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1954 (2) TMI 25
... ... ... ... ..... can it be urged that the detention orders were mala fide simply because the District Magistrate passed them shortly after the previous detention orders were set aside by this Court, nor can they be held to be mala fide or bad on the ground that only the past activities of the detenus were relied upon. 'Tarapada De's case (O)', referred to before, -- 'Naranjan Singh Nathwan v. State of Punjab (I)'; -- ' 1952CriLJ656 (V)' and -- 'Bhim Sen v. The State of Punjab', 1952CriLJ75 (W) may be seen in this connection. They furnish a sufficient answer to this line of attack. This ground of attack must also fail. 32. These were the main points canvassed before us and in view of our observations on them, we do not think that any good reason has been made out justifying our interference with the impugned detention orders. Both the applications must therefore be dismissed. 33. The rules are discharged accordingly. Sailendra Nath Guha Ray, J. 34. I agree.
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1954 (2) TMI 24
... ... ... ... ..... the custody of the money. But, inasmuch as he has handed over the money to the Subordinate Judge with the knowledge that it was to be utilised for a purpose other than that for which it was legally intended, he may be said to have abetted criminal breach of trust by the Subordinate Judge. In an appropriate case the conviction may probably have been altered to one of abetment of an offence under Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code. But in this case an alteration of the appellant's conviction under section 409 of the Indian Penal Code into one of abetment thereof would imply a definite finding of guilt against the Subordinate Judge, Shri Ghambir, who is not before us. It would, therefore, be unfair to make such an alteration. We do not accordingly feel called upon to do so in an appeal on special leave. 17. In the result Criminal Appeals 46 and 47 of 1953 are allowed and the convictions of the appellant for both the offences with which he was charged are hereby set aside.
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1954 (2) TMI 23
... ... ... ... ..... y of assessment or re-assessment, computation or re-computation. 17. It is obvious that this interpretation will in some cases lead to much hardship on the part of the assessee. Reopening an assessment is a fearful process at all times. If an assessee is made the subject of repeated application of that process, his condition is certainly a fit subject of commiseration. But that cannot be a reason for interpreting the section, otherwise than ac-cording to its plain intendment. 18. If of course the process is repeated mala fide, e.g. if there is any dishonest motive or if it can be shown that it is being done for a collateral purpose, this Court can and will always interfere. But no such imputation has been made or established in this case. 19. I must, therefore, hold that the only point urged on behalf of the petitioner has failed. The application must therefore be dismissed. The rule is accordingly discharged and all interim orders vacated. There will be no order as to costs.
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1954 (2) TMI 22
... ... ... ... ..... for the purpose of punishing offences under Sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (and under no others) converted proceedings before the officers mentioned therein which are not judicial proceedings ordinarily, into 'judicial proceedings'. . . . Therefore, having regard to the terms of Section 37, it cannot be said that the proceedings which took place before the Additional Income Tax Officer on the production of the account books on the two dates referred to above were 'judicial proceedings'." 27. Finally, it remains to refer to the decision given by a Bench of this Court in -- 'R. M. Seshadri v. Second Addl. Income Tax Officer, Madras' 1954 25ITR400(Mad) , where it was held that the Appellate Income Tax Tribunal is not a court. If that is so it must be even more manifest that an Income Tax Officer cannot be a court. 28. In the result, I hold that the decision of the learned Magistrate is correct. These petitions are therefore dismissed.
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1954 (2) TMI 21
... ... ... ... ..... n could not be thrown out before his status had been judicially determined there would have been no incentive on his part to take proceedings in court to establish his status and it would have thrown upon the State the duty of initiating proceedings and of discharging the onus of proving the negative fact of his not being a citizens of India. In view of all the circumstances prevailing at the time the law was enacted and remained in force and in view of the considerations hereinbefore alluded to I have no doubt in my mind - except what arises out of my respect for the opinions of my Lord and other learned brothers - that the provisions of section 7 were necessary and reasonable and fell within clause (5) of article 19. In my judgment the four appeals as well as Petition No. 57 of 1952 should be dismissed. 41. Agent for the appellants and petitioners S. S. Shukla, R. A. Govind, Sardar Bahadur and P. K. Chatterji. 42. Agent for the respondents G. H. Rajadhyaksha and C. P. Lal.
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1954 (2) TMI 20
... ... ... ... ..... usiness and that no partnership was constituted on 30-6-1946 of the five sons of Bansidhar in the manner alleged on their behalf. We hold, on the contrary, that the entries of books of account dated 29-6-1946 and the two deeds of partnership executed on 3-9-1946, and 30-10-1946, constitute sufficient materials in law for a finding as to the disruption of joint family status with respect to the cloth business and for bringing into existence a partnership firm. We are further of opinion that this partnership firm is en titled to registration under Section 2GA, Income-tax Act, and it was not open to the Income Tax Authorities to come to a contrary decision. We think that the question referred for the opinion of the High Court must be answered in favour of the assessee in both. M. J. C. 147 of 1951 and M. J. C. 148 of 1951. The Income Tax Department must pay the cost of this reference and we assess the hearing fee at ₹ 250/- which is the consolidated fee for both the cases.
