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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 64 Records
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1969 (1) TMI 86
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... ... ..... l in this country, it cannot be said that the warrant issued by the Chief Presidency Magistrate for the arrest of More with the aid of which requisition for securing his presence from Hong Kong was to be made, was illegal. 29. We are unable to agree with the High Court that because of the enactment of the Extradition Act 34 of 1962 the Government of India is prohibited from securing through diplomatic channels the extradition of an offender for trial of an offence committed within India. There was, in our judgment, no illegality committed by the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta, in sending the warrant to the Secretary, Home (Political) Department, Government of West Bengal, for transmission to the Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, for taking further steps for securing the presence of More in India to undergo trial. 30. The appeal must therefore be allowed and the order passed by the High Court set aside. The writ petition filed by More must be dismissed.
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1969 (1) TMI 85
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... ... ..... rted specific portions from the incriminating material copied in the Answer Book. The evidence is definite that the candidate copied certain answers from the incriminating material in his possession". It was on this finding that the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion that the possession and use of the incriminating material were proved and recommended that the results of the Examination be cancelled and he be debarred from appearing in two more Examinations. 13. Here, in the absence of any statutory rules, the principles of natural justice appear to have been followed in the course of the proceedings. In view of the confession made by the petitioner during enquiry and also on the facts and circumstances of the case, there was no necessity to summon the Invigilator on his written report against the petitioner which was shown to him. 14. In this view of the case, the writ petition is dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. Bala Krushna Patra, J. 15. I agree.
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1969 (1) TMI 84
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... ... ..... raph 4 should be read along with paragraph 7 of the plaint in which the plaintiff challenged the alienations made in favour of the several parties to the suit and had claimed relief in respect of all the lands mentioned in the schedule to the plaint. Survey plots Nos. 77 and 43 are expressly mentioned in the schedule. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention of the appellants that the plaintiff had not challenged the sale deed Ex. 159 with respect to survey plots Nos. 77 and 43. The High Court has pointed out that defendant No. 3 was a minor at the time of sale, that Goudappa had acted as her guardian and that defendant No. 3 had no property of her own. The High Court therefore rightly held that the sale must be held to be without consideration and not genuine and was, therefore, not binding on the plaintiff. 8. For these reasons we hold that the judgment of the Bombay High Court dated 12th December, 1962 is correct and this appeal must be dismissed with costs.
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1969 (1) TMI 83
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... ... ..... de to the decision in Read v. Croydon Corporation, (1938) 4 All ER 631 at page 647 where water appears to have been held to be goods and a similar argument that the contract there to supply water was a contract for services was repelled. The essence, however, of that decision was that it was decided on the basis of the relationship between a local authority supplying water and the rate-payer and not on the basis of a contract between parties to a contract for the sale of goods or for services. The claim there arose out of a statutory duty. 25. In the view that I have taken and for the reasons recorded above, I answer the issue in the affirmative and hold that this Court has jurisdiction to try this suit. I hold that electricity is goods within the meaning of clause 4(iv) of the First Schedule of the City Civil Court Act. 26. It follows therefore that there will be a decree for the amount claimed with interim interest and interest on judgment at 6 per cent per annum and costs.
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1969 (1) TMI 82
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... ... ..... the laws must, therefore, stand rejected. 56. The High Court has apparently not considered the other arguments which were advanced at the Bar, and has observed that it was not necessary to consider those other contentions raised in the petition. As the petition has not been heard by the High Court in respect of the other contentions which the first respondent may choose to raise, we set aside the order passed by the High Court declaring Section 53 read with Section 67 insofar as it authorised acquisition of land by the local authority under a town-planning scheme, as violative of Article 31(2) of the Constitution, and the acquisition of the first respondent's land under the City Wall Improvement Town Planning Scheme No. 5 as invalid. The appeal is allowed. The case is remanded to the High Court with a direction that it be dealt with and disposed of according to law. The order of costs passed by the High Court is set aside. There will be no order as to costs in this Court.
