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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 34 Records
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1959 (10) TMI 47
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... ... ..... ssed for the grant of a permanent license to him after fulfilling all the conditions for the grant of such a license. The Revenue Divisional Commissioner rightly pointed out that so long as a permanent cinema house was not located in the town the temporary license granted to the petitioner was being renewed from time to time, even though it involved some risk to public safety, but since a permanent building was put up there was no necessity for continuing the temporary license and the attending risks also. 21. I see therefore no unconstitutionality either in the Orissa Act 11 of 1954 or in the appellate order dated 2nd September 1958 passed by the Revenue Divisional Commissioner, Northern Division, Sambalpur. 22. The petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at ₹ 200/-(Rupees two hundred only) to be apportioned equally between opposite parties 1, 2 and 3 on the one hand and opposite party No. 4 on the other. Sujit Barman Roy, J. 23. I agree.
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1959 (10) TMI 46
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... ... ..... tled to the intermediate grade. We are of opinion that this view of the Authority is correct. 5. The question then arises whether we should interfere in our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, when we are satisfied that there was no failure of justice. In similar circumstances this court refused to interfere and did not go into the question of jurisdiction on the ground that this Court could refuse interference unless it was satisfied that the justice of the case required it see A.M. Allison v. B.L. Sen, (1957)ILLJ472SC . On a parity of reasoning we are of opinion that as we are not satisfied that the justice of the case requires interference in the circumstances, we should refuse to interfere with the order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition of the appellant. We accordingly dismiss the appeal, but having regard to the peculiar circumstances of the case which we have referred to above we order that each party will bear its own costs of this appeal.
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1959 (10) TMI 45
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... ... ..... sis for it. 48. After having carefully considered the various submissions made by learned counsel I am of the opinion that the impugned Act has been validly passed and is intra vires of the State Legislature. I, therefore, hold there are no merits either in the petitions before us or in the special appeal. I would, therefore, dismiss all the petitions and the special appeal with costs, 49. It may be stated that in some of the petitions before, us some questions other than those of the constitutionality of the Act have been raised. We have not heard learned counsel in respect of those matters. We have confined our attention only to the consideration of the question relating to the validity of the Act leaving it open to the petitioners to raise questions other than those which affect the constitutionality of the Act before appropriate authorities. Raghubar Dayal, J. 50. I agree. 51. BY THE COURT We accordingly dismiss all these writ petitions and the Special Appeal with costs.
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1959 (10) TMI 44
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... ... ..... are unable to hold that there was no material on which the Tribunal could rest its finding, that one of the objects of the transfer of funds in 1933 was avoidance of tax liability in India. Therefore, the assessee is not entitled to the benefit of the saving for which sub-section (3)(a) to section 44D provided. Learned counsel for the assessee contended that section 44D was ultra vires. This contention was never put forward at any stage before and we declined to hear arguments on that head and at this stage. As we said, the only question that was reserved for decision was whether the assessee could have the benefit for which section 44D(3)(a) provided, and we have answered that question against the assessee. The other questions have already been answered against the assessee. We answer the question referred to this court under section 66(1) of the Act in the affirmative and against the assessee. Since the assessee has failed the costs of this reference will be paid by them.
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1959 (10) TMI 43
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... ... ..... ry for it but that consideration is in the first place to be presumed because the Legislature would not have granted the authority to levy the toll unless there was consideration. In any case the consideration is to be found in the general amenities and advantages which the respondent No. 1 provides for the appellant. It is not suggested that the rate is unreasonable, I am unable to accept as correct the contention that the tax is not a toll because there is no specific service or advantage provided by the respondent Board as its consideration which can be utilized by the railway wagon on which it is levied. I would therefore answer the question referred to me in the affirmative. 89. Let the case be sent back to the Division Bench with the above answer. BY THE COURT Orby Howell Mootham, C.J. and Raghubar Dayal, J. 90. In view of the opinion of the learned Judge to whom the difference in opinion was referred this appeal is dismissed with costs which we assess at ₹ 500/-
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1959 (10) TMI 42
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... ... ..... d out by 6 Suth WR 228 (FB). 21. The value of the house has been fixed at ₹ 2,561-9-0. There is no dispute as regards this figure. The plaintiff will pay the amount to the defendant within nine months from this date, if she desires to keep the house. In case she does not so desire the defendant will be at liberty to remove the building and restore the property to its original condition within three months of the expiry of the period of nine months or earlier intimation that the plaintiff does not desire to keep the house and pay compensation. 22. The plaintiff" is now no more. Her legal representatives have been brought on record, and references to her must be construed as references to her legal representatives. 23. The appeal is allowed in the manner and to the extent indicated above. The trial court's order as regards costs will stand. The parties will bear their respective costs in the lower appellate Court. The appellant will have his costs in this court.
