of one coparcener from all other members of a joint family by a decree of partition, the decree alone should be looked at to determine the question.
The expression used in Explanation to Section 6(5) 'partition effected by a decree of a court' would mean giving of final effect to actual partition by passing the final decree, only then it can be said that a decree of a court effects partition. A preliminary decree declares share but does not effect the actual partition, that is effected by passing of a final decree; thus, statutory provisions are to be given full effect, whether partition is actually carried out as per the intendment of the Act is to be found out by Court. Even if partition is supported by a registered document it is necessary to prove it had been given effect to and acted upon and is not otherwise sham or invalid or carried out by a final decree of a court. In case partition, in fact, had been worked out finally in toto as if it would have been carried out in the same manner as if affected by a decree of a court, it can be recognized, not otherwise - There is a clear legislative departure with respect to proof of partition which prevailed earlier; thus, the Court may recognise the other mode of partition in exceptional cases based upon continuous evidence for a long time in the shape of public document not mere stray entries then only it would not be in consonance with the spirit of the provisions of Section 6(5) and its Explanation.
Thus, it is decided as under:
(i) The provisions contained in substituted Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 confer status of coparcener on the daughter born before or after amendment in the same manner as son with same rights and liabilities.
(ii) The rights can be claimed by the daughter born earlier with effect from 9.9.2005 with savings as provided in Section 6(1) as to the disposition or alienation, partition or testamentary disposition which had taken place before 20th day of December, 2004.
(iii) Since the right in coparcenary is by birth, it is not necessary that father coparcener should be living as on 9.9.2005.
(iv) The statutory fiction of partition created by proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as originally enacted did not bring about the actual partition or disruption of coparcenary. The fiction was only for the purpose of ascertaining share of deceased coparcener when he was survived by a female heir, of Class-I as specified in the Schedule to the Act of 1956 or male relative of such female. The provisions of the substituted Section 6 are required to be given full effect. Notwithstanding that a preliminary decree has been passed the daughters are to be given share in coparcenary equal to that of a son in pending proceedings for final decree or in an appeal.
(v) In view of the rigor of provisions of Explanation to Section 6(5) of the Act of 1956, a plea of oral partition cannot be accepted as the statutory recognised mode of partition effected by a deed of partition duly registered under the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908 or effected by a decree of a court. However, in exceptional cases where plea of oral partition is supported by public documents and partition is finally evinced in the same manner as if it had been affected by a decree of a court, it may be accepted. A plea of partition based on oral evidence alone cannot be accepted and to be rejected outrightly.
The views to the contrary expressed in Prakash v. Phulavati and Mangammal v. T.B. Raju and Ors. [2018 (5) TMI 1368 - SUPREME COURT] overruled - The opinion expressed in Danamma @ Suman Surpur and Anr. v. Amar [2018 (3) TMI 867 - SUPREME COURT] is partly overruled.
Let the matters be placed before appropriate Bench for decision on merits.
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2020 (8) TMI 533
Cancellation of assignment deed - section 31 of the Specific Relief Act - suit for specific performance - rectification of the instrument - arbitral proceeding - HELD THAT:- A perusal of section 26(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 would show that when, through fraud or mutual mistake of parties, a contract or other instrument in writing does not express the real intent of the parties, then either party or his representative in interest may either institute a suit to have the instrument rectified or as defendant, may, in addition to any defence open to him, ask for rectification of the instrument. Importantly, under section 26(3), a party may pray in a rectification suit for specific performance – and if the Court thinks fit, may after rectifying the contract, grant specific performance of the contract. Thus, what is made clear by this section is that the rectification of a contract can be the subject matter of a suit for specific performance, which have been already seen, can be the subject matter of an arbitral proceeding.
Under section 27(1) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, “any party interested” in a contract may sue to have it rescinded and such rescission may be adjudged by the Court in the cases mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1). Sub-section (2) of section 27 refers to four exceptions to this rule - Third parties to the contract are not persons who can be said to be “any person interested”, particularly when section 27(2)(c), which refers to third parties, is seen and contrasted with the expression “any person interested” in section 27(1) – under section 27(2)(c), third parties come in as an exception to the rule only when they have acquired rights in good faith, without notice and for value, during the subsistence of the contract between the parties to that contract.
The factum of registration of what is otherwise a private document inter parties does not clothe the document with any higher legal status by virtue of its registration.
When it comes to cancellation of a deed by an executant to the document, such person can approach the Court under section 31, but when it comes to cancellation of a deed by a non-executant, the non-executant must approach the Court under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Cancellation of the very same deed, therefore, by a non-executant would be an action in personam since a suit has to be filed under section 34. However, cancellation of the same deed by an executant of the deed, being under section 31, would somehow convert the suit into a suit being in rem. All these anomalies only highlight the impossibility of holding that an action instituted under section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is an action in rem.
Appeal dismissed.
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2020 (8) TMI 107
Smuggling - cannabis (ganja) - contraband item - rebuttal of presumption - presumption against the accused of culpability under Section 35 - fabricated and fictitious document - HELD THAT:- In view of the nature of evidence available it is not possible to hold that the prosecution had established conscious possession of the house with the appellant so as to attribute the presumption under the NDPS Act against him with regard to recovery of the contraband. Conviction could not be based on a foundation of conjectures and surmises to conclude on a preponderance of probabilities, the guilt of the appellant without establishing the same beyond reasonable doubt - The police investigation was very extremely casual, perfunctory and shoddy in nature. The appellant has been denied the right to a fair investigation, which is but a facet of a fair trial guaranteed to every accused under Article 21 of the Constitution. The consideration of evidence by the Trial Court, affirmed by the High Court, borders on perversity to arrive at conclusions for which there was no evidence. Gross misappreciation of evidence by two courts, let alone poor investigation by the police, has resulted in the appellant having to suffer incarceration for an offence he had never committed.
The conviction of the appellant is held to be unsustainable and is set aside - appellant is acquitted - Appeal allowed.
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