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1969 (1) TMI 81
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... ... ..... was cured by Section 135 Sub-section (3). 8. As to the third objection it is to be observed that Section 134 Sub-section (2) does not provide for the publication of the special resolution passed under it. Assuming that this special resolution had to be published under the general provisions of Section 94, we think that the non-publication was a mere irregularity. The inhabitants had no right to file any objections against the special resolution. They had clear notice of the imposition of the tax from the notification published in the official gazette on August 3, 1957. The defect of the non-publication of the special resolution in the manner prescribed by Section 94 was cured by Section 135 Sub-section (3). The High Court was in error in quashing the imposition of the water tax. 9. In the result, the appeals are allowed with costs in this Court and in the High Court, the order of the High Court is set aside and the writ petitions are dismissed. There will be one hearing fee.
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1969 (1) TMI 80
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... ... ..... se - which had passed into the hands of someone who was completely out of touch with the board. But I think that in such cases the commissioners can be trusted to act reasonably and not to draw unfavourable inferences from a failure of the executors to produce information which they are not in a position to produce. At all events, the disadvantages -such as they are - of the "Crowns" test as compared with the "published information" test appear to me to weigh very lightly in the balance against the considerations telling in favour of the Crowns test which I have tried to set out. In the event, therefore, I agree with my Lords that this appeal should be allowed and the figure pounds 4 10s. be substituted for Pound 3 10s. as the value of each share in the company held by Mrs. Lynall. Appeal allowed with costs in court of Appeal. No order as to costs below. Application by appellants for certificate for three counsel refused. Leave to appeal to House of Lords.
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1969 (1) TMI 79
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... ... ..... r for which the contracts were given has expired. The persons to whom the contracts were given are not before us, and we cannot declared the contracts which had been entered into by the Government for the sale of Kendu leaves for the year 1968 unlawful in these proceedings. Counsel for the appellants agree that it would be sufficient if it be directed that the tenders for purchase of Kendu leaves be invited by the Government in the next season from all persons interested in the trade. We trust that in accepting tenders, the State Government will act in the interest of the general public and not of any class of traders so that in the next season the State may get the entire benefit of the monopoly in the trade in Kendu leaves and no disproportionate share thereof may be diverted to any private agency. Subject to these observations we make no further order in the petitions out of which these appeals arise. 23. There will be no order as to costs in all these appeals throughout.
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1969 (1) TMI 78
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... ... ..... e bar of limitation, if the mortgagee is not in possession of the mortgaged property nothing survives the barred charge except an imperfect legal right not constituting an interest in the property sufficient to attract Section 91 (a) of the T. P. Act and consequently unenforceable in action. The right of redemption given to a puisne mortgagee is only ancillary to his right of sale and when that right is lost by limitation the right' of redemption also becomes lost. I respectfully disagree with the decisions which have taken a different view in this respect, also. 14. As the right to recover the money due under Ext. F had become barred by limitation before the institution of the present suit the appellants have no right to redeem the mortgages, Exts. XI and XII. In the result, this appeal is dismissed with costs. Isaac, J. 15. I agree with the conclusions of my learned brother on the two points raised in this appeal, and that it should accordingly be dismissed with costs.
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1969 (1) TMI 77
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... ... ..... 3(1) by itself provides for two procedures. that section merely formulates and imposes penalties in respect of offences mentioned therein. In other words, the contraventions of sections specified therein are made punishable offence by it that the said sub-section does not provide for a minimum sentence in the case of an adjudication by the Director while providing for a maximum sentence in the case of a prosecution before a magistrate is the view expressed by the Supreme Court in the subsequent case of Durga Prasad (Sukumar Pyne)? 1966CriLJ946 . The said case followed and applied the previous decision in the case of Shanti Prasad Jain 1963 2SCR297 . 14. We are therefore of the opinion that the contentions now raised by the petitioner are fully concluded against him by the said two rulings of the Supreme Court. 15. All the four writ petitions are therefore dismissed. 16. The petitioner will pay the costs of the respondents one set, which we fix at a lump sum of ₹ 200/-.
