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Showing 1 to 20 of 71 Records
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1964 (10) TMI 115
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... ... ..... estion of law presented for our decision in this case. (8) Similarly, the decision of the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth and General Mills. Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, (1960)ILLJ520SC does not bear on the point under consideration. Therein the question that fell for decision was whether the employer was a competent to hold a domestic enquiry on a charge which is also the subject matter of a criminal proceeding. (9) As seen above, it is laid down by high authority that, when a particular charge had been enquired into by Tribunals constituted under other enactments, so long as the acquittal before the Criminal Court is not on any technical ground, but on merits. (10) In the result, we allow this petition and quash the impugned orders, viz the order passed by the 1st respondent in Appeal No. 956/61(M.V.), of the 2nd respondent in Appeal No. 209/61 and of the 3rd respondent in subject No. 27(d) of 1961. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. (11) Petition allowed.
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1964 (10) TMI 114
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... ... ..... ional jurisdiction under S. 115 C.P.C. I do not agree, because the learned Judge has not exercised his jurisdiction to see whether there was "sufficient cause" for not presenting the appeal in the District Court. 8. In Krishna v. Chathappan, ILR (1890) Mad 269 it was held the words, "sufficient cause" must be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice particularly when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant. 9. In Kayambu Pillai v. Court of Wards, Trichinoploy, AIR 1942 Mad 170 Abdur Rahman J. after referring to ILR (1890) Mad 269 held that the equities on which S. 14 is based may be taken into account though the section may not in terms be applicable. The existence of circumstances mentioned in S. 14 therefore constitutes a sufficient ground for excusing the delay under S. 5, caused by wrong proceedings. 10. In these circumstances the civil revision petition is allowed. No costs. 11. Revision allowed.
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1964 (10) TMI 113
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... ... ..... rt. 31-A and that Art. 31-B is a constitutional device to place the specified statutes beyond any attack on the ground that they infringe Part III of the Constitution. We, therefore, hold that, as the Amending Act was void from its inception, Art. 31-A could not save it. 21. As we have held that the Amending Act is void, it is not necessary to express our opinion on the question whether it infringes the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution. 22. We, therefore, hold that the Amending Act was void at its inception and that the lands acquired should be valued in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In the result, the decree of the High Court is set aside and the appeals are remanded to the District Court with the direction that it should dispose them of in accordance with law. The respondents will pay to the appellants the costs of this Court and costs of the High Court. The costs of the District Court will abide the result. 23. Appeals remanded.
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1964 (10) TMI 112
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... ... ..... .38(2) of the Punjab Police Rules." It may be added that under Rule 16.38(2) what is required is that "When investigation of such a complaint establishes a prima facie case, a judicial prosecution shall normally follow; the matter shall be disposed of departmentally only if the District Magistrate so orders for reasons to be recorded." In the instant case Rule 16.38 has been breached in two essential aspects. In the first place the Superintendent of Police has himself made a suggestion of a departmental enquiry, and secondly the District Magistrate has conveyed his acceptance of the suggestion through some one else without assigning his own reasons for this course of action. It is not necessary to go into the other points arising in this petition, which must be allowed and the order of dismissal set aside. As the enquiry had been initiated in violation of the elementary rules of procedure, I make an order that the petitioner will get the costs of this petition.
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1964 (10) TMI 111
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... ... ..... tion even if they may be within the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature. These, I think, are pertinent for understanding the nature of the restriction that could be imposed in regard to the medicinal and toilet preparations. 17. Reliance has not been placed by the learned Advocate General on the provisions of any other statute or Rules framed thereunder in support of the restrictions that have been imposed by Exts. P4 and P5 orders. In the light of the above, I declare that the limitations introduced by Exts. P4 and P5 are without the authority of law and that the applications made for licenses under the Act must be dealt with unhampered by what is stated in Exts. P4 and P5. 18. It will be open to the petitioners to renew their applications for the two years and they will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions in the statute and in the light of what is stated above. I allow these two writ applications on the above terms but make no order as to costs.
