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Showing 1 to 9 of 9 Records

• 1952 (6) TMI 23
  
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  ... ... ..... n to serious challenge. In Withers ( Inspector of Taxes) v. Nethersole 1948 16 ITR Suppl. 92 at p. 95, Lord Viscount Simon said - "The question of law is whether the facts set out in the case, and the documents annexed to it, establish that the amount paid to the respondent under the agreement of June 27, 1939, is 'annual profits or gains', falling under Case VI of Schedule D". In the present case the question is whether the security deposit received for the purpose of ensuring the return of empty bottles is assessable income under Section 10 of the Act. In my opinion the judgment of the House of Lords in Nethersole' s case (supra) governs the case. For the foregoing reasons, I am not satisfied with the correctness of the decision of the Tribunal so far as question No. 1 is concerned. That being so, I would require the Tribunal to state the case in the several matters and refer for decision to this Court question No. 1 set out above. Khosla, J.-I agree.

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• 1952 (6) TMI 22
  
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  ... ... ..... f law does not make the decision of a Tribunal with jurisdiction bad on the ground that it has erred in law and the error is apparent on the face of the record. We have had occasion several times to point out that only that error will be corrected by this Court which is clearly apparent on the face of the record and which does not become apparent only by a process of examination or argument. With some hesitation Mr. Phadke has also attempted to argue that the decision of the Tribunal with regard to the competency of Rule 17 (4) is a decision as to jurisdiction. It is obviously not. because Rule 17 (4) has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, hut it has something to do with the jurisdiction of the Municipality, and the Tribunal was perfectly competent to decide whether the Municipality was right in dismissing its servant under Rule 17 (4). (9) The result is that the petitioner fails. Rule discharged. No order as to costs. Rule discharged. (10) Rule discharged.

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• 1952 (6) TMI 21
  
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  ... ... ..... were sales to the Ministry of Industry and Supply which as a re-designation of the former Department of Industries and Supplies was really the bigger department, formed on amalgamation of the preexisting Supply Department and Industries and Civil Supplies Department etc. of the Government of India, and, thus, in the light of what I have said above, the disputed sales would not be entitled to protection. This appeal, therefore, ought to succeed on the merits too. It is true that the statute in question, being a taxing or fiscal statute, should be strictly construed against the taxing authority but it seems to me that the construction which I have put above on the relevant statu- tory provision is the only possible and reasonable construction in the true context of things and does not offend against that rule of strict construc- tion. In the circumstances, the appellants claim ought to prevail. I agree, therefore, that this appeal should be allowed with costs. Appeal allowed.

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• 1952 (6) TMI 20
  
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  ... ... ..... lify for exemption totally until 8th December, 1950, whereafter it will be liable to be taxed at three pies in the rupee like ordinary vegetable oils. When it is realised that Cocogem is more ex- pensive than hydrogenated oils, known commercially as Vanaspati, the result to my mind is apparently one that could not have been intended by the Legislature. But, as this particular legal provision has been worded at present, the case must be decided in favour of the applicant, which I do accordingly. The application for revision is, therefore, allowed and the assessment made in respect of sales of Cocogem is cancelled. I must note that this case relates to the first quarter -1st June, 1947, to 30th September, 1947. The position in respect of assess- ment for the period 11th April, 1949, and 8th December, 1950, might well be different, having regard to the entry in column 3 against this item (item 14) in Schedule 11 as amended with effect from 11th April, 1949. Ordered accordingly.

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• 1952 (6) TMI 19
  
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  ... ... ..... ining to grant the applica- tion. Any action to the contrary on his part would have been illegal, on the analogy of the general legal principles stated in Section 40(3) of the C.P. Land Revenue Act or Section 39(3) of the Berar Land Revenue Code. The so-called appeal is misconceived and is rejected. Appeal rejected.

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• 1952 (6) TMI 18
  

  Penalty for wrongful with holding of property

  
  
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  ... ... ..... nto custodia legis. He has also argued that in order to make out an offence under section 282-A of the Indian Companies Act the accused must be holding the post of director, managing agent, manager, officer or other employee of a company at the date of the complaint. At this stage I am not concerned with the merits of these objections and I do not express any opinion on them. It is open to him to urge these points when the case goes back to the trial court for proceedings according to law or bring this matter to the notice of the court by means of a proper application stating the grounds on which he bases his prayer for quashing these proceedings. I am of opinion that the order of the Magistrate refusing to entertain the complaint is clearly wrong and must be set aside. I accordingly accept this reference, set aside the order of the trial court refusing to entertain the complaint and direct that the case shall be sent back to the court concerned for disposal according to law.

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• 1952 (6) TMI 17
  

  Compromise and arrangement

  
  
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  ... ... ..... bjection also is one that can be raised at the meeting. Even if the scheme is approved by not less than 3/4th of the members it can come into effect only if it is sanctioned by the court and the court will have to consider all objections relating to the scheme at the time of according sanction. The court below rejected the petition of the official liquidator as if it were one for sanctioning the scheme proposed by him. The prayer in the petition is only for a direction to convene a meeting for considering the proposal. We find no reason why such permission should not be granted. We, therefore, set aside the order of the lower court and direct the appellant to convene a meeting of the members of the company as prayed for by him. He will take the necessary directions from the court below relating to the time and place of the meeting. The expenses for convening the meeting will be met from the assets of the company. The appeal is thus allowed. There will be no order as to costs.

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• 1952 (6) TMI 16
  

  Winding up - Power of registrar to strike defunct company off register

  
  
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  ... ... ..... The court below in decreeing the suit gave certain directions in respect of the deposit of the balance purchase money by the plaintiff in the earlier suit. These directions will be regarded as having been embodied in the judgment of the earlier suit and the relief given will be on condition of his paying the balance purchase money payable by him. We are told that the plaintiff has deposited in court the balance purchase money pursuant to the directions contained in the judgment of the court below. With these observations A. S. 285/1122 must be allowed with costs to be paid by the company to the appellant. The company will also pay the costs of both the defendants in the court below, here and in that court. The appeal having been permitted to be filed in forma pauperis the appellant is directed to pay the court fee due to the State. There was no appearance before us on behalf of the liquidator. The memorandum of cross objection filed by the 1st respondent company is dismissed.

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• 1952 (6) TMI 1
  

  Writ jurisdiction - Natural justice - Adjudication - Confiscation, fine - Charge-sheet

  
  
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  ... ... ..... ion in contravention of the provisions of any law which becomes void with respect of the exercise of any fundamental rights the inconsistent law is not wiped out so far as the past act is concerned. 25.In the case before me the offence was no doubt committed in 1949 but the order or confiscation and imposition of penalty which is challenged as being made in violation of the principles of natural justice was passed on the 19th May 1950. It is this order which furnished the cause of action for the petitioner applying for the writ under Art. 226. Until the order was made the petitioner had no right to apply for writ under Art. 226. The act complained of being one which was done after the Constitution came into force, the case of Keshav Menon v. State of Bombay does not assist the argument of Mr. Chaudhury. 26.In view however of my findings on the other points the petition must fail. The Rule is accordingly discharged. The petitioner must pay the costs of the present proceedings.

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