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Showing 301 to 320 of 453 Records
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1996 (2) TMI 153
Issues involved: The issues involved in this case include the availing of Modvat credit, imposition of penalty under Rule 173Q, and the interpretation of procedural rules related to Central Excise.
Summary:
The petitioner, a manufacturer of excisable goods, filed a Writ Petition seeking relief from a penalty imposed under Rule 173Q for availing Modvat credit on imported Vinyl Chloride Monomer (VCM). The petitioner contended that they had complied with Modvat rules, but faced challenges when the Assistant Collector refused to deface Bill of Entries and insisted on supplementary gate passes. Despite compliance, the Assistant Collector imposed a penalty of Rs. 42,00,000 under Rule 173Q. The petitioner appealed, and the penalty was reduced to Rs. 2 lakhs by the Collector of Customs & Excise (Appeals). Subsequently, the Tribunal confirmed the penalty, leading the petitioner to file a Writ Petition challenging the decision.
The Tribunal acknowledged the petitioner's plea of paying substantial duties annually and the inadvertent nature of the Modvat credit availed. The petitioner argued that the penalty was disproportionate and not warranted for a procedural lapse. The Court noted the bona fides of the petitioner and the genuine difficulty faced in implementing procedures. While recognizing limitations in interfering with factual findings, the Court remitted the matter to the Assistant Collector for reconsideration based on the arguments presented, emphasizing the need to assess the leviability of the penalty in the specific circumstances of the case.
In conclusion, the Writ Petition was disposed of with directions to the Assistant Collector to review the matter considering the arguments raised by the petitioner and the factual findings of the previous authorities.
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1996 (2) TMI 152
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the ex parte order under appeal should be set aside due to the appellant's failure to submit a written representation being attributed to his counsel's fault.
2. Whether the order under appeal is bad for non-compliance with Rule 233A of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.
3. Whether the respondent complied with the provisions of Rule 173Q of the Central Excise Rules, 1944.
4. Whether the order under appeal is incompetent and liable to be set aside for violation of the maxim "nemo judex in re sua."
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Ex Parte Order and Counsel's Fault
The court examined whether the ex parte order dated June 19, 1986, should be set aside and the appellant given a fresh opportunity to file a written representation. The appellant's failure to submit the representation was attributed to his counsel's fault. The court emphasized the principles of natural justice, fairness, and reasonableness. It was noted that the appellant had entrusted the matter to his advocate, who failed to act promptly. The court held that the consequences of the counsel's inaction should not be borne by the appellant. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision emphasizing that an innocent litigant should not suffer due to his advocate's fault. The court concluded that the ex parte order should be set aside, granting the appellant a fresh opportunity to file the representation.
Issue 2: Non-Compliance with Rule 233A
The court did not find it necessary to answer this issue separately, as the ex parte order was already set aside based on the first issue. The non-compliance with Rule 233A, which mandates a reasonable opportunity of being heard, was rendered moot by the setting aside of the ex parte order.
Issue 3: Compliance with Rule 173Q
Similarly, the court did not address this issue separately. The provisions of Rule 173Q, which involve the confiscation of land, building, plant, machinery, etc., were not examined independently as the ex parte order was already quashed.
Issue 4: Violation of "Nemo Judex in Re Sua"
The court also did not find it necessary to address this issue independently. The question of the adjudicating authority's potential bias due to involvement in sanctioning rewards was not separately analyzed, given the setting aside of the ex parte order.
Conclusion:
The court quashed the ex parte order dated June 19, 1986, and directed the adjudicating authority to proceed de novo with the show cause notice dated January 29, 1986. The appellant was granted 30 days from receipt of the relevant documents to file a written representation. The court emphasized the importance of fairness and reasonableness, ensuring that the appellant was not penalized for his counsel's fault. The adjudicating authority was instructed to complete the proceedings expeditiously, and the appellant was restrained from dealing with his immovable properties pending the completion of the adjudication.