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1954 (2) TMI 19
... ... ... ... ..... ther this court cannot interfere under Section 622, C. P. C., without an application from a party. In all probability the party aggrieved has abstained from action owing to the action taken by the Judge. There is nothing to limit the power conferred by Section 622 to cases in which there is an application by a party." This view has never been questioned and indeed there are innumerable decisions wherein the High Court had interfered 'suo motu' against orders of the subordinate tribunals when an appeal filed was held to be not maintainable. 12. For the aforesaid reasons I hold that the decree is not executable against the properties allotted to the second defendant in the partition and accordingly set aside the orders of the courts below. As I am interfering with the orders of the courts below 'suo motu' in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction, I think this is a fit case to direct the parties to bear their own costs. Panchapakesa Aiyar, J. 13. I agree.
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1954 (2) TMI 18
... ... ... ... ..... ered document with respect to the whole money of ₹ 35,000 in favour of his daughter Mst. Chandra Kumari Devi. This transaction is destructive of the Department's case that the money belonged to the Hindu undivided family for Kedarnath would not in such a case transfer the whole money to Mst. Chandra Kumari Devi, wife of Radhakrishna, one of the two brothers. In our opinion the Income-tax Department has failed to discharge the onus which lay upon them of establishing by some material that the amount of ₹ 35,000 plus interest of ₹ 1,120 did not belong to Kedarnath but belonged to the assessee. We hold that there is no material before the Income-tax Department to justify the assessment of income-tax on the amount of ₹ 36,120 under the provisions of Section 34 of the Indian Income-tax Act and the question should be answered in favour of the assessee. We do not propose to make any order as to the costs of this reference. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (2) TMI 17
... ... ... ... ..... of the principle laid down by Lord Greene in British Sugar Manufacturers Limited v. Harris. We have already given reasons to hold that the payment to Kedarnath Jhunjhunwala of 2a. 6p. share of the total profits of the business was not a mere division of profits Simpliciter, but that the payment represents a remuneration for services rendered by him and that remuneration was to be calculated with reference to the total profits. If this is the legal character of the payment, it follows that the assessee is entitled under Section 10(2)(xv) to claim deduction of ₹ 8,649 which was paid to Kedarnath Jhunjhunwala. We hold that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was not justified in law in disallowing this claim, and the question referred to the High Court must be answered in favour of the assessee in both Miscellaneous Judicial Cases Nos. 138 and 139 of 1951. We assess consolidated hearing fee in both the cases at ₹ 200 (two hundred only). Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (2) TMI 16
... ... ... ... ..... and the nature of that practice." Their duty does not end by declaring an election to be void or not because section 99 provides that in addition to that " at the time of making an order under section 98the tribunal shall also make an order etc........" A number of allegations were made in the petition about corruption and illegal practices, undue influence and bribery. It was the duty of the tribunal not only to enquire into those allegations, as it did, but also to complete the enquiry by recording findings about those allegations and either condemn or clear the candidate of the charges made. We make no order about costs. Vivian Bose, J. I agree on all but one point. I have some doubt about the reason given by my learned brother which is based on the definition' of "candidate" in the Act. I prefer not to express any opinion that one point. Case remanded. Agent for the appellant Ratnaparkhi Anant Govind. Agent for respondent No. 1 A. D. Mathur.
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1954 (2) TMI 15
... ... ... ... ..... discloses that Gangaram Thaware led Mahar agitations and processions as a member and leader of the Mahar caste. In 1936 he contested the election for the Provincial Assembly as a Mahar candidate. No one appears to have questioned his competency. And lastly, he declared himself to be a Mahar in the verification to his nomination form in the present election as also in an affidavit filed before the Returning Officer who rejected his nomination. The 'Returning Officer described that as a "cleverly, worded document. " We have read it and find nothing tricky or crooked in it., Therefore, applying the test in Abraham v. Abraham 9 M.I.A. 199. 199.we hold that despite his conversion he continued to be a Mahar and so his nomination form was wrongly rejected. That affects the whole election. The other points argued before the Election Tribunal were not pressed before us. We therefore uphold the decision of the Tribunal and dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1954 (2) TMI 13
... ... ... ... ..... is question was neither raised nor urged before the Income-tax Tribunal, either in appeal or on the application for reference, and cannot therefore be allowed to be urged in this reference nor would it be open to us for the reasons already given to direct the Tribunal to make a reference on a fresh question. The specific question referred to us pertains only to depreciation actually allowed on the basis of the written down value computed at the time of assessment for 1359F., namely, under the Hyderabad Income-tax Act, and we, therefore, confine our judgment only to that question. In the result, our answer to the first part of the question is in the negative and the second part is in the affirmative, that is, in our view, the assessee is entitled to claim depreciation on the basis of actual cost minus the depreciation allowance actually allowed under the Hyderabad Income-tax Act. We answer the reference accordingly with costs to the respondent, which we assess at ₹ 100.
