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1965 (12) TMI 156
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... ... ..... rs does not in any way come into conflict with the object or the scheme of the Act and must, therefore, be accepted. 49. Civil Writ petitions Nos. 396 of 1963 and No. 196 of 1963, are, therefore, allowed and the impugned orders by which the holdings of the petitioners, who are all displaced allottees of more than 50 standard acres and whose allotments are sought to be reduced below 50 standard acres are quashed and set aside. The permissible area of these allottees is 50 standard acres irrespective of the fact that on conversion the area would exceed 100 ordinary acres. C. W. No. 1605 of 1963 fails and is dismissed. The allotment of the petitioners in that case was in ordinary acres. Their permissible area is, therefore, 100 ordinary acres, in spite of the fact that on conversion it works out to only 49.9 standard acres. In the peculiar circumstances of these cases parties are left to bear their own costs. I.D. Dua, J. I agree. Shamsher Bahadur, J. I agree. Order accordingly.
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1965 (12) TMI 155
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... ... ..... e notice and the statement to accompany to the notice and the same shall be settled by the Registrar of this Court. This was obviously done by the Solicitors for the Company and in my opinion, no exception can be taken to the same. The signature of the Court's officer clearly indicates that he had approved the same in toto or had settled the same. In the absence of any other evidence in my opinion, it would not be proper to infer that the Registrar of this Court did not apply his mind and do his duty. Hence this contention must be rejected. 180. In the result, however, the application should be dismissed and is hereby dis-missed. The applicant will pay-one set of costs of this application as of hearing of a suit to the respondents who will share it equally. Certified for two Counsel. 181. I think it would not be right to conclude without acknowledging the valuable assistance given, to me by the learned advocates appearing for the parties and in particular Mr. Samaren Sen.
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1965 (12) TMI 154
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... ... ..... s limits, arises only when an application by a person aggrieved in that respect has been made. The Civil Procedure Code does not confer on Courts any general power of reviewing its decision suo motu. It is not in dispute that the proceedings which ultimately culminated in the said order of 31st October 1962 were initiated suo motu by the third respondent himself. The exercise of such a power cannot be justified even under the rule on which Mr. Vaidya has placed reliance. Looking at the case from any angle, it is not possible to sustain the order made by the third respondent on 31st October 1962. 10. In the result the rule is made absolute. The aforesaid order of 31st October 1962 of the third respondent is hereby quashed . The aforesaid order made on 13th January 1953 by the Claims Officer, Delhi, and which has been confirmed by the Chief Claims Commissioner on 28th April 1953 are hereby restored. 11. The respondents shall pay the costs of the petition. (12) Petition allowed.
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1965 (12) TMI 153
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... ... ..... e which includes an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence which he can do only when he knows what the charges levelled against him are and the allegations on which such charges are based. In our judgment, the appellant was entitled to an opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him. 14. The order of termination passed against the appellant is bad in law since it contravenes the provisions of clause 4 (b) of the Regulation and also the principles of natural justice. In all the circumstances of the case, we are satisfied that the impugned order must be quashed. A writ of certiorari will accordingly issue quashing the order of dismissal, but this will not preclude the respondent from making a fresh enquiry against the appellant after giving him reasonable opportunity to show cause as provided under clause 4(b) of the regulations. 15. The appeal is accordingly allowed, but there will be no order as to costs. 16. Appeal allowed.
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1965 (12) TMI 152
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... ... ..... india (UOI) and Other (A.I.R. 1964 S.C.R. 1658.), whether the claim of privilege raised by the State Government should be sustained or not. That must be done after appropriate affidavits by the heads of the Departments concerned are filed and the claim of privilege is properly examined. 18. In the result the writ of prohibition issued by the High Court is dissolved but the order quashing the order, dated March 31, 1958, is upheld. The claim for privilege which has not been properly raised shall be raised in accordance with law. The Compensation Officer, who undoubtedly possesses jurisdiction to reopen the case, shall decide whether to reopen it or not after passing an order on the claim of privilege in accordance with the rulings of this Court. The respondent shall be entitled to raise such pleas in opposition as may open to him in law. The appeal is thus allowed in part but in the circumstances the respondent shall pay the costs of the appellant. 19. Appeal allowed in part.
