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Indian Laws - Supreme Court - Case Laws
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1989 (4) TMI 338
... ... ... ... ..... n the allegation that forged/false certificates had been produced by them in support of qualification/eligibility and in the enquiry a prima facie case had been made out. We express no opinion about it as it shall be for the State Government to deal with the question and the appellant's appeal has nothing to do with it. 13. The appeal is allowed, the order of the learned single Judge as also the appellate order are vacated and the State Government and the Public Service Commission are directed to consider the appellant's claim for recruitment on the basis of the notification for recruitment. In case the appellant is found qualified, he shall be selected for the post and duly appointed. The question of appellant's seniority is left open to be dealt with by the State Government in consultation with the Public Service Commission. The appellant shall have the cost of the appeal. Hearing fee is assessed at ₹ 3,000/- to be recovered from the Respondent-State only.
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1989 (4) TMI 334
... ... ... ... ..... e counter affidavit filed by the Additional District Magistrate (Land Reforms), Mayurbhanj, Orissa it has been stated in reply to paragraphs 21 to 24 of the SLP that there is no Home-Stead land and no non-agricultural land belonging to the appellant-land holders in the Notified Area Council of Udala. It has also been stated in paragraph 3(c) of the said counter affidavit that no Notification as contemplated by Section 73(c) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act has been made by the State Government. It has further been stated therein that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 has not been made applicable so far to the Udala Notified Area Council. In this view of the matter it is not possible for us to record any finding with regard to this submission and consequently we express no opinion in this behalf. 14. In the result, we find no merit in any of these appeals and they are accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.
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1989 (4) TMI 333
... ... ... ... ..... ion of the premises or of the rent payable therefor. That is the position as between the landlord and the heirs of the deceased tenant. In other words, the heirs succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants. In the present case it appears that the respondent acted on behalf of the tenants, that he paid rent on behalf of all and he accepted notice also on behalf of all. In the circumstances, the notice served on the respondent was sufficient. It seems to us that the view taken in Ramesh Chand Bone (supra) is erroneous where the High Court lays down that the heirs of the deceased tenant succeed as tenants in common. In our opinion, the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act served by the appellant on the respondent is a valid notice and therefore the suit must succeed. 5. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and decree of the High Court are set aside and the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court are restored. There is no order as to costs.
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1989 (4) TMI 328
... ... ... ... ..... which were supplied to him along with the grounds of detention were not legible and he placed before the Advisory Board a copy of representation said to have been made by him for supply of legible copies of the documents. The legible copies of the documents were, however, supplied to the detenu after the detention order was confirmed. It was held that the detenu was denied the opportunity of making a representation and as such there was a clear contravention of the right guaranteed by Article 22 of the Constitution. The detenu was, therefore, set at liberty. 7. Considering these decisions we are constrained to hold that the refusal on the part of the detaining authority to supply legible copies of the said relevant document to the detenu for making an effective representation infringed the detenu's right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The order of detention is, therefore, set aside and the detenu is directed to be released forthwith. The appeal is thus allowed.
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1989 (4) TMI 327
... ... ... ... ..... o the suit. The Court held, that those who were impleaded as party to the suit in place of the deceased defendant represented the entire estate as they had share in the property and since they had been brought on record the decree was binding on the entire estate In the instant case Mrs. Nalini Bai had admittedly hall share in the property left by the deceased defendant and as she was brought on record within time, she represented the estate of the deceased defendant and the suit could proceed on merit. In this view the impleadment of other legal repre- sentatives at a subsequent stage could not affect validity of the proceedings. In the result we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and order of the Judicial Commission- er dated 30.6.1972, and restore the order of the trial Judge. Since trial of the suit has been delayed, we direct the trial court to make every effort to decide the suit expeditiously. The appellant is entitled to its costs throughout. Appeal allowed.
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1989 (4) TMI 325
... ... ... ... ..... he benefit of the Provident Fund Scheme and took those benefits, have been held entitled to opt for the Pension Scheme without fixing a cut-off date. The question raised is of considerable importance. Even, as far as the financial implications to the Railways are concerned, they would be immense. The same question would again arise in connection with other departments of the government or State Undertakings where a similar situation might have existed. In view of this, we are of the view that the matter should be decided by the larger Bench, preferably comprising five learned Judges or at least, of three learned Judges. 3. Before parting with the matter we may add that many of the retired employee before us are quite old and are anxious that their matters should be decided very early. The matter is, of course, one which deserves to be disposed of very expeditiously. 4. We, therefore, direct that the papers may be placed before the learned Chief Justice of appropriate orders.
