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1982 (3) TMI 283
... ... ... ... ..... he cards, but not any game of chance. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to above, it is commonly known that stacks have to be purchased and maintained for the use of the members and service is give, money is thus collected. Just as some fee is charged for the games of billiards, pingpong, tennis, etc., an extra charge for playing cards (unless it is extravagant) would not show that the club was making a profit or gain so as to render the club into a common gambling house. The collection of some fees may become necessary to maintain the Association running. Therefore, if accused-26 was collecting some commission for allowing them to have the game the Rummy being played there, it cannot be said any such offence at all is made out. 7. In the result, for the reasons stated above, this revision petition is allowed. The process issued against the accused-petitioner are set aside and the proceedings instituted against them are quashed. 8. Petition allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 282
... ... ... ... ..... as fully qualified for being considered for appointment to the two posts of Lecturers in Forensic Medicine advertised by the Commission on November 16, 1972, and that the Commission acted illegally in treating the appellant as not being possessed of the requisite academic qualification and excluding him from consideration on the said ground. 13. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and restore the judgment of the learned Single Judge, subject to the modification that in carrying out the directions contained in the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the Commission should treat the appellant as a fully qualified candidate in the light of the finding recorded by us that at the relevant time the appellant possessed not merely the prescribed academic qualification but also the requisite experience of two years' Medico-legal work. The appellant will get his costs throughout from respondents 1 and 2 in equal shares.
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1982 (3) TMI 281
... ... ... ... ..... iety is not left to vagaries of the trade or the powerful sugar industry. To strike the balance between the conflicting interests not only State acquired power to fix minimum price of sugar and khandsari sugar but that this wholesome effort may not work to the disadvantage of the Sugarcane growers section of the society, the power to prescribe rate of rebate was acquired. And the power to fix price or minimum price comprehends the power to so regulate supply as to ensure the price so fixed and to ensure that in the name of unauthorised and unwarranted deduction the price fixed or negotiated is not rendered illusory. 25. Viewed from either angle the restriction is both reasonable and it is imposed in the interest of general public, and has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Control Order. 26. These were all the contentions in this batch of petitions and as none has merit in it, the petitions fail and are dismissed with costs; hearing fee in one set.
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1982 (3) TMI 280
... ... ... ... ..... nt from the facts of the case before us. In that case, when the ITO discovered in the account book of the assessee loans to the tune of ₹ 90,000, he came to the prima facie conclusion that these represented concealed income. The assessee firm agreed to the addition of the aforesaid amount of ₹ 90,000 as its business income for that year and the addition was made by the ITO as the assessee's concealed income from business and not as income from undisclosed sources. In the present case, the assessee has nowhere admitted that it has concealed its income and even the ITO has not added the said amount of ₹ 10.590 as concealed income from business but as from undisclosed sources. In view of this, the said decision in the case of Western Automobiles (India) v. CIT 1978 112ITR1048(Bom) is clearly inapplicable to the present case. 3. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The Commr. to pay the costs.
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1982 (3) TMI 279
... ... ... ... ..... with its inevitable bitterness and in this context the further continuation of the police investigation cannot, but amount to an abuse of power which eminently calls for interference by this Court in the ends of justice. I am, therefore, of the view that the case is one which clearly calls for the exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code. Even whilst sharply keeping in mind the somewhat exceptional nature of the exercise of such a power. I am constrained to hold that the Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 4022-M/1981 must necessarily be allowed and the criminal proceedings initiated against the petitioners be and are hereby quashed. 65. Criminal Miscellaneous Applications Nos. 3884-M, 5119-M, 5309-M, 5791-M, 5860-M of 1980; 1451-M, 1478-M, 1585-M, 1597-M, 2361-M and 3367-M of 1981 however, would go back for decision on merits before a single Bench, in the light of the law enunciated and its application as above. 66. Order accordingly.
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1982 (3) TMI 278
... ... ... ... ..... (3). If principle (2) were to be so literally construed, then the alternate remedy visualised thereby would be rendered virtually nugatory. With the greatest respect, it would appear that the view expressed in Banarsi Dass's case (supra) is overly constricted and does not lay down the law correctly and has, therefore, to be overruled. 14. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we would render the answer to the question as reframed (in paragraph 2 above) in the affirmative. It is held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit by a, workman in connection with an industrial dispute arising of the right or liability under the general or the common law (and not under the Act), if no steps had been earlier taken by him to resort to the remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act. 15. All these appeals would now go back to the learned Single Judge for disposal on merits in the light of the aforesaid answer to the legal question. Prem Chand Jain, J. 16. I agree.
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1982 (3) TMI 277
... ... ... ... ..... to dissuade Rajpal and Kayam from keeping them away from land in dispute but that by itself would not render the sale deed invalid so long it was executed deliberately, consciously and with open eyes. Under Expt. 2 to Section 25 of Contract Act a sale deed is not rendered void due to inadequacy of consideration. It may be helpful in ascertaining whether agreement was entered freely or not but where free consent and valid execution is established inadequacy of consideration becomes irrelevant. Apprehension of saving the land from Raj-pal and Kayam or preserving it for family's sake may have been motivative factors in creating a cover by execution of the sale deed but that did not render the transaction as vitiated by undue influence so long the respondents were not found to have been instrumental in getting it executed in their favour by abusing their advantageous position. 4. In the result this appeal fails and is dismissed but parties shall bear their costs throughout.
