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Showing 1 to 20 of 40 Records
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1954 (10) TMI 58
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... ... ..... ready observed to prove the source and nature of the money which he miserably failed to discharge. The Appellate Tribunal was perfectly entitled to decide this question of fact by drawing an adverse inference against the assessee because of his failure to discharge the onus that lay on him and where the question has not passed from the region of fact into the region of law, the High Court has no authority to interfere with the finding of the Tribunal. In the present case I am satisfied that the Appellate Tribunal has not committed any error of law in coming to the finding on the question referred. Thus it follows that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the conclusion reached by the Appellate Tribunal. The question referred to the High Court, therefore, must be answered against the assessee and in favour of the Income-tax department. The assessee must pay costs of the reference. Hearing fee Rs. 250. RAMASWAMI, J.―I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (10) TMI 57
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... ... ..... t. Now, Section 14 provides for exclusion of time spent in proceedings taken 'bona fide' in a Court without jurisdiction. In the circumstances of this case I am unable to hold that the provisions of this section are applicable and that there was anything bona fide in filing the application in the Court of the District Judge. Every Advocate appearing in the District Courts should know that the power of distribution is vested in the Senior Subordinate Judge, and not in the District Judge and also that the suits are to be instituted in the Court of the lowest jurisdiction, In my opinion therefore in the present case even though the words may be "subject to the control of the District Judge" the suit cannot be held to be instituted except on 17-4-1950 and I would therefore allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the Senior Subordinate Judge and restore that of the trial Court. In the circumstances of this case the parties will bear their own costs throughout.
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1954 (10) TMI 56
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... ... ..... nsideration of the situation that arises in this case we have reached the decision that the dignity of the High Court would be sufficiently upheld if the unqualified apology tendered in this Court in the first instance and reiterated in absolute terms by Dr. Tek Chand again at the next hearing is accepted and that apology is regarded as sufficient to purge the contempt. The matter has become very stale and the ends of justice do not call for maintaining the punishment of fine on two senior counsel for acting wrongly under an erroneous impression of their rights and privileges. 19. For the reasons given above we allow this appeal to the extent that the sentence of fine passed on both the appellants is set aside, and the unqualified apology given by them to this Court and the High Court is accepted. We also desire to issue a strong admonition and warning to the two counsel for their conduct. There will be no order as to costs in these proceedings throughout. 20. Appeal allowed.
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1954 (10) TMI 55
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... ... ..... hajan J. (as he then was) has observed When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purpose and between what persons the statutory fiction in to be resorted to and full effect must be given to the statutory fiction and it should be carried to its logical conclusion.... The dictum of his Lordship however would not apply to a case like the present where the Legislature has clearly indicated the limits of the fiction. BY THE COURT 70. For the reasons separately recorded in Miscellaneous Petition No. 34S of 3953 the petition is allowed with costs, the election of the respondent No. 2, Kamptaprasad, is set aside and a fresh election after due preparation and publication of the electoral rolls for the Godhi constituency is directed to be held. The outstanding amount of security shall be refunded to the petitioners. 71. Counsel's fee ₹ 100/-, if certified.
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1954 (10) TMI 54
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... ... ..... der but as this is mentioned as the minimum it is obvious that the Government may compel the licensee to exhibit a film of 10,000 or 12,000 feet which in effect will amount to pushing out of the film intended to be shown by the licensee during the time allotted. Here again no maximum limit having been imposed it follows that the discretion of the authority is unrestrained and unfettered and must lead to an unjustifiable interference with the right of the licensee to carry on his business. We hold, therefore, that this condition is equally obnoxious and must be deleted. We accordingly allow the appeal and hold that condition 4(a) and special condition 3 expressed as they are at present are void and have no legal effect as against the fundamental right of the appellant under article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 6. We express no opinion upon the first contention advanced by the appellant. The appellant will get his costs from the respondent in this Court and in the Court below.
