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Showing 241 to 260 of 18016 Records
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2023 (12) TMI 1198
Best judgment assessment u/s 144 - treating cash deposits in the assessee’s bank account as its unexplained money u/s.69A r.w.s.115BBE - HELD THAT:- We find that it is not a case where the CIT(Appeals) had discarded any material available on the record and summarily dismissed the assessee's appeal in limine for want of prosecution. Instead, it is a case where in the absence of any evidence whatsoever, whether documentary or otherwise, which would substantiate that the A.O was unjustified in treating the cash deposits in the assessee’s bank account as its unexplained money u/s.69A of the Act, the CIT(Appeals) had sustained the addition made by the A.O u/s 144 of the Act, dated 11.12.2019.
Now, when the assessee society, as per its volition, had not filed any return of income for the year under consideration A.Y 2017-18, i.e., either u/s 139 or in compliance to notice u/s 148 of the Act; or appeared before the A.O during the assessment proceedings or placed on his record any written submission or filed replies to the queries that were raised vide notice(s) issued u/s.142(1) of the Act; nor despite sufficient opportunities participated in the proceedings before the CIT(Appeals), then, in the absence of any evidence whatsoever, whether documentary or otherwise, which would reveal that there was no justification for treating the cash deposits in the assessee’s bank account as its unexplained money u/s.69A of the Act, we are of a firm conviction that no infirmity emerges from the order of the CIT(Appeals) who had rightly approved the order passed by the A.O u/s 144.
Although Section 253 of the Act, inter alia, vests with an assessee a statutory right to assail before the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal an order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals), but a careful perusal of the aforesaid statutory provision reveals that the same can be triggered only where the assessee appellant is, inter alia, aggrieved with “ any order of assessment”. Thus, considering the scope of Sec. 253 of the Act, it transpires that the same lays down as a pre-condition a grievance of the assessee appellant arising from the order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals).
Apropos, the claim of the Ld. A.R. that the matter in all fairness be restored to the file of the A.O. for fresh adjudication, the same does not favor us. As observed by us herein above, the grounds based on which the order of the CIT(Appeals) has been assailed before us are devoid and bereft of any merit; therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed on the said count itself. Apart from that, we are of a firm conviction that the right vested with an appellant to approach the tribunal by preferring an appeal before it is for a limited purpose, i.e. a grievance that the assessment framed by the AO, or for that matter, order of the CIT(Appeal) were not according to law.
In no case can the Tribunal be taken as a forum for an appellant who, as per his volition, had either adopted an evasive or lackadaisical approach before the lower authorities and not participated in the assessment or appellate proceedings to come up with its case for the first time before the Tribunal and, as a matter of right seek restoring of the impugned order to the file of the lower authorities for fresh adjudication. Assessee appeal dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1197
Validity of SCN - jurisdiction of the assessing officer - justifiabilty of demand - non-reversal of excess ITC availed - HELD THAT:- Once petitioner has subjected itself to jurisdiction of the authority by filing reply, it is not deemed proper to address on the contentions raised by the petitioner touching the jurisdiction as well as merits of the show cause notice. Petitioner if so advised, may file additional reply incorporating the submissions as advanced before this Court.
This Court hopes and trusts that the authority concerned shall address on the issues raised in the reply/ additional reply and pass an order with due advertence to the record keeping in mind the provisions of GST Act maintaining judicial discipline.
The writ petition disposed off.
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2023 (12) TMI 1196
Seeking permission to travel abroad for a period of 12 months - HELD THAT:- This Court deems it appropriate to modify the condition (i) of order dated 07.07.2022 to the extent, that instead of prior permission to be obtained from the I.O., the same be read as “prior permission of the Trial Court”.
Accordingly, the applicant/ petitioner is granted permission to travel abroad i.e. Dubai, UAE, for a period of two months, on the same terms and conditions imposed vide order dated 31.12.2022 by the learned Trial Court, to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court.