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1964 (10) TMI 110
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... ... ..... efore the Tribunal, and as it calls for findings of fact beyond those which already exist before us, it is not possible to say that Nanhi Devi did not succeed in perfecting the endowment to which she appears to have devotedherself. Consequently, we cannot entertain this contention of learned counsel for the Commissioner. Upon the reason given by us, we hold that there was no "gift" as defined in section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act by Smt. Nanhi Devi in favour of the idol, Sri Parmanand Behariji Thakurji Maharaj, but we are of opinion that there was an endowment by her in favour of the idol. We answer the question referred to this court accordingly. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The assessee will get its costs from the Commissioner of Income-tax, which we fix at ₹ 200. Counsel's fee is also fixed at ₹ 200. Question answered accordingly.
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1964 (10) TMI 109
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... ... ..... namely, "outstandings due to the plaintiff"(.....) showing that the transaction embodied in the decree was a transaction of loan. We do not agree with any such construction of the decree, for the expression clearly means that the outstanding not out in the decree were the outstanding which arose a result of the decree for specific performance passed by the Court and under which the assessee company became liable to pay the purchase price. The transaction, therefore, cannot amount to borrowing within the meaning of clause (iii). The contention urged on the basis of that clause must, therefore, be rejected. (13) In our view, neither of the two sums can be claimed as a deduction either under clause (iii) or clause (xv) of S. 10 (2) and our answers, therefore, to the two questions referred to us must be - Question No. 1 - in the negative, Question No. 2 - in the negative, The assessee will pay the to the Commissioner the costs of this reference. (14) Reference answered.
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1964 (10) TMI 108
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... ... ..... e context of that statement that we took the view that, on the facts and circumstances of that case, the assessee was not entitled to deduction of the amount claimed. In the present case however, such is not the position and what we must, therefore, do is to lay down the correct principle in substitution of the wrong principle laid down by the Tribunal and to leave it to the Tribunal to give effect to it. The question as framed by the Tribunal does not bring out the real controversy between the parties and it is, therefore, necessary to reframe the question. We will reframe the question in the following terms "Whether the liability in respect of gratuity under the two agreements dated 22nd June, 1949, and the 2nd July, 1952, is an allowable deduction in computing the net wealth of the assessee under section 7(2)(a) of the Wealth' tax Act?" The question will be answered in accordance with our judgment. Each party will bear and pay its own costs of the reference.
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1964 (10) TMI 107
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... ... ..... ded family, but to the trustees who hold that asset for the beneficiaries. The deed of settlement is a document of transfer made by and between the settlor and the trustees and not between the settlor and the beneficiaries and, therefore, it is a transfer directly made to the trustees and no question of any indirect transfer arises in this case. Therefore, in our view, clause (ii) also would not apply. None of the four items of expenditure, therefore, can be included in the family's assessment for either of the two assessment years. So far as question No. 3 is concerned, Mr. Palkhivala stated before us that he was not pressing that question and, therefore, that question would need no answer. Our answers, therefore, to the two remaining questions are Question No. 1-in the negative; Question No. 2-in the negative. The same will be our answers in respect of the assessment for the assessment year 1959-60. The Commissioner will pay to the assessee the costs of this reference.
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1964 (10) TMI 106
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... ... ..... ccount for computation either of profits or of its wealth. In many instances, where shares are allotted to the Directors or employees of a company at face value when the market value is higher, the allottees were held in a series of cases to be assessable to the tax on the difference between the par value actually paid for the shares and their market value. (See Weight v. Salman (1935) 19 Tax Cas 174 ; Abbott v. Philbin, 1960 39 Tax Cas 82 and Bentley v. Evans 1959 39 Tax Cas 132. We therefore think that the Income tax Officer should have taken the market value of the shares into consideration in computing the profits, if any. (9) Our answer to the first question, therefore, is in the negative and to the second question, therefore, is in the negative and to the second question, in the affirmative, i. e. that it is the market value that has to be taken into consideration. The reference is answered according with costs. Advocate's fee ₹ 200/-. (10) Answer according .
