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Showing 1 to 20 of 110 Records

• 1978 (10) TMI 158
  
  ..... nt should be read and understood as applicable only to this question whether the State Government is entitled to recover non-agricultural assessment from the Board. There was no dispute before us bearing on the question of recovery of municipal taxes and we have not gone into that question. If such a question arises in future or is presently pending, it will have to be decided on its own merits. Before we conclude we must record our appreciation for the able assistance rendered to us by the learned Counsel appearing for the rival parties in these two appeals. In this view of the matter, we concur with the conclusion reached by our learned brother and hold that the writ of mandamus was rightly issued against the State Government and its officers requiring them to desist and forbear from giving effect to the impugned notice of demand and from enforcing the same. We accordingly dismiss the appeals, but-haying regard to the facts of the case, we do not make any order as to costs.

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• 1978 (10) TMI 157
  
  ..... ' must be to obviate destitution of the divorcee and to provide her with wherewithal to maintain herself. The whole scheme of s. 127(3) (b) is manifestly to recognise the substitute maintenance arrangement by lump sum payment organised by the custom of the community or the personal law of the parties. There must be a rational relation between the sum so paid and its potential as provision for maintenance. To interpret otherwise is to stultify the project. Law is dynamic and its meaning cannot he pedantic but purposeful. The proposition, therefore, is that no husband can claim under s. 127(3)(b) absolution from this obligation under s. 125 towards a divorced wife except on proof of payment of a sum stipulated by customary or personal law whose quantum is more or less sufficient to do duty for maintenance allowance. The conclusion that we therefore reach is that the appeal should be allowed and it is hereby allowed, and the order of the trial court restored. Appeal allowed.

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• 1978 (10) TMI 156
  
  ..... neal descendants made under section 34(1)(c). The following question was referred to the Madras High Court "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was right in law in deleting the addition of ₹ 1,54,897 representing the share of the lineal descendants made under section 34(1)(c) of the Estate Duty Act, 1953?" The Madras High Court in its judgment, dated 28-11-1977, in Tax Case No. 173 of 1974 upheld the decision of the Tribunal. It is, therefore, clear that there is nothing wrong in the Tribunal relying on the judgment of the Madras High Court in coming to the conclusion that the aggregation of the shares of the lineal descendants with that of the deceased for purposes of computing the duty payable is not justified. We, therefore, agree with the view expressed by the learned Judicial Member on this point. 11. The appeal papers may now be placed before original bench which heard the appeal for passing the final order.

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• 1978 (10) TMI 155
  
  ..... iod of suspension, be debarred from practising in any court or before any authority or person in India. If the making on such a direction implies the termination of the order of suspension, on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down, I am of the considered view that no restriction on the right of the advocate to appear before any court or authority, which privilege he enjoys under s. 30 of the Act, can be imposed. The taking, of too lenient a view in the facts and circumstances of the case, I feel, would not be conducive to the disciplinary control of the State Bar Councils. I would, for these reasons, dismiss the appeal and maintain the punishment imposed on the appellant. In conclusion, I do hope the appellant will fully reciprocate the noble gesture shown to him by the majority, come up to their expectations and turn a new leaf in life. It should be his constant endeavour to keep the fair name of the great profession to which he belongs unsullied. S.R. Appeal dismissed.

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• 1978 (10) TMI 154
  
  ..... the brother and he was intending to cover the expenditure of internal travel, board and lodge and for that purpose he handed over the foreign exchange. As far as the specie of property is important question in all such cases is whether one person has passed on the foreign exchange for the unquestionable as well non-accountable use of another person, and if the answer be in the affirmative then unless exceptions are established it does appear that such payments will fall within the meaning of the term "otherwise acquired". As already indicated, acquisition implies, in the context of foreign exchange, coming into possession and taking of such money and having capacity and entitlement to use it as one's own. 22. By these tests, it cannot but be concluded that there has been a breach of s. 4(1) of the Act and the appeal has no merit. 23. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. 24. Mr. Pathak applies for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Leave refused.