Application allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1195
Levy of penalty and interest without any jurisdiction - extension of time limit - HELD THAT:- The time limit fixed by the learned Judge for filing appeal with required pre-deposit, is extended by further period of eight weeks, which will take effect from today. Accordingly, the appellant shall file an appeal before the first respondent along with pre-deposit of 10% of Rs. 14,88,370/-, as directed by the learned Judge in the impugned order passed in the writ petition, within the time extended today. On filing of such appeal, the first respondent shall consider the same, without raising any issue relating to limitation, if any and pass appropriate order, on merits and in accordance with law, after affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant, as expeditiously as possible.
Appeal disposed off.
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2023 (12) TMI 1194
Seeking grant of anticipatory bail - scam of availing bogus input tax credit on the basis of forged documents - HELD THAT:- The public exchequer has been cheated. It also appears that upon documents of some other persons registration of the GST has been made to avail false input tax credit. Bogus bills are also prepared for the same and thus the present applicant has played an important role in commission of the offence of economic nature. It also surfaces that money is transferred from one account to another account and such huge loss has been caused to the government exchequer by the petitioner. Hence, serious economic offence is made out against the petitioner, which has wide effect on the society. Thus, the petitioner has failed to make out a case to allow this application and grant of pre-arrest bail. No case is made out to exercise the judicial discretion in favour of the applicant-accused. There is no whisper to indicate that petitioner has been falsely implicated in the offence.
To be noted that, this is an economic offence having huge magnitude needs to be viewed with different approach and to be considered seriously, as it is eroding economic death of the country.
Without expressing any opinion on the merit of the case, this Court is of the view that petitioner cannot be released on pre-arrest bail - Petition dismissed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1193
Validity of SCN issued under Section 73 of the CGST Act, 2017 - Non-application of mind - respondent authorities have alleged that there appears to be non-payment of tax by the petitioner @ 28% and for which also, the explanation has been sought for by the petitioner - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- A plain reading of the Show Cause Notice itself would give a clear indication that the Show Cause Notice lacks necessary information, source and the materials on the basis of which the authority concerned found the necessity for issuance of the Show Cause Notice. The Show Cause Notice, from the plain reading, seems to be one which has been issued in a mechanical manner without application of mind and without any cogent sufficient materials available or even the basic scrutiny or the investigation which were required for the authority concerned in reaching to the conclusion that certain transactions which have been carried on by the respondents appear to have been the transactions where there is evasion of tax or where there is suppression of material facts or atleast there was reasonable suspicion on the transactions so made by the petitioner.
This Court also finds sufficient force in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner when they say that since the proceeding has been initiated under Section 73 of the Act, the very provision of Section 73 of the Act starts with the words where it appears to be for the authority concerned which by itself means that at the time where the authority appears to found it necessary for initiating the proceedings, there ought to had been some material, information or even sort of a complaint available with them as regards the suspicious transactions or the alleged evasion of tax made by the petitioner.
Ex. P1 – Show Cause Notice, dated 30.09.2023 would not be sustainable as they are bereft of facts and materials and the same deserves to be and is accordingly set aside/quashed - petition allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1192
Maintainability of petition - availability of alternative remedy - non-constitution of the tribunal - HELD THAT:- Since the petitioner wants to avail the remedy under the provisions of law by approaching 2nd Appellate Tribunal, which has not yet been constituted, as an interim measure subject to the petitioner depositing entire tax demand within a period of fifteen days from today, the rest of the demand shall remain stayed during the pendency of the writ petition.
The I.A. stands disposed of - List this matter along with W.P.(C) No.6684 of 2023 on the date fixed therein.
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2023 (12) TMI 1191
Maintainability of petition - availability of alternative remedy - non-constitution of the tribunal - HELD THAT:- Since the petitioner wants to avail the remedy under the provisions of law by approaching 2nd Appellate Tribunal, which has not yet been constituted, as an interim measure subject to the petitioner depositing entire tax demand within a period of fifteen days from today, the rest of the demand shall remain stayed during the pendency of the writ petition.
The I.A. stands disposed of - List this matter on 31st October, 2023.
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2023 (12) TMI 1190
Income taxable in India - Fees for Technical Services (FTS) and hence exigible to tax u/s 44DA and Section 115Aof the Income Tax Act, 1961 - PE in India - whether Section 44BB of the Act would be applicable to the respondent/assessee, who is a second line contractor? - HELD THAT:- Delay condoned. We are not inclined to interfere in the matter. The Special Leave Petition stands dismissed.
