|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 47 Records
-
1967 (10) TMI 73
... ...
... ... ..... t case are almost identical with those in V.D. Dhanwatey v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1968 68 ITR 365 (SC), judgment in which has been pronounced today. For the reasons elaborately set out in that case we hold that the decision of the question of law in the present case is governed by the decisions of this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Kalu Babu Lai Chand 1959 37 ITR 123, and in Mathura Prasad v. Commissioner of Income-tax 1966 ITR 428 (SC). We are accordingly of the opinion that the question referred to the High Court was rightly answered against the assessee and this appeal must be dismissed with costs. Hegde, J.-I agree with the conclusion reached by my learned brothers. For the reasons stated in my judgment in Civil Appeals 1372 and 1373 of 1966, V.D. Dhanwatey's case (supra). I am unable to subscribe to the observation in the majority judgment that the material facts of the present case are almost indentical with those in V.D. Dhanwatey's case (supra).
-
1967 (10) TMI 72
... ...
... ... ..... rom the date of grant of the certificate, and it is expressly provided that the right, title and interest of the landowner in the said land shall determine. In the context the word "owner" is very comprehensive indeed, and it implies that all rights, title and interest of the landowner pass to the tenant. Further, it seems to us that it would lead to utter confusion if the contention of the learned counsel is accepted. There would be interminable disputes as to the rights of the erstwhile landowners to go on the lands of erstwhile tenants and cut trees or take the fruit. Moreover, under s. 15 of the Act we would, following the same reasoning, have to hold that the trees on the land of the landowner did not vest in the State. This could hardly have been the intention. 12. For the aforesaid reasons we must uphold the judgment of the Judicial Commissioner, although for different reasons. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 13. Appeal dismissed.
-
1967 (10) TMI 71
... ...
... ... ..... d expenses of the Official Assignee. The purchasers to continue in possession of the shop in question and the Official Assignee to refund the sum of ₹ 7,000 deposited as security to the purchasers. The other properties of the debtors to be returned by the Official Assignee to the debtors on his costs, charges and expenses being satisfied. If the petitioning-creditor does not pay the costs, charges and expenses, the Official Assignee to recover the same from the amount which is in his hands and if he so recovers it from the amount which is in his hands, the debtors to be at liberty to recover the same from the petitioning-creditor. The sum of ₹ 39,000 deposited with the Official Assignee by Khona and Suryakant, Attorneys for the 1st mortgagees being surplus of the sale-proceeds be returned to Mr. Dhanuka's clients (debtors); however, before withdrawing the said amount the debtors should give notice to Aibara & Co., Attorneys for the alleged 2nd mortgagees.
-
1967 (10) TMI 70
... ...
... ... ..... counsel for the appellant. A Hindu son governed by the Mitakshara law is liable to pay the debts of his father even if they are not incurred for purposes of legal necessity or for benefit to the estate, provided the debts are not avyavaharika or illegal. But there is no evidence that the appellant is sought to be rendered liable for a debt which is avyavaharika or illegal. In raising his contention counsel assumes that Lachhmi Narain had misappropriated the jewellery entrusted to him, but for that there is no support. Granting that the appellant was, after the death of Lachhmi Narain, unable to trace the jewellery entrusted by the plaintiff, it cannot be inferred that the jewellery was misappropriated by Lachhmi Narain. The burden of proving that there was a debt and that the debt was avyavaharika or illegal lay upon the appellant. There is no evidence to prove that the debt was avyavaharika or illegal. 17. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 18. Appeal dismissed.
-
1967 (10) TMI 69
... ...
... ... ..... the exercise of his general powers of management the General Manager had clearly the power to issue a notice inviting applications from intending candidates, It is not alleged that he made any appointment pursuant to the notice. The respondent also contended that he had the right to be promoted to a class II junior post. But there is nothing on the record to show that he has any vested right of promotion to the post. Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 3032 of 1967 filed by the respondent asking for liberty to adduce additional evidence and to raise new contentions is dismissed. In the order dated August 17, 1967 granting special leave to the appellant, the Court directed that the appellant must pay the costs of the respondent in any event. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition is dismissed. The appellant shall pay the costs of the appeal to the respondent pursuant to the order dated August 17, 1967. Appeal allowed.