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1959 (10) TMI 41
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... ... ..... ourt that some of the buildings were taken possession of by the Defendant at a later date, i.e. in November 1949 and this finding of fact has not been challenged before us by the Respondent. The trial Court has calculated the rent at ₹ 1,200 p.m. in regard to some buildings from November 1949 and in regard to others from January 1951 and has come to the conclusion that the total amount due from the Defendant was ₹ 32,340. Reliving on the calculation made by the trial Judge and reducing the rental from ₹ 1,200 p.m. to ₹ 750 p.m. the decretal amount is reducible proportionately to ₹ 20,212/8/- which the Plaintiff is entitled to recover from the Defendant. 25. We therefore, allow the appeal of the Defendant to the extent that we reduce the decretal amount from ₹ 32,340 to ₹ 20,212/8/- with proportionate costs throughout. The decretal amount shall be paid within two months from today's date. K.V. Gopala Krishnan Nair, J. 26. I agree.
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1959 (10) TMI 40
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... ... ..... earning their living by doing day-to-day labour. It must, therefore, be assumed that they were working for their living, and were not wholly unemployed. Therefore, the burden of the back wages for the long period that has escaped between the date of the end of the strike and the date of the Award, ordering their reinstatement, should be divided half and half between the parties. 27. The appeal is, therefore, allowed in part, is as indicated above, that is to say, (1) the order of reinstatement in respect of Jahangir Sardar and Keayamat Hussain, is set aside, (2) similarly, the order of reinstatement in respect of the thirty seven workmen, who had been convicted under s. 188 of the Indian Penal Code, is also set aside, and (3) the order for payment of full back wages, etc., is modified by reducing those amounts by half, for the period aforesaid. As success between the parties has been divided, they are directed to bear their own costs in this Court. 28. Appeal partly allowed.
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1959 (10) TMI 39
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... ... ..... rrect construction of the provisions of S. 22 is clear from the language of sub-s. (3) which defines the liability of the person inheriting the estate of the deceased. The words 'who takes the estate' occurring in sub-s. (3) make it very clear that the estate that is liable is the estate taken after the commencement of the Act by those who inherited it. (17) Any other view would lead to the incongruous result that whereas a dependant who has obtained a share in the estate of a Hindu dying after the commencement of the Act is not entitled to maintenance from that estate, a dependant who had obtained a share in the estate of a Hindu who had died before the commencement of the Act, would nevertheless be entitled to such maintenance. (18) That being the position, the contention urged by Mr. Karanth cannot succeed. (19) This appeal fails and should, therefore, be dismissed. (20) In the circumstances of the case, we however make no order as to costs. (21) Appeal dismissed.
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1959 (10) TMI 38
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... ... ..... re. The case is no authority on the question, what facts coming to the knowledge of the defendant would amount to a knowledge of the decree. As stated earlier, in the facts and circumstances of the case, I accept the version of the defendant that he got information of the decree entitling him to present the application on the 10th of June, 1954 as alleged by him and whatever information he may have received earlier is not sufficient for start of the limitation. 14. The appeal is accordingly allowed; the order of the lower court dismissing the application to set aside the ex parte decree is set aside. The application for setting aside the ex parte decree is allowed and the ex parte decree dated 25th of March, 1954 is set aside. Much of the difficulty in the case has been caused by the indifferent statement of the defendant himself. He will pay costs for setting aside the ex parte decree to the respondent, which are fixed at ₹ 100/-. The costs of this Court will be easy.