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1954 (2) TMI 12
whether the Madras Electricity Supply Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1949 was a law with respect to electricity under entry 31 of the concurrent list or with respect to corporations under entry 33 in list I?
Held that:- If power’ inhered in the Federal Legislature to make a law for the acquisition of any property for any purpose connected with a matter with respect to which it had’ power to make laws then section 127 would not have’ been necessary at all. The absence of any entry empowering any Legislature to make laws with respect to compulsory acquisition of a commercial or industrial undertaking and the provisions of section 127 to, which reference has just been made make it abundantly clear that the contentions urged by the learned’ Advocate-General cannot possibly be sustained. In our opinion, therefore, it must be held that the Madras Legislature had no legislative competency to enact the impugned law. Appeal allowed.
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1954 (2) TMI 11
... ... ... ... ..... deciding by correspondence with the petitioners the questions which were required to be decided under the Act and the rules made thereunder according to the prescribed procedure. The opinion expressed by the Sales Tax Officer in the letters addressed by him to the petitioners does not and cannot, however, relieve him of the duty of adjudicating upon the above points in accordance with law. We have no doubt that the Sales Tax Officer will determine all the points that may arise in connection with the petitioners liability to assessment to tax in respect of the transactions effected by them in the light of this decision and uninfluenced by the opinion expressed by him in his replies to the petitioners. 17.. For the foregoing reasons, all these petitions are dismissed with costs. Counsel s fee in each case is fixed at Rs. 100. The outstanding amounts of security deposits, after deduction of costs, in each case shall be refunded to the petitioner concerned. Petitions dismissed.
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1954 (2) TMI 10
... ... ... ... ..... to the buyer at Jogbani railway station subject to the buyer s option to return the goods if they had not passed at the second test by the Sleeper Control Officer at the respective destinations. The transaction is in the nature of a conditional sale which is of a different legal character from the transaction of sale or return which is only a contract of bailment and does not pass title to the goods. I do not think that Section 24 of the Sale of Goods Act has any application to this case. The argument addressed on behalf of the assessee on this point is not valid. For the reasons which I have expressed I hold that the firm of Messrs. B.N. Guha and Company is liable to pay sales tax on the sale of timber to the exent of Rs. 3,80,354-12-0 and that the question referred to the High Court must be answered in favour of the State of Bihar. The assessee must pay the cost of the reference. I would assess the hearing fee at Rs. 250. AHMAD, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1954 (2) TMI 9
... ... ... ... ..... s Tax Act, possibly, the Criminal Courts would be entitled to resort to that section of the Criminal Procedure Code, when questions of the kind now in controversy arise. But the existence of Section 16A bars the Courts acting under Section 15(b) from resorting to the procedure for reference and to that extent also we have to hold the enactment of Section 16A of the Act should be considered to be repugnant and void, as it hits against the rights of the accused under the Criminal Procedure Code and against the fundamental principles of criminal justice. For all these reasons set forth in the foregoing paragraphs of this judgment, we are of the opinion that Section 16A of the Madras General Sales Tax Act is ultra vires of the Constitution and of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Such being the case, the convictions of the petitioners will have to be held as illegal. The convictions and senten- ces of the petitioners are accordingly set aside. Convictions set aside.
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1954 (2) TMI 8
Shares warrants and entries in register of members ... ... ... ... ..... sion with regard to a company registering an instrument of transfer which is not duly stamped. Therefore, considering these sections, it is clear that the only liability to pay stamp duty in the case of an instrument of transfer is upon the executant. If he fails to do so, the revenue authorities can proceed against him. If the document is brought before the revenue authorities, the revenue authorities will impound it, but having impounded it the only right given to them to proceed for the recovery of the duty is against the person who was liable to pay the duty. Therefore, while the revenue authorities are perfectly within their rights in impounding a document, they are not right when they call upon the company to pay stamp duty. Therefore, in the view that we have taken as to the liability of the company, it is unnecessary to answer the first question raised for our decision, and the answer to the second question is in the negative. The revenue authorities to pay the costs.
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1954 (2) TMI 1
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of this case is the surplus of ₹ 13,05,144 arising out of the sale of the plant and machinery of the sugar factory chargeable under Section 10(2)(vii) ?
Held that:- Even if the sale of the stock of sugar be regarded as carrying on of the business by the company and not a realisation of its assets with a view to winding up, the machinery or plant not being used during the accounting year at all and in any event not having had any connection with the carrying on of that limited business during the accounting year, Section 10(2)(vii) can have no application to the sale of any such machinery or plant. In this view of the matter, the answer to the question should be in the negative and we answer accordingly. Appeal allowed.
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