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1964 (10) TMI 105
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... ... ..... hich were negatived in that judgment. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in Vasisht Narain Sharma's case, 1955 1SCR509 too narrow a view was taken regarding the powers of this Court and we overrule the preliminary objection of Mr. S. T. Desai. (19) In so far as the age of the second respondent is concerned the High Court has fully considered the evidence and has rightly rejected the entries in the birth and death register maintained by the police patel and instead accepted the school certificates pertaining to the second respondent in which his date of birth, is stated. We need not say anything more on this point as Mr. Patel, who appears for the first respondent, has not seriously challenged the finding of the High Court. Upon this view we hold that no ground has been, made out for setting aside the election of the appellant, allow the appeal, set aside the decisions of the High Court and the Election Tribunal and dismiss the election petition with costs throughout.
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1964 (10) TMI 104
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... ... ..... interfere with the order of the High Court insofar as it is against the Governing Body of the College. At the same time we should like to make it clear that we should not be taken to have approved of the order of the High Court against the Governing Body of the College in circumstances like the present and that matter may have to be considered in a case where it properly arises. 15. Before we leave this case we should like to add that it was stated on behalf of the State before us that even if the decision went in favour of the State, it would not enforce r. 7 insofar as the respondent is concerned, as the State was concerned merely with the clarification of the law on the subject. 16. In the result we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court granting a writ against the State through the Director. The State of Assam has agreed to pay counsel engaged amicus curiae for respondent, Ajit Kumar Sharma. We therefore pass no order as to costs. 17. Appeal allowed.
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1964 (10) TMI 103
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... ... ..... in the view I have taken, it is not necessary for me to express any concluded opinion on this point. In passing, however, I may refer to the case of Snyamapada v. Controller of Insurance, Govt. of India, Simla, AIR 1962 SC 1355, where interpreting the provisions under Section 86 (H) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, which was an analogous provision to Section 293 of the Companies Act, 1956, their Lordships held that an agreement only to transfer the undertaking by Directors does not violate the section, it being merely tentative subject to final approval by company at the general meeting. The Resolutions (Ex. P-2 and P-3) and the circulating Resolution (Ex. P-4-A) indicate that final transfer of the Jabalpur factory of the applicant was contemplated to be made in future but was not actually made at the time when possession was given to the defendants. 14. For allthesereasons,therevision petitionmustbe andishereby dismissed with costs. Counsel'sfeeRs. 200, if certified.
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1964 (10) TMI 102
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... ... ..... on the ruling of the Bombay High Court reported in Aboobaker Dawood v. Potdar (1963-1 L. L. J. 398). Counsel on behalf of the respondents however has brought to my notice two decisions; one of the Supreme Court reported in Ambica Mills Co., Ltd. v. S. B. Bhatt (1961-1 L. L. J. 1.) and the other of this Court reported in Mary Chacko v. Ouseph & others (1961 K. L. T. 423). These decisions relied on by the respondents seem to lay down that all questions incidental to the main question to be decided can also be determined. In fact in the latter case it is said that the question as to whether there is an employer-employee relationship can be decided by the Payment of Wages Authority. I do not think I should enter into a fuller discussion of this issue since this point as such has not been raised before the' authorities concerned; I negative this contention as well. In the result, these writ applications have to be dismissed and I do so. There will be no order as to costs.
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1964 (10) TMI 101
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... ... ..... t; 20. If it was intended that the word "Hindu" used in this paragraph should have a wide meaning similar to that in Explanation II just quoted there would have been no need to make a mention of the Sikh religion. From the fact that a special mention is made of the Sikh religion it would follow that the word "Hindu" is used in the narrower sense of the orthodox Hindu religion which recognises castes and contains injunctions based on caste distinctions. 21. For the foregoing reasons we are satisfied that respondent No. 1 had ceased to be a Hindu at the date of his nomination and that consequently he was ineligible to be a candidate for election from a constituency reserved for members of Scheduled Castes. In the circumstances the Tribunal was right in setting aside his election. Accordingly, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the Tribunal. Costs throughout will be borne by respondent No. 1. 22. Appeal allowed.
