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Showing 1 to 20 of 103 Records
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1973 (3) TMI 152
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... ... ..... t respondent No. 2. 61. We do not agree with this contention, for, while proceeding to dispose of the petition by judgment the learned Judge has, consistent with the reservations made by respondent No. 2 while submitting to the orders of the Court, merely proceeded on the basis that the allegations made in the petition against the respondents should be assumed to be true. Besides, the learned Judge has also clearly observed that the making of this order does not involve any admission by any of the respondents of the allegations made against them in the petition nor his giving a finding on any of the issues framed in the case. 62. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Liberty to the attorneys for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in the appeal (Union of India and respondent No. 1 Company) to withdraw the sums of Rs. 500 each deposited by the appellant towards such costs. The judgments in the remaining Appeals are not material to our report. 63. Appeals dismissed.
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1973 (3) TMI 151
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... ... ..... he gown is to remain, it would accord very unsatisfactorily with the dhoti. The superfluous cloth worn from the waist in massed folds is bound to get mixed up with the gown and make a mess, with the result that a learned advocate dressed in that fashion would look more an ungeometrical bundle of loose clothing than a neat and well trimmed figure." 20. Lastly, the learned counsel rested the petition on the ground of mala fide. We have perused the averments made in the petition and the affidavit filed in support thereof. We are not satisfied on the material placed before us that any case of mala fide is made out. If the Court possessed the legal power to prevent the petitioner from appearing before it otherwise than in prescribed dress, the exercise of that power would not be vitiated merely for the reason that the same was not exercised against all or other members of the Bar practising at Bulandshahr. 21. In the result this writ petition fails and is dismissed in limine.
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1973 (3) TMI 150
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... ... ..... consumption” and that the State Legislature has no right to impose any excise duty thereon. 11. In our opinion, rectified spirit is not an “alcoholic liquor for human consumption” and is not an excisable article under the U.P Excise Act. No excise duty could be legally imposed upon rectified spirit. The duty imposed by the Commissioner of Excise on the rectified spirit produced and exported by the appellants was without the authority of law. The demand notices issued by the Excise Commissioner are liable to be quashed. 12. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside, the writ petition is allowed and the seven demand notices Annexure 1 to 7 to the writ petition are quashed. In case the excise duty has been recovered on the basis of these demand notices, the same shall be refunded to the appellants forthwith. The appellants are entitled to their costs in this appeal as well as in the writ petition. Appeal allowed.
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1973 (3) TMI 149
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... ... ..... aken prior to the issue of the summons and if that be the true position the only answer of the petitioner to the summons would be to show that the documents so called for are not in its possession. That, however, does not render the summons bad. Similarly Item No. 2 of the summons would be relevant to find out the hold and authority of Shri B. M. Birla over the petitioner company and its management. It would be remembered that the documents have not yet been produced and at this stage what is to be found is their prima facie relevance which the commission has found giving reasons and I do not consider that any ground has been made out for interference with such a finding of the commission. Therefore, this point also fails and is overruled. 27. As all the points raised in support of this Writ Petition fail the application fails. The Rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs. 28. Let the operation of this order remain stayed for a period of one week from this date.
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1973 (3) TMI 148
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... ... ..... we hold that the first respondent's revision before the Sessions Court was competent and reject the second contention of Mr. Rana. 24. Coming to the third contention of Mr. Rana, it has been held by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapati Ganeshwara Raoand Anr. 1964 3SCR297 that "a pardon granted bona fide is fully protected by the provisions of Section 529 of the Criminal Procedure Code". We have already extracted the relevant part of Section 529. On the view expressed by us that the order of the District Magistrate granting pardon is legal and valid, it is not necessary for the State to rely on Section 529, Clause (g) in this case. 25. In the result the order and judgment of the High Court dated September 11, 1968, in so far as it holds that the grant of pardon by the District Magistrate was illegal are set aside and to that extent the appeal is allowed in part. The order dated June 1, 1966 of the District Magistrate, Kanpur, will stand restored.
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1973 (3) TMI 147
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... ... ..... are unable to hold that there was any enforceable contract and that the plaintiff was entitled to damages but we must say that the action of the State Government in this case was very much arbitrary and it goes a lone way to shake the confidence of the people in the State Government. The Director of Mines and Geology also failed to do his duty in spite of the fact that he had had the power to sign the indenture, submitted by the plaintiff. He did not sign it and shirked his responsibility as an officer. We view this whole affair with great displeasure. 23. In the result, we accept the appeal in part, set aside the judgment and decree of the learned trial Judge and instead decree the plaintiff's suit only for ₹ 4715/- against the State with proportionate costs in both the courts. The amount shall bear pendente lite and future interest at the rate of 6% per annum. The State is allowed three months' time to pay the decretal amount, if it has not been paid already.