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1996 (2) TMI 151
Issues:
1. Petition for quashing order of Customs, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal.
2. Consideration of financial position for waiver of excise duty pre-deposit.
3. Allegations of defective forgings and transfer without permission.
Detailed Analysis:
1. The petitioner sought a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Customs, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, which rejected the petitioner's application for waiver in part. The dispute arose from a demand of excise duty of Rs. 2,86,036 imposed by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, which was challenged by the petitioner before the Tribunal. The Tribunal directed the petitioner to deposit Rs. 1 lac instead of the full amount under Section 35F of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
2. The petitioner contended that the impugned order did not consider the balance-sheet of the company and failed to acknowledge the petitioner's financial constraints. However, the court found no merit in these arguments. The court observed that the petitioner did not provide substantial evidence to support their claim of financial hardship. The balance-sheet as of March 31, 1995, did not conclusively prove the inability to pay the required deposit. The court noted the petitioner's stock in trade and outstanding debtors, indicating potential liquidity.
3. The issue of defective forgings and their transfer without permission was also raised. The Tribunal had considered this aspect and concluded that it was a factual matter requiring evidence for resolution. The petitioner's argument that the forgings were treated as scrap was contested, alleging a violation of rules under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The court found no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's decision, deeming it reasonable and based on judicial considerations.
In conclusion, the court dismissed the writ petition, stating that the order of the Appellate Tribunal was justified. The petitioner was given two months to deposit the required amount, with the appeal to be decided thereafter.
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1996 (2) TMI 150
Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of Notification No. 211 of 1982 regarding excise duty on base fabrics and embroidery.
2. Applicability of Rule 96DD for removal of cotton fabrics for embroidery without payment of duty.
3. Requirement to pay excise duty on base fabrics for goods exported under bond.
4. Validity of the orders demanding excise duty on base fabrics before removal for embroidery.
5. Relevance of rebate claims exceeding excise duty paid.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Interpretation of Notification No. 211 of 1982:
The main question revolves around the interpretation of Notification No. 211 of 1982, which sets the excise duty rate for embroidery machines. The notification specifies that the rate of duty per meter length of the machine per shift is in addition to the duty leviable on the base fabrics used for embroidery. However, it does not state that excise duty on base fabrics must be paid at the time of removal for embroidery or simultaneously with the duty on embroidery.
2. Applicability of Rule 96DD:
Rule 96DD allows the removal of cotton fabrics from one factory to another for embroidery without payment of duty, provided the prescribed procedure is followed. Sub-rule (3) clarifies that if the embroidered fabrics are cleared for home consumption, the duty is payable at the time of such clearance. The rule does not require payment of duty on base fabrics at the time of removal for embroidery.
3. Requirement to Pay Excise Duty on Base Fabrics for Exported Goods:
Rule 13 permits the export of goods without payment of duty from a licensed factory, provided the export is made according to the specified procedure and a bond is executed. The petitioners exported embroidered cotton fabrics under bond, thus exempting them from paying excise duty on the base fabrics. The purpose of Rule 13 is to grant exemption from duty for exported goods, and it is not subject to Rule 96DD or Rule 96ZI.
4. Validity of Orders Demanding Excise Duty on Base Fabrics:
The orders dated 8th June 1987, 9th October 1987, and 19th October 1987, which demanded excise duty on base fabrics before removal for embroidery, were found to be against the statutory rules. The orders misinterpreted Proviso (1) to Notification No. 211/82, which does not mandate such payment. The subsequent Trade Notices clarified that base fabrics duty should be collected only after embroidery and at the time of clearance for home consumption or export.
5. Relevance of Rebate Claims Exceeding Excise Duty Paid:
The contention that the petitioners received more rebate than the excise duty paid was deemed irrelevant. The rebate is claimed on embroidered fabrics, not on base fabrics, and is governed by Rule 12 and Notification No. 162/69. The rebate rates are fixed per square meter and are not linked to the excise duty paid.
Conclusion:
The court concluded that the impugned orders were unjustified and against statutory rules. The orders demanding excise duty on base fabrics at the time of removal for embroidery were quashed. The respondents were restrained from taking further action based on the impugned show cause notices, which were also quashed. The petition was allowed, and the rule was made absolute with no order as to costs. The issuance of a certified copy of the judgment was expedited.
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1996 (2) TMI 149
Issues Involved:
1. Classification of products under Tariff Item 3402.90.
2. Eligibility for exemption from excise duty under Notification No. 101 of 1966 as amended by Notification No. 4 of 1968.