However, liberty is reserved to the petitioner to raise the issue which arises in this Special Leave Petition, in the event any adverse final order is passed by the High Court against the petitioner herein.
Pending application(s) shall stand disposed of.
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2023 (12) TMI 1189
Compounding of case u/s 279 (2) - alleged offences under Sections 276C and 277 of the Act - Ld' Judge after finding that the Contempt Petition had no merits, proceeded to direct the authority to re-examine the application filed by the respondent herein, in the light of the fresh circular dated 14.06.2019, which provides for a more liberal policy - HELD THAT:- The order of the learned Single Judge insofar as it remits the matter back to the 4th appellant to compound the case by fixing the compound fee, does not warrant interference. We say so, inasmuch as we find that the learned Judge [2019 (9) TMI 59 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] even while remanding the matter, had made it clear that the judgment in Prem Dass case [1999 (2) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT] would apply to the respondent, and further, the respondent herein is entitled to the benefit of Section 279 (1A) of the Act. The revenue having failed to challenge the above order is bound by it.
Ld' Judge had found that the Respondent herein was entitled to compound in terms of Section 279(1A) of the Act, which provides that the assessee would be entitled to compound if the penalty stood reduced or waived under Section 273A of the Act. Importantly, the Supreme Court in Prem Dass case [1999 (2) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT] while construing Section 279(2) of the, Act had rejected the argument that the reduction of penalty by an appellate authority not being an order under Section 273A of the Act, the assessee/applicant would not be entitled to the benefit of Section 279(1A) of the Act and it was held that it may not be appropriate to adopt a literal construction of provisions of Section 279(1A) of the Act.
Respondent would be entitled to the benefit of Section 279(1A) of the Act and the judgment of Supreme Court in Prem Dass case in view of reduction of penalty from 300% to 100% by the appellate authority, the failure of the appellant to challenge, in our view, would prove fatal, to any attempt by the revenue to contend to the contrary.
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2023 (12) TMI 1188
TP Adjustment - International transaction or not? - AMP expenses - HELD THAT:- As we had taken recourse to the decision rendered in Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications India Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT ([2015 (3) TMI 580 - DELHI HIGH COURT] and Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. [2015 (12) TMI 634 - DELHI HIGH COURT]
Thus, having regard to the aforesaid position, the appeal is closed.
We are told that the appellant/revenue has preferred an appeal against the decision rendered in Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications India Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT. [2015 (3) TMI 580 - DELHI HIGH COURT]
Thus as made clear that if the appellant/revenue were to succeed in the pending Special Leave Petition, it would have liberty to approach the court for revival of the instant appeal. Registry will dispatch the copy of the order passed today to the respondent/assessee via all modes, including email.
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2023 (12) TMI 1187
CIT(A) admitting additional evidence and deleted addition - Best judgment assessment - addition were made u/s 69B based on unexplained investment in time deposits - CIT(A) carried out an inquiry in the matter by exercising his powers under Section 250(4) of the Act and evidence was sought with regard to remittances made to the NRE Account maintained with the Canara Bank - Tribunal dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant/revenue and CIT(A) had exercised his powers u/s 250(4) of the Act which was co-equal to that of the AO. It also took note of the fact that notice was issued to the concerned branch of Canara Bank under Section 133(6) of the Act and it was only after information was received from Canara Bank and material evidence furnished by assessee, that the addition was deleted
HELD THAT:- According to us, the Tribunal has reached the correct conclusion. Appellant cannot but accept that the CIT(A) has co-equal powers as that of the AO. The enquiry carried out by the CIT(A) revealed a grave factual error committed by the AO, in noting the figure with regard to the time deposits.
In our opinion, since the CIT(A) has returned a finding of fact with regard to the source of funds that were found deposited in the period in issue, i.e., Rs. 9.50 crores, no interference is called for as these findings have been affirmed by the Tribunal as well. Thus, according to us, no substantial question of law arises for our consideration. No substantial question of law arises for our consideration.
