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1962 (6) TMI 62
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... ... ..... e at the time of the remittances or not at Parbhani and Latur would depend on the decision of the second issue. 33. Our answer, therefore, to question (a) is that on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was in error in holding the action of the Income Tax authorities taxing the sum of ₹ 97,398 was remittances of income under section 4(1) (b) (iii) of the Act. On the other hand, it should have upheld the action of the Income Tax authorities taxing the sum of ₹ 71,874 as remittances of income under section 4(1) (b) (iii) of the Act provided accumulated profits to the extent of that sum were available at Parbhani and Latur for being remitted. 31. The answers to questions (a) and (c) for the year 1946-47 are as indicated in the judgment. Question (b) for the assessment year 1946-47, in our opinion, does not survive. 34. The reference is answered accordingly. The assessee shall pay two-thirds costs of the department. 35. Reference answered accordingly.
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1962 (6) TMI 61
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... ... ..... ed by the Court presumably at the request of the respondent. 12. That the decree-holder had sufficient means to furnish security and draw the money if he wanted to do so is hardly relevant in the consideration of the question. There are therefore no special circumstances in the present case to award interest on the amount deposited. We are unable to accept the decision in ILR 55 Mad 1025 AIR 1933 Mad 33 and the cases that followed it, in so far as they laid down as an inflexible rule that regardless of circumstances, a party who succeeded in the trial Court in obtaining a money decree which was subsequently set aside would be bound to pay interest as a part of restitution to the other party who was obliged to deposit the decree amount albeit such amount could not be drawn without furnishing security, a condition which the decree-holder did not choose to comply with. 13. The appeal is allowed. But there will be no order as to costs either before us or before the learned judge.
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1962 (6) TMI 60
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... ... ..... rms are satisfied there is a statutory liability on the quondam employer. Whether such employer has a right of indemnity against the Government in respect of whatever he pays to the worker will really be beside the point. It may also be noticed that the Electricity Undertakings Acquisition Act, 1954 had been enacted earlier than Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act. The latter provision has expressly made the previous employer liable; it will be doing violence to its language if by reason of any taking over of the liability under Section 6 of the former enactment, the new employer were to be made liable. 35. The result is that the case does not satisfy two out of the three conditions set out in the proviso to Section 25-FF. The petitioner will therefore be liable to pay retrenchment compensation to the concerned worker under Section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act. The rule nisi will be discharged. Petitioner will pay the costs of respondent 1. Order accordingly.
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1962 (6) TMI 59
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... ... ..... married daughters is not represented, the frame of the suit is defective and the suit is liable to be dismissed. In the circumstances, I would uphold the decree of dismissal of the suit passed by the two Courts below, though for reasons mentioned above. I would, therefore, dismiss this appeal, 28. Regarding the question of costs, I may point out that the effect of the Hindu Succession Act is not yet fully realised and appreciated by the people at large. The law has gone ahead in the matter of giving rights to certain heirs but the implications of those provisions are not properly understood. The claim of the plaintiff has been held proved by all the three Courts but his failure is more or less on technical grounds of want of proper parties. In the circumstances, so far as this Court is concerned, I make no order as to costs. 29. At this stage, an oral request is made on behalf of the appellant to file an appeal in Letters Patent, The prayer is granted. 30. Appeal dismissed.
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1962 (6) TMI 58
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... ... ..... Sri Srinivasan that the clause referred to above expressly purports to bear on the point in question. His case is that it is a pointer. In our opinion that clause merely sets the limit for exemption under Clause A and it has no other purpose. For the reasons mentioned above, none of the contentions advanced on behalf of the assessee has commended itself to us. Therefore, we have to answer the question referred to us in favour of the department and against the assessee. In other words, our answer to question No. (i) is the sole male surviving coparcener of the Hindu joint family, his widowed mother and sisters constitute a Hindu undivided family within the meaning of that expression in the Act. Our answer to question No. (ii) is that the assessment of the income in the hands of the Hindu undivided family is correct. Our answer to the last question is that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was entitled to correct the status. The assessee shall pay the costs of the revenue.
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1962 (6) TMI 57
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... ... ..... he question is next raised as to whether the petitioner ought to have come to court at this stage. In my opinion, he is entitled to do so. Where a citizen is being sought to be taxed in a manner which is prima facie against the law, he has a right to come to this jurisdiction to have the position clarified at the earliest opportunity. In this case, the Income-tax Officer has no jurisdiction to assess the income in the hands of the assessee as income in the hands of a Hindu undivided family. He has plainly expressed his opinion in his letter dated 10th December, 1959, and it is not enough to say that at the hearing he might change his mind. The result is that this rule should be made absolute and there will be an appropriate writ directing the respondent not to assess the income mentioned in the petition in the hands of the petitioner as that if a Hindu undivided family, but to make the assessment in accordance with law. There will be no order as too costs. Order accordingly.
