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1997 (1) TMI 568
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... ... ..... the respondents are directed to allow the petitioner to resume his duty within four weeks from the date of this judgment and to pay him his salaries in accordance with the provisions of law month by month from the date of resumption of his duties. 27. Immediately after the delivery of this judgment learned Advocate for the respondents prayed for stay of the operation of this judgment for six weeks. The prayer is considered and rejected. 28. Respondents are directed to take a decision within eight weeks from today in respect of payment of salary for the period spent under suspension. Such decision should be taken after affording an opportunity to the writ petitioner and after giving a personal hearing to him. A reasoned order should be passed by the respondents and the same should be communicated to the writ petitioner within a week from the date of making such order. If xerox certified copy is applied for, the same should be given to the parties as expeditiously as possible.
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1997 (1) TMI 567
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... ... ..... the utility and force of the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948. And, the reason for it is not far to seek. Section 30 of the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948, confers on the Corporation special rights to enable it to recover its dues promptly and effectively, and without the necessity of resorting to long drawn litigation requiring adjudication by judicial authorities and which may harm the interest of the Corporation, frustrate its rights, block its funds and make it difficult for it to freely invest money. 15. In short, thus, section 34 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, keeps intact the Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948, and in no way limits, hinders or impairs the play of its provisions. This being the position, the coming into force of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, has no effect on the pendency of the present proceedings. I hold accordingly. 16. Ordered accordingly.
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1997 (1) TMI 566
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... ... ..... from the above it is clear that he received the notice back on 21-9-1989. Even accepting that the petitioner refused the notice on 20-9-1989, the respondent ought to have filed this complaint after the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice. The date of issuance of notice cannot be taken into account, for the reasons stated above. Therefore, the cause of action had not arisen to file the complaint against the petitioner and the complaint was premature. However, the learned Magistrate has not taken into consideration this fact before passing the order directing issue of summons to the petitioner. Under those circumstances, it is a case where this Court has to interfere and the entire proceedings are liable to be quashed. 7. In the result, I proceed to pass the following ORDER The petition is allowed. The proceedings in C.C. No. 13178/90 (P.C. No. 71/89) pending on the file of the III Addl. Munsiff & JMFC., Mangalore, D.K. are quashed. 8. Petition allowed.
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1997 (1) TMI 565
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... ... ..... is in know of the facts referable to the offences allegedly under investigation. The respondents are accordingly required to be restrained from proceeding against the petitioner and cautioned that they are indulging in such acts, as they have done in the case of the petitioner, against persons, who moved the Court of law in accordance with law, and will be viewed seriously. 9. In the result, the application is allowed. The respondents are restrained from proceeding any further and all notices issued to him under Section 160(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the respondents are quashed and accordingly consequent proceedings are quashed. Let a copy of this order be forwarded to the State Government for necessary instructions to the District Superintendent of Police to abstain in future from indulging in such methods to prevent persons from moving the Courts of law for action against any person, who, according to him/her, has done any illegal act. 10. Application allowed.
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1997 (1) TMI 564
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... ... ..... n, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1997 (1) TMI 563
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... ... ..... ing in view the entire facts and circumstances, the order of the appellate Court is unsustainable. I respectfully disagree with the contentions raised by Mr. Bhargava learned counsel fox the defendants. The ratio of Usman Gani's case 1992 (3) SCC 455) (supra) and the State of West Bengal's case (AIR 1995 SCW 1694) (supra) is not applicable in the present case. Disputed questions of fact can be adjudicated in the suit after leading the evidence by the parties, I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that the appellate Court had committed jurisdictional error in allowing the appeal of the defendant and if the impugned order of the appellate Court is allowed to stand it would occasion failure of justice. 16. In the premises aforesaid, the revision is allowed. The order dated October 10, 1996, passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 2, Ajmer is set aside and order of the learned Munsif, Ajmer dated September 16, 1993 is confirmed. Costs easy.
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1997 (1) TMI 562
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... ... ..... -availability of the forensic report does not vitiate the charge-sheet which has been filed on the basis of the other materials collected during investigation. The question whether such other materials in the absence of any forensic report will be sufficient to sustain a conviction in trial is entirely a different matter from the question whether the charge-sheet is based on materials on which the prosecution can invite the Magistrate to take cognizance. In this case the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance on the basis of the charge-sheet and the materials submitted therewith. There is therefore no question of holding now that the charge-sheet should be treated as non-existent, inoperative or invalid. On the other hand we find that the charge-sheet was filed in time and it was accepted by the learned Magistrate. There is therefore no question of granting statutory bail to the accused under s. 167(2) Cr. PC. On materials also we reject the petitioner's prayer for bail.
