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Showing 1 to 20 of 82 Records
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1974 (4) TMI 122
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... ... ..... sion (see Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay South v. Ogale Glass Works Ltd. (supra). 28. My answer to the question referred to this Bench consequently is that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the tenant-respondent could not be said to have committed a default under Section 3 (1) (a) of the Act in respect of the payment of ₹ 35 which he sent to the plaintiffs-landlords by a money order well within time but which had reached the landlords after the expiry of thirty days. Mahesh Narain Shukla, J. I agree and have nothing to add. Kunj Behari Srivastava, J. I agree. BY THE COURT 29. Our answer to the question referred is that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the tenant-respondent could not be said to have committed a default under Section 3 (1) (a) of the Act in respect of the payment ₹ 35 which he sent to the plaintiffs Landlords by a money order well within time but which had reached the landlords after the expiry of thirty days.
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1974 (4) TMI 121
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... ... ..... that dedication was in favour of the public. The decision of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in Ramsaran Das v. Jai Ram Das MANU/BH/0025/1942 AIR1943Pat135 that "a mere provision for the service of sadhus, occasional guests and wayfarers in a dedication to an idol does not render the dedication substantially for public purpose" must be understood in the background of that case where the properties originally stood in the names of various mahants and the property was to be held by the grantee generation after generation and the Court held that the gift was to the mahant personally. 9. We are, therefore, satisfied that on the facts of this case the trust should be deemed to be a religious trust as the public are interested in it. The appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree of the High Court set aside, restoring the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge. The 1st respondent will pay the costs of the appellant. The C.M.P. No. 3132 of 1973 is allowed.
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1974 (4) TMI 120
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... ... ..... he Bombay General Clauses, Act and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. 8. Therefore, our answers to the two questions referred to us are as follows Answer to the first question is ent of refusal found on the returned registered envelope without being substantiated by any evidence of the postal peon who went to deliver the letter, a statutory rebuttable presumption of fact that the addressee had in fact refused to accept the delivery of the letter can be raised under the provisions of S. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. Answer to the second question is That in a case under Section 12 of the Rent Act, the addressee tenant who refused to take delivery of the registered letter addressed to him can be posted with knowledge that the landlord has given a notice to pay up the arrears of rent. 9. The case papers are ordered to be returned for final disposal of the revision application in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs of this reference. 10. Case remanded.
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1974 (4) TMI 119
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... ... ..... e injuries have escaped punishment and conviction has been clamped down on those who have sustained injuries in the course of the clash. It is equally true that those who have allegedly committed the substantive offences have jumped the gauntlet of the law and the appellants have been held guilty only constructively. We also notice that the case has been pending for around ten years and the accused must have been in jail for some time, a circumstance which is relevant under the new Criminal Procedure Code though it has come into operation only from April 1, 1974. Taking a conspectus of the various circumstances in the case, some of which are indicated above, we are satisfied that the ends of justice, would be met by reducing the sentence to three years rigorous imprisonment under Section 307, read with Section 149, and one year rigorous imprisonment under Section 147, I.P.C., the two terms running concurrently. Wish this modification regarding sentence, we dismiss the appeal.
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1974 (4) TMI 118
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... ... ..... ndis to the activity of the Federation. It will bear repetition that the Federation also publishes periodicals, bulletins etc. and issues the same to members free of this Court in R.K. Mittal's case (supra) we would hold that the commercial or industrial exhibitions, runs museums and makes profits. Of course, that profit is ploughed back for the purposes of the Federation as set out in its Memorandum of Association, and is not distributed among its members. But that does not alter the fact that its activity is a trading or business activity. 28. For all the foregoing reasons, particularly in view of the decision of this Court in R.K. Mittal's case, (supra) we would hold that the prepromises of the Federation are a "commercial establishment" within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 29. In the result we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the writ petition. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.