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1962 (6) TMI 56
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... ... ..... e profit and loss account of the next year. This amount and the profits earned by the firm in the succeeding account year were distributed according to the shares of the partners. The Nagpur High Court decided that in order to entitle a firm for registration under section 26A, the divisible profits must be wholly divided and that since in that case a part of the profits was credited to the profit and loss account of the next year, the renewal was rightly refused. With respect, we express our respectful assent to the propositions enunciated in that case. If a firm desires to have the privilege conferred on it under section 26A of the Income-tax Act, it must conform to the form of the law strictly and rightly. Otherwise, the firm could not take advantage of section 26A. We have, therefore, no option but to answer the question in favour of the department and against the assessee. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. Advocates' fee--Rs. 100 (one hundred only).
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1962 (6) TMI 55
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... ... ..... filing these appeals. We do not propose to express ourselves on this contention raised by Mr. Joshi. Suffice it to say that the contention has not been raised in this from either before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Tribunal. We would, therefore, not be justified in proceeding to decide this contention in this reference. The department, if so advised, can raise this contention when the matter goes to the tribunal or the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. All that we say at this stage is that proper attention had not been given to the decision of the question, which fell for consideration before the Tribunal, viz., whether sufficient ground had been made out by the applicant entitling him to condonation of delay. It will not be possible for us, therefore, to answer question No. 6 either way. Our answers to the questions referred to us would be as indicated above. The department shall pay the costs of this reference to the applicant. Question answered accordingly.
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1962 (6) TMI 54
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... ... ..... e question which we have proceeded to decide is in the affirmative. Before parting with the case it is necessary to state that Mr. Pandit had contended before us that even assuming that the aforesaid observations amount to a finding, they are only obiter and, therefore, is not a finding within the meaning of the second proviso to sub-section (3) to section 34 enabling the income-tax authorities to reopen the assessment of the assessee for the assessment year 1944-45. In our view the question raised by Mr. Pandit does not fall within the ambit of this reference. If and when the reassessment is sought to be made for the assessment year 1944-45 such a question may become relevant in those proceedings. We, therefore, do not consider it proper to express any opinion on the contention raised so as to avoid any possible prejudice being caused to either side. Reference is answered accordingly. Assessee shall pay the costs of the department. No separate costs in the notice of motion.
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1962 (6) TMI 53
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... ... ..... 394, 384. In these Income Tax Act cases one has to try, as far as possible, to tread a narrow path, because there are quagmires on either side into which one can easily be led...'" In another portion of the judgment, the learned judge observed "It is thus obvious that though the English cases may be of some help in an indirect way by focussing one's attention on what is to be regarded as relevant and what rejected, they cannot be regarded in any sense as precedents to follow." These observations are equally true in the present case. For the reasons mentioned above, I think the question referred to us must be answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. My answer to the question referred is that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the sum of ₹ 1,92,136 is liable to be taxed. Assessee shall pay the costs of the revenue. Advocate's fee ₹ 250. MIR IQBAL HUSAIN J.--I agree. Question answered in the affirmative.
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1962 (6) TMI 52
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... ... ..... bunal that paragraph 2 had no application to the case. What was contended was that the questions whether any depreciation was allowed under the Industrial Tax Rules, or if it was so allowed, whether such depreciation was under any law or rules relating to income-tax or super-tax, etc., not having been determined, the contention raised by the department on the basis of paragraph 2 of the Taxation Laws (Part B States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1950, could not be entertained at that stage, and that contention has been accepted by the Tribunal. In these circumstances, our answer to question No. 2 as framed is that paragraph 2 of the Taxation Laws (Part B States) (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1950, is a valid provision of law, but it will have application to the present case only if the questions which the Tribunal has asked the Income-tax Officer to determine, are determined by the Income-tax Officer in favour of the department. No order as to costs. Order accordingly.
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1962 (6) TMI 51
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... ... ..... for ascertaining these relevant facts. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Tribunal had acted arbitrarily or capriciously in remanding the matter for a further inquiry even though the department had not asked for an inquiry into those facts or stated that it had any further evidence to lead. It is indeed true that the assessee may find it difficult to lead evidence after a lapse of such time, but that would be a matter, which will have to be taken into consideration in assessing and weighing the evidence. In our opinion it can hardly be a ground for saying that no inquiry be made into these relevant questions. For aught we know the relevant evidence may still be available to the assessee. In our opinion, therefore, it is not possible to say that the Tribunal has misdirected itself in making the order of remand. In the result, both the questions are answered in the negative. The assessee shall pay the costs of the department. Questions answered in the negative.
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1962 (6) TMI 50
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... ... ..... subsequently that it was claimed on behalf of the firm that the benefit of the transaction must go to it. Until this claim of the firm was determined in favour of the firm, it could not be said that the firm had any right to the profit which arose under the said transaction. Whether the point of time when this profit accrued to the firm was when the consent order was passed by the court or when the award was made by the Commissioner appointed under the said order or when the parties actually received the amounts in their hands in pursuance of the award, is not necessary to be determined in the present case, for all these dates are admittedly much after the end of the assessment year 1947-48. In our opinion, therefore, the answer to the third question in the refrained form is in the negative. In view of our answer to the third question, question No. 2 is unnecessary to be considered and we do not propose to answer the same. The assessee will get the costs from the department.