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1964 (10) TMI 100
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... ... ..... e respondent's return to Calcutta the defendant would hand over to the plaintiff possession of the premises and the management of the business. The respondent further stated that he returned to Calcutta in or about December, 1949 and occupied one of the rooms of the suit property and made demands on the defendant to hand over possession and management which he failed to do. This case of the respondent has been concurrently found to be true by both the Courts. It would be seen that the basis of the respondent's claim to possession is independent of and wholly dissociated from the illegal transaction of the original benami purchase and falls into line with Sajan Singh's case 1960 A.C. 167. Not being tainted with illegality, the respondent's claim on this footing is not open to objection and as it has been upheld by both the Courts I agree that the appeal should stand dismissed and also to the order for costs proposed by my learned brother. 45. Appeal dismissed.
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1964 (10) TMI 99
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... ... ..... ster, the High Court was not prepared to accept the Minister's denial. Making an allowance for the fact that Ramakotaiah may have been embittered by the decision of the Minister, it still seems difficult to hold that the High Court was in error in coming to the conclusion that the story set up by him about the bias in the mind of the Minister had been established, the persons who have made affidavits in support of kotaiah's case are all men of stauts, and no. allegation is made indicating that they were either hostile to the Minister, or had any other motive in making false affidavits. That is why having carefully considered the whole of the evidence and having bestowed our anxious consideration on the points raised by the learned Solicitor- General in support of the appeals, we cannot hold that a case has been made out for our interference with the conclusion of the High Court. 25. The result is, the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. One set of hearing fee.
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1964 (10) TMI 98
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... ... ..... plied request by the assessee to British Indian buyers to send the sale proceeds by means of cheques through post and that the cheques representing the advance payment of the sale proceeds were sent by British Indian buyers to the assessee pursuant to any such request of the assessee. We are, therefore, of the view that, so far as the sale proceeds in respect of the sales belonging to the second category of sales are concerned, there is nothing to show that they were received by the assessee in British India and that the profit embedded in these sale proceeds cannot, therefore, be regarded as received in British India so as to be assessable to tax under section 4(1)(a). Our answer to questions Nos. 6 and 7 is, therefore, in the affirmative, to the extent to which those questions refer to the sale proceeds of ₹ 5,30,460 and is in the negative to the extent to which those questions refer to the remaining sale proceeds. There will be no order as to costs of the reference.
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1964 (10) TMI 97
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... ... ..... luding the pit mouth, depots and railway siding. The defendant as a receiver will submit his accounts and copies of the returns that are required under the law to be filed with the different authorities in the court below and the plaintiff will have access to that in Court. The defendant will furnish security for ₹ 50,000/- to the satisfaction of the court below within six weeks from today. If he fails to do so, the trial court shall appoint another person as receiver and direct the defendant to make over charge to him. The appointment of the defendant as a receiver will take effect from tomorrow the 6th October, 1964. The defendant signified his consent through his counsel Mr. Nagendra Prasad Singh No. 1 to act as receiver subject to these conditions. 20. The result is that the appeal is allowed, and the order of the court below is set aside but in view of the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs of this Court. A.B.N. SINHA, J. 21. I agree.
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1964 (10) TMI 96
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... ... ..... the contention. When the matter goes back to the Tribunal, the Tribunal may take the view that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was right in not entertaining the contention or that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner was wrong in doing so. The Tribunal may also take the view that, having regard to the facts before it and in the interests of justice, it will still entertain the contention of the assessees despite the refusal of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to do so. These are matters which it will be for the Tribunal to consider and decide. All that we say is that the ground on which the Tribunal refused to consider the contention of the assessees was wrong and the Tribunal will now have to consider what it should do in the matter. Our answer to the third question is therefore in the affirmative. The assessees will pay the costs of the reference to the Commissioner while the Commissioner will pay to the assessees the costs of the application under section 66(2).
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