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1965 (12) TMI 151
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... ... ..... Court has ordered just cannot be done as it is against the provisions of section 24." In our opinion, the case is fully covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Jadavji Narsidas & Co. The first question referred for our determination, therefore, must be answered in favour of the Commissioner of Income Tax and against the assessee. We, accordingly, hold that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee is not entitled to claim a set-off of the loss of ₹ 8,814 towards it share in the unregistered firm of M/s. Bhagwandas Santosh Kumar. In the view we have expressed above, it is conceded on all hands, and rightly so, that it is unnecessary to go into and determine the second question referred by the Appellate Tribunal for the opinion of this court. In the result, the reference is disposed of accordingly. The assessee must pay the costs of this reference; hearing fee ₹ 250 (Rupees two hundred and fifty)
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1965 (12) TMI 150
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... ... ..... gument was raised that the portion, which was in occupation of the tenants as shops, could not be exempt from attachment and sale under section 60(1)(ccc). This contention of the decree-holder was repelled by the learned Judge, who held-- "Nor can I hold that the house is not in the occupation of the judgment-debtors, merely because the shops, which cannot be used otherwise, have been let to tenants. In my opinion, therefore, the exemption relied upon by the executing Court applies in this case and the entire house is exempt from attachment." 33 . My answer to the third question, therefore, is that it would certainly make a difference if the letting was not voluntary, but the result of the order of a Competent Authority, as for example, the Requisitioning or the Rehabilitation Authority. In such cases, the non-agriculturist-judgment-debtor would be deemed to be in occupation of the entire house within the meaning of section 60(1)(ccc) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
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1965 (12) TMI 149
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... ... ..... d the fact of a partition after division in definite portions. Sub- section (2) enables the officer to treat the family, even after division in status, as a joint family for the purpose of this Act. It could not have been the intention of the legislature to treat the joint family before division by metes and bounds as divided in different circumstances. In our view, whatever may be the position under the Hindu law, for the purpose of the Gift-tax Act, the joint family is deemed to continue till there is a partition by metes and bounds and the same recorded by the officer. As the joint family continues having a distinct entity, there cannot be any "transaction by a sharer as a person diminishing the value of his own property." We are satisfied that the transaction in question is not a gift liable to pay tax under the Gift-tax Act. We answer the reference in favour of the assessee with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250. Question answered in favour of the assessee.
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1965 (12) TMI 148
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... ... ..... irector or other person aforesaid..." The Tribunal has rightly pointed out that the phrase, "has a substantial interest in the company", as provided for in the said sub-clause governs the word "person" and not the word "director"; otherwise the latter word would be superfluous, as the former would include the latter also. Moreover, as a matter of construction, it is obvious that if the benefit is obtained from a company either by a director or by any other person possessing the substantial interest, as mentioned in the said sub-clause, it has to be included in his income. In the result, therefore, we hold that, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the Tribunal was correct in applying the provisions of section 10(4A) of the Act to the case of the assessee-company. Both parts of the question referred to this court are answered in favour of the department and against the assessee. We shall make no order as to costs in this case.
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1965 (12) TMI 147
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... ... ..... on a consideration of the final report and the police papers he had reason to suspect that the offence was committed and there was a case for placing the accused on trial. The same position also obtains in regard to Revision Application No. 248 of 1964. In that case too the learned Magistrate was of the view on a consideration of the final report and the police papers that an offence did appear to have been committed and there was a case for placing the accused on trial and he was, therefore, entitled to take cognizance of me offence under Section 190(1)(c) though in view of the final report as drawn up by the police he might not have been entitled to take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1) (b). We would, therefore, direct the learned Magistrate in each case to take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(c) and to proceed further in the matter in accordance with the provisions of the Code. There will be order accordingly in both the Revision Applications.