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1974 (4) TMI 117
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... ... ..... nts to those proceedings are concerned, we are of the view, on the evidence in this case which we have already discussed in detail, that Krishnan had no settled or definite intention to return to Travancore and that, as he was a resident in England and as his acts and conduct were consistent only with his intention to make it his permanent home, he died domiciled in England. 53. We think that the High Court was right in its conclusion that the sale proceeds of the house in Sheffield has to be distributed accordingly to the English law. To this extent we uphold the judgment of the High Court but set it aside in other respects. 54. In the result, we hold that the succession to the amount specified in Schedule-C minus the amount which represents the sale proceeds of the house property in Sheffield must also be governed by English law and that the amount must be distributed between the first and second defendants in equal shares. We allow the appeal but make no order as to costs.
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1974 (4) TMI 116
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... ... ..... . The agreement also provided for such termination. The relationship between the State and the petitioners is purely contractual. 15. The petitioners contended that there were 160 dealers selling levy sugar and out of the 160,24 dealers like the petitioners have been discriminated. The State issued instructions that preference should be given to Co-operatives. The State is taking steps to replace the private retailers wherever Co-operatives are available and Government retail shops can be established. In Tiruchirapalli Town two model shops have been opened by the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation. Some of the private retailers in that town were replaced. As and when more shops are opened, the private retailers in other places will be eliminated. There is no discrimination. The agency agreements have been terminated. 16. The petitioners have no legal right to trade in levy sugar. 17. For these reasons the petitions are dismissed. Parties will pay and bear their own costs.
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1974 (4) TMI 114
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... ... ..... bay Rent Act to entertain the suit filed by opponent No. 1, had jurisdiction to restrain persons from taking recourse to determination of disputes under Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act. I have already pointed out above that the judge has no such jurisdiction. If he passes any such orders it will be contrary to Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and also highly improper even on general principles which should guide Courts in granting injunctions even temporarily, particularly having regard to the facts that while the proceedings before the officer under Section 91, if uninterrupted may end within six months, a suit in the Small Causes Court has ordinarily almost a decade's life having regard to the present pattern of arrears in that Court. 12. In the result, the revision application is allowed. Rule is made absolute with costs. The order passed by the learned Judge of the Small Causes Court at Bombay is set aside. 13. Revision allowed.
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1974 (4) TMI 113
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... ... ..... merit may well reach the top. In this connection it may be necessary to point out here that though the promotees of the 1960's lose some places to direct recruits, class II officers who were not promoted in the years 1963, 1965 and 1967 to 1970 but got their chances of promotion for the first time in 1971 will now get posts reserved for them in 1969. See for example serial No. 1354 of the new seniority list and onwards. All this is the result of haphazard promotions which were made in order to meet the demands of a suddenly expanding department without sufficient attention to the Rules in force. We have to take an overall view to determine whether the rule now framed by the Government to determine seniority is just and fair. We think it is. 25. Since the seniority list Annexure B filed on 15-2-1973 is in accordance with the directions given by this Court in its judgment dated 16-8-1972, we accept it as the correct seniority list. 26. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1974 (4) TMI 112
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... ... ..... first towards interest accrued upto the date of payment and the balance towards the principal. Calculating in the above manner, the amount due to the plaintiffs up to the date of the suit comes to ₹ 10301.68 as principal and ₹ 4755.81 by way of interest, total ₹ 15,057.49. Since the plaintiffs relinquished ₹ 39.18, they are entitled to a decree for ₹ 15,018.31. 10. In the result, the appeal filed by the defendants is dismissed with costs. The cross-objection filed by the plaintiffs is allowed, the decree of the Court below is modified and the decretal amount is enhanced from ₹ 10,993.25 to ₹ 15,018.31. The plaintiffs shall be entitled to interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of the suit to the date of the decree and from the date of the decree to the date of realisation of the principal sum of ₹ 10,301.68. The parties shall give and take costs of the cross-objection according to their success and failure.
