|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 85 Records
-
1972 (1) TMI 120
... ...
... ... ..... mpt was made on behalf of the plaintiff to controvert the said denial by examination of a hand-writing expert. Reliance was also placed by the High Court on the fact that the plaintiff who filed a petition under Sections 107 and 145 Cr. P.C. against the first defendant and 12 others on 8th December, 1956 described himself as the Mahant of Chanwa Math and made no reference in the petition itself to the installation ceremony at Turki. The High Court also did not believe the plaintiff's version that he had signed a blank sheet of paper to be used as a compromise petition in the earlier suit filed by him and nothing has been shown to us as to why we should take a different view. 12. In the result we hold that the plaintiff was unable to discharge the onus which lay on him to substantiate the custom as to succession pleaded in his plaint. He also failed to establish that he had in fact been installed as the Mahant of the said Math. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
-
1972 (1) TMI 119
... ...
... ... ..... generally, or the Collector specially authorises in that behalf. Section 29 of the Indian Arms Act, 1878, says No proceedings shall be instituted against any person in respect of such offence without the previous sanction of the Magistrate of the District or, in a presidency town, of the Commissioner of Police. In all these sections, the language employed is prohibitory in character Section 83(1) of the Act is not prohibitory either in terms or in intention. 8. We think that, on the point under consideration, the decisions in Gopinath v. Kuldip Singh and Ors. I.L.R. Calcutta, 11, Re Piranu Nadathi and Ors. I.L.R. 40 Mad 880, and Emperor v. Yesa Nana Didwagh and Ors. A.I.R. 1937 Bom. 191 lay down the correct Law. 9. We cannot appreciate or approve the reasoning in Emperor v. Mohd. Mahdi and Ors. AIR1934All963 and Nga Pan Gaing and Ors. v. King Emperor A.I.R. 1927 Rang 61 or the cases followed in these rulings. 10. The result is that the appeal has to be dismissed and we do so.
-
1972 (1) TMI 118
... ...
... ... ..... dence in view of Section 35 of the Stamp Act. It is true that the award in the original is not engrossed on a stamp paper. What the arbitrators had done at the time of filing the award was to file the original award along with a true copy of it engrossed on a stamp of ₹ 2,865/-. It is not disputed that an instrument of this kind can be admitted in evidence after proper duty and penalty is paid. The High Court has rightly pointed out that the intention of the arbitrators in engrossing a copy of the award on the stamp paper and producing the same attached to the original award dt. 10-11-1955 was merely to show that the required stamp duty and penalty had been paid. It is not disputed that the actual and penalty required for the document and, therefore, there is no difficulty in holding that the award is admissible in evidence and cannot be rejected on the ground that the proper duty and penalty has not been paid. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
-
1972 (1) TMI 117
... ...
... ... ..... . Therefore, it is difficult to agree with Counsel that Government should have reached its conclusion during the said period. No doubt, the delay in deciding the representation was of 34 days, but part of it was due to the fact that the representation and the record remained with the Board. In these circumstances, it is difficult to say that there is a just and proper analogy between this case and that of Khairut Haque W.P. No. 246 of 1969 decd. on Sept. 10, 1969, or Jayanarayan 1970 CriLJ 743 or that upon such analogy we should reach the same conclusion which was reached in those cases. As held in Jayanarayan's case 1970 CriLJ 743 there can be no hard and fast rule with regard to the time which Government can or should take, and that each case must be decided on its own facts. In the circumstances of the present case we are unable to hold that the delay was so inordinate as to affect the validity of the petitioner's detention. 16. The petition fails and is dismissed.
-
1972 (1) TMI 116
delete
... ... ... ... ..... such price would have to be liquidated. On the facts of the case, the conclusions is inescapable, even apart from the ratio in the Travancore Sugars and Chemicals' case(62 ITR 566) being applicable, that the transaction was, as held by the Tribunal, a licence and not a sale of the goodwill. The disbursements in question, therefore, were in the nature of royalty and must be treated as admissible deductions. In this view, it does not become necessary to go into the question whether cl. (6) in the deed, dated January 2, 1951 and cl. (5) in the deed, dated October 18, 1951 contained overriding provisions by reason of which payments ill question could not form part of the assessable profits of the firm, The appeals are, in this view, allowed with costs, both here and in the High Court. The costs, 'however, will be only one set of costs. ORDER In view of the decision of the majority, the appeals are allowed with costs in this Court and, in the High Court. One set of costs.