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1982 (3) TMI 276
... ... ... ... ..... ariats so far as may be, and accordingly it is provided by these provisions that alienations of such holdings or partition thereof shall be ineffective unless the sanction of the Collector has first been obtained. It is of the utmost importance that this important safeguard should be maintained in full force and effect so that the parties must exactly know what they have bargained for. The condition for the grant of sanction by the Collector as a pre-requisite for a valid transfer of a holding or the making of a partition by metes and bounds, is to ensure that the actual tiller of the soil is not deprived of his land except for valid consideration, or that the partition effected between the members of a family is not unfair or unequal. These provisions therefore do not create a statutory bar to a transfer or a partition once the conditions mentioned therein are fulfilled. 45. In the result, the appeals must fail and are dismissed. There shall however be no order as to costs.
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1982 (3) TMI 275
... ... ... ... ..... us Appeal as well as in the petition under Order 9, Rule 13, C.P.C. The said appeal and the application have already been dismissed. In such circumstances. I hold that the notice was sufficient. 10. The respondent contends that the arbitrator was biased because he happened to be lawyer for the appellant. A report was called for from the arbitrator. It appears that the arbitrator was also a lawyer for the respondent. No definite bias has been established in this case. The very same points were also urged in the Miscellaneous Appeal as well as in the application under Order 9, Rule 13, C.P.C. and both the said matters have been dismissed. I entirely agree with the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge on this point. 11. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge so far as absence of proper notice and jurisdiction about the reference are concerned is set aside and the award of the arbitrator is made a rule of the Court. 12. No costs.
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1982 (3) TMI 274
... ... ... ... ..... the guilt of the offender beyond reasonable doubt. The past conduct or antecedent history of a person can appropriately be taken into account in making a detention order. It is indeed largely from prior events showing tendencies or inclinations of a person that an inference can be drawn whether he is likely in the future to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community or his act of violation of foreign exchange regulations and his smuggling activities are likely to have deleterious effect on the national economy." 11. When the legislature has made only the subjective satisfaction of the authority making the order of detention; it is not for the court to question whether the grounds given in the order are sufficient or not for the subjective satisfaction of the authority. 12. We find-ourselves unable to accede to either of the two contentions and the writ petition must fail. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 273
... ... ... ... ..... und for condoning the delay. As the first respondent failed to decide the matter on merits, the order at Annexure 'B' is required to be quashed and set aside. The first respondent is directed to restore to his file the said appeal of the petitioner and to decide the same on merits on accordance with law upon hearing the concerned parties after issuing notices to them about the date of hearing. Rule is accordingly made absolute to the aforesaid extent by granting prayer 16 (A) of the petition. There is no question of granting prayer 16 (B) as no such question arises for the decision in this Court at this stage. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid limited extent with no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. As the matter is a long delayed one the first respondent is directed to decide the appeal of the petitioners on merits at the earliest preferably within a period of six weeks from the receipt of writ from this Court at his end. 9. Order accordingly.
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1982 (3) TMI 272
... ... ... ... ..... t;. 8. Thus from the facts and circumstances of the present case I feel that this matter should be decided by the District Judge, as a preliminary issue to whom the papers would be sent by the Collector under Section 18 of the Act. 9. Consequently the order of the Collector dated 17th July, 1981, is set aside and the case is sent back to him with the direction that the case be referred to the District Judge under Section 18 of the Act, who will decide the objection under Section 31(2) of the Act afresh. The evidence already led by the claimant before the Collector will be read as evidence before the District Judge as well because the State was fully represented there before the Collector and had cross-examined the witnesses. However, the State may be provided a further opportunity to lead rebuttal, if any, to the evidence of the claimant. The parties are directed to appear before the Collector on 12-4-1982. 10. There will be no order as to costs. 11. Petition partly allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 271
... ... ... ... ..... pex bank has no free hand in relation to the stipulation of interest on advances made by it to debtors and is bound by the periodical circulars issued by the Reserve Bank of India regulating the rate of interest on lending and this would, constitute a special; crew vista gee, within the meaning, of Explanation I to S. 3(1) of the Usurious Loans Act. In this case, as seen earlier, the petitioner had produced Exs. A-17 and A-18 and have not been in any manner disputed by the respondents and the circumstances that the petitioner is obliged to charge rates of interest in accordance with those circulars, would Justify the recovery of the amounts as claimed by the petitioner from the respondents without the application of the provisions of the Usurious Loans Act to the transaction in question. 22. The result is, in modification of the decree of the courts below; there will be a decree as prayed for. The Civil Revision Petition is therefore allowed with costs. 23. Revision allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 270
... ... ... ... ..... e loan with interest. In either event the amount of loan with interest as discussed above is repayable and so long as that is not paid up the Petitioner cannot ask for the release of his title deeds because those title deeds were given to the Corporation while creating equitable mortgage. 21. Fox the reasons in the foregoing, the petition is allowed in part. The notice dated 3-9-1980 (Annexure 14) to the writ petition is quashed, and the opposite-parties are restrained from realising any amount towards the collection charges as no property of the Petitioner had been put to sale for recovery of the loan. The U.P. Financial Corporation is, however, directed to afford reasonable opportunity and grant permission, if asked for, to the Petitioner to sell the properties mortgaged and hypothecated or any portion thereof by private negotiations for the purpose of redeeming the mortgage and repaying the loan. 22. In the circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs.