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1997 (1) TMI 561
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... ... ..... ng the process he should see to it that it is not confined only to section 138 of the Act but shall also issue process under section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, as well. The learned Magistrates should know and know for ever and accordingly bear in mind that doing justice is not a mere a matter of formality, but it is a matter of substance, where a person committing offences under several Acts should be duly served with processes for all the alleged offences. 8. In view of the aforesaid discussion, since there is no substance in the petition, the same deserves to be dismissed. The learned Magistrate is directed to add section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, in this case and conduct the trial accordingly and as expeditiously as possible. 9. In the result, this petition fails and is dismissed. Ad interim relief granted earlier stands vacated. The learned Magistrate is directed to proceed with the trial by giving notice to the complainant and accused. Rule discharged.
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1997 (1) TMI 560
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... ... ..... o his mistakes or for the reckless of the Returning Officer the person affected is entitled for compensation and the election will be set at naught by the competent authority and those who succeeded on the basis of such illegal acts will suffer for his or their mistakes. 34. For he reasons aforestated, I see no merit in the contentions urged by the petitioners and they cannot be allowed to participate in the election intercepting the election process in the intermediate stage. Before parting with this case, it is appropriate to mention that in the event of filing election petition, the authority to complete the proceedings expeditiously without protracting for an unduly long period. In view of the aforestated reasons, the petitions are dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs. Consequently, W.M.P.Nos. 237, 238, 283 and 371 of 1997 are also dismissed. The impleading applicants not being aggrieved parties, their applications are liable to be rejected and accordingly rejected.
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1997 (1) TMI 559
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... ... ..... to the Managing Director as owner in the inspection report is not of much relevance. By a mere reference to the Managing Director as owner in the inspection report of the appellant the Managing Director cannot be given the same proprietorty rights as in the case of a partner in the partnership properties. But at the same time so long as the appellant has not proved that the Managing Director was functioning as an employee under a contract of employment with the company, it has to be taken that she is having only the normal status of a Managing Director. The remuneration received by her cannot be termed as 'wages' and she will not be covered by the provisions of the Act. Thus, while not agreeing with the reasoning of the Employees Insurance Court we affirm the final conclusion that the Managing Director of the respondent Company is not an employee of the Company who could be covered by the provisions of the Act. In this result the appeal fails and it stands dismissed.
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1997 (1) TMI 558
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... ... ..... limitation. I am, therefore, of the view that the suit filed by the appellant was barred by Sub-rule (4)(b) of Rule 1 of Order 23 of the Code, it was hence not maintainable. 13. In the present case, however, I find that though the suit as filed was not maintainable, but no such point was raised on behalf of the defendant either before the trial Court or in the first appellate Court. No cross objection too has been filed before this Court to oppose this appeal. Objection in this regard has been taken for the first time before me during the course of arguments in the appeal. In these circumstances, I do not propose to dismiss the suit in toto. Therefore, this ground shall be confined for the dismissal of the present appeal and not to the part of the decree, which has been passed in favour of the appellant by the trial court against which no cross objection has been filed in this court. 14. In view of what has been discussed above, the appeal is dismissed with costs throughout.
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1997 (1) TMI 557
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... ... ..... year. We may not need to travel to the various decisions of various High Courts and Supreme Court, but it would suffice to state that what is decided in one year may not apply to the following year, which has been so held by the Supreme Court in Radhasoami Satsang v. CIT 1992 193 ITR 321 / 60 Taxman 248. It was precisely for this reason that the Bombay High Court in CIT v. Shree Nirmal Commercial Ltd. 1995 213 ITR 361 (FB) had observed that where a fundamental aspect permeating through the different assessment years has been found as a fact, one way or the other the authorities have allowed that position to be sustained by not challenging the order, it would not be at all appropriate to allow the position to be changed in the subsequent year. This particular decision is so provided to emphasise that the settled matter should not be disturbed. Accordingly upholding the various issues raised before us, we set aside the order of the CIT. 7. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1997 (1) TMI 556
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... ... ..... r, the aggregate exceeded 8-1/3 per cent and it had to be disallowed. On appeal, the AAC, following the order of the Tribunal in the case of Higgingothems Ltd. in ITA No. 828/77-78 held that it was paid out of business expenditure and was an admissible deduction. On further appeal by the Revenue, the Tribunal followed its own decision in ITA No. 828/Mad/77 dt. 28th Sept., 1978 confirmed the order of the AAC. A similar question came up for consideration in T.C. No. 360 of 1982 wherein by judgment dt. 7th Oct., 1996, this Court held that when the expenditure incurred as bonus in settlement of a dispute between employer and employees, it would amount to expenditure incurred for the purposes of business. Therefore, it is an allowable deduction. In view of the aforesaid decision of this Court, there is no infirmity in the order of the Tribunal in allowing the amount paid by way of bonus. Accordingly, we answer question No. 3 in the affirmative and against the Department. No costs.