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1959 (10) TMI 37
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... ... ..... ped from questioning the title of the purchaser. He placed strong reliance on the decisions in Colonial Bank v. Cady and Williams (1890) 15 AC 267 Fazal v. Mangaldas ILR 46 Bom 489 (AIR 1922 Bom 303) and Abdul Vahed Abdul Karim v. Hasan Ali Alibhai. The view of Kanga J., in ILR 46 Bom 489 (AIR 1922 Bom 303) was, however, dissented from by a Bench of the Bombay High Court in ILR 50 Bom 229 AIR 192G Bom 338, where it was held that a registered owner of shares does not by handing over the share certificates and blank transfers signed by him to another person, make a representation to the world that such person is entitled to deal with the shares and, therefore, there is no question of any estoppel against the registered owner of the shares. But in the view we have taken that the suit filed by the plaintiff must fail, it is not necessary to pursue the question further. 71. For these reasons, we hold that the appeal should fail and it is accordingly dismissed with costs, one set.
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1959 (10) TMI 36
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... ... ..... appellant was not bound to explain any portion of the period for which the law of limitation provided, in this case 60 days. The delay was only one day, and that day's delay alone had to be explained. In spite of that feature having been pointed out, the Tribunal made no attempt to go into the real question at issue, even when submitting the statement of the case, whether that day's delay after the expiry of the 60 days had been satisfactorily explained. In the circumstances of this case, we have no hesitation in holding that the discretion exercised by the Tribunal in rejecting the application of the appellant to excuse the delay was not based on the relevant considerations they had to bear in mind. It was not a case of judicial exercise of a discretion at all. We answer the question in the negative and in favour of the assessee. As the assessee has succeeded, she will get the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the negative.
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1959 (10) TMI 35
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... ... ..... lakh as in any sense an inordinate payment. Therefore, even if we have to view the matter solely from the point of view of the period of reasonable notice, we would reach the conclusion that in case of an employee whose services were of the nature of the managing directorship in this case and whose emoluments varied between ₹ 72,000 and ₹ 1,25,000 per year compensation of ₹ 1 lakh would be reasonable. We may mention that a statement showing the emoluments paid to the employee is part of the record and marked as annexure 'B'. That statement also shows that the amount of dividend which the Cement Agencies Ltd. received for the year ending 31st December 1952, was ₹ 6,04,800 and had Mr. Captain continued in the employment of F.E.Dinshaw Ltd. his remuneration would have been ₹ 1,86,960. For the reasons already indicated, our answer to the question will be in the affirmative. Commissioner to pay the costs. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1959 (10) TMI 34
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... ... ..... ted in Ram Kirpal's case(1) it would appear that the order of Chunder, J., cannot now be questioned before us and the appellant is bound by it As the appellant cannot contend that his acquittal by Mr. Dutta Gupta was an acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction, he cannot plead s. 403 in support of this appeal. I appreciate that the view that I have taken is hard on the appellant. But it does not seem to me that he was entirely without a remedy. I would have been prepared to give relief to the appellant if he had appealed from the judgment of Chunder J. and for that purpose I would have felt no difficulty in extending the time to appeal. As it is, I feel that the appeal must be dismissed. ORDER OF COURT. In accordance with the opinion of the majority the appeal is allowed, the order of the Calcutta High Court directing the complaint to be proceeded within the Court of the Sub- Divisional Magistrate is set aside, and the proceedings against the appellant are quashed.
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1959 (10) TMI 33
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... ... ..... ncurred a loss and the finding that on the contracts for the supply of mutton gross profits of ten per cent. of the turnover would be a reasonable estimate. Judged by the test of the unexplained cash credits, we cannot say that an estimate of ten per cent. was not reasonable in the circumstances of the case. Thus, the net position would be that the assessee's gross profits would be as follows beef ₹ 41,056, live animals ₹ 88,592, meat ₹ 43,135, milk ₹ 184. From out of this gross profits, the assessee would be entitled to deduct an expenditure of ₹ 65,627. The balance so assessed is his income. On only a portion of that income was the assessee liable to income-tax under the Indian income-tax Act. The apportionment itself is not in dispute. We answered the first question in the affirmative and against the assessee. As the assessee has failed he will pay the costs of this reference. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Reference answered accordingly.