3. Validity of final approval of classification lists subject to the Deputy Chief Chemist's report.
4. Refund of excise duty amounting to Rs. 12,70,274.62.
5. Applicability of amended Section 11B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
1. Classification of Products under Tariff Item 3402.90:
The Petitioners manufacture products "INDOSTAT SF52" and "INDOSTAT SF", which they claim are classifiable under Tariff Item 3402.90. These products were initially classified under old Tariff Item 15AA. The Petitioners argue that the products are emulsifiers and should be exempt from excise duty under the relevant Notifications.
2. Eligibility for Exemption from Excise Duty under Notification No. 101 of 1966 as Amended by Notification No. 4 of 1968:
The Petitioners contend that their products are covered under Notification No. 101 of 1966, which exempts "Emulsifiers, wetting out agents; softeners and other like preparations intended for use in any industrial process." This Notification was amended by Notification No. 4/68-C.E., dated January 20, 1968. The Petitioners argue that they meet the conditions stipulated in the Notification for exemption.
3. Validity of Final Approval of Classification Lists Subject to the Deputy Chief Chemist's Report:
The Petitioners submitted fresh classification lists, which were provisionally approved and later treated as finally approved, subject to the Deputy Chief Chemist's report. The Petitioners argue that the final approval should not be subject to the report of the Deputy Chief Chemist.
4. Refund of Excise Duty Amounting to Rs. 12,70,274.62:
The Petitioners seek a refund of Rs. 12,70,274.62, consisting of two amounts: Rs. 7,54,714.70 and Rs. 5,15,559.92. The first amount was conceded by the 2nd Respondent, and the Petitioners were directed to take credit for this amount in their Personal Ledger Account. The second amount was paid under protest. The Court made a distinction between the two amounts, permitting the Petitioners to withdraw the first amount by executing a bond and the second amount by furnishing a Bank Guarantee.
5. Applicability of Amended Section 11B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944:
The Court considered whether the Petitioners' claim for refund of Rs. 5,15,559.92 is subject to the amended provisions of Section 11B, which requires that no refund shall be made except as provided in sub-section (2) of Section 11B. The Court held that the Petitioners' claim for refund of the second amount is subject to the amended provisions of Section 11B.
Judgment:
The Court found merit in the Petitioners' contentions regarding the classification of their products and their eligibility for exemption under the relevant Notifications. The Court held that the Petitioners are entitled to the benefit of the exemption Notification as they have satisfied the conditions stipulated therein. The Court also held that the Petitioners are entitled to a refund of Rs. 7,54,714.70, which was already granted under the Assessment Memorandum issued on 25th June 1986. However, the refund of Rs. 5,15,559.92 is subject to the amended provisions of Section 11B of the Act. The Court directed the Petitioners to deposit this amount along with interest and directed the 2nd Respondent to reconsider the refund claim in light of the amended provisions.
Order:
1. Rule is made partly absolute in terms of prayer (a) of the Petition.
2. The Petitioners are directed to deposit Rs. 5,15,559.92 along with interest within four weeks.
3. In case of non-compliance, the Respondents may encash the Bank Guarantees.
4. The 2nd Respondent is directed to reconsider the refund claim of Rs. 5,15,559.92 in light of the amended provisions of the Act.
5. The Petition is disposed of with no order as to costs.
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1996 (2) TMI 148
Issues: Classification of Decorative Laminated Sheets under Central Excise Tariff
Issue 1: Classification of Decorative Laminated Sheets under Central Excise Tariff
The judgment revolves around the classification of Decorative Laminated Sheets under the Central Excise Tariff. The Petitioner contested the classification under Tariff Item 15(A)(2) by challenging two orders from the Assistant Collector and the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals). The manufacturing process involves impregnating base paper with a solution, laminating it under heat and pressure to produce Decorative Laminated Sheets. The authorities classified the product under Tariff Item 15(A)(2) due to the use of laminating solution as the main raw material. The Petitioner argued against this classification, citing precedents and interpretations from the Supreme Court and Gujarat High Court regarding the classification of products made partially from plastic materials.
