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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 36 of 36 Records
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1955 (10) TMI 30
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... ... ..... into the possession and management of Krishna Rao's branch. To say that such an arrangement was implied is to ignore the plain terms of the deed. The properties now in dispute are the items covered by the deed. They did not form the subject-matter of the two previous litigations. Since 1867, the date of Exhibit No. 35 they have always been in the possession of the defendants' branch as owners. It must also be remembered that the earlier suits of 1925 and 1936 proceeded on the basis that the defendants' branch was the heir to the properties left by the deceased, Yeshwant Rao. There is no other question which arises for discussion or decision. It follows that, the trial Judge was right in holding that the plaintiff's claim to recover possession of the suit properties covered by the deed of 1867 was entirely baseless. The decree of the High Court is reversed and that of the trial Judge is restored with costs throughout payable by the plaintiff to the defendants.
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1955 (10) TMI 29
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... ... ..... of it. They are free to sue on it or to assign it if they want. The State merely says, as any other person might say "I was not a party to that contract. Neither its rights nor its liabilities have devolved on me and I refuse to recognise it or to assume the obligations of either contracting party". If the State is wrong in its attitude that may give rise to a suit against it for damages for breach of contract or possibly, (though we do not say it would), to a right to sue for specific performance; but no question under articles 19(1)(f) and 31(1) can arise because the State has not confiscated or acquired or taken possession of the contract as such. If it had it would have claimed the benefits under it. It would have taken the money that the petitioners paid to the Raja from the Raja or demanded it over again from the petitioners. But it is not doing that. It simply refuses to recognise the existence of the contract. The petition fails and is dismissed with costs.
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1955 (10) TMI 28
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... ... ..... s the Cement Control Order was in force from January 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968, in the assessment year 1967-68. According to the Tribunal when the Cement Control Order was in force the freight charges are taxable as part of the sale price and when the Cement Control Order was not in force the freight charges is not taxable, since it does not form part of the sale price. We have already seen that during the period when Cement Control Order was not in force, the assessee is governed by the contract. Therefore, the order passed by the Tribunal in granting exemption for a sum of Rs. 47,53,709 stands set aside and the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is restored and, accordingly, the freight charges of Rs. 56,35,314 forms part of the sale price and, therefore, taxable. 22. In that view of the matter, the orders passed by the Tribunal in both the assessment years are set aside and the revisions filed by the department are allowed. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1955 (10) TMI 27
Whether the instrument in question is a single power of attorney or a combination of several of them?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The instrument in question does not comprise distinct matters but comprises one matter only and that matter is the execution of a general power of attorney by the donor in favour of the donees constituting the donees his attorneys to act for him in all the capacities which he enjoys. The instrument in question cannot be split up into separate instruments each comprising or relating to a distinct matter in so far as the different capacities of the donor are concerned. A general power of attorney comprises all acts which can be done by the donor himself, whatever be the capacity or capacities which he enjoys and cannot be split up into individual acts which the donor is capable of performing and which he appoints his attorney to do for him and in his name and on his behalf.
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1955 (10) TMI 26
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... ... ..... he sale price of the goods supplied. But the basis of this decision disappeared after the enactment of section 14A by the Amending Act, namely, Bihar Act VI of 1949. As the statute stands at present, in our opinion, the Sales Tax Authorities are not legally entitled to include sales tax in the taxable turnover of the assessee. That is the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Tata Iron and Steel Co., Ltd. v. State of Bihar 1956 7 S.T.C. 158 A.I.R. 1956 Pat. 92., judgment in which was pronounced yesterday, and we are bound by the authority of this decision. For these reasons, we hold that sale price as defined in the Bihar Sales Tax Act does not include the amount charged by the assessee dealer as sales tax, and the question referred by the Board of Revenue to the High Court must be answered in favour of the assessee and against the State of Bihar. We direct the State of Bihar to pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (10) TMI 25
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... ... ..... follow not because of any defect in the making of the rules but because of the negligence or indifference of the dealers in the specified commodity in not obtaining a licence which they are empowered to take under the (1) 1952 3 S.T.C. 367 (1952) 2 M.L.J. 598 at p. 612. (2) 1954 5 S.T.C. 399 (1954) 2 M.L.J. 658. rules. If the other view be accepted, it will lead not only to the anomaly but to the breaking up of the scheme itself. If the learned counsel s contention be accepted a licensed dealer will be taxed at one purchase point, whereas an unlicensed dealer escapes assessment altogether. That result unless it inexorably flows from the provisions of the Act should not be accepted by any Court. As pointed out by us, the provisions of the Act and the rules can reasonably be construed to give effect to the legislative intention. We, therefore, agree with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge and dismiss the appeal with costs which we fix at Rs. 200. Appeal dismissed.