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2023 (12) TMI 1186
Exemption u/s 11 - Application for condonation of delay in filing Form 10B u/s 119(2)(b) rejected - non-filing of the audit report in Form 10B would not be so fatal requiring initiation of proceedings so far as denial of exemption u/s 11 - contention of petitioner all along was that filing of the audit report in Form 10B is only a directory and not mandatory in nature and non-filing of the same cannot be fatal to the exemption which the petitioner is otherwise entitled under Section 11 - HELD THAT:- A plain reading of Section 119(2)(b) clearly indicate that the intention of the framers of the law was to provide a liberal approach where there is a delay occurred. What is necessary to be considered at this juncture also is the fact that the petitioner is a registered establishment u/s 12A - Section 12A of the Act provides tax exemption to charitable trust that is registered with the Income Tax Department. So far as registration is concerned, there no quarrel on the same. The dispute in the present case is only in respect of the assessment order for the Assessment Year 2017-18.
The admitted factual matrix from the facts of the case is that the return of income was filed by the petitioner for the Assessment Year 2017-18 on 02.11.2017. Before filing of the said return itself, the accounts of the petitioner were got audited and the audit report was prepared well in time on 20.09.2017. The due date for filing of the return was on or before 31.10.2017 and the petitioner herein did file his return on 31.10.2017. However, on account of certain defects detected, the same was returned and revised return was filed on 02.11.2017. Thus, the return stands submitted within the time. However, there was a requirement for uploading of the audit report. The audit report meanwhile was uploaded though at a belated stage on 21.02.2019, nonetheless the uploading of the audit report was much before (before 2.5 years) the assessment order dated 24.09.2021 was passed. It is in this factual backdrop that the application for condonation of delay filed by the petitioner ought to have been decided by the authority concerned.
Now if we look into the statutory provisions, what is reflected is that the provisions under Section 119(2)(b) has been enacted with a specific purpose empowering the authorities concerned to condone the delay on the part of the assessee in furnishing or in submitting of the returns or an appropriate application within a reasonable period of time. The said provision of law does not provide for any specific period of time within which the application for condonation of delay needs to be filed. The said provision has also been enacted to ensure that genuine hardship which an assessee may face can be avoided by condoning the delay if any that has occurred and an appropriate application seeking for condonation of delay is filed.
We are inclined to allow the writ petition setting aside the impugned order - consequential order passed subsequent to the rejection of the application under Section 119(2)(b) of the Act would also get automatically quashed and the application of the petitioner for condonation of delay stands allowed. Wherefore the respondent No. 3 would be required to pass an appropriate consequential order in accordance with law.
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2023 (12) TMI 1185
Validity of reopening of assessment u/s 147 - Shorter period to reply notice - it is the contention of the petitioner that the notice issued under Section 148 A (b) dated 23.03.2022 by post was received by the petitioner only on 28.03.2022 i.e. one day, prior to the time fixed for filing reply/objection and therefore, according to the petitioner, in terms of the said provision, notice granting 7 days' time has not been provided - HELD THAT:- Unable to accept the contention of respondent, for, the terms '‘Notice has been Issued'' attains finality only when the notice has been issued/served on the assessee.
In the present case, though the show cause notice calling forth petitioner's reply within 29.03.2022 was dated 23.03.2022, unfortunately, the said notice was received by the petitioner/assessee only on 28.03.2022. Therefore, from 28.03.2022, the period of 7 days has to be reckoned, whereas, in the present case, the respondent has not considered the said aspect and proceeded to pass orders by stating that the petitioner failed to respond to the notice dated 23.03.2022 and hence, the proposals contained in the show cause notice dated 23.03.2023 is confirmed.
Therefore, as rightly pointed out by petitioner, the impugned order suffers from violation of principles of natural justice, since it blatantly violates the provisions of Section 148 (b), AO has to give time not less than seven days but not more than 30 days to the assessee for furnishing his explanation and further, the respondent, despite knowing fully well that the notice served on the petitioner by post was received by him only 28.03.2022, ought to have granted further time, in terms of Section 148 (b) of the Act of not exceeding 30 days, and waited for the petitioner's reply and before passing the impugned order, heard the petitioner and in the absence of same having been failed to be done by the respondent, not only the impugned Notice dated 23.03.2022 has to be quashed and entire proceedings, initiated in furtherance of the same are also to be quashed.
