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1979 (2) TMI 215
... ... ... ... ..... d consideration has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary (fourth edition) to mean such as is founded on natural duty and affection , and would amount to consideration within the meaning of Section 32FF of the Act. But even there it has been clarified that good is generally used in antithesis to valuable consideration , which has necessarily to be excluded in the case of a gift by virtue of its definition in Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act. The argument of learned Counsel becomes untenable on a reference t....... + More
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1979 (2) TMI 214
... ... ... ... ..... ose such punishment as a measure of social necessity, as a means of deterring other potential offenders. Failure to impose a death sentence in such grave cases where it is a crime against the society-particularly in cases of murders committed with extreme brutality, will bring to nought the sentence of death provided by Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. To allow the appellants to escape with the lesser punishment after they had committed such intentional, cold-blooded, deliberate and brutal murders will deprive t....... + More
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1979 (2) TMI 213
... ... ... ... ..... timate the exact amount he can put a tentative valuation upon the suit for accounts which is adequate and reasonable. The plaintiff cannot arbitrarily and deliberately undervalue the relief. A full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in a decision in Chillakuru Chenchurand Reddy v. Kanupuru Chenchurand Reddy I.L.R. 1969 A.P. 1042 after elaborate considerations of the case law on the subject has rightly observed that there must be a genuine effort on the part of the plaintiff to estimate his relief and that the estimate ....... + More
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1979 (2) TMI 212
... ... ... ... ..... the land vested in the said three persons only so long as they were not dispossessed of it at the instance of Bai Vajia in accordance with the terms stated therein. As soon as Bai Vajia took possession of the land, no rights of any kind whatsoever in relation thereto remained with them and thus they ceased to be the owners for the span of Bai Vajia's life. 7. Following Tulsamma's case we hold that Bai Vajia became a full owner of the land in dispute under the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act a....... + More
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1979 (2) TMI 211
... ... ... ... ..... e them of that possession. Probably the learned Judge was under the impression that non-applicant No. 1 would not be able to retain the possession of the field if the applicant's are allowed to stay in the hut. That cannot be reason for ousting them from possession under the guise of temporary injunction. In my opinion, therefore, the learned trial Judge was not right in deleting the condition and it appears that the appellate Judge has also not applied his mind to this aspect of the case. The order passed by the Court....... + More
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1979 (2) TMI 210
... ... ... ... ..... We are unable to accept this contention. There is no evidence that the defendant No. 1 purchased the disputed property at a low price. In our opinion, the defendant No. 1 was not at all obliged to disclose the source of the money with which she purchased the disputed property. It may be that there is no mention in the sale deed that she purchased it with her own stridhana money, but that will not necessarily raise any presumption about the benami nature of the transaction. By the sale deed, she has acquired title to the di....... + More
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1979 (2) TMI 209
... ... ... ... ..... assessee was a dealer in dry fruit, ice and fire works. No cash memos were issued by him and entries were made by him after counting the cash received at the end of the day. No purchase vouchers were also available in respect of ice purchased by him. It was held that although in certain lines of business, absence of such document may be a relevant consideration for rejection of accounts, principle was not one of usual application, and did not apply to the line of trade of the assessee. Section 8-A (3) applies to all dealer....... + More
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1979 (2) TMI 208
... ... ... ... ..... of liability of a director etc. on the grounds mentioned in the said Sub-section would arise, and not otherwise. 10. The prosecution, therefore, against the respondents-accused in the absence of the company having been prosecuted, was not legal and any plea of guilty by them to the charge as aforesaid would not entitle the learned Magistrate to record a finding of guilty against them, because the condition precedent viz. the company having committed the offence and having been prosecuted for the offence and the same having....... + More
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1979 (2) TMI 207
... ... ... ... ..... had satisfied myself that the consent terms would be for the benefit of the minors. It is true that I have not expressly recorded that these consent terms are for the benefit of the minors. But, in my view, it is not necessary to make such a record. I have already passed a decree in terms of the consent terms which have been signed and handed in. And, in my view, it is not open to me to set aside this order unless both sides agree to its being set aside. The only grounds on which consent orders may be set aside are the gro....... + More
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1979 (2) TMI 206
... ... ... ... ..... dd that to adopt the reasoning of the Full Bench of three Judges, in Cherukuru Muthayya v. Gadde Gopalakrishnayya and Ors. would lead to conflict of jurisdiction and the implementation of the Act would be thrown into disarray. 7. In this connection we may quote the observations of Subba Rao, Chief Justice, who said as follows in Appanna v. Sriramamurty (1958) 1 A.W. R. 420. Where a special tribunal, out of the ordinary course is appointed by an Act to determine questions as to rights which are the creation of that Act, the....... + More