-
1967 (10) TMI 68
... ...
... ... ..... refore of the view that the High Court was in error when it held that sec. 6 notification was not in accord with that section and that proceedings taken thereafter were vitiated. We may mention that Counsel for the 1st respondent Society cited certain authorities and also attempted to canvass the issue as to mala fides on the part of the Government. As to the authorities cited by him we think that they were neither relevant nor of any assistance to him. As regards the question of mala fides, we do not think there is any justification for reopening the concurrent finding of the Trial Court and the AdditiOnal District Judge. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the High Court’s judgment and decree are set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the Addl. District Judge dismissing the suit of the 1st respondent Society are restored. The 1st respondent Society will pay to the appellant the costs in this Court as also in the High Court.
-
1967 (10) TMI 67
... ...
... ... ..... and members go but the club goes on for ever. That is true in a sense. We are not concerned with members who go out. The club belongs to members for the time being on its list of members and that is what matters. Those members can deal with the club as they like. Therefore, the club is identified with its members at a given point of time. Thus it cannot be said that the club has an existence apart from the members. It is said that the case of the club is indistinguishable from the Hospital 1960 2 S.C.R. 866 case. That case is one which may be said to be on the verge. There are reasons to think that it took the extreme view of an industry. We need not pause to consider the Hospital(1) case because the case of a members' club is beyond even the confines established by that case. In our judgment the Madras Gymkhana Club being a members' club is not an industry and the Tribunal was right in so declaring. The appeal fails and is dismissed but we make no order about costs.
-
1967 (10) TMI 66
... ...
... ... ..... tors and as regards interest on damages awarded by them. We need not however say anything about these two questions as ultimately they were not pressed by him. The last contention raised by him was that the arbitrators awarded damages on the basis of the market rate at ₹ 51 per maund instead of ₹ 65 which was the export price fixed by the Government of Pakistan. The argument was that such a basis was contrary to the public policy laid down by the Government of Pakistan and it would not be expedient on our part to give our imprimatur to an infringement by the arbitrators of such a policy. There is, in our view. no merit in the argument. The Government of Pakistan cannot lay down any public or economic policy for this country. If the arbitrators found the prevalent rate A on January 2, 1959 in Calcutta to be ₹ 51 a maund there can be no objection to their adopting that rate for adjudicating the quantum of damages. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
-
1967 (10) TMI 65
... ...
... ... ..... 6, 1950 lay claim to that property which was vested in the Aligarh University by the 1920-Act and say that the 1965-Act merely because it made some change in the constitution of the Court of the Aligarh University deprived the Muslim minority of the property, for the simple reason that the property was not vested in the Muslim minority at any time after the 1920-Act came into force. The argument that there has been breach of Art. 31(1) has therefore no force. We are therefore of opinion that there is no force in any of these petitions. It is not disputed that the 1951 and 1965- Acts are within the competence of Parliament unless they are hit, by any of the constitutional provisions to which we have referred above. As, they are not hit by any of these provisions, these Acts are good and are not liable to be struck down as ultra vires the Constitution. The petitions therefore fail and are hereby dismissed. In the circumstances we make no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
-
1967 (10) TMI 64
'Inam' paid or to be paid to its workmen under the Inam Scheme initiated on 28th December, 1955 - whether is not "wages " as defined in the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (No.-34 of 1948) and that no contribution, either as employer's special contribution or employees' contribution, is payable by the Company in respect thereof?
Held that:- It was again a one-sided promise on behalf of the appellant not to deny this payment of Inam during a period for which the Inam Scheme had already been notified by the appellant, but such an assurance on behalf of the appellant does not indicate that the employees could claim that a right to receive the Inam had accrued to them as an implied condition of contract of employment. The decision given by the High Court has, therefore, to be set aside.The appeal is thus allowed.