Therefore, the contention of respondent that notice served on the petitioner through e-portal on 23.03.2022, and the same has to be deemed to be sufficient service and the period of 7 days has to be reckoned from such date of issuance has to be brushed aside, since, in terms of Section 282 (1) notice can be served only by adopting the mode of service by post or such other courier service and notice sent by adopting the mode of service by e-mail or e-portal and the same can be considered and adopted in addition to the service effected by physical mode.
This Court is of the view that the show cause notice issued u/s 148 A (b) is not sustainable. So far as the sustainability of the impugned order on the limitation aspect is concerned, since the petitioner/assessee has taken steps to file returns by showing the source of income and the manner of utilization of sale proceeds of agricultural land, as the said issue pertains to the AY 2015-16, obviously, the period of limitation for the said assessment year has come to an end even for service of notice u/s 148A of the Act on 31st March, 2021, this Court is of the view that the impugned proceedings are not sustainable on limitation aspect as well, inasmuch, as the Department failed to take appropriate action at the appropriate time within the limitation period of six years, which is not directory in nature but mandatory, and the respondent-Department having failed to do so, they cannot, all of sudden, on one fine day, attack the petitioner/assessee.
This Court would like observe herein that the Income Tax Department cannot always have the sword of Damocle's dangling over an assessee all the time.
Accordingly, this Writ Petition is allowed, the impugned order dated 23.03.2022 is quashed
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2023 (12) TMI 1184
Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - bogus purchases - case reopened after four years - competent jurisdictional Assessing Officer to issue notice - AO received information from DDIT(Inv.) Mumbai as well as DDIT(Inv), Unit-VI, Jhandewalan, New Delhi and thus made his belief that income of assessee as “escaped assessment” as recorded above.
HELD THAT:- We find merit in the submission of assessee that all the material relating to assessment was available with the Assessing Officer in the original assessment completed u/s 143(3) - AO has nowhere recorded that he obtained any sanction/ approval from Joint-Commissioner of Income-tax as mandated u/s 151(2).
We further find merit in the submission of assessee that jurisdictional AO in case of assessee lies with Assessing Officer at Surat. However, notice under section 148 was issued by AO i.e., ITO Ward-33(2), New Delhi. Thus, the reopening is not only suffering by “satisfaction” from proper approval by competent person as well as the notice under section 148 was not issued by a competent jurisdictional Assessing Officer. Therefore, the reopening as well as issuance of notice under section 148 is bad-in-law. Since the re-opening u/s 147 and issuance of notice under section 148 is bad-in-law, subsequent action initiated thereto have become ab initio.
Considering the fact that we have held the validity of re-opening and issuance of notice under section 148 had invalid, therefore, subsequent action has become ab initio and the ground of assessee succeeds on primary contention raised - Appeal of assessee is allowed.
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2023 (12) TMI 1183
Exemption u/s 11 and 12 - exemption denied as assessee is not engaged in charitable activities - CIT(A) held that the Assessee is a facilitator for arranging funds for charitable organisations, and that the assessee receives fees from the donors as well as the donees - assessee submitted that the activity of the assessee is that it acts as a bridge between the donor and the donee i.e. the activity of the assessee is that on receipt of donation, the assessee identifies suitable recipients, who are not the direct beneficiaries of such donation but are usually other trusts who are engaged in conducting charitable activities. The role of the assessee is to identify such genuine organizations / trusts which are engaged in carrying out charitable activities in the form of giving relief to the poor etc.
HELD THAT:- The assessee had further given the donation to other trusts for the purpose of carrying out charitable work itself would not disentitle the assessee from denial of exemption. Before us, we observe that it is not the case of the Department that the trusts / organisations to whom the assessee had given the donations for carrying out charitable activities had not in fact carried out any charitable activities in the first instance. Secondly, it would be useful to reproduce the relevant extracts of the decision rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority[2022 (10) TMI 948 - SUPREME COURT] as held that while carrying out charitable activities, the assessee trust may also collect nominal cost / consideration with the objective to effectuate the carrying out of the charitable activities. However, this is subject to the condition that such charge is only confined to the extent the same is required for the purpose of carrying out charitable activities and should not take the colour of professional fees / business income.