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1955 (10) TMI 24
Whether in a works contract which has as its object the construction of a building as such, the contractor could be said to have sold any goods or materials used in the building in order to bring them within the power of taxation conferred on a State by Entry 54 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution.
Whether a building contractor is doing a business or occasionally transacting the business of buying, selling or supplying of goods to the person with whom he has contracted to build a building or structure or repair of building or structure?
Held that:- Petition allowed. Where a works contract is undertaken the materials which make up the finished product or building, are generally purchased from an outside agency, unless the builder or manufacturer is himself the producer of the material so used, and are not sold to the person for whom the building is being built or article is made for profit. In this view of the matter also the assessee cannot be said to be a dealer within the meaning of the Hyderabad General Sales Tax Act as to be taxed on the materials used in the works contract - direct the issue of a writ of mandamus prohibiting respondents 1 and 3 from collecting sales tax.
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1955 (10) TMI 23
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... ... ..... he revisional authority. Learned counsel for the assessee has relied on the decision in Ranchhoddas Karsondas v. Commissioner of Income tax, Bombay City(1). The facts of that case are entirely different and the principle laid down in that decision has no application to the facts of the present case. That was a decision with reference to the period of limitation laid down in section 34(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act. I would accordingly answer the question formulated in this case against the assessee. My answer is that the assessment for the period prior to the 1st July, 1947, is not barred under the proviso to sub- section (6) of section 10 of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944. The result, therefore, is that both the references are answered against the assessee and the opposite party are entitled to their costs. We assess the hearing fee at Rs. 150 in each of the two cases. KANHAIYA SINGH, J.-I agree. References answered accordingly. (1) 1954 26 I.T.R. 105 A.I.R. 1954 Bom. 543.
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1955 (10) TMI 22
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... ... ..... er, i.e., before the -turnover is estimated finally. In the circumstances of the case, no useful purpose would have been served by starting another enquiry. The appellants did not offer any satisfactory explanation with regard to the omissions pointed out in the list sent with the notices. They did not make any endeavour to convince the Taxing Officer that the infor- mation in his possession was unreliable, the final estimate should not rest thereon and that consequently their returns could be regarded as correct and complete. We have shown that the assessing authorities conducted elaborate enquiries and did not do things in a haphazard manner. There was therefore no necessity for another enquiry. For these reasons this submission also has to be rejected. It follows the assessments were validly made and could not be impugned on any ground whatsoever and the judgments under appeal are unassailable. In the circumstances, the appeals are dismissed with costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1955 (10) TMI 21
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... ... ..... les tax upon the assessee was made and the liability of the assessee to pay sales tax had accrued long before the Constitution came into force. In my opinion, Article 286 of the Constitution has no retrospec- tive force and the assessments of sales tax upon the assessee under section 4(1) read with section 2(g) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act are legally valid. I further hold that the Commissioner of Chotanagpur was not bound to decide the appeal according to Article 286 of the Constitution. It follows that the fifth and sixth questions referred by (1) 1947 15 I.T.R. 302 at p. 308. (3) (1930) 16 Tax Cas. 1, at p. 19. (2) (1926) 10 Tax Cas. 88. the Board of Revenue to the High Court must be answered against the assessee and in favour of the State of Bihar. As the State of Bihar has succeeded in this reference on five out of the six questions, I direct that the assessee should pay the costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 250. BANERJI, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
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1955 (10) TMI 20
Compromise and arrangement ... ... ... ... ..... h law and the observations made above. Mr. Rang Behari Lal also objects to the sum of Rs. 1,000 which Amar Nath Mehrotra had deposited from being expended in the manner as ordered by the learned District Judge. Amar Nath Mehrotra is no party to the proceedings. He only gave Rs. 1,000 to ensure that he does not go back upon his proposal to run the scheme. I have already held that he is prepared to run the scheme, and in any case Rs. 1,000 could not be confiscated and ordered to be paid to the parties to the proceedings. The liability in such cases is of the company or of the persons fighting litigation but not of outsiders. That part of the order of the learned Judge is set aside and Rs. 1,000 should be kept in deposit for meeting the purpose for which it was deposited. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above, and the parties are ordered to appear before the learned District Judge on the 16th November, 1955. In the meanwhile the status quo ante shall be maintained.