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1973 (3) TMI 146
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... ... ..... ge has not dealt with that question apparently because it was not argued before him. We do not, therefore, propose to say anything about the merits of the case. It is not necessary to refer to the, decision in Madan Lal v. state of Punjab( 1967 3 S. C. R. 439) and Bhanwar Singh v. Rajasthan( 1968 2 S. C. R. 528) which are relied upon on behalf of the appellants in the view that we have taken that all the offences with which the, accused are charged are cognizable offences, and therefore, the question whether charges which require sanction under s, 196A could be tried alongwith charges which did not require such sanction and the entire charges are vitiated for want of sanction, as held by the learned Single Judge, does not arise. The appeals are allowed and the order of the learned Single Judge is set aside. The Special Judge will now proceed to deal with the cases and dispose of them as expeditiously as possible as the matter has been pending for a long time. Appeals allowed.
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1973 (3) TMI 145
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... ... ..... eral. 10. The petition of the appellants was utterly misconceived. The relevant authorities have power to call for the record of any proceeding in which any Custodian has passed an order for the purpose of satisfying as to the legality or propriety of such order. In the present case the order has been questioned by the authorities on the ground that the appellant Fatima Bi obtained the order fraudulently. Fraud is a question of fact. It is open to the appellant Fatima Bi to establish that she obtained the order properly. Certiorari will not lie for the obvious reason that the authorities have jurisdiction to issue the notice. There is neither excess of jurisdiction nor usurpation. 11. It was said on behalf of the appellants that the order of 1956 was called in question in 1964. Several years have passed. The relevant authorities will take steps to expedite the hearing in the matter. 12. For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed. Each party will pay and bear their own costs.
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1973 (3) TMI 144
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... ... ..... mal Dass & Ors., (A. I.R. 1937 Lab. 828) and Ana Sheikh Mohidin Tharagan v. Vadivalagianambia Pillai(22 1. C. 37) relate to penal clauses in compromise decrees and are therefore distinguishable. The Full Bench decision in Chanbasappa Gurushantappa Hiremath v. Basalingayya Gokurnaya Hiremath & Ors., (51 1. L. R. Bom. 908) can also have no application because that case is an authority for the limited proposition, prior to the enactment of the Arbitration Act, 1940, that where in a suit parties have referred their dispute to an arbitration without an order of the court and an award is made, a decree in terms of the award could be passed by the court under Order XXIII, Rule 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the instant case, parties agreed to refer their disputes to arbitration when no suit was pending and the award subsequently became a rule of the court. For these reasons we confirm the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the appeal with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1973 (3) TMI 143
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... ... ..... id assignment and also impleaded his assignors as defendants Nos. 2 and 3 in the suit. The defendants Nos. 2 and 3 did not repudiate or in any way challenge the said assignments. The deeds of assignment were filed in the case. The transfer of the actionable claim having been made in accordance with the requirements of Section 130 of the Transfer of Property Act the right of defendants Nos. 2 and 3 vested in the plaintiff who became entitled to recover the sums due under the two bonds in suit from defendant No. 1. We, therefore, affirm the finding of the trial Court that the plaintiff was a bona fide assignee of ' the bonds in suit for consideration and that even if the assignments were not for consideration that would not have made any difference and the plaintiff was entitled to maintain the suit and recover the debts due under the two bonds in question. 11. No other point was urged or pressed. 12. In the result, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1973 (3) TMI 142
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... ... ..... nother suit against the son and widow without obtaining a fresh permission Under Section 3. It was held that the suit could be filed against the heirs on the basis of the permission obtained against the tenant. Clearly, the permission to evict related to the condition of the premises which did not change with the death of the tenant. 21. We have referred to some of the decisions in the three categories, not with a view to determining their correctness but only in order to show that they rest on different principles or could be explained in reference to such principles. We are concerned with a matter not involving the application of any of those principles. For reasons already stated, we are of the view that considering the nature of the claim made in the instant case and the bundle of facts which constitute the plaintiff's cause of action, his right to sue will not survive to his legal representatives. 22. In the result, the appeal fails but there will no order of costs.