-
1972 (1) TMI 115
... ...
... ... ..... rners of the Act and whether it has acted in good faith. The Courts will pursue the enquiry further and will use judicial review for determining whether the repository of a discretion although acting in good faith has not abused its power by an excessive or oppressive use thereof on irrelevant grounds or without regard to relevant considerations or with gross unreasonableness. The discretion committed to the authority functioning under Section 112 of the Act is a judicial or qualified discretion and is amenable to correction in the event, among other things, of the unreasonable or patently unjustifiable exercise of the power. Accordingly we quash that part of the order of the Collector of Customs. The Collector of Customs will now reconsider the matter and levy appropriate penalty or penalties in the light of the observations made herein. The writ appeals are allowed in the manner indicated above. The parties will bear their respective costs throughout. 39. Order accordingly.
-
1972 (1) TMI 114
... ...
... ... ..... e old and the new sub-sections have been pointed out to us. When the amending Act has stated that the old sub-section has been substituted by the new sub-section, the inference is that the Legislature intended that the substituted provision should be deemed to have been part of the Act from the very inception. When the proceedings were pending, the amended provision came into force. It is the amended provision that has to be applied and not the old provision which has ceased to exist. 10. Unfortunately both the parties did not bring to the notice of the Court below the amended provision and the Courts below proceeded as if there was no amendment. In these circumstances, the proper course for us to follow is to set aside the orders of the learned District Judge under revision and remit the matter to the Court of the Munsiff at Sagar with a direction to restore the case to its original file and dispose of the same in accordance with law. 11. It is ordered accordingly. No costs.
-
1972 (1) TMI 113
... ...
... ... ..... The only other question which has been agitated relates to the quantum of damages. It is common ground that no evidence was produced with regard to the actual rates prevailing on the date of breach but it was fully established by Exhibit P-46, the validity and genuineness of which has not been disputed, that on 13-1-1951 the rate was ₹ 210/- per candy. Again on 3-2-1951 the rate was ₹ 224/- per candy vide exhibits P-1 and P-2. It was admitted by the defendant in his evidence that the price was rising from the month of November 1950 to March 1951, the rate finally going up to ₹ 220/-per candy. The High Court, therefore, took the lowest rate, namely, ₹ 210/-per candy which prevailed on 31-1-'51 as the rate for computing the damages. We do not find anything illegal for unreasonable about the process by which the damages were computed. 10. In the result the appeal fails and it is dismissed but we leave the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.
-
1972 (1) TMI 112
... ...
... ... ..... en to the appellants before they were convicted. If by mistake of the court or its Office, the appellants who were respondents in that case were not informed of the date of hearing, it will be unreasonable to hold that an opportunity had been given to them, merely because notice had been issued to them of the appeal some 2 1/2 years earlier. The very idea behind publishing the cause list is to give notice to advocates and the parties that the case in which they were concerned was going to be heard on or after a particular day. Where no such notice had been given, it will be idea to say that no opportunity had been denied. 7. In our opinion, there was no proper hearing of Criminal Appeal No. 52 of 1966 and, therefore, the order of conviction and sentence recorded by the High Court must be set aside. We have not referred to the facts of the case because we are not concerned with the same. The High Court shall hear the appeal afresh after issuing necessary notice to the parties.
-
1972 (1) TMI 111
... ...
... ... ..... to points like limitation, jurisdiction and res judicata and may be either collateral to the merits which precludes their determination altogether or a point which, though relating to the merits, precludes their general determination. It is a point which when determined against the plaintiff brings the suit to an end leaving other issues undetermined. I therefore hold that in any view of the matter upon an order of remand being passed in this appeal the appellant is entitled to a certificate under Section 13 of the Court-fees Act. 19. These were the only points canvassed in the appeal which stand concluded on the conclusions reached above. I would therefore allow this appeal with costs throughout against respondent No. 1, the chief contesting respondent, set aside the judgment and decree of the court below and remand the case for a fresh decision of the case according to law. U.S. Srivastava, J. 20. I agree with the order proposed and there is nothing that I can usefully add.