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• 1978 (10) TMI 153
  
  ..... would not amount to closure of the undertaking. The three workmen were doing work of painting the containers. No records were shown that there was a separate establishment, that it was a separate sub-section of that it had some separate supervisory arrangement. In fact, once the container making section was closed down, the three painters became part and parcel of the manufacturing process and if the painting work was not available for them they could have been assigned some other work and even if they had to be retrenched as surplus, the case would squarely fall in s. 25F and not be covered by s. 25FFF, on a specious plea of closure of an undertaking. The Tribunal in our opinion was right in holding that this was a case of retrenchment and as conditions precedent were not complied with, the retrenchment was invalid and the relief of reinstatement with full back wages was amply deserved. Accordingly this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs quantified at ₹ 2,000/-.

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• 1978 (10) TMI 152
  
  ..... fied Landscape Architect and there is nothing on the record to show that he lacked integrity. The Governor has made strong observations in his favour in his minute dated July 17, 1959, and we think it is desirable that the government or governments concerned should make a lump sum payment to him in addition to any terminal benefit he might have received already, so that he may be able to find some solace now that he has attained the age of super-annuation and cannot look out for fresh employment. It may also be mentioned that the appellant made applications for the production of some record by the State Government, but we were satisfied, while hearing the arguments, that the State Governments had placed whatever record was available with them for the disposal of this appeal and the appellant cannot have any legitimate grievance on that account. So far as we are concerned, we have not found any difficulty in disposing of this appeal on the basis of the material on the record.

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• 1978 (10) TMI 151
  
  ..... d by a High Court either in exercise of its appellate or its revisional jurisdiction, no review or revision can be entertained against that judgment as there are no provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code which would enable the High Court to review the same or to exercise revisional jurisdiction. This Court entertained the application for quashing the proceedings on the ground that a subsequent application to quash would not amount to review or revise an order made by the Court. The decision clearly lays down that a judgment of the High Court on appeal or revision cannot be reviewed or revised except in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. The provisions of section 561A of the Code cannot be revoked for exercise of a power which is specifically prohibited by the Code. In the result we accept the contention put forward by Mr. Mukerjee for the State and hold that High Court has no power to revise its own order. The appeal is allowed. Appeal allowed.

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• 1978 (10) TMI 150
  
  ..... nt case was not directly in issue in those cases and the observations made therein about laying were merely incidental. From the foregoing discussion, it inevitably follows that the Legislature never intended that non-compliance with the requirement of laying as envisaged by sub-section (6) of section 3 of the Act should render the order void. Consequently non-laying of the aforesaid notification fixing the maximum selling prices of various categories of iron and steel including the commodity in question before both Houses of Parliament cannot result in nullification of the notification. Accordingly, we answer the aforesaid question in the negative. In view of this answer, it is not necessary to deal with the other contention raised by the respondent to the effect that the aforesaid notification being of a subsidiary character, it was not necessary to lay it before both Houses of Parliament to make it valid. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.

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• 1978 (10) TMI 149
  
  ..... ment of their right and title, if any, to the property. Accordingly, the order of the High Court allowing the writ petition and declaring that the inclusion of the property in dispute in the list of wakf published by the Board bf Muslim Wakfs, Rajasthan under sub-s. (2) of s. 5 of the Wakf Act, 1954 was not binding on the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 is upheld, but its direct restraining the Board of Muslim Wakfs from entering the disputed property in the register of wakfs and from dispossessing the respondents Nos. 1 and 2, except by way of a suit in a civil court of competent jurisdiction is set aside as it proceeds on the assumption that sections 27 and 36B of the Act are not applicable, which question did not arise for its consideration. The parties are left to take recourse to their remedies according to law, with advertence to the observations made above, Subject to this modification, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There shall he no order as to costs. Appeal Dismissed.