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1973 (3) TMI 141
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... ... ..... found the relevant facts and put to themselves the proper questions having proceeded to give the right answer, they may be said on this view to have erred in point of law". 44. There can be no disagreement with this said proposition of law and applying it to the facts of the present case one can only come to the conclusion that the learned Civil Judge did not at all ask himself the proper question. He thus failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him under Order XXI, Rule 58 read with Rules 59, 60 and 61 of the Civil Procedure Code. The error committed by the learned Civil Judge was clearly in relation to the jurisdiction of the Court. On this finding this revision petition is not only maintainable but ought to be allowed. 45. In the circumstances I allow the revision petition and set aside the order of the trial Court and remand the matter back to it to be tried in accordance with law. The opponents will pay the costs of the petitioner here. 46. Revisions allowed.
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1973 (3) TMI 140
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... ... ..... the relevant date, it will be open to the Government to issue a notification with respect to it under Section 8. If, on the other hand, it is found in that enquiry that it was not an "agricultural-area" on the said date, no notification under Section 8 should be issued with respect to it. The appeals are also allowed. The orders of the High Court abating the appeals and the suits are set aside. The High Court will restore the appeals and the suits to their original numbers. The appeals will be decided on merits when the appropriate authority under Section 5 of the Act has held that the land in dispute is not an "agricultural area". If it is held by him that the land in dispute is an "agricultural area" and the State Government issues a notification under Section 8 of the Act with respect to the land, the appeals will be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In the circumstances of this case parties shall bear their own costs.
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1973 (3) TMI 139
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... ... ..... nd evidence had come on the record to satisfy the Court as well as the tenant that the grounds on which ejectment had been sought would be ultimately established and when the tenant entered into the compromise, it was implicit in the aforesaid circumstances that he was admitting the correctness of the grounds which had been taken for his ejectment. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the tests which have been laid down by the authorities have been fully satisfied and it cannot he said that the decree which was passed on the basis of compromise was a nullity or could not be executed. That is exactly the position here. 40. All these decisions amply support the proposition that I have put forward that an eviction order based on a compromise where the landlord has asked for possession on any one of the grounds on the basis of which he could ask for possession would be valid. This would, however, have to be considered when a proper occasion arises. The present appeal is allowed.
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1973 (3) TMI 138
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... ... ..... -payment of the fees and the removal of the trade mark from the register was advertised and the appellants--we will assume--by their negligence failed to notice that fact. Even so, the question is whether the appellants, who are proprietors of the trade mark, should be denied restoration. 2. The question, in our view, should not be approached from any penal point of view. No punishment is contemplated by the statute. If restoration is just, it is bound to be made. That is the effect of the rule. It is true that there is an inordinate delay. But, if that delay has led to registration of the trade mark in favour of someone else, it would, of course, be a proper ground for denial of restoration. The justness for the purpose of Rule 49(2) should be viewed, particularly from the point of view whether by restoration any third party would be prejudiced. In this particular case, were are satisfied that the appellants would be entitled to restoration. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
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1973 (3) TMI 137
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... ... ..... dated 3rd December, 1956 could be passed because the mortgage money was not deposited in court as required by Section 83 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is not necessary for a mortgagor to deposit the mortgage money in court before instituting a suit for redemption. Three remedies are open to him; (i) he may tender the mortgage money privately to the mortgagee under Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act; (ii) he may deposit the money in court under Section 83 of that Act; or. (iii) he may institute a suit for redemption under Section 91 of the Act. He can avail himself of any of these remedies and cannot be compelled to resort to any one of the remedies in particular. A suit for redemption cannot fail on the ground of non-deposit of money in court is also supported by a Bench decision of this Court in Dinanath Rai v. Rama Rai. ILR 6 Pat 102 (AIR 1926 Pat 512). 12. For the foregoing reasons we find no merit in the appeal and it is, accordingly, dismissed with costs.
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1973 (3) TMI 136
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... ... ..... flour with the condemned flour. But this act also would not show that they intended to sell the mixed flour for human food. The respondents could not therefore take action under S. 244. The orders passed by them under Section 244 are invalid. It is immaterial that the respondents had acted bona fide and in the interests of preservation of public health. Their motive may be good but their orders are illegal. They would accordingly be liable for any loss caused to the appellants by their action. The High Court has not recorded any finding on the quantum of their liability. In view of our finding that the respondents are liable, the case will now have to go back to the High Court for giving a finding on the issue regarding damages. (7.) WE allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court. The case is remanded to the High Court for deciding the issue about damages. Costs will abide the decision of the High Court on the question of damages. Appeal allowed.