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1997 (1) TMI 555
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... ... ..... ability by the State Government does not arise. Therefore, it is unnecessary for us to go into the question in these appeals. By order dated February 29, 1996 passed by this Court, the State Government was directed to work out the amount due and payable to the cane growers in terms of the undertaking given to this Court at the time of passing the interim order. Pursuant thereto, it appears and is not in dispute that the Government has worked out the dues at ₹ 62,90,398.72 and made a demand on March 22,1996 and in furtherance thereof, the appellant has deposited the amount on April 3, 1996. In view of the above, if there is any demand other than what was directed, the respondents are at liberty to proceed in accordance with law and if there is no demand and the demand has already been satisfied, then it is needless to mention that the respondents may not take any further steps in that behalf. 9. The appeals are accordingly dismissed with the above observations. No costs.
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1997 (1) TMI 554
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... ... ..... f the statutory provisions." (20) Keeping in mind the principles laid down in the aforesaid pronouncements of the Supreme Court and the limits of judicial review on transfers, we are satisfied that the transfer and posting of the respondent was in exigency of service and was not liable to be interfered with in writ jurisdiction. We cannot accept the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that officers, other than respondent were duly qualified and available and should have been posted since it is not for this to consider the comparative merits of the various officers who could have been posted instead of the respondent. Admittedly, this is not a case where the respondent has-even pleaded any malafides. (21) In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the appeal deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the order of the learned Single Judge dated 7.8.1996, quashing the transfer and posting of the respondent is set aside.
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1997 (1) TMI 553
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... ... ..... o alternative but to cancel the results and we think, in the circumstances, they were justified in doing so. This should serve as a lesson to the students that such malpractices will not help them succeed in the examination and they may have to go through the drill once again. We also think that those in charge of the examinations should also take action against their Supervisors/Invigilators, etc., who either permit such activity or become silent spectators thereto. If they feel insecure because of the strong-arm tactics of those who indulge in malpractices, the remedy is to secure the services of the Uniformed Personnel, if need be, and ensure that students do not indulge in such malpractices. 3. In the result, we think that this was not a case in which the High Court should, at all, have interfered. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Division Bench of the High Court and affirm the decision taken by the Board. There will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (1) TMI 552
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... ... ..... without reference to the Criminal Procedure Code. Point 4 is decided against the petitioners. (24) Learned counsel for the appellants has circulated further submissions a few days back. Learned counsel has quoted some judgments of the Supreme Court in regard to interpretation of statutes. In view of the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to us in particular in M.M. Ipoh Vs. I.T. Commissioner we do not think necessary to deal with the rulings quoted in the additional written submissions furnished by the counsel. (25) A point has been raised that Section 27 is violative of the Article 14 of the Constitution of India. But we did not think that there is any merit in this contention. It cannot be said that the provisions which permit punishment to be imposed for not complying with orders of the State Forum or National Forum are arbitrary. This contention is to be rejected as being totally unsubstantiated. (26) For the aforesaid reasons, the Civil Writ Petition is dismissed.
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1997 (1) TMI 551
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... ... ..... kar, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1997 (1) TMI 550
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... ... ..... lanation. - Until the debt is legally recoverable the drawer of the cheque cannot be fastened with the liability under section 138 of the Act." 8. There appears to be no force in the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that by issuance of the cheque, the limitation for realising the loan amount was extended, because at the time of issuance of the cheque the debt should be a legally recoverable debt. In case a cheque is issued for a time-barred debt and it is dishonoured, the accused cannot be convicted under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act simply on the ground that the debt was not legally recoverable. 9. For the foregoing reasons, no fault can be found out with the findings of the acquittal recorded by the learned lower court and under these circumstances whether a cheque was issued after the closure of account or not does not assume relevance in this case. 10. In the result, the appeal against the acquittal, being without merit, is dismissed.
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1997 (1) TMI 549
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... ... ..... re situate. On that view the High Court has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant. Hence this appeal 4. The learned counsel for the appellant has urged the contentions aforementioned which have been rejected by the High Court. We do not find any reason to take a view different from that taken by the High Court. In our view, the said contentions were rightly rejected by the High Court for the reasons mentioned above 5. The learned counsel for the appellant has sought to urge a new contention, namely, that the area in which the properties of the appellant are situate is not included in the notification of October 1954 to which reference has been made by the High Court. This is a question of fact which was not agitated by the appellant before the High Court. It cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in this Court6. We, therefore, do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. The respondents will be entitled to their costs.
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