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1982 (3) TMI 269
... ... ... ... ..... ar as the second respondent is concerned, there is violation of s. 314(1)(a) of the Act. 6. Now, turning to the third respondent, I must hold that here also, the applicant has no case. I have already held that s. 314(1)(a) does not apply to a relative of any ordinary sitting director holding any office or place of profit carrying even a monthly remuneration of ₹ 500 and of but applies to the relative of a director who holds any office or place of profit. In this case, the applicant has not succeeded in establishing that the third respondent was a relative of such director holding any office of place of profit. It is true that the third respondent is the son of the second respondent, but then the second respondent is only an ordinary director, but not one holding any office or place of profit as defined in s. 314(3) of the Act. If that is so, there can be no violation of s. 314(1)(b) of the Act. 7. The result is, the application fails and is dismissed but without costs.
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1982 (3) TMI 268
... ... ... ... ..... med under the Act. He relies on item 8 of that form in support of his contention. It reads "8. Have all details of all lands owned by others but held by the declarant and where the declaration is by a family unit, by all members of the family unit as limited owner, usufructuary mortgagee, tenant, or in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract for the sale of land or otherwise on the specified date, been furnished in Enclosure II ?" We are afraid, item No. 8 of Form I of the rules does not help the respondent at all. Rather it goes counter to his content. It envisages that the same land can be part of the holding of various persons in different capacities. For the foregoing discussion the appeal must succeed. We, accordingly allow the same and set aside the order of the High Court and restore that of the Land Reforms Tribunal. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to casts. Appeal allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 267
... ... ... ... ..... ase for the facts of the aforesaid decision. 16. The argument though attractive cannot be accepted. Over the years sugar has become a scare commodity and people have to purchase it even at a prohibitive price. In the circumstances it cannot be expected that the dealers would not be able to sell the sugar in their stock. There is absolutely no difficulty in selling the sugar at any time at the prevalent market price. If in a rare case there is difficulty on that score we hope and trust that the concerned Government would allow a reasonable time within which the petitioners are permitted to dispose of the excess quantity of sugar, if any. In any case, in some given case there may be some hardship but it cannot be said on that account that the impugned order is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 17. For the foregoing discussion the writ petitions must fail. They are accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there shall, however, be no order as to coasts.
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1982 (3) TMI 266
... ... ... ... ..... ears and it was for this reason that the State Government redetermined the age of superannuation of the teaching staff of the Medical Colleges taken over by it at 58 years and directed that the services of those who have attained the age of 58 years should be terminated after giving one month's notice. We may point out that, quite apart from the power expressly conferred under sub- section (3) of section 6, the State Government would have power to terminate the services of any person employed on an ad hoc basis. The termination of service of the first respondent was therefore, perfectly valid and the High Court was in error in granting relief to the first respondent. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order passed by the High Court and dismiss the writ petition of the first respondent. Having regard to the fact that the first respondent is merely a teacher in a Medical College, we direct that there will be no order as to costs throughout. S.R. Appeal allowed.
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1982 (3) TMI 265
... ... ... ... ..... before 30th of June, 1982 on condition that each of the appellants in the appeals and the petitioner in the special leave petition files an undertaking in this Court within four weeks from today to the following effect 1. that he will hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the landlord-respondent on or before 30th of June, 1982; 2. that he will pay to the respondent arrears of rent, if any, within a month from today; 3. that he will pay to the respondent future compensation for use and occupation of the suit premises for each calendar month by the 10th of the succeeding month; and 4. that he will not induct any other person in the suit premises as a sub-tenant or licensee or in any other capacity whatsoever. We further direct that in default of compliance with any one or more of the conditions of the undertaking or if the undertaking is not filed within the stipulated time, the decree of eviction shall become executable forthwith. Appeal dismissed.
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1982 (3) TMI 264
... ... ... ... ..... rward by the appellant, and hence no directions from this Court are called for in regard to the said matter. We are purposefully refraining from dwelling in greater detail on this aspect lest any observations that we may make should prejudicially affect the future service prospects of the appellant. We, however, consider it necessary to observe that the appellant would do well to rid himself of the obsession that all his official superiors are put to harass or persecute him and open up a new chapter of devoting his high talents and skills for advancing the effectiveness of the R&D Organisation. The charges put forward by the appellant in the Contempt Application (C.M.P. No. 5698 of 1981) and in C.M.P. No. 69 of 1981 filed by the appellant under Section 340(1), Code of Criminal Procedure are bereft of merit and those applications will accordingly stand dismissed. In the result, we dismiss this appeal but direct the parties to bear their respective costs. Appeal dismissed.
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