Analysis:
The Assistant Collector and the Appellate Collector classified the Decorative Laminated Sheets under Tariff Item 15(A)(2) based on the predominant use of the laminating solution as the main raw material. The Petitioner challenged this classification by referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Geep Flashlight Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, emphasizing the interpretation of "articles made of plastic" under Tariff Item 15(A)(2). The Gujarat High Court's decision in Bhor Industries v. Union of India was also cited to support the argument that products made partially from plastic should not be automatically classified under Tariff Item 15(A)(2). The Court agreed with the Petitioner's contention, ruling that Decorative Laminated Sheets should not be classified under Tariff Item 15(A)(2) but did not provide a definitive classification under Tariff Item 17 or 68, remanding the matter back to the appellate authority for further consideration.
Conclusion:
The Court set aside the impugned orders classifying the Decorative Laminated Sheets under Tariff Item 15(A)(2) and directed a reconsideration of the classification under either Tariff Item 17 or 68. The judgment highlights the importance of interpreting tariff classifications based on the predominant materials and characteristics of the product, as established through legal precedents and industry standards.
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1996 (2) TMI 147
The Supreme Court of India ordered that a Committee of the Secretaries of the Central Government will decide on the matter involving a Central Government Corporation within three months. The Special leave petition was dismissed as withdrawn. (Citation: 1996 (2) TMI 147 - SC Order)
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1996 (2) TMI 146
Issues:
Challenge to order directing pre-deposit of funds under Central Excises and Salt Act - Failure to consider financial hardship and prima facie case - Interpretation of clubbing of clearances under Central Excises and Salt Act.
Analysis:
The judgment involved two writ petitions challenging an order directing the petitioner to pre-deposit a sum of Rs. 3.50 lakhs under the Central Excises and Salt Act. The petitioners sought a waiver of the pre-deposit based on financial hardship and a strong prima facie case. The court noted that the 1st respondent failed to consider the prima facie case and financial position of the petitioners adequately. The court highlighted that the petitioners had a negative net current asset and a significant accumulated loss, which the 1st respondent did not take into account. The court criticized the 1st respondent for mechanically directing the deposit without proper reasoning or analysis of the petitioners' case.
The judgment also discussed the interpretation of clubbing of clearances under the Central Excises and Salt Act. The court referred to a clarificatory Trade Notice issued by the Government of India and the Central Board of Excise and Customs, emphasizing that different firms should be treated as separate manufacturers. The court held that each limited company is a manufacturer by itself and entitled to a separate exemption limit. The court found that the 2nd respondent, as an adjudicating authority, failed to follow this principle, and the 1st respondent, as the appellate Tribunal, should have noticed a prima facie case based on this principle.
In conclusion, the court allowed both writ petitions and quashed the impugned order directing the pre-deposit. The court highlighted the failure of the authorities to consider the financial hardship and prima facie case of the petitioners adequately. The judgment emphasized the importance of proper analysis and reasoning in such decisions and the need to follow established principles in interpreting relevant laws like the Central Excises and Salt Act.
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1996 (2) TMI 145
Whether the value of C.F.Cs. should be included in the value of refrigerators for the purpose of value under Section 4 of the Central Excise Act?
Held that:- On a consideration of the relevant circumstances mentioned supra including the fact that Godrej has paid up all amounts due accepting the contentions of the Revenue, we think that an order levying penal interest would meet the ends of justice instead of the direction for prosecution made in the impugned order.
Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Company Private Ltd. shall pay penal interest at the rate of twenty per cent per annum on all the amounts which were withheld by it, for the period commencing March 1, 1979, whether on the basis of the Order of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court dated March 10, 1984 [allowing Writ Petition No. 1110/83] or otherwise as well as on the amounts which it had obtained by way of refund but which it ultimately paid back to the Revenue. The interest shall be payable for the period commencing from the date when the said amount/amounts became due and payable and ending with the last date of full payment. The observations in the nature of qualifications or reservations contained in the Order [Minutes of the Order] dated March 12, 1990, insofar as they relate to inclusion of value of C.F.Cs. in the value of refrigerators shall stand deleted. In other words, Godrej shall not dispute the inclusion of the value of C.F.Cs. in the value of refrigerators for the period covered by the demand notices impugned in Writ Petition No. 1110/83 and upto March 12, 1990, the date of "Minutes of the Order" aforesaid.
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1996 (2) TMI 144
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal against the Bombay High Court judgment in a customs duty refund case involving P.V.C. resin import. The High Court had granted the refund, but the Supreme Court held that the respondent was not entitled to full exemption under an earlier notification as they opened letters of credit after a subsequent notification limiting the exemption. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment, following a previous decision on similar notifications. No costs were awarded.