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• 1978 (10) TMI 148
  
  ..... d item No. 1 in the Order as in force in May, 1969 to cover Tyres and Tubes of Motor-cars . In the instant case before us there are no such drafting precedents of the type which obtained in the aforementioned case. As stated earlier, the Item paper in s.2 (a) (vii) in the Act has all along remained the same without any modification, alteration or enlargement and it is only the item No. 13 in the Schedule to the Regulation order (a subordinate piece of legislation) that has undergone a change and the item has been amended so as to include specifically exercise- notebooks . We have no doubt in our minds that the said amendment to the item paper is declaratory or clarificatory in nature. In the circumstances, in our view, the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the exercise-books of the appellant-firm that were seized were liable to confiscation and the remand order made by the High Court was proper. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.

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• 1978 (10) TMI 147
  
  ..... n pointed out by a recent judgment of this Court in Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and Sales Tax (Law), Board of Revenue (Taxes), Ernakulam v. M.K. Ahammed Kutty 1976 38 S.T.C. 210 at 216. Having chosen to find that there is no ground to receive the additional evidence, the Tribunal went wrong in allowing the appeal and directing the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to dispose of the matter afresh in the light of the additional evidence tendered. This was clearly unsustainable. An omnibus remand to the lower authority for the purpose of dealing with the matter afresh in the light of the additional documents tendered by the party was quite improper and unsustainable. 3.. We allow this tax revision case and set aside the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal and remit the appeal back to the Tribunal for fresh disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.

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• 1978 (10) TMI 146
  
  ..... d to have defaulted to pay the tax demanded as per the demand notice dated 9th April, 1969, till 10th March, 1970, when only the excess amount was refunded. By adjustment the appellant paid it on 25th April, 1969, within time. We are not in this case concerned as to whether the appellant is a defaulter during the period 10th March, 1970 (the date of refund), to 31st March, 1970 (the date of remittance), since the Deputy Commissioner s finding to that effect was not challenged by the appellant before the Board, nor before us. It appears to me that if the assessing authorities deal with the assessment proceedings of this nature with a little more imagination by taking up these proceedings simultaneously, the situation like the one on hand which gives rise to the impression that the object of assessment proceedings is to create artificially defaulters (which it is not, but to raise revenue for the State according to law, and with humane approach) can be avoided. Appeal allowed.

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• 1978 (10) TMI 145
  
  ..... point sales tax, subject to special conditions when imposed on separate category of specified goods, the expression was apparently meant to exhaustively enumerate the kinds of goods on a given list. The purpose of enumeration in a statute dealing with sales tax at a single point in a series of sales would, very naturally, be to indicate the types of goods each of which would constitute a separate class for a series of sales. Otherwise, this listing itself loses all meaning and would be without any purpose behind it. This decision completely resolves the controversy. The first question is answered by saying that sain and asna are not timber within the meaning of the notification. The second question is answered by saying that the trees mentioned in the notification are not merely illustrative but are exhaustive. As the reference has been answered in favour of the department, the department is entitled to its costs, which is assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.

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• 1978 (10) TMI 144
  
  ..... ls case1973 R.L.R. 698. In an elaborate and exhaustive judgment, Dhillon, J. (with whom Pandit, J., concurred), repelled every conceivable constitutional challenge to the said provisions and dismissed all the writ petitions. The observations in the aforesaid case appear to cover the present one on all fours. In our view, it would be wasteful to tread the same ground all over again. Following the said judgment, we repel the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner and uphold the retrospectivity of item No. 34 of Schedule B of the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973. The petitioner, however, would not be precluded by this judgment from prosecuting any statutory remedies which maybe available to it strictly by virtue of section 58 of the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, Here italicised. against the notice, annexure P-1. The writ petition being without merit is hereby dismissed. The parties, however, will bear their own costs. MITAL, J.-I agree. Petition dismissed.