Thus in interest of justice, the matter is being restored to the file of the AO to analyse the impact of the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decision of AUDA [supra] more specifically on the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court with regards to incidental earning of income, in the light of the assessee’s set of facts.
AO after considering of the facts of the assessee’s case may then decide whether, looking into the assessee’s facts, the assessee is engaged primarily in rendering of services for consideration (retained earnings) or whether looking into the totality of facts of the assessee’s case, it could be inferred that such retained earnings are only kept by the assessee to the extent of facilitating the above activities.
Assessing Officer may also analyse the impact of decisions which have held that the assessee acts as a bridge between the donor and the recipient, even then, looking into the particular facts of assessee’s case, it may be inferred that the assessee is carrying out charitable activities within the meaning of Section 2(15) - Accordingly, looking into the totality of facts of the assessee’s case, the Assessing Officer may also analyse whether the aforesaid decisions have a bearing on the assessee’s set of facts. In the result, the primary matter involved in all the Assessment Years under consideration before us is restored to the file of the Assessing Officer for carrying out the analysis as directed above. Issue raised by the assessee is allowed for statistical purposes.
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2023 (12) TMI 1182
TP adjustment - royalty paid by the assessee to its AE - selection of MAM - Whether CUP is the most appropriate method for benchmarking the royalty payment made by the assessee to its AE; Or “Other Method” can be treated as MAM on the facts of the present case? - HELD THAT:- The method of the assessee can be pigeonholed in the “other method” provided in Rule 10AB r.w.s. 92C (1) and in our opinion this is the MAM in the peculiar facts of the Assessee. Accordingly, we hold that “other method” would be a good substitute for CUP as there is lack of reliable comparables and looking to the fact that the royalty payments have been made for unique intangibles, therefore, we direct the ld. TPO to adopt “other method” as the Most Appropriate Method. However, the working given by the assessee before us as incorporated above needs to be examined afresh by identifying the costs and profits attributable to manufacture and sales to the non-AE and to find out appropriate allocation of the costs and what could be the profits on account of royalty which can be stated to be attributable on account of royalty. The assessee is directed to substitute the working on the basis of “other method”.
The method of the assessee can be pigeonholed in the “other method” provided in Rule 10AB r.w.s. 92C (1) and in our opinion this is the MAM in the peculiar facts of the Assessee. Accordingly, we hold that “other method” would be a good substitute for CUP as there is lack of reliable comparables and looking to the fact that the royalty payments have been made for unique intangibles, therefore, we direct the ld. TPO to adopt “other method” as the Most Appropriate Method.
However, the working given by the assessee before us as incorporated above needs to be examined afresh by identifying the costs and profits attributable to manufacture and sales to the non-AE and to find out appropriate allocation of the costs and what could be the profits on account of royalty which can be stated to be attributable on account of royalty. The assessee is directed to substitute the working on the basis of “other method”. With this direction, all the grounds raised by the assessee are allowed for statistical purposes.
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2023 (12) TMI 1181
Seeking immediate release of the goods without charging any demurrage or rent charges - goods were detained and re-valuation was done - petitioner deposited custom duty on the declared transaction value to take release the goods - HELD THAT:- Since the issue in hand is not res judicata and the same has already been decided by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s Continental Carbon India Ltd. [2015 (10) TMI 2131 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT] where it was held that the respondent was not entitled to charge any demurrage charge from the goods so detained by the custom authorities.
Learned counsel for the respondent heavily relied upon the recent judgement of Delhi High Court in the case of Bhavik S. Thakkar [2023 (2) TMI 681 - DELHI HIGH COURT]. The case is of no help to the respondent as in the aforesaid case, the goods were seized and detained and at the time of confiscating the goods, time was granted to pay the dues but the same was not paid thereafter order was passed by the Settlement Commissioner imposing the penalty of Rs. 2 lakh and fine of Rs. 1 lakh in lieu of confiscation of imported goods. On the said premise, it was held that Settlement Commissioner is not the Court and the order was passed holding that the waiver cannot be granted to the parties therein.