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1974 (4) TMI 111
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... ... ..... ciety really consisted of landless labourers or backward class members. We are not concerned to adjudicate on that issue here. We set aside the judgment of the High Court and leave the matter of the grant of the lease of the lands in question to in the appellant, Government being free to grant leases of its lands according to any public policy which it may evolve in that behalf. 13. In the circumstances of the case, we allow Civil Appeal No. 602 of 1971. This decision will also govern the fate of the other appeals viz. Civil Appeal Nos. 983 988 of 1971. However, in regard to facts we direct that the appellants be given costs by the contesting respondents in the various appeals (C.As. Nos. 602/71, 983/71, 984/71, 985/71, 986/71, 987/71 and 988/71) but only one set of hearing fees will be allowed in all the appeals together. The burden of one set of the costs will thus be borne by the aforesaid respondents equally. With this direction regarding costs, we allow all the appeals.
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1974 (4) TMI 110
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... ... ..... On any view of the matter whether the agreement was void at initio, or was void or valid initially but became void or discovered to be void subsequently, the appellants are entitled to succeed in these appeals. We accordingly allow these appeals, reverse the judgment and decree of the High Court and dismiss Suit No. 94 of 1956 with costs. We hold that the first respondent Murli Prasad is not entitled solely to the whole of the compensation money, but that all those whose names appear in the partnership deed of August 31, 1950, or the legal representatives or assignees of such of them who are dead, are otherwise entitled to share the compensation money in proportion to their respective shares as specified in the said document. The compensation amount which is so distributed is the balance of the amount remaining after payment of the outstanding liabilities of the Chhapra Electric Supply Works. The Trial Court will give the necessary directions to the Receiver in this behalf.
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1974 (4) TMI 109
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... ... ..... Magistrate either prior or subsequent to the date on which the accommodation was unauthorisedly let out by the landlord to the former person or by the District Magistrate suo motu even in the absence of such allotment order. The reference should therefore be answered in the affirmative. D.N. Jha, J. 41-A. I concur with Hon'ble Jagmohan Lal J. BY THE COURT 42. The question referred to the Full Bench is answered in the affirmative, namely, that a person to whom an accommodation governed by the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 has been let out by the landlord in contravention of the general order passed by the District Magistrate under Section 7 (2) of the Act is liable to be proceeded against under Section 7-A at the instance of the person in whose favour an allotment order was passed by the District Magistrate even though that allotment order was passed subsequent to the accommodation being unauthorisedly let out and occupied by the former person.
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1974 (4) TMI 108
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... ... ..... filiated college which is connected with the conditions of service of such member shall, on a request of the governing body or of the member concerned be referred to a Tribunal of Arbitration consisting of one arbitrate nominated by the governing body and the other by the member of the teaching and non-teaching staff and an Umpire appointed by the Vice-chancellor. Sub-section (2) in effect provides that the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940 shall-apply to the arbitration under Sub-section (1). 308. Counsel supporting the petitioners have urged that this amounts to external interference with the management of the affairs of the college; This provision is also intended to check the abuse of power of administration by the managing body and to provide a cheap and expeditious remedy to the small-pursed teaching and non-teaching staff. It is necessary in the interest of security of service. I am unable to discover any legitimate objection to it on the basis of Article 30(1).
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1974 (4) TMI 107
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... ... ..... Section 33(C)(2) claiming computation of the benefit on the basis that the discharge being unlawful, his services must be deemed to be continuous and uninterrupted. 21. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the High Court's view that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to deal with the questions referred to it Under Section 33(C)(2). The appeal must, therefore, be allowed. But there shall be no order as to costs. Civil Appeal No. 1780 of 1973. 22. This appeal is from the Order of the High Court dated July 20, 1973 refusing to grant a certificate to appeal to this Court under Article 133(1) of the Constitution. Since this Court had granted leave to appeal under Article 136 in special leave petition No. 2543/1973, and Civil Appeal No. 1779 (NL) of 1973 resulting therefrom, has already succeeded, it is not necessary to pass any orders on this appeal except to say that in view of the orders passed in Civil Appeal No. 1779 (NL) of 1973, no orders are necessary on this appeal.