-
1967 (10) TMI 63
... ...
... ... ..... nd the intention of entry 44 is not to cover such stools. We are unable to accept this construction. The phrase furniture of all types is wide enough to cover all kinds of furniture, and is not confined to furniture used in homes and offices. Read in the light of entry 13, there is no doubt that entry 44 is intended to cover all types of furniture. The turnover relating to sale of garage stools has been properly charged to tax. So far as the turnover relating to bus body-building contracts is concerned, it is not disputed that our judgment in T.C. No. 227 of 1964 (Simpson and Co. Ltd. v. The State of Madras represented by the Board of Revenue, Madras-5Reported at p. 374 supra.) is applicable to the facts. The terms of the contracts are practically identical with those in T.C. No. 227 of 1964. Following that judgment, we have to hold that the turnover relating to bus bodybuilding also has been charged rightly. The tax case fails and is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1967 (10) TMI 62
... ...
... ... ..... a person but which are of the same genus as perfumery, cosmetics etc. This Court has held in Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. v. Sadhna Aushadhalaya, Jabalpur 1963 14 S.T.C. 813 1963 M.P.L.J. 772. , referred to above, that the words cosmetics and totilet , being words of everyday use, must be construed as understood in common parlance. If the words are interpreted in that manner, in our opinion, a razor blade cannot be interpreted to mean either as an item of cosmetic or an article of toilet. We are, therefore, of the view that the Tribunal was right in holding that a razor blade is not included in entry 31 of Schedule II, Part II, and that the sale thereof can be taxed only under entry 1 of Schedule II, Part VI, of the M. P. General Sales Tax Act. 6.. For the aforesaid reasons, our answer to the question is in the negative. The Commissioner of Sales Tax, M. P., shall pay the costs of these proceedings to the assessee. Hearing fee Rs. 100. Reference answered in the negative.
-
1967 (10) TMI 61
... ...
... ... ..... the assessee is that in its view the two items of turnover were not liable to tax and that failure to include them in the return was bona fide. It is true section 12(3) speaks of levying a penalty in case of failure to disclose a turnover in the return. But, in our view, this language is not to be interpreted in a literal fashion. Sub-section (3) of section 12 is attracted only in case of assessments made under sub-section (2). These are not cases where no returns were submitted nor are they cases in which the accounts submitted by the assessee were rejected. It cannot be disputed that the two items of turnover did find a place in the accounts of the assessee. That being the case, we are satisfied that these are not cases of deliberate suppression of items of turnover from the returns. The tax revision cases are allowed in respect of the penalties and also the turnover relating to sales of aluminium scrap, but dismissed in other respects. No costs. Petitions partly allowed.
-
1967 (10) TMI 60
... ...
... ... ..... nd, on that basis it has stated that the rods by user of oxygen gas melted and became non-existent in the process of welding. That means the welding rods were capable of user without electrical energy. Even otherwise, the Tribunal was correct in its view that the rods did not fall within the ambit of electrical goods as defined in entry 41, because the rods themselves neither generate nor transmit electricity. But in the process of welding, the rods, due to the heat produced, melt and disappear. Following our judgment in Tax Case No. 140 of 1964(1), we dismiss this tax case. No costs. Petition dismissed.
-
1967 (10) TMI 59
... ...
... ... ..... form. Once that is done, there is no further obligation on the part of the selling dealer and he will automatically be entitled to the concessional rate. If the declaration turns out to be false, in the sense that the goods purchased have not been used as declared in the prescribed form, the purchaser is exposed to the penalties provided by section 23 and section 45(2)(e). If the purchaser will make a false declaration or a declaration which he does not comply with he would do so under peril of meeting those penalties. But on that account, the selling dealer is not deprived of the concessional rate. The physical changes which the Board mentioned do not appear to us to bring about any substantial change to the fact that the goods sold will fall within the First Schedule and are to be used as component parts by the purchasing dealer in the manufacture of some other goods falling within that Schedule. The tax case is allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
-
1967 (10) TMI 58
... ...