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1954 (10) TMI 53
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... ... ..... matter, and by accepting the Appellate Assistant Commissioner's description of this order as being under Section 30 (2) and so refusing to admit the appeal the Appellate Tribunal has precluded all possibility of any enquiry being held into the assessee's allegations, which 'prima facie' at least deserve some investigation. On the whole, after considering the terms of the Act and the authorities mentioned above, I am of the opinion that the correct view of the matter is that taken by the High Courts of Allahabad and Bombay in the cases of -- "Mohd. Naim Mohd. Alam (A)', and 'Champalal Asharam (G)', and that the answer to the question framed should be that the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner Is not under Section 30 (2) but under Section 31 of the Act and that as such it is appealable to the Tribunal, and I would also allow the assessee's costs in the reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250/-. A.N. Bhandari, C.J. 15. I agree.
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1954 (10) TMI 52
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... ... ..... Plaintiff's husband, the partnership was dissolved and a right to an accounting arose. But Rup Chand died in 1905, and this suit was not raised until 1914. It is, therefore, time-barred as a suit for such an accounting. If, however, on Rup Chand's death the widow was admitted as a partner to a new partnership, then the date of dissolution would only be the raising of the suit and no limitation could apply. o p /o p 32. We, therefore, hold that neither the death of Rai Bahadur Chandiprasad nor that of Sidhakaran caused dissolution of the partnership. The partnership continued right from 1895 to the date of suit. o p /o p 33. For the reasons stated above, we consider that it is not necessary to amend the direction given by the trial Court as to the year from which accounts art to be taken. o p /o p 34. The result is that this appeal is dismissed, as also the cross-objection, In the circumstances of the case we order that the parties shall bear their own costs. o p /o p
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1954 (10) TMI 51
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... ... ..... administration of justice. This is certainly an extra-ordinary power which must be sparingly exercised but where the public interest demands it, the Court will not shrink from exercising it and imposing punishment even by way of imprisonment, in cases where a mere fine may not be adequate. 11. After anxious consideration we have come to the conclusion that in all the circumstances of this case it is a fit case where the power of the Court should be exercised and that it is necessary to impose the punishment of imprisonment. People must know that they cannot with impunity hinder or obstruct or attempt to hinder or obstruct the due course of administration of justice. We, therefore, find respondent, Hira Lal Dixit, guilty of contempt of Court, make the Rule absolute as against him and direct that he be arrested and committed to civil prison to undergo simple imprisonment for a fortnight. He must also pay the costs, if any, incurred by the Union of India. 12. Order accordingly.
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1954 (10) TMI 50
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... ... ..... at even on a strict construction of Order III, Rule 1, and even assuming that the provisions of Order III, Rule 1, apply to the High Court, Shambhuprasad has no right of audience in this Court, as the right of audience does not form part of an appearance, application or act in or to any Court. The larger and the wider question to my mind is also of great importance to the Bar as to whether a recognised agent can act in the High Court. It may be considered by the Bar and may come up for decision on a suitable and appropriate occasion. 9. I am thankful to the Advocate General who has appeared on behalf of the Original Side Bar Association, to Mr. Jahagirdar who has appeared on behalf, of the Western India Advocates Association and to Mr. Adarkar who has appeared on behalf of the Bar Council, in response to the notice directed to be issued by me. They have given me considerable assistance in coming to the conclusion that I have. 10. No orders as to costs. 11. Order accordingly.
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1954 (10) TMI 49
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... ... ..... e order of requisition was under section 5(1) but the same questions arise. As in the other two cases, no public purpose is mentioned and, as before, a second order setting out the purpose, housing a person without accommodation, was made in August, 1951. For the reasons already given, we hold that there was a public purpose and that the orders here were valid. 28. The only other question, namely, whether a mandamus can issue now, becomes unnecessary. Civil Appeals Nos. 145 and 147 of 1952 are allowed and the petitions in these two cases will be dismissed but here also there will be no order about costs throughout. 29. Civil Appeal No. 146 of 1952 will be dismissed because or the undertaking given by the learned Attorney-General, and the order of the High Court will stand. In view of this we need not decide whether a mandamus can or should have been issued. As we have said, this appeal will be dismissed but there will be no order about costs throughout. 30. Appeal dismissed.