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1973 (3) TMI 135
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... ... ..... s no substance in this criticism of Mr. Singhvi. Mr. Singhvi, learned counsel, then referred us to the fact that after the judgment of the High Court the State Government has passed an order on March 19, 1971, the effect of which is to equate the Sales Tax Officers of the erstwhile Madhya Pradesh State with the Sales Tax Officers, Grade III, of Bombay. This order, in our opinion, has been passed by the State Government only to comply with the directions given by the High Court. It was made during a period when the appeal against the judgment was pending in this Court. The fact that the State Government took steps to comply with the directions of the High Court cannot lead to the inference that the appeal by the Union of India has become infructuous. In the result the judgment and order dated 25/26th February, 1969, of the High Court are set aside and Civil Appeals Nos. 2303 and 2304 of 1969 are allowed. There will be no order as to costs in both the appeals. Appeals allowed.
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1973 (3) TMI 134
Interpretation of section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act - whether section 11A applies to industrial disputes which have already been referred to for adjudication and were, pending as on 15-12-1971?
Held that:- Both in respect of cases where a domestic enquiry has been held as also in cases where the Tribunal considers the matter on the evidence adduced before it for the first time, the satisfaction under section 11 A, about the guilt or otherwise of the workman concerned, is that of the Tribunal. It has to consider the evidence and come to a conclusion one way or other. Even in cases where an enquiry has been held by an employer and a finding of misconduct arrived at, the Tribunal can now differ from that finding in a proper case and hold that no misconduct is proved.
In order to make the section applicable even to disputes, which had been referred prior to the coming into force of the section, there should be such a clear, express and manifest indication in the section. There is no such express indication. An inference that the section applies to proceedings, which are already pending, can also be gathered by necessary, intendment. In the case on hand, no such inference can be drawn as the indications are to the contrary. We have already referred to the, proviso to section 11A which states ’in any proceeding under this section’. A proceeding under the section can only be after the section has come into force.
Further the section itself was brought into force some time after the Amendment Act was passed. These circumstances as well as the scheme of the section and particularly the wording of the Proviso indicate that section 11A does not apply to disputes which had been referred prior to 15-12- 1971. The section applies only to disputes which are referred for adjudication on or after 15-121971. To conclude, in our opinion, section 11A has-no application to disputes referred prior to 15-12-1971. Such disputes have to be dealt with according to the decisions of this Court already referred to.
In Civil Appeal No. 1461 of 1972, the Industrial Tribunal had considered only the question regarding- the applicability of the section to disputes which had been referred before the section came into force. The Tribunal has held that the section does not apply to such disputes. This view is in accordance with our decision and as such is correct. This appeal is hence dismissed.
In the three other orders, which are the subject of consideration in Civil Appeals Nos. 1995 of 1972, 1996 of 1972 and 2386 of 1972, the Labour Court, Bombay has held that section 11A applies even to disputes which had been referred prior to 15-121971 This view, according to our judgment, is erroneous. The Labour Court has also-expressed some views on the construction to be placed on section 11 A. Part of the views expressed therein is correct; but the rest are wrong. To the extent that the decision of the Labour Court in the three orders are contrary to our decision on both the points, they are set aside add the appeals allowed to that extent. The Tribunal and the Labour Courts concerned in all these appeals, will proceed with the adjudication of the disputes in accordance with the views expressed in this judgment.
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1973 (3) TMI 133
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... ... ..... , which in turn is obtained by thrashing of stems, leaves and the outer husk of grain. The rice bran in question, as has been seen, is obtained during the polishing process of the grain itself. It is not a product obtained from stalk, leaves or the husk of paddy or rice. The counsel for the assessee drew our attention to the meaning of the word bran as given in the Chambers s English Dictionary and the meanings of the words bhusi and bhusa given in the Brahat Hindi Kosh by Kalka Prasad. None of the meanings given in these two publications are of any assistance to the assessee s case. Bhusa and bhusi as understood in common parlance are commodities obtained from stalk, leaves and husk of grains. Rice bran cannot be termed as bhusi of rice . We, therefore, answer both the questions in the negative and in favour of the department. The department is entitled to its costs which we assess at Rs. 100. Counsel s fee is assessed at the same figure. Reference answered in the negative.
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