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1969 (1) TMI 76
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... ... ..... are of the view that an application for leave to appeal cannot be regarded as an "appeal" and, therefore, merely because the defendants-appellants filed an application for leave to appeal to Division Bench and also a petition for Special Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, it cannot be said that they had preferred an "appeal" either to the Division Bench or to the upreme Court. We are, therefore, unable to subscribe to the view taken by the learned Single Judge that an application for grant of leave to appeal must be regarded as an "appeal" within the meaning of Clause (d). 22. This appeal is, therefore, allowed, the order of the learned single Judge dated 18-3-66 is set aside and the case is sent back to him for disposal of the defendant-appellants' application under Section 13-A or the Act according to law. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs of this appeal.
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1969 (1) TMI 75
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... ... ..... eir lands with cattle and sell the, cattle, bargains being struck. through brokers in the market arranged by the Petitioners on those pieces of land. It is not clear from the averments made, in the petitions whether the so-called market is of the nature of a fair. the Petitioners are prohibited from holding or conducting a cattle fair, since the enactment of Punjab Act 6 of 1968. The lands belonging to the petitioners have not been included in a cattle fair area under the notification issued by the Fair Officer. Without deciding the question whether the business carried on by the petitioners is in the nature of a fair or a market, we declare that the petitioners are not entitled to carry on the business of a cattle fair and the, relief claimed by them in Paragraph-21(b) cannot be granted. We deem it necessary to add that the petitioners are not prohibited from carrying on the business of cattle market on their own lands. There will be no order as to costs in these petitions.
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1969 (1) TMI 74
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... ... ..... other aspect of the reasoning is this. Certainly, a partner can sell his property, to a partnership firm which includes himself as a member. But the question whether there was such a sale, would depend upon his intention and on the language of the document. In the present case, the very partnership firm formally comes into existence under the document, and there are no words whatever of a dispositive character, which, expressly or by implication, amount to a transfer of interest as between the fifth defendant and the other partners. Admittedly, Clause (8), which is the only clause relied on, can only be taken as a declaration of the rights of the partnership in these aforesaid properties, consequent upon the fact that the properties were brought into the common stock. ( 7. ) Accordingly , we would answer the reference in the form that this document is a deed or agreement of partnership, pure and simple, chargeable to duty only under article 46 of Schedule I of the Stamp Act.
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1969 (1) TMI 73
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... ... ..... mandatory in character and even if one of the procedural requirement is not complied with, the order of detention would be rendered illegal. Accordingly, the order of detention dated 17-2-1968 made against petitioner No. 2, Sk. Abdul Karim and the subsequent order of the Governor of West Bengal dated 24th April, 1968 confirming the order of detention must be held to be illegal and ultra vires and petitioner No. 2 Sk, Abdul Karim was entitled to be released. In the case of petitioners Nos. 5, Nirmal Chandra Jana, No. 6 Sk. Ibrahim and No. 8 Nur Mohd. the order of detention suffers’ from the same legal defect as the order of detention in the case of petitioner No. 2, Sk. Abdul Karim. For the reasons already stated we hold that the order of detention and the order of confirmation under section 11 of the Act in the case of petitioners Nos. 5, 6 and 8 were also illegal and ultra vires and the petitioners were consequently entitled to be released. R.K.P.S. Petition allowed.
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1969 (1) TMI 72
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... ... ..... in the inner box, but according to the approver only one hole Was made. It was also said that according to the report of the expert, bent steel wire was found in the first parcel which was sent to him. It was argued that the report of the expert was not consistent with the evidence of the approver who said that the safety pin of the wire had been removed. It was suggested that Mohinder Singh would have probably thrown the safety pin and not kept it in the box. The High Court has examined in detail the argument of the appellant on this point and reached the conclusion that the statement of the approver with regard to, the packing, of the hand grenade should be accepted as 'true. The question involved is one of appreciation of evidence and not a question of law. In any event, we see no sufficient reason for taking a view different from that of the High Court in this matter. For, these reasons we hold that there is no merit in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed.