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• 1978 (10) TMI 143
  
  ..... tion dated 1st December, 1962. In view of the amendment to the Hindi version of the notification, the word brasswares has to be read as meaning all articles of brass and not confined to utensils made of brass. However, before a commodity can be described as a ware, it must be in a finished state and not in the shape of raw material used for manufacturing other commodities. See the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Manohar Glass Works 1971 27 S.T.C. 51. In the present case, the Judge (Revisions) has found that the bars and rods sold by the assessee were not finished products but were used as raw material. In view of this finding of fact, the Judge (Revisions) was right in holding that the bars and rods sold by the assessee could not be taxed as brasswares. The question referred is answered in the affirmative in favour of the assessee and against the department. The assessee is entitled to its costs, which is assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered in the affirmative.

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• 1978 (10) TMI 142
  
  ..... the present case, there is a contract between the ex-U.P. buyers and the assessee to buy notified goods and send them to the ex-U.P. principals. On the purchase of the goods for the ex-U.P. principals in their account, the assessee could not divert the goods. As regards the necessity of the seller to have a say in the movement of the goods, the tests appear to be satisfied, as it was the purchaser who had contracted with the ex-U.P. buyers and sent the goods outside the State. These cases do not match the facts of the present case and it appears to be more akin to the cases alluded to in Hajee Abdul Shukoor s case 1964 15 S.T.C. 719 (S.C.). So far as the third question is concerned, that becomes academic as the first question is being answered in the affirmative. The first and the second questions are answered in the affirmative and the third question is returned unanswered. The assessee is entitled to its costs, which is assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.

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• 1978 (10) TMI 141
  
  ..... eve used in section 21 of the Act cannot be interpreted to encompass within its fold a mere change of opinion. It may be added that the phrase reason to believe means a reasonable belief on the part of the Sales Tax Officer that the turnover has escaped assessment. A belief cannot be reasonable in case it is purely subjective formed without reference to any other objective fact. Change of opinion by the Sales Tax Officer without reference to any other objective material would be a subjective belief and not an objective one. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Industries (P.) Ltd. case 1973 31 S.T.C. 293 at 300 (S.C.)., it must be held that the proceedings under section 21 of the Act cannot be initiated on a mere change of opinion on the part of the Sales Tax Officer. The first question is answered in the affirmative and the second question in the negative. The assessee is entitled to its costs, which is assessed at Rs. 200. Reference answered accordingly.

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• 1978 (10) TMI 140
  
  ..... onstitution of India and was struck down to the extent that it placed a fetter on an appeal against the orders of the Deputy Commissioner under section 20(2). In the said case, at page 186, it was observed The fetter imposed by sub-section (6) of section 21 appears to be more to depend upon a fortuitous circumstance of similar revisional powers being exercised by a particular authority. As stated above, in the present case, no question of discrimination arises as the assessees are not similarly situate and further section 20(1) of the said Act is dealing with an appellate power, whereas section 20(3) of the said Act is dealing with a revisional power, and the second proviso to section 20(3) makes it clear that no revision will lie where an appeal lies against an order of assessment. In the result, we hold that the writ petition is maintainable, but reject it on merits for the reasons set out above. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.

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• 1978 (10) TMI 139
  
  ..... eal, the operative order is the order of the appellate authority, whether it has reversed the original order or modified it or confirmed it. In law, the appellate order of confirmation is quite as efficacious as an operative order as an appellate order of reversal or modification........... That being the position in law, on the facts and in the circumstances of the instant case, the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes has no jurisdiction to revise the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes dated 4th July, 1963, in exercise of his revisional power under section 24(4) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, inasmuch as the said order of the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes had merged in the order dated 28th May, 1965, passed by the Commercial Taxes Tribunal. 12.. The question is answered in the affirmative and against the department. The respondent will be entitled to costs. Hearing fee Rs. 250. SARWAR ALI, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.

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