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1996 (2) TMI 143
Issues involved:
Jurisdiction of Delhi High Court to entertain writ petition challenging levy of countervailing duty on imported goods.
Summary:
The appellants imported partially oriented yarn (POY) and claimed exemption from countervailing duty under a notification issued u/r 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules. The dispute was whether the imported POY fell within a specific denier range for exemption. The authorities assessed the POY under a Circular issued by the Central Board of Excise & Customs. The appellants argued that duty should be levied at the time of import, not after undergoing a process, citing relevant judgments.
The learned counsel for the respondent acknowledged the validity of the judgments supporting the appellants' position. The Delhi High Court's jurisdiction to hear the writ petition was established based on the issuance of the circular in Delhi. The Customs Tariff Act mandates duty to be levied on goods as imported. The POY in question fell within a specific denier range and was liable to duty as per the exemption notification.
The Supreme Court allowed the Civil Appeal, setting aside the Delhi High Court's order, and also allowed the Writ Petition filed by the appellants. The bank guarantee furnished by the appellants was discharged. No costs were awarded in this matter.
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1996 (2) TMI 142
The petitioner challenged the seizure of his truck by Excise officials, seeking release or reduction of security demanded. The truck was seized for alleged smuggling, but court found seizure not legally permissible as goods were not yet loaded. The court quashed the seizure order and directed the truck's release to the petitioner. (Case Citation: 1996 (2) TMI 142 - High Court of Judicature at Allahabad)
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1996 (2) TMI 141
Issues Involved:
Appeal dismissed due to delay in filing, Interpretation of statutory provision, Service of orders, Barred by limitation under Section 35 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, Rebuttal of presumption of service.
Analysis:
The High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam considered two petitions where the appeals before the Customs, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal were dismissed due to being filed after the statutory time limit prescribed by Section 35 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory provisions and the significance of timely filing of appeals to avoid unjust outcomes. The Court referred to previous decisions, including one by the Supreme Court, highlighting the need to balance procedural rules with the administration of justice.
The Court acknowledged the arguments presented by the respondents' counsel in support of the impugned orders but stressed the need to prevent meritorious matters from being dismissed due to procedural delays. It emphasized that the law of limitation and procedure serve crucial functions in ensuring a fair and efficient judicial process. The Court underscored the importance of balancing technical considerations with the overarching goal of achieving substantial justice.
In analyzing the issue of service of orders, the Court noted discrepancies in the delivery of the orders to the petitioner-appellant. Despite the Department's assertion that the orders were dispatched and delivered on a specific date, evidence suggested otherwise. The Court highlighted the lack of conclusive proof of service, particularly due to the incorrect delivery of the orders to a different entity. This raised doubts regarding the presumption of service and warranted further examination.
Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, directing respondent No. 2 to address specific questions of law related to the timeliness of the appeals and the rebuttal of the presumption of service. The Court's decision underscored the need for a just and pragmatic approach in legal proceedings, ensuring that technicalities do not overshadow the pursuit of justice. The order was to be communicated to the relevant appellate tribunal for further action in light of the Court's findings.
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1996 (2) TMI 140
The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad ordered the refund of a pre-deposit of rupees one lakh to the petitioner as the appeal was disposed of and the order of the adjudicating authority was set aside by the Appellate Tribunal. Respondent No. 2 was directed to refund the amount within two weeks. [Citation: 1996 (2) TMI 140]
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1996 (2) TMI 139
The Supreme Court granted leave in a case involving a demand for duty payment based on provisional assessment. The Court noted a final assessment had been made, rendering the provisional assessment unnecessary. The appeal was deemed infructuous, and the Court directed payment of any amount due with interest at 18% per annum from a specified date. If a refund is due, it should also include interest. The appeal was disposed of with no costs awarded.
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1996 (2) TMI 138
Whether the goods manufactured prior to March 1, 1978 but removed on or after March 1, 1978 are liable to pay the special duty of excise?