-
1972 (1) TMI 110
... ...
... ... ..... cepted. The contention of counsel that this Court has sub silentio sanctioned the issue of a writ under Article 226 to quash an order terminating services of a teacher passed by a college similarly situate in Prabhakar Ramakrishna Jodh v. A. L. Pande and another( 1965 2 S.C.R. 713.), and, therefore, the fact that the college or the managing committee was not a statutory body was no hindrance to the High Court issuing the writ prayed for by the appellant has no merit as this Court expressly stated in the judgment that no such contention was raised in the High Court and so it cannot be allowed to be raised in this Court. In this view of the matter, it is quite unnecessary to go into the question whether the appellant was given sufficient opportunity to meet the charges against him. We hold that the High Court was right in its view that the writ petition was incompetent. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal but, in the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
-
1972 (1) TMI 109
... ...
... ... ..... nt possession after removing the superstructure. In default, the plaintiff will be entitled to recover the land along with the superstructure and the plaintiff also will be entitled to mesne profits which will have to be determined in further proceedings both with regard to the land and with regard to the superstructures till such time the plaintiff obtains delivery of possession. C.M.P. 5450 of 1971, C.M.P. 4004 of 1971 and C.M.P. 3873 of 1971 are all ordered accordingly, subject to the conditions mentioned above. As regards the costs, we think that costs one set in all the appeals would be sufficient. A.S. No. 601 of 1963 is allowed, no costs in the appeal. A.S. 479 of 1963 is dismissed; no costs in the appeal. In both the matters, the costs as awarded by the trial court shall stand. The appeal A.S. 455 of 1967 is dismissed. The municipality will be entitled to its costs on the valuation in the appeal as valued in A.S. 455 of 1967 and the costs in the trial court as taxed.
-
1972 (1) TMI 108
... ...
... ... ..... the Senior Executive Officer (Quarry) of the Jaipur Udyog Limited and that he was fully conversant with the facts of the case and was competent to swear the affidavit. In Petition No. 11 of 1971 of Hindusthan Sugar Mills Ltd., Bombay, the affidavit has been sworn by one Shri Rangnath Kabra who has described himself as the Administrative Manager of the petitioner company and has stated that he was fully conversant with the facts of the case. These averments of the aforementioned two officers clearly show that the petitions were signed and verified on behalf of the companies by their principal officers who were able to depose to the facts of the cases and as such they were entitled to sign the petitions and present them in the court. The preliminary objection has, therefore, no force and it is rejected. 23. For the reasons mentioned above, all these three writ petitions are allowed. The impugned notification dated 29th of January, 1970, is hereby quashed. No order as to costs.
-
1972 (1) TMI 107
... ...
... ... ..... s no jurisdiction to go behind or question the statements of fact made by the Tribunal. " As we have earlier referred to the facts and circumstances of this case, and held that the Tribunal's finding on the benami nature of the business is based on sufficient materials on record, it is not necessary in this case to go into the question posed by the learned counsel for the revenue that the assessee should have sought a specific reference attacking the findings arrived at by the Tribunal if he had desired to challenge the same. We, therefore, answer the reference in T. C. No. 66 of 1965 in favour of the revenue and against the assessees. In view of our above answer, the cancellation of the protective assessments have to be sustained and the question in T. C. No. 17 of 1965 is to be answered in the affirmative and against the revenue. The revenue will be entitled to its costs in T. C. No. 66 of 1965. Counsel's fees ₹ 250. T. C. P. No. 54 of 1965 is dismissed.
-
1972 (1) TMI 106
... ...