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1955 (10) TMI 19
Winding up - Appeals from orders and Power of court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc.
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1955 (10) TMI 13
Charges – Registration of ... ... ... ... ..... be because of the ambulatory nature of stocks-in-trade. I find myself in agreement with the view of Tendolkar J. It is also in accordance with the decision in Radhakrishnan Chettiar v. Madras Peoples Bank (in liquidation) 1942 MWN 692 which I am bound to follow. The contention of the Official Liquidator that the pledges must be registered does not appear to me to be correct. His claim must fail on another ground also. Under section 171 of the Indian Contract Act. Bankers, . . . .may, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, retain, as a security for a general balance of account any goods bailed to them . . . . . In the present case, not only is there no contract to the contrary but on the other hand, there is express contract emphasising and recording this right. In the result, Application No. 3617 of 1954 is also dismissed with costs payable out of the estate. The Official Liquidator may take his costs from the assets in his hands. Advocate s fees, (two sets), Rs. 250.
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1955 (10) TMI 3
Whether the Court could take cognisance of the case without previous sanction and for this purpose the Court has to find out if the act complained against was committed by the accused while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. Once this is settled, the case proceeds or is thrown out?
Held that:- The assault and use of criminal force etc. alleged against the accused are definitely related to the performance of their official duties. But taken along with them, it seems to us to be an obvious case for sanction. The injuries--a couple of abrasions and a swelling on Nandram Agarwala and two ecchymosis on Matajog--indicate nothing more than a scuffle which is likely to have ensued when there were angry protests against the search and a pushing aside of the protetors so that the search may go on unimpeded.
Mr. Isaacs finally pointed out that the fourth accused Nageswar Tewari was a constable and the case should have been allowed to proceed against him at least. This question arises only in Nandram Agarwala's case. The Magistrate who dismissed the complaint took the view that there was no use in proceeding against him alone, as the main attack was directed against the Income-Tax Officials. No such grievance was urged before the High Court and it is not raised in the grounds for special leave.
We hold that the orders of the High Court are correct and dismiss these two appeals.
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1955 (10) TMI 2
Whether section 46(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act under which the Income-tax Officer issued the recovery certificate to the Additional Collector of Bombay is void under article 13(1) of the Constitution in that the same offends article 22(1) and (2), article 21 and article 14 of the Constitution?
Whether section 13 of the Bombay City Land Revenue Act, 1876, under which the warrant of arrest was issued by the Additional Collector is void under article 13(1) of the Constitution as the same is repugnant to article 14 of the Constitution?
Held that:- The law impugned before us has only adopted, for its own purpose, the same coercive process which was devised by the States for their own purposes which are closely akin or similar to the purpose of the Union. To deny this power to the Union on constitutional grounds urged before us will lead us to hold that no new offence created by law can be made triable according to the procedure laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, for that Code sanctions different modes of trial in different areas, namely, by section 30 Magistrate in some areas, by the Sessions Judge with assessors in certain areas, and by the Sessions Judge with jurors in other areas. Adoption of an existing machinery devised for a particular purpose cannot, if there be no vice of unconstitutionality in the machinery, render it unconstitutional if it is made to subserve a purpose closely akin or similar to the purpose for which it had been devised. The first objection formulated by learned counsel for the petitioner must, therefore, be rejected.
It is only after the sale proceeds were found to be insufficient to satisfy the assessed amount and the assessee failed to pay up the balance that the question of the arrest of the defaulter arose. By that time section 13 had been amended and the warrant of arrest was issued on the 7th June, 1955, that is to say, long after the amendment of the section. In our opinion the second ground urged by the learned counsel must also be negatived. Appeal dismissed.
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1955 (10) TMI 1
Whether the grievance made by the respondents before the High Court was not well founded?
Held that:- High Court erred in holding that the prosecution had failed to establish their case and in acquitting the accused.
We accept these appeals, reverse the order of acquittal passed by the High Court and restore and confirm the order of conviction, sentences and directions made and passed by the trial Court, although on different grounds.
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