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1959 (10) TMI 32
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... ... ..... the grounds of appeal to the High Court the objection was to the form of the sanction. It also appears that no argument was raised in the High Court that the sanction under s. 270 of the Constitution Act could not take the place of a sanction under s. 197, Criminal Procedure Code, because the scope of the two provisions is different. But as I have said above the evidence to support the plea under s. 197 and to establish the requisite nexus between the act done by Henderson and the scope and extent of his duties is lacking and therefore the applicability of s. 197 to the facts of the present case cannot be held to have been proved. In my opinion the foundation has not been laid for holding that sanction under s. 197 was necessary in the instant case. I therefore agree that the appeals be dismissed. By court.-The petitioner’s Criminal Appeals Nos. 100 to 105 of 1954 having been dismissed and the conviction of the petitioner having been upheld, this petition is dismissed.
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1959 (10) TMI 31
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... ... ..... ile unit would be machinery "installed", learned counsel could not challenge that position. That is why we said the word "installed" has to be given its normal meaning and with reference to a given plant or a machinery we have got to see whether such installation as that machinery is capable of has been achieved. That test, in our opinion, was satisfied by the assessee when he put the buses and lorries on the road, that is when his "plant or machinery" was set up for service. We find that the Bombay High Court has taken a similar view in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Saraspur Mills Ltd.( 1959 36 I.T.R. 580) We respectfully agree with the principle of interpretation laid down by the Bombay High Court in that case. The question referred to this court is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the asssessee. As the Department has failed, it will pay the Costs of the assessee. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1959 (10) TMI 30
Whether s. 8(a) prevents the registration of the respondent's mark?
Held that:- Desai, J.,correctly held that the appellant had acquired a reputation among the public for the mark 'Glucovita' in respect of glucose powder mixed with vitamins. He however disagreed with the view of the Deputy Registrar that the respondent's mark was not likely to cause deception or confusion. He held that the two marks were sufficiently similar so as to be reasonable likely to cause deception and confusion. He, therefore, set aside the order of the Deputy Registrar and held that the respondent's mark could not be registered in view of s. 8(a) - set aside the order of the learned appellate Judges of the High Court and restore that of Desai, J - Appeal allowed.
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1959 (10) TMI 29
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... ... ..... as never heard ......................I think that the appellant is perfectly entitled to come to this Court and say, upon precedent and authority I was convicted as the result of a denial of justice, and I ask for justice, which can be done only by the quashing of that order. I think the order passed against a person without an opportunity being given to him to attend the hearing must be held to be void on the ground of denial of natural justice and may well be quashed by this Court by the issue of a writ of certiorari in spite of the fact that other remedies are available. The assessment orders in these writ petitions will be quashed. The order relating to penalty imposed in consequence of non-payment must also be held to be illegal and without jurisdiction. In this view, I do not propose to discuss the other points raised in these writ petitions. The petitioner will get his costs in these petitions. Advocate s fee in each of them will be Rs. 100. Assessment orders quashed.
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1959 (10) TMI 28
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... ... ..... able for the sales tax due by the dissolved firm...................Though there is no specific provision in the Act or the rules thereunder for collection of arrears of tax due from a dissolved firm, the liability of the petitioner as a partner of the dissolved firm to pay whatever was lawfully due by the partnership of which he was a partner can be enforced, if it is established that there was default within the meaning of section 10. The arrears could be recovered from him independent of his possession of any of the assets of the dissolved partnership, as if the arrears of tax constituted an arrear of land revenue. The appeal from this decision-W.A. No. 132 of 1955-was dismissed in limine. Learned counsel for the petitioner tried to explain away this case. But, I think, it is clearly in point. I prefer to follow the views expressed in this Court, which means that this writ petition must fail. It is therefore dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Petition dismissed.
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