However in the case in hand, the appellate court specifically passed the order in favour of the petitioner holding that the disclosed value was correct - the respondent authority cannot charge the demurrage charges, therefore, no demurrage charges can be charged or demanded from the petitioner.
The petitioner is granted relief to the extent that it would be open for the petitioner to clear off the goods without payment of demurrage charges subject to payment of other charges subsequent to the period of 17.9.2020 till the date of actual clearing off the goods in question - Petition disposed off.
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2023 (12) TMI 1180
Nature of transaction - classification of goods or refund of excess maount - Liability to pay court fees on all the 4191 appeals in terms of section 129A (6) of the Customs Act, 1962 - aggrieved by reassessment, the appellant filed 4191 appeals before Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) who confirmed the assessments in respect of the said bills of entry.
Whether the present appeal relates to the classification of the goods in question or is a simple case of refund of the excess amount? - HELD THAT:- On perusing, the statement of facts in the appeal memorandum, it is found from paragraph 4 that the order of assessment on the bill of entry were challenged in an appeal before Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) challenging the classification concluded by the respondent - Further, in the memo of appeal, the appellant explained the manufacturing process and the use or purpose of the back covers, front cover and the middle cover. Had it been a simple case of refund, there was no scope for urging these facts - Considering the statement of facts as well as the grounds of appeal, the only logical conclusion is that the challenge in the present appeals relates to the issue of classification only and there is not a whisper of the refund claim. The present appeals have not arisen out of the rejection of any refund claim applications. In fact as appears, no such application for refund has been filed by the appellant.
Liability to pay Court fees - HELD THAT:- The provisions of section 129A (6) makes it mandatory for the appellant to deposit the court fees where the demand has been disputed or challenged arising out of assessment or reassessment. The only exception as per the Proviso is where under subsection (2) the Committee of Commissioners decides to file an appeal against the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) or a memorandum of cross objections as provided in subsection (4) is filed. Needless to mention that section 129A (7) even where an application for rectification of mistake (ROM) and restoration of an appeal (ROA) is filed the party has to deposit Rs 500/- as court fees and the only exception is where an application has been filed by or on behalf of the Principal Commissioner of Customs or Commissioner of Customs no such fee shall be payable.
Reliance placed on the decision of this Tribunal in the case of E-BIZ. COM PVT. LTD. VERSUS COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, NOIDA [2008 (9) TMI 55 - CESTAT NEW DELHI], where the controversy related to the provisions of Section 86(6) of the Finance Act, 1994 which are pari-materia to the provisions of section 129A (6) of the Act and hence it squarely applies to the present case.
Once the duty is paid ‘under protest’ and the party challenges the same by filing an appeal, it necessarily implies that demand of duty is disputed and consequently the case would fall under section 129A (6) of the Act and the party would be liable to pay the court fees on such appeal being filed.
The reasoning adopted by the appellant that it is not a case of demand of duty is basically frivolous as had it not been so there was no scope to file the present appeals challenging the impugned order. The objection raised by the Registry of the deficit court fees in filing the present appeals is justified. The appellant is, accordingly directed to deposit the requisite court fees in terms of section 129A (6) of the Act within a period of two weeks from the date of the order.
Application disposed off.
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2023 (12) TMI 1179
Benefit of concessional rate of CVD as per Notification No. 12/2012 dated 17.03.2012 - Polyester Staple Fibre (PSF) recycle - HELD THAT:- The appellant has declared the goods as Polyester Staple Fibre recycled which indicate that the goods are manufactured from waste. However, the plea of the appellant whether they are eligible for Notification No. 12/2012-CE dated 17.03.2012 has to be verified.
It is opined that the matter can be remanded to the original authority who is directed to verify whether the appellant is eligible for the benefit of Notification No. 12/2012 dated 17.03.2012. The original authority shall also consider the decisions relied upon by the appellant which have considered the very same issue and noted the retrospective application of Notification No. 12/2012.
The impugned order is set aside. The appeal is allowed by way of remand to the adjudicating authority.
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9911796707