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1974 (4) TMI 106
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... ... ..... ding them an opportunity. The case is clearly distinguishable. It can lend no support to the petitioner' contention that in a matter of fixation of electricity charges under the Supply Act a consumer who has no direct interest in the matter of fixation of rates and who had made no representation in that regard should also be given an opportunity of hearing before enhancement of rates by the licensee who has a unilateral right to do so under the Supply Act. ( 11. ) Learned counsel for the respondents has invited my attention to the fact that the writ petition No. 16 of 1973 is not a properly sworn petition. The assertion seems to be well founded. The swearing has been done toy Sri Vijai Bahadur Sinha as the Secy, of Bareilly Laghu Tel Udyog Sangh, petitioner No. 1. This is an association. No petition is maintainable on behalf of an association. The petition is not a properly sworn petition. ( 12. ) The writ petitions fail and are dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1974 (4) TMI 105
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... ... ..... what could be their legal status and rights by reason of long possession ? 4. What was the nature of the claims to any land put forward by the Gaon Panchayats ? 5. Is this a case in which the Collector can interfere or pass any order under any provision of law or should the matter be left to be decided between the alleged lessees, the alleged private owners, and the Panchayats by such other legal proceedings as may be open to them for the purpose of getting their claims adjudicated upon ? 7. The result is that we allow the appeals and Writ Petitions before us and quash the orders of the Collector directing dispossession of the appellants and the petitioners from the lands occupied by them, and we order that no further proceedings under the Act be taken against the alleged lessees so long as it is not decided that the lands in their possession are still governed by the provisions of the Act relied upon. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs.
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1974 (4) TMI 104
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... ... ..... early burden. We do not think any case has. been made out that this petitioner has not the capacity to meet the wage increase, particularly when it has been placed in the appropriate class in which is should be placed, having regard to its gross profits. No other objection was raised and accordingly Writ Petition No. 37 of 1968 is dismissed. NO orders in Civil Appeal No. 2102 of 1968, Writ Petition No. 40 of 1968 is allowed, the order of the Central Government in S.O. 3883 dated October 27, 1967, in so far as the petitioner P.T.I. is concerned, is struck down, and it is directed that the petitioner will pay the wages, agreed to between the petitioner, the P.T.I., and the Federation of the P.T.I. Employees Union as from the date when the recommendations of the Wage Board were payable and will continue to pay them accordingly till they are refixed by the Central Government on the recommendations of another Wage Board constituted under that A There will be no order as to costs.
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1974 (4) TMI 103
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... ... ..... his legitimate pecuniary resources. Indeed the latter charge failed. But under-assessment with a dishonest motive has been substantially held proved in the case of a large number of assessments. The charge about dishonesty and acceptance of illegal gratification was mainly inferential on the material which was 'placed before the appellant from the very beginning. After the third charge-sheet was given, the appellant was not hustled through the enquiry. He was given enough opportunity to make whatever representations he wanted to make against the evidence disclosed by the circumstances of the case. All that we can say is that by reason of the third charge-sheet the enquiry was prolonged for sometime, but the essential facts being the same, there was no basis for complaint that the enquiry had become oppressive. 24. In the result we do not think that the High Court was in error in dismissing the plaintiff's suit. The appeal fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1974 (4) TMI 102
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... ... ..... or some proportion of such pay and allowances or nothing more than the subsistence allowance would be a matter for the appropriate authority to decide under the relevant rules. If the decision of the appropriate authority on this question, when made, is contrary to the rules governing the conditions of service, the appellant would be free to challenge such decision. But that question does not arise now and we do not purpose to express any opinion upon it. We therefore, partly allow the appeal and issue a writ of mandamus quashing and setting aside the third part of the impugned order dated 9th June, 1971 continuing the suspension of the appellant and direct the respondents to pay to the appellant arrears of salary from 26th October, 1967 after deducting the amount of subsistence allowance paid to him. Since the appellant has partly succeeded and party failed, the fair order of costs would be that each party should bear and pay its own costs throughout. Appeal partly allowed.
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