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1989 (4) TMI 323
... ... ... ... ..... side, employers and workers, to be responsible for one week at a time. "Next, it was suggested that, even if the board could not delegate their functions, at any rate they could ratify the actions of the port manager, but, if the board have no power to delegate their functions to the port manager, they can have no power to ratify what he has already done. The effect of ratification is to make it equal to a prior command, but as a prior command, in the shape of delegation, would be useless, so also is a ratification." These observations again are of little assistance to us since we have already held that there was no prior delegation of power to the Vice-Chancellor to take disciplinary action against the respondent. There was no subsequent delegation either. Therefore, neither the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor, nor the ratification by the Executive Council could be sustained. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.
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1989 (4) TMI 322
... ... ... ... ..... he validity and correctness of the deduction to be made under Section 8 as well. So construed, the provisions of Section 10 would furnish a reasonably adequate machinery for the assessment of the "net-amount" payable to licensee. 38. So far as Arbitration is concerned, even after the decision of the "Special-Officer", there is the further Arbitral forum to decide disputes in respect of the specific areas in which disputes are rendered arbitrable under Sec- tion 20. In view of these circumstances, we think the grievance of the petitioners on these points questions are not sub- stantial. The points (h) and (i) are also, accordingly, held and answered against the petitioners. 39. In the result, for the foregoing reasons all the contentions urged by the petitioners in support of their challenge to the impugned legislations fail. The Writ peti- tions are, accordingly, dismissed; but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1989 (4) TMI 320
... ... ... ... ..... r which there must have existed an opportunity for a choice between the relinquishment and the conferment of the right in question. Nothing of the kind could be proved in this case to estopp the first respondent. In Shanti Devi v. A.K. Banerjee, 1981 2 SCC 199, it was held that parties could not by their pleadings alter the intrinsic character of the lease or bring about a change of the rights and obligations flowing therefrom. The Court would only look into the terms of the lease irrespective of the averments in the pleadings. In the instant case as we have already held the lease to have been for twenty years, its character could not have been changed by the pleadings, if any, in the above cases. Nor could the respondents be held to have waived their rights under the lease. We do not find any infirmity in the impugned High Court order on this count also. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed, but without any order as to costs. Stay order, if any, stands vacated.
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1989 (4) TMI 319
... ... ... ... ..... rucial difference between ss. 87 and 89. This is that, within the period of two years mentioned in s. 89, the Central Government can, while adapting pre-existing laws make any changes therein, including changes by way of repeal or amendment. But s. 87 though capable of enforcement indefinitely, confers a more limited power. It can be invoked only to extend laws already in existence to the Union Territory and cannot make any substantial changes therein. The power under s. 89 is limited in time but extensive in scope while under s. 87 the power is indefinite in point of duration but very much more restricted in its scope. The above discussions dispose of all the contentions urged before us. For the reasons set out, we are of opinion that the conclusion arrived at by the Punjab and Haryana High Court was the correct one. All these petitions and appeals fail and are dismissed and the rules nisi discharged but, in the circumstances, we direct each party to bear his/its own costs.
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1989 (4) TMI 318
... ... ... ... ..... t servant who was on probation. The termination was on the ground that his work had never been satisfactory and he was not found suitable for being retained in the service. This Court held that the termination of service in such cases on the ground of unsuitability for the post not attract Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 7 There cannot be any dispute about this proposition. We are not laying down the rule that there should be a regular enquiry in this case All that we wish to state is that if she is to be discontinued it is proper and necessary that she should be told in advance that her work and performance are not up to the mark. 8. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order dated 12 January, 1985 terminating the service of the appellant. We, however, make it clear that the appellant will not claim the status of a regular employee unless her services are regularised in accordance with law. In the circumstances of case, we make no order as to costs.
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1989 (4) TMI 315
Whether the action of the respondent in evicting the appellant and granting the premises in question to M/s Dhanji Mavji was proper and right?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As we look upon the facts of this case, there was an implied obligation in respect of dealings with the tenants/occupants of the Port Trust authority to act in public interest/purpose - That requirement is fulfilled if it is demonstrated that the Port Trust Authorities have acted in pursuance of a policy which is referable to public purpose.
Once that norm is established whether that policy is the best policy or whether another policy was possible, is not relevant for consideration. It is, therefore, not necessary for our present purposes to dwell on the question whether the obligation of the Port Trust Authorities to act in pursuance of a public purpose was of public law purpose or a private law purpose. Under the Constitutional scheme of this country the Port Trust Authorities were required by relevant law to act in pursuance of public purpose.
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1989 (4) TMI 292
Whether the trust can be compelled to pay by a writ of mandamus?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available 'to reach injustice wherever it is found'. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226. therefore, reject the contention urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition.