... ... ..... Commission of Inquiry is altogether different. In any case, it cannot be said that the Commission of Inquiry would be liable for contempt of Court if it proceeded to inquire into matters referred to it by the Government Notification. In appointing a Commission of Inquiry under Section 3 and in making the inquiry contemplated by the notification, the Commission is performing its statutory duty. We have already held that in the appointing of the Commission of Inquiry the Government was acting bona fide. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the argument of the appellants that the setting up of the Commission of Inquiry, by the State Government or the continuance of the inquiry by the Commission so constituted would be tantamount to contempt of Court. 17. In our view the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. We, therefore, accept the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and discharge the rule which was issued against the appellant for contempt of Court.
-
1972 (1) TMI 105
... ...
... ... ..... ot; in that section refers to the taking of possession and not to the declaration of urgency. Even in case of urgency, the Government may not think it necessary to take immediate possession for good reasons. Neither the language of s.17(1) nor public interest justifies the construction sought to be placed by the learned Counsel for the appellant. For the reasons mentioned above, these appeals fail and they are dismissed; but in the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs in these appeals. Before concluding the case, it is necessary to record the assurance given by the Attorney-General on behalf of the State Government of Bihar that the Government of Bihar will not realise from the appellant any interest on the loans advanced for the development of the lands notified for acquisition in the two Land Acquisition cases from the dates they were notified under s. 29 of the Indian Forest Act. A Memo. to that effect has been filed. Appeals dismissed.
-
1972 (1) TMI 104
... ...
... ... ..... The High Court was also not justified in disallowing 5 awarded by the Judicial Commissioner, Chhotanagpur as compensation for severance merely because there was an entrance to the land. When a portion left out there would be a diminution in the value of ;the land that is left out for which some compensation has to be allowed. The 5 allowed by the Judicial Commissioner, Chhotanagpur is reasonable. In this view, the claimants would be entitled to a decree as follows in respect of the lands acquired - (1) At the rate of ₹ 1,35,000 per acre for 4.65 acres; (2) 5 severence and 15 solatium on the market value computed as in (1); (3) Interest at 6 from the-date of taking possession. The appeals of the claimants are allowed to the extent of the variation and those by the Government are dismissed with costs. The claimants will be entitled to proportionate costs on the difference between the amounts decreed and those that are now awarded in each of the two appeals filed by them.
-
1972 (1) TMI 103
... ...
... ... ..... bonafide. But on the other hand, he deliberately did so may be for obvious reason that if he had to withdraw the suit he would have to give notice under Section 80, CPC to the Government, wait for the expiry of the period of notice of two months and thereafter file a fresh suit. To avoid this he thought he would take a chance but that chance boomeranged against him. It is not a case where he prosecuted due to ignorance of law or bonafide mistake nor can it be said that he had misconceived the suit. None of the cases cited by the learned Advocate can assist the appellant because in all of them it was either a case of mistake of law on a doubtful point such as in the case of Bishambhur Haldar v. Bonomali Haldar and Ors. ILR 26 Calcutta 414, or ignorance of law. 5. We do not think, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, that there is any justification for the application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act and in this view the appeal is dismissed with costs.
-
1972 (1) TMI 102
... ...
... ... ..... before the submission of the charge-sheet, (cf. Chandradip v. State((1955)Bihar Law Journal Reports, 323.) and Ajit Singh v. State((1970) 76 Cr. L.J. 1075.), that is, at the stage when the investigation is still not over. If the view we hold is correct that s. 344 operated, the Magistrate, provided he complied with the condition in the Explanation, was competent to pass remand orders from time to time subject to each order being not for a period exceeding 15 days. There can be no doubt that the Magistrate had satisfied that condition. The judgment of the High Court in para 11 points out that the prosecution case was that the appellant had himself made a confession before the police. That was in addition to a confession by two others which implicated the appellant in the commission of offences under s. 395 of the Code. In our view none of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant can be sustained. The appeal, therefore, fails and has to be rejected. Appeal dismissed.
-
1972 (1) TMI 101
grant of import licence to units engaged in the manufacture of hospital equipment" - classification of medical and surgical equipment and appliances".
whether the application for the import licence in question should be considered in accordance with the policy in force when the licence is granted or when the application is made.
|