... ... ..... at the earth, out of which the bricks were to be made and supplied, was given to the assessee free of cost, which meant that there was transfer of property in the earth to the assessee. That is not the case here. It cannot be said, having regard to the terms of the contracts, that the property in the metal quarried by the assessee passed to him at any stage. The transactions were, therefore, purely of work and labour. Following the ratio of our decision in Tax Case (Appeal) No. 196 of 1966(1), we allow these tax appeals. No costs. Appeals allowed.
-
1967 (10) TMI 57
... ...
... ... ..... rescribed places should only be supplied to the Corporation or the Highways Department. The Board of Revenue thought that these provisions were only meant to regulate the correct supply. This is not the correct view to take. Whether the given transaction is a works contract or a sale of goods will, no doubt, turn upon the construction of the contract, but, in construing, the passing of property and the position of risk in relation to the property have to be kept in view. Having regard to the terms of the contracts in this case, we have no doubt that these are transactions relating to work and labour and they are not sales of goods. Just now we disposed of P. K. Muthurama Reddiar v. The State of MadrasTax Case (Appeal) No. 156 of 1966 since reported at page 174 supra., in which we held the transactions to be sales of goods, because there, unlike in this case, the contractor had to pay seigniorage fee for collecting pebbles. The tax appeal is allowed. No costs. Appeal allowed.
-
1967 (10) TMI 56
... ...
... ... ..... upreme Court held that under the contract there was a transfer of property in the earth to the assessee, that though the contract itself did not mention sale, there was also a transfer of property in the bricks from the assessee to the company for consideration and that therefore the transaction was a sale of goods. In the instant case too, as we already noticed, there is a specific stipulation for payment by the assessee and recovery from his bills of the seigniorage fee which the Corporation was liable to pay to the Revenue Department for quarrying the pebbles in the licensed site. Our attention has been invited to a recent judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in C. Krishnaswami Rao v. The State of MadrasT.C. Nos. 165, 206 and 207 of 1964 since reported at page 146 supra., but it is, in our opinion, distinguishable, because there was no stipulation for payment for the earth out of which brick was made. The tax appeal is dismissed, but with no costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1967 (10) TMI 55
... ...
... ... ..... o required to be in accordance with the Rules framed under the Act. But that, in our opinion, pertains only to the procedure in relation to the collection and not to the sanction itself and what can be collected whithin the scope of section 9A. Section 13(3) empowers the State Government to make Rules not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and perhaps also the preamble thereto. In the present context the purpose of the Act is to be found in section 9A which is to authorise a registered dealer to collect an amount by way of tax, that is to say, an amount in respect of which there is liability to pay as tax, subject to the condition that such collection should be in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. On that view of the scope of section 9A and Rule 4-A, it follows that the demand made on the assessee to make over the excess collection cannot be supported. The tax case is allowed with costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 100. Petition allowed.
-
1967 (10) TMI 54
... ...
... ... ..... ments were allowed by Government by their first order, disappeared, and in its place, the petitioner was allowed to pay the tax in instalments without being subjected to any specific condition. When Government allowed instalments, they extended time for payment. Such extension clearly negatives the concept of any default, and so, the Commercial Tax Officer could not demand any penalty under section 13 of the Sales Tax Act. Since the petitioner paid all the instalments as and when they became due after those instalments were allowed by Government, it was impossible for the Commercial Tax Officer to proceed on the hypothesis that there was any default in the payment of tax, since there was none. On this short ground, we allow these writ petitions and set aside the impugned demands. The penalty, if it is already paid, shall be refunded to the petitioner. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs in these two writ petitions. Advocate s fee Rs. 100, one set. Petitions allowed.
|