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1989 (3) TMI 404
... ... ... ... ..... es lead to an inference that someone else might have committed this foul play taking advantage of the failing health of Bhargava and Bhargava himself might have voluntarily agreed to meet good the loss of money fearing for any criminal prosecution. 38. Mr. A.K. Sanghi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of R-1 has alleged that there is no evidence to prove the conspiracy and the absence of identification parade is detrimental to the prosecution. We have already dealt with the similar argument in the earlier part of this judgment, and so it is unnecessary for us to reiterate the same. 39. For the reasons hereinbefore mentioned, we hold that the impugned order of acquittal passed by the High Court is neither erroneous nor perverse nor improper and unreasonable resulting in miscarriage of justice and this is not a fit case for interference in exercise of the powers of this Court vested under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 40. In the result, the appeals are dismissed.
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1989 (3) TMI 403
... ... ... ... ..... f persons falling into this category are not more than live. In the rejoinder filed on behalf of the Government, it is staled that the Government made some orders extending the period for individuals to pass the examination on administrative grounds or on some genuine hardships. It is also stated that such orders were made upon recommendations by the respective departments and those persons passed the examination within the period extended. There is no reason to doubt the correctness of these statements made in the rejoinder. The power to relax the conditions of the rules to avoid undue hardship in any case or class of cases cannot now be gainsaid. It would be, therefore, futile for the respondents to make any grievance. 14. In the result and for the reasons stated, we allow these appeals and in reversal of the judgment of the High Court, we dismiss the writ petitions filed by the contesting respondents. In the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs.
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1989 (3) TMI 401
... ... ... ... ..... s position is also apparent. It is not necessary in the facts of this case to go into the question whether these documents were relevant or material. 4. In view of the fact that the copies of the documents were, in fact, supplied at the request of the appellant, but the copies supplied were illegible, we are of the opinion, that the safeguards provided by the Constitution have not been followed. In that view of the matter the decision of the High Court cannot be sustained and, therefore, is set aside. The order of detention dated June 9, 1988 is quashed and the appellant be set at liberty unless he is required in respect of any other proceedings. 5. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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1989 (3) TMI 397
... ... ... ... ..... d. The judgment passed by the High Court as well as by the by the first appellate court is set aside We remand the matter back to the first appellate court as that court had disposed of the appeal treating it to have been rendered infructuous We therefore direct that the learned IInd Additional District Judge, Nagpur before whom the appeal was filed will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law. 14. A suggestion was made by the counsel for the appellant about some tests and willingness of the appellant for getting those test performed which could be used as additional evidence in respect of the paternity of the child born to the appellant which has been made a ground for declaration of marriage as nullity. Without expressing any opinion, it would be appropriate for the lower appellate court to consider the matter if parties approach about additional evidence. The appellant shall be entitled to costs of this appeal. Costs quantified at ₹ 2500/-.
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1989 (3) TMI 395
... ... ... ... ..... such a view could be advocated in a film. To say that one should not be permitted to advocate that view goes against the first principle of our democracy. 50. We end here as we began on this topic. Freedom of expression which is legitimate and constitutionally protected, cannot be held to ransom by an intolerant group of people. The fundamental freedom under Article 19(1)(a) can be reasonably restricted for the purposes mentioned in Article 19(2) and the restriction must be justified on the anvil of necessity and not the quicksand of convenience of expediency. Open criticism of Government policies and operations is not a ground for restricting expression. We must practice tolerance to the views of others. Intolerance is as much dangerous to democracy as to the person himself. 51. In the result, we allow these appeals, reverse the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the writ petitions of the respondents. In the circumstances of case, however, we make no order as to costs.
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1989 (3) TMI 390
... ... ... ... ..... ions of Section 13(2)." It is highlighted in this connection that in the affidavit- in-reply filed by the respondent No. 1, the detaining authority, he merely denied the specific averments made in para 3(III) that no act prejudicial to the maintenance of law and order on the part of the detenu is alleged to have been committed by the detenu between 14th March to 13th April, 1988 etc. without specifically denying those statements. In this background, a mere bald statement that the detenu who is in jail custody is likely to be released on bail and there are full possibilities that he may continue the above offensive activities without reference to any particular case or acts does not show on the face of the order of detention that there has been subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority in making the order of detention in question. We, therefore, quash the order of detention and direct the respondents to set the detenu at liberty forthwith. Y.L. Petition allowed.
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1989 (3) TMI 389
... ... ... ... ..... copy of the earlier grounds of detention was also one of the documents furnished to the detenu in the present case which confirms the fact that the detaining authority has considered the earlier grounds of detention along with other documents for drawing his requisite subjective satisfaction for passing this impugned order. In other words, the earlier grounds of detention dated 2.1. 1987, quashed by the High Court was one of the material documents considered by the detaining authority in drawing his subjective satisfaction. Therefore, we hold that this order of detention is vitiated on the ground that the detaining authority has taken into consideration the grounds of earlier detention order along with other materials f or passing this impugned order. Hence, the order is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, we quash the detention order on this ground and direct that the detenu be set at liberty forthwith if his detention is not required for any other case. Petition allowed.
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