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1969 (1) TMI 71
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... ... ..... im made by the claimants that in implementing the award of the International Tribunal an attempt is made to cede any part of the territory which formed part of the State of Kutch before 1948, or was in de facto occupation and in respect of which sovereign authority was exercised by the Maharao of Kutch. The award does no more than define on the surface of the earth a boundary which has at all material times remained indefinite, because of the nature of the terrain, the shifting nature of the border of what was called Rann, the highly discrepant and conflicting claims made from time to time by the British authorities as well as the Kutch State authorities before the State merged with the Dominion of India in 1948, and the persistent refusal of the British authorities, though there were several occasions to demarcate the boundary between Sind and the Rann of Kutch. The appeal and the writs are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in the appeals and the writ petitions.
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1969 (1) TMI 70
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... ... ..... laws must,, therefore, stand rejected. The High Court has apparently not considered the other arguments which were advanced at the Bar, and has observed that it was not necessary to consider those other contentions raised in the petition. As the petition has not been heard by the High Court in respect of the other contentions which the first respondent may choose to raise, we set aside the order passed by the High Court declaring s. 53 read with s. 67 insofar as it authorised acquisition of land by the local authority under a town-planning scheme, as violative of Art. 31(2) of the Constitution, and the acquisition of the first respondent’s land under the City Wall Improvement Town Planning Scheme No. 5 as invalid. The appeal is allowed. The case is remanded to the High Court with a direction that it be dealt with and disposed of according to law. The order of costs passed by the High Court is set aside. There will be no order as to costs in this Court. Appeal allowed.
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1969 (1) TMI 69
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... ... ..... nt words in section 279 (1) relating to plant and machinery, then section 300 of the same Income Tax Act, 1952, would be unnecessary. But that section relates to " alterations to an existing building incidental to the installation of machinery or plant " ; and its wording suggests that it was enacted simply as an assurance to remove doubts about a particular kind of case. Section 16 (3) of the Finance Act of 1956, which is also relied upon by the appellant, I do not find of help, for it refers to expenditure on (among other thingh) preparing and cutting land for which no allowance could be made under Chapter II of Part X of the Act of 1952, which Chapter II includes section 279. One is thus back at the self-same problem and I would answer it in the same way as did the Court of Session. The decision of Finlay J. in Margrett v. Lowestoft Water and Gas Co. on which the appellants relied was in my opinion wrong. I think the appeal should be dismissed. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (1) TMI 68
Whether a person holds an office of profit under a Government is the amount of control which the Government exercises over that officer?
Held that:- The power to appoint and dismiss respondent No. 1 does not vest in the Government or in any government servant. The power to control and give directions as to the manner in which the duties of the office are to be performed by respondent No. 1 also does not vest in the Government, but in an officer of the Company. Even the power to determine the question of remuneration payable to respondent No. 1 is not vested in the Government which can only lay down rules relating to the conditions of service of the employees of the Company.
Thus unable to agree that, in these circumstances, the indirect control exercisable by the Government because of its power to appoint, the Directors and to give general directions to the Company can be held to make the post of Superintendent, Safety Engineering Department, an office of profit under the Government. he principles which will apply to the Company will be on a par with those applicable to other Government Companies or Companies in which the Government holds more than 25 per cent of the share capital. The Company cannot, therefore, be treated as either being equivalent to the Government or to be an agent of the Government, so that the control exercised by its Directors or the Managing Director over respondent No. 1 cannot be held to be control exercised by the Government. Therefore, respondent No. 1 cannot be held to be holding an office of profit under the Government of Mysore and was Pot disqualified from being chosen as a member of the Assembly of the State. Appeal dismissed.
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1969 (1) TMI 67
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... ... ..... e rules confer power on the assessing authority to assess a turnover escaping assessment. In the instant case, the assessing authority was the Regional Assistant Commissioner, who could alone have started proceedings under section 11-A of the old Act or section 19 of the new Act. The proceedings in revision taken by the Additional Commissioner, who is not the assessing authority, cannot be construed as proceedings relatable to either section 11-A of the old Act or section 19(1) of the new Act. 5.. As a result of the above discussion, we answer the questions as follows (1) The action to revise the assessment was relatable to section 22-B of the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. (2) The proceedings in revision were barred by time, as they were taken after expiry of the period prescribed in section 22-B of the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. (3) In view of the answers given above, question No. (3) does not arise and we decline to answer it. Reference answered accordingly.
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