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1979 (2) TMI 205
... ... ... ... ..... would be possible. It goes without saying that arbitration depends for its authority and validity on consent of parties and there cannot be compulsory arbitration. Arbitration only works out an earlier agreement of parties that they would rather resort to an adjudication by a process different from that of an adjudication in Civil Court. That would not be possible in a case where the parties had not agreed to submit to arbitration. Additional defendants 2 and 3 are not parties to any arbitration agreement and what is sough....... + More
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1979 (2) TMI 204
... ... ... ... ..... designedly used in the said Section 41 not to confine the section only to a suit for the recovery of possession of immovable property situate in Greater Bombay but also to permit to be included within the ambit of such a suit all other reliefs which the plaintiff can claim in a suit for the recovery of possession of immovable property on the termination of a licence or a tenancy. 12. For the reasons set out above, we hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the plaintiffs suit, and we answer the issue ....... + More
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1979 (2) TMI 203
... ... ... ... ..... id is not sufficient to convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable. Moreover, the appellant in his statement under Section 342 has denied the recovery of the mosey and has stated that he had been falsely implicated. The High Court was wrong in holding that the appellant had admitted either the payment of money or recovery of the same as this fact is specifically denied by the appellant in his statement Under Section 342 Cr. PC Thus mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the pr....... + More
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1979 (2) TMI 202
... ... ... ... ..... he better in point of law . Jessel M. R. in a like circumstance said in Baker v. White (1877) 5 Ch D 183 at p. 190 that he was left with liberty to say which was not sould law. It seems to us, therefore, the High Court would be well advised to consider which of the interest of the administration of justice and it ought to follow that which is better in point of law than in point of time. OPINION OF THE FULL BENCH 12. In view of the majority opinion, the answer to the question referred to this Full Bench, is as follows - If....... + More
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1979 (2) TMI 201
... ... ... ... ..... pay the arrears is entirely without substance. Each of the bills mentions the total amount payable including the arrears. The bill separately mentions the amount which the consumer may pay in view of the orders of the Supreme Court. The bill also mentions the amounts of arrears which would have to be paid if the appeals were to be eventually rejected by the Supreme Court. The bill also informs the consumers that in the event of rejection of the appeals by the Supreme Court surcharge will have to be paid. It is impossible t....... + More
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1979 (2) TMI 200
... ... ... ... ..... e plaintiff by the Courts below. We do not agree. The Courts below could not have been oblivious of the fact that defendant 3 has since died and the respondent is his widow. We, therefore, do not want to interfere with the discretion of the Courts below in the matter of costs. 61. For the foregoing reasons, we partly allow the plaintiff's appeal (Civil Appeal No. 2375 of 1969) to the extent indicated above, with proportionate costs. We will dismiss the defedant's appeal (Civil Appeal No. 466 of 1969) except to the ....... + More
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1979 (2) TMI 199
... ... ... ... ..... dust. The horrendous increase of highway casualties and the chronic neglect of rules of road- safety constrains us to recommend to the Central Law Commission and to Parliament to senitize this tragic area of tort law and overhaul it humanistically. Another aspect must be noticed before we part with this petition. In many States, for want of judicial manpower or other pathological causes, the accident claims pend before tribunals in heartless slowness. Courts must give this bleeding class of cases high priority, adopt simpl....... + More
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1979 (2) TMI 198
... ... ... ... ..... ich it is draped, the Agreement (Ex. I), in substance and in fact, is a lease in the accepted legal sense of the term and not a licence as defined in Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act. If this be the correct construction of the document, and we think it is so it is doubtful whether Section 6(1) (i) could cover the appellant s case and give him a right to retain the land in dispute eve if Section 28 was out of his way. o p /o p In sum, we may reiterate that even on the assumption that the respondent was a licensee, the....... + More
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1979 (2) TMI 197
... ... ... ... ..... in 'business' was affective to start the son in medical practice. The learned Judge held that it did, observing that the word 'business' was capable of including the practice of a profession and that it plainly included the profession of a Doctor. We may refer to just one more case i.e. Taramal v. Laxman Sewak Surey Ors( 1971 M.P.L.J. 888) where this very question whether the practice of law was a 'business' within the meaning of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act came for consideration be....... + More
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1979 (2) TMI 195
... ... ... ... ..... d discharged. In the event of the appellant's failure to make the deposit, the Chief Judge is enjoined by the section to make an order of dismissal. The pending appeal concludes, whether or not the requisite deposit is made, in a judicial order. 17. Mr. Makhija pleaded that the provisions of the amended Section 217 were harsh and left no discretion to the Chief Judge to condone the deposit, either fully or in part, in cases of undue hardship. This is undoubtedly true; but the court cannot test the validity of statutory....... + More