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1962 (6) TMI 49
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... ... ..... ure has not given a right of appeal to the party. What we have to decide is whether such a right is given by the provisions which provided for a right of appeal. The argument, therefore, that the amendment of the provisions of section 18A(6) since after 1st April, 1952, is indicative of a right of appeal being made available to the assessee against an order imposing penal interest, cannot be accepted. In our opinion, therefore, in view of the decision in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Jagdish Prasad Ramnath 1955 27 I.T.R. 192, which is in no way affected by the decisions of the Supreme Court, to which Mr. Palkhivala has invited our attention, the Tribunal's decision was right, and our answer to question No. 3 must be that no appeal lay to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against the levy of penal interest correctly computed in accordance with the provisions of section 18A(6). We answer it accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. Questions answered accordingly.
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1962 (6) TMI 48
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... ... ..... as laid down there that crushed stalks of tobacco were outside the purview of item 13 of section 8(2-A) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act which mentions tobacco and all its products. The present situation is dissimilar to the one that obtained in that case and the principle of that case is inapplicable to the instant case. Therefore, with regard to the turnover for the period subsequent to 1st April, 1958, crushed tobacco stalks are not subject to levy under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act but so far as the turnover for the prior period is concerned, the petitioner will not be entitled to the benefits of the notification relied on by him, unless he established that he had paid the additional excise duty as contemplated by the notification. The Sales Tax Department will work out the liability of the petitioner in the light of the law declared by us. With this declaration of law, the writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1962 (6) TMI 47
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... ... ..... inion of the assessing authorities. The orders, which are very laconic, do not at all indicate that the Board had applied its mind to the various aspects of the problem that posed themselves for solution before it. In cases of this type we expect the Tribunal exercising revisional jurisdiction to indicate that it had considered the points that were raised before it and also the reasons for its decision. The Board of Revenue exercises quasi-judicial functions and as such it is expected to give consideration to the questions that present themselves before it. For these reasons, we have no option but to quash the orders impugned before us and to send back the matter to the Board for determination of the points that arise in the matter afresh. The petitioner will be afforded an opportunity to present its case before the Board of Revenue. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed with costs in W.P. No. 374 of 1960. Advocate s fee Rs. 100 (one hundred only). Petitions allowed.
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1962 (6) TMI 46
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... ... ..... the contempt bred of ignorance. Such material frequently affords a guide to the intent of the Legislature conceived of in terms of purpose. 14.. We do not think there is any ambiguity in the expression cashewnut including its kernel . In our opinion, it can only mean the whole or unshelled nut with the kernel inside it. The reference to the legislative history and the objects and reasons has been made in this judgment only because of the emphasis placed on them during the course of the hearing. 15.. In the light of what is stated above we must accept the contention of the assessee that the purchases of kernel made by him even though they were the last purchases in the State do not attract the purchase tax, that the position is not as contended by the department and held by the Appellate Tribunal, and allow these two revision cases before us. We do so. 16. The department will pay the costs of the assessee, Advocate s fee Rs. 150 in both the cases together. Petitions allowed.
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1962 (6) TMI 45
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... ... ..... s to adopt, and invite objections from him. In this case unfortunately though the objections had been filed one day late, they have been taken into account by the assessing authority. But on the same day on which the objections were received, namely 28th March, 1961, the assessing authority has also made the order of assessment. The reasonable conclusion in such circumstances is that receipt of the objection from the party is nothing but an empty and idle formality, and the authority could not have given serious consideration to the objections, because an inquiry into that would lead to the necessity of giving further opportunity to persons like the petitioner of establishing their case. No such opportunity has been given to the petitioner in these proceedings. 12.. Therefore subject to the directions and observations contained in this order, the assessment order under attack is set aside and the writ petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1962 (6) TMI 44
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... ... ..... Canteen, Madras v. Deputy Commercial Tax Officer, Perambur Division(1). Following this view, this petition has to be allowed. The learned Additional Government Pleader contended that the facts, in this case, have not been settled, and before arriving at that stage, a writ of prohibition should not issue. About the proposition, there is no difficulty but, in this case, there appears to be no real controversy about the facts. They have been found in the order dated 17th December, 1958, of the Commercial Tax Officer on appeal in relation to the year 1957-58. The petitioner states in his affidavit, that the same practice as was noticed by the Commercial Tax Officer is followed for the subsequent years too in the matter of supply to the employees, of the particular commodities without any intention to profit, and there is no reason to doubt this statement. The petition is allowed, and the rule nisi is made absolute. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1962 (6) TMI 43
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... ... ..... l turnover of a dealer- (a) all amounts allowed as discount, provided that such discount is allowed in accordance with the regular practice of the dealer or is in accordance with the terms of a contract or agreement entered into in a particular case and provided also that the accounts show that the purchaser has paid only the sum originally charged less the discount. The meaning of the word discount is given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary as deduction from amount due or price of goods in consideration of its being paid promptly or in advance deduction from amount of bill of exchange etc., by one who gives value for it before it is due........... It, therefore, follows that the exemption claimed in respect of the value of groundnut oil-cake cannot be treated as discount. No other question has been argued. We are, therefore, not inclined to differ from the order of the Tribunal. The revision case fails, and is dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 100. Petition dismissed.
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