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1965 (12) TMI 146
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... ... ..... , as has in fact happened in this case, and it is a factor which must be considered as weighty in coming to the conclusion whether the action taken as a whole is or is not mala fide. In the circumstances of the case, to my mind, the impugned notification cannot be held to have been issued in good faith and has to be held to have been issued mala fide. On this conclusion the impugned notification must be struck down as invalid. Once this conclusion is reached the petitioners succeed in their petition. 6. The consequence is that the impugned notification is struck down as invalid because it has been issued mala fide so that the petitioners succeed in their petition which is hereby accepted, but, in the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to their own costs. S. B. Capoor, J. 7. I agree. Prem Chand Pandit, J. 8. I agree that the writ petition should be accepted, because the impugned notification was issued mala fide. The parties should, however, bear their own costs.
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1965 (12) TMI 145
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... ... ..... there were two writ petitions before the High Court. They gave rise to two appeals. The appeal before us is only from one of the appeals, in which the present appellant was the appellant and the present respondent No. 1 was respondent No. 1. The appeals failed before the Appeal Court in view of the decision of this Court in Rajagopala Naidu's case 1964 7 S.C.R. 1. The only point raised before us is whether the order of the High Court reviving other appeals before the Appellate Tribunal besides the two between the parties which went to the High Court is correct. In view of our decision in appeal No. 363 the reconsideration before the Appellate Tribunal will only be confined to the parties which went to the High Court in writ proceedings and the respondents therein. We therefore partially allow all the appeals and vary the order of the Appeal Court in the manner indicated above. In the circumstances we pass no order as to costs in all the appeals. Appeals allowed in part.
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1965 (12) TMI 144
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... ... ..... nt's trespass, till 27-2-1118 (13-10-1942) the date of the institution of the suit, at the rate of ₹ 5000 per annum, and, thereafter, up to this date, at the rate of ₹ 31, 193 per annum with interest on each year's mesne profits at six per cent per annum from the date of its accrual; (3) directing an inquiry by the lower court regarding mesne profits from this date under Order XX rule 12 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code up to the time contemplated by that provision and the passing of a final decree against the 1st defendant accordingly; (4) for a sum of ₹ 2,06,423 as compensation for waste with interest at six per cent per annum on that sum from this date; and (5) for costs both in this court and in the court below. These costs will not however include the court fee payable to Government on the plaint and the memorandum of appeal. These amounts will be paid by the 1st defendant and will, of course, be a first charge on the subject-matter of the suit.
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1965 (12) TMI 143
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... ... ..... de and the respondents will make over the possession of the properties sold to the appellant. The appellant will not be entitled to any past mesne profits but if the respondents do not deliver the possession of the properties the appellant will be entitled to the future mesne profits from the respondents from the date of deposit till the actual date of delivery of possession. Learned Counsel for the appellant has informed us that the deposit has already been made by the appellant in pursuance of the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court, dated October 3, 1958. If the deposit has already been made the appellant will be entitled to take possession of the properties through the executing court and to future mesne profits from the date of this judgment till the actual date of delivery of possession. We accordingly allow the appeal to the extent indicated above. In the circumstances of the case we do not propose to make any order as to costs. Appeal allowed in part.
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1965 (12) TMI 142
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... ... ..... elevant to the issue and to determine where the balance lay. Its finding that the balance lay on one side or the other cannot be assailed before the High Court in a reference. Question No. 4 is, as it ought to be, a question of law. As the application for registration for the assessment year 1957-58 was barred by time and as the other application for renewal, though within time as such, did not lie, the Tribunal acted legally in refusing registration and renewal. The refusal of registration was also justified by its finding that the firm as constituted by a deed of partnership did not exist during the relevant accounting year. Question No. 4 is answered in the affirmative. A copy of this judgment shall be sent under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal as required by section 66(5) of the Act. The assessee shall pay the costs of this reference which we assess at ₹ 200. Counsel's fee is assessed at ₹ 200.