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1954 (10) TMI 48
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... ... ..... 5 (h), Madras General Sales Tax Act, or S. 386, Criminal P. C. any bearing on the present inquiry. Section 15 (h) only directs the Magistrate convicting a person for contravention of any of the provisions of the Act to specify in the order that the tax or fee which such convicted person has filed or evaded to pay, or wrongfully collected shall be recoverable, as if it were a fine. That does not enable a Magistrate to give such a direction in respect of tax which is not personally payable by a director. Section 386, Criminal P. C. provides only the mode of collecting the fine imposed. That also does not throw any light on the present inquiry. 14. For these reasons, I must hold that the petitioner, the Managing Director, cannot be made personally liable for the arrears of tax due by the company. The taxing authorities could proceed against the assets of the company. If the tax has been collected from the petitioner personally, it will be refunded to him. 15. Order accordingly.
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1954 (10) TMI 47
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... ... ..... e has been brought to my notice in which 'certiorari' has been refused on the ground suggested by the Advocate-General, and I think the petitioner is entitled to his order. A writ of 'certiorari' will accordingly issue quash-ing the order of the Chancellor dated 20-8-1954. 17. In the circumstances it is unnecessary for one to consider the suomissions of Sri Pathak that the petitioner was nominated a member of the Court by the Government of Nepal with affect from 15- -1954, or that the nomination by the Chancellor was effective from midnight Of 12-3-1954. 18. The petitioner also prays for the issue of A mandamus. There is however no evidence before me which shows that the University authorities intend notwithstanding the quashing of the Chancellor's order to interfere in any way with the petitioner, and the Advocate-General has stated that they have no such intention. This prayer therefore fails. 19. In the circumstances, I shall make no order as to costs.
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1954 (10) TMI 46
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... ... ..... rn out that his concern was hit by the Act, he applied for registration. It is to be observed that though he applied on 12th April, 1949, he was not registered till 4th May, 1950, and the certificate was not given to him till 8th January, 1951. The present prosecution was launched on 4th April, 1951. Government itself seems to have been in doubt. However, that is neither here not there. What we think was wrong was placing of the burden of proof on the appellant, in a criminal case, because of a so-called admission. The learned High Court Judges also advert to the fact that though the appellant's concern was registered as a "shop" he made no protest and did not have resource to section 7(3) of the Act. 12. We do not think section 7(3) has any application. The appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence are set aside and the judgment of the learned trying Magistrate acquitting the appellant is restored. The fines, if paid, will be refunded. 13. Appeal allowed.
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1954 (10) TMI 45
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... ... ..... as produced by Kamalabai, wife of the first accused, at her native place. This item of evidence is clearly admissible against the first, accused as indicating his connection. Therefore no prejudice can be said to have been caused. It is also to be noticed that no objection under sect ion 27 of the Indian Evidence Act appears to have been taken at the trial nor is there any indication of it in the grounds of appeal to the High Court. In view of our opinion that the evidence of identification parades relating to. the fourth accused was inadmissible, we were ’taken through the rest of the evidence as against this accused.. I agree, on a consideration of that evidence, that this is not a case in which interference with the verdict even as against the fourth accused is called for. Appeals dismissed. (i) judgment of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos. 454 and 464 Of 1949 in the case of Rex v. Gobutchand Dwarkadas Morarka No. I, delivered on the 11th January, 1950.
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1954 (10) TMI 44
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... ... ..... by the assessee. In the view of their Lordships that was the central idea behind these statutory provisions and therefore the amount which the assessee received could only be taxed if it was the produce or the result of carrying on the agencies of the oil companies. But since it was admitted that the amount was received by the assessee not for carrying on the business but for its compulsory stoppage, the Privy Council reached the conclusion that the amount was not taxable in the assessee's hands. It is clear that the ratio of this case has no bearing on the question we are investigating in the present case. For the reasons expressed we hold that in the circumstances of the case the amount of ₹ 8,272 received by the assessee from the Central Public Works Department is taxable in the hands of the assessee as income from other sources. The question referred to the High Court must accordingly be answered in favour of the Income-tax Department and against the assessee.