Held that:- The goods manufactured/produced before March 1, 1978 but cleared on or after March 1, 1978 are not exigible to special excise duty. At the same time, we have also expressed the view that the goods manufactured/produced on or before February 28, 1979 but cleared thereafter would be liable to pay the said duty at the rate and valuation in force as on February 28, 1979. In the light of the fact that the duty was continued from 1978 to 1986, indeed upto February 28, 1989 and also in view of the principle behind the presumption incorporated in Section 12B of the Central Excise Act inserted by the Central Excises and Customs Law (Amendment) Act, 1991 - which is but a legislative recognition of a widely accepted presumption - we think it appropriate to direct that the assessees shall not be entitled to refund of any amount collected from them by way of special excise duty on or after March 1, 1978 in respect of goods manufactured prior to the said date. Looked at from the standpoint of avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings and of unending legal quibbling also, it is desirable to give a quietus to this controversy. To avoid any discriminatory consequences, it is further directed that if any amounts are due and are yet to be recovered in respect of such goods on account of special excise duty, the same can be recovered according to law. In favour of assessee.
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1996 (2) TMI 137
Whether prosecution against valiant and dutiful Customs Officer who risked his life to fight the mighty under-world of smugglers; unarmed and single-handedly and he succeeded after hot chase on his motorcycle - smuggler being in a car. The result was smuggling of gold worth ₹ 8 crores was prevented be allowed?
Held that:- We have all praise for such an officer and we would not allow him to be prosecuted, much though the smugglers would want it to be so. Indeed the appellant is being persecuted, not prosecuted, as the action smacks of revenge seeking to take his life because he has taken the life of a smuggler; of course, one close to political high ups of Goa. Let this not be countenanced. Let this head-hunting be not permitted. Appeal allowed. The prosecution against the appellant is, therefore, quashed.
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1996 (2) TMI 136
Issues involved: Show cause notice for denial of refund claim u/s 11B of Central Excise Rules and Act, 1944 for deposit made under Section 35F for appeal remedy.
Summary:
The High Court of Bombay heard a case where a show cause notice was issued by the Superintendent (Tech.) Central Excise to the petitioner, questioning the refund claim for Excise Duty and Redemption fine paid amounting to Rs. 14,07,410, deposited under Section 35F for appeal remedy. The Appellate Tribunal had allowed the petitioner's appeal with consequential relief, but the refund of the deposited amount was denied, leading to the issuance of the impugned show cause notice under Section 11B. The Court found the Department's claim in the notice to be dishonest and baseless, stating that Section 11B cannot be applicable to a deposit made under Section 35F, as it is not a payment of Duty but a pre-deposit for appeal rights, mandating refund upon appeal success.
Regarding the deposit under Section 35F, the Court held that the doctrine of unjust enrichment does not apply. Consequently, the petition was successful, and the impugned show cause notice was quashed. The respondents were directed to refund the deposited amount of Rs. 14,07,410 along with 15% interest per annum from the date of the Appellate Tribunal's order on 30th November 1993. The rule was made absolute in the stated terms, and the respondents were ordered to pay the petitioners the costs of the petition.
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1996 (2) TMI 135
Issues Involved: Interpretation of import policy and customs tariff regarding miniaturised switches for hearing aids.
Summary:
The case involved a dispute over the importation of miniaturised switches for electronic hearing aids, specifically reed switches, by the respondent. The Customs authorities contended that the import license did not cover reed switches, leading to a disagreement over the concessional rate of import duty. The High Court, in its order, highlighted the Customs authorities' static interpretation of the term "switches, miniaturised" and emphasized the dynamic nature of the industry due to continuous technical progress. The High Court ruled in favor of the respondent, stating that reed switches were covered by the tariff entry and noting that there was no evidence of diversion of the imported switches for purposes other than manufacturing hearing aids.
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, emphasizing that progress should not be hindered by rigid interpretations of import policies or customs tariffs. It stressed that both should be interpreted based on the date of importation, allowing for the importation of items reasonably covered, regardless of whether they were in existence or contemplated at the time of policy formulation. The appeal was dismissed, and the bank guarantee provided by the respondent was discharged without any costs imposed.
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1996 (2) TMI 134
The Supreme Court held that the Central Government had jurisdiction to exercise power of revision before the constitution of CEGAT. The issue of excisability of acetylene gas for excise duty was pending before a Constitution Bench in C.A. No. 2062/79, so the decision was deferred until the Constitution Bench's ruling. The case was listed for further proceedings after the decision in C.A. 2062/79.
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