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1965 (12) TMI 141
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... ... ..... he family held a quota is identified not by the trademark assigned to it by the family but by its original manufacturer The yarn supplied by Madurai Mills and Meenakshi Mills to quota-holders is just the same and one quota-holder does not in any way differ from any other quota-holder of the mills in the matter of the quality and standard manufacture of yarn supplied against the quotas In that sense, the longstanding of the family business will have no significance in the context of whether there was a goodwill or not attached to the business We think that the facts in this case provide no basis and quota-holding, without anything more, cannot, in the nature of things, admit of the existence or development of any goodwill On this view, it is unnecessary to consider whether the value of the goodwill has been properly determined or not is supported by material We answer the questions referred to us in favour of the accountable person with costs Counsel’s fees, ₹ 250
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1965 (12) TMI 140
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... ... ..... le reasoning, if the reality of the expenditure and the purpose for which it is incurred are accepted. The Tribunal merely accepted that reasoning. (4) In our view, a proper disposal of the appeal would have been for the Tribunal to find whether the agreement of agency with each of the four persons was a fact, whether payment of commission to each of them as claimed by the assessee was true, and whether payment of commission to the four persons was an expenditure incurred by the assessee wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. If these points are found in favour of the assessee, no further question can arise as to reasonableness or otherwise of the quantum of the commission paid, for it is entirely for the assessee to decide it. (5) We answer the question referred to us in favour of the assessee, but in the expectation that the Tribunal will dispose of the appeal afresh in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. No costs. Reference answered.
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1965 (12) TMI 139
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... ... ..... pinion its true intent, namely that what is intended is to validate post-1956 action, that is action taken under Section 34 as amended by Section 18 of the Finance Act 1956". Kapur J. was of a similar view; "The notices to which Section 4 applies and which are validated are those that were issued between the periods mentioned in that Act i.e. before the Amending Act 1959 and after the Finance Act 1956 in spite of the expiry of the eight years period before the amendment by the Finance Act of 1956". The view of Hidayatullah J. is stated thus - "By the validating Section 4 of the 1959 Act, any notice issued before 1959 could not be challenged even if under the 1948 Act, they would be out of time". It follows that Section 4 of Act I of 1959 saves the notice under S. 34(1)(a) issued on 9-7-1958 from the bar of limitation. (6) the question referred to us is answered against the assessees with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250/-. (7) Answer accordingly.
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1965 (12) TMI 138
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... ... ..... prepared to accept this explanation, for it is the duty of the Minister to see that the order is issued in accordance with his satisfaction and carries out his directions. Though the Minister may not write out the order himself he is as much responsible for it as if he had done so himself, for no order of detention can be passed without the satisfaction of the authority empowered under the Act and the Rules. The authority cannot take refuge in saying that it was really satisfied about, say, one ground but the person who later on wrote out the order of detention added many more grounds which the authority never had in mind. It is the duty of the authority to see that the order of detention is in accordance with what the authority was satisfied about. If it is not so, the inference of casualness is strengthened and the Court would be justified in coming to the conclusion that the order was passed without the application of the mind of the authority concerned. Petition allowed.
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1965 (12) TMI 137
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... ... ..... when the matter goes in appeal before it. These are not matters which can be legitimately raised before this Court under Art. 136. The result is, certified Standing Order 29(a) is modified as indicated in this judgment; Standing Order 54 which deals with the age of superannuation or retirement and provides for consequential payment of pension, as well as the two provisos to Standing Order 47, and Standing Orders 48 and 49 are struck down and deleted from the list of certified Standing Orders. The rest of the order passed by the Appellants Authority is confirmed. The certified Standing Orders will now have to be renumbered. As we have already indicated, this order will govern also Civil Appeal No. 1105 of 1964, with the result that the Standing ,Orders in this appeal which correspond to the Standing Orders in C.A. No. 164 of 1965, will be modified or struck down in accordance with this judgment. There would be no order as to costs in both the appeals. Appeal allowed in part.
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