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1954 (10) TMI 43
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... ... ..... this particular item it did not draw any adverse inference from other matters in dispute. In the circumstances I consider that the finding of the Tribunal on this matter is based almost entirely on mere suspicion and not based on any obvious defects in the evidence produced on behalf of the firm or on any facts proved to rebut any of this evidence. I would accordingly answer the question framed for our consideration as follows. It certainly lay on the assessee firm to explain the nature of the credit of ₹ 30,500 in the bank account of one of the partners Seth Mohan Lal, but in this case the onus which lay on the firm has been discharged and there was no material on the record on which the Tribunal could find that the sum represented the firm's income from some undisclosed sources and deposited in the bank in the name of one of the partners. The assessee will have his costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. BHANDARI, C.J.―I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (10) TMI 42
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... ... ..... t members besides them who are expected to take a fair and impartial view of the matter. These provisions in our opinion, constitute an adequate safeguard against any hasty or capricious decision by the "appropriate Government." In suitable cases the "appropriate Government" has also been given the power of granting exemptions from the operation of the provisions of this Act. There is no provision undoubtedly for a further review of the decision of the "appropriate Government", but we do not think that by itself would make the provisions of the Act unreasonable. In our opinion, the restrictions, though they interfere to some extent with the freedom of trade or business guaranteed under article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution, are reasonable and being imposed in the interest of the general public are protected by the terms of clause (6) of article 19. The result is that the petitions are dismissed. We make no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1954 (10) TMI 41
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... ... ..... tax 1952 21 I.T.R. 458. It was held in that case by both the learned Judges that the Income-tax (Amendment) Act (XXII of 1947) by which section 12B was for the first time introduced was a valid piece of legislation and it was not ultra vires the Indian Legislature. Chagla, C.J., proceeded upon the view that section 12B fell within the ambit and scope of item 55 of List I of the 7th Schedule. But Tendolkar, J., was of the opinion that section 12B was legislation with respect to "income" and was covered by item 54 of List 1 of the 7th Schedule. With great respect we think that the view taken by Chagla, C.J., is correct and we have already expressed our reasons for taking the same view in this case. For the reasons expressed we hold that both the questions referred to the High Court must be answered in favour of the Income-tax Department and against the assessee. The assessee must pay the costs of the reference. Hearing fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (10) TMI 40
Whether the amendments made to the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act by the Central Legislature in 1948, 1949 and 1950 are "furthers legislation" falling within section 107(2) of the Government of India Act or "law with respect to the same matter" falling within article 254(2)?
Held that:- We are entirely in agreement with the opinion of Chagla C.J. and Chainani J. that Act No. LII of 1950 is a legislation in respect of the same matter as Act No. XXXVI of 1947. Appeal dismissed.
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1954 (10) TMI 39
Whether the expression "appropriate Government" has been defined in section 2(b) (ii) of the Minimum Wages Act to mean, in relation to any scheduled employment, not carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government, the State Government?
Whether the preamble to the Minimum Wages Act as well as its title indicate clearly that the intention of the Legislature was to provide for fixing minimum wages in certain employments only and that the Legislature did not intend that all employments should be brought within the purview of the Act?
Whether the term of the committee, as originally fixed, expired on the 16th of July, 1952, and on and from the 17th of July all the members of the committee became functus officio?
Held that:- The order made under section 94(3) of the Government of India Act should be reckoned now as an order made under article 239 of the Constitution and we are unable to agree with Mr. Chatterjee that it was beyond the competence of the President under clause (2) of article 372 to make the adaptation order mentioned above. The first contention of Mr. Chatterjee therefore fails.
It is to carry out effectively the purpose of this enactment that power has been given to the "appropriate Government" to decide, with reference to local conditions, whether it is desirable that minimum wages should be fixed in regard to a particular trade or industry which is not already included in the list. We do not think that in enacting section 27 the Legislature has in anyway stripped itself of its essential powers or assigned to the administrative authority anything but an accessory or subordinate power which was deemed necessary to carry out the purpose and the policy of the Act. The second contention of Mr. Chatterjee cannot therefore succeed.
It is not disputed that the committee did not function at all and did no work after the 16th of July, 1952, and before the 21st of August next when its term was extended. No report was submitted during this period and there was no extension of time granted after the submission of the report. Assuming that the order of the 21st August, 1952, could not revive a committee which was already dead, it could certainly be held that a new committee was constituted on that date and even then the report submitted by it would be a perfectly good report. Quite apart from this, it is to be noted that a committee appointed under section 5 of the Act is only an advisory body and that the Government is not bound to accept any of its recommendations. Consequently, procedural irregularities of this character could not vitiate the final report which fixed the minimum wages. In our opinion, neither of the contentions raised in support of these appeals can succeed and both the appeals therefore should fail and stand dismissed
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