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1980 (10) TMI 212
... ... ... ... ..... n collateral facts was hardly a ground to reject their ocular account when there was general agreement among them with regard to the substratum of the prosecution case. In short, all the arguments employed by the High Court in rejecting the evidence of the eye-witnesses and other material witnesses examined by the prosecution were, with respect, clearly unsustainable, whereas those given by the trial court in accepting the evidence of these eye-witnesses were weighty and sound. 39. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order of acquittal passed by the High Court and convict the accused-respondent under Section 302, Penal Code for the murder of Panehania deceased and sentence him to imprisonment for life. We also restore the order of his conviction and sentence passed by the trial court under Section 324, Penal Code, for causing hurt to the child, Jai Devi. The accused, if on bail, shall surrender to his bail bonds to serve out the sentence inflicted on him.
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1980 (10) TMI 211
... ... ... ... ..... e already held that there was no valid retraction of bids by the appellants and to their knowledge their retraction had been rejected by the Board on October 8, 1952 itself. That the appellants were interested in the extension granted by the Board becomes evident from their telegram dated October 22, 1952 (Ex. A 129) seeking confirmation of the extension. After November 10, 1952 some reasonable notice of re-sale would have to be issued, so the defaulted coffee could not be put up for sale in the pool auction that was held in the month of November, 1952. The next pool auction was to be held in December, 1952 and, therefore, after issuing notice of re-sale on December 18, 1952 the re-sale was held by conducting a pool auction on December 23, 1952. In our view, both the Courts were right in taking the view that the re-sale had been held within the reasonable time. 17. Since all the contentions urged by counsel for the appellants have failed, the appeals are dismissed with costs.
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1980 (10) TMI 210
... ... ... ... ..... ndant failed to take delivery in pursuance of the contract and the Plaintiff has admittedly sold the consignment of 500 bags of E. 30 sugar treating the stocks as its own. This also will show that the contract is not a concluded one as contended by the Plaintiff/Appellant. Thus on a due consideration of the matter we hold that the Plaintiff is not entitled to claim damages firstly on the ground that there was no concluded contract and as such there could not have been any breach thereof committed by the Defendant and secondly on the ground that even assuming that there was a concluded contract the materials on record would show that it was the Plaintiff who has committed the breach by terminating the contract taking the time as the ground that the Defendant did not pay the price and take delivery of the goods by 20th April, 1972. 8. For the foregoing reasons this appeal has to be dismissed and is therefore dismissed. Under the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.
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1980 (10) TMI 209
... ... ... ... ..... of this court (Hon'ble C. S. P. Singh, J.) has taken the view that the accounts can be rejected for failure of the assessee to comply with section 8-A (3) of the Act. I have also taken a similar view in C.S.T. v. K. P. Sui, 1981 UPTC 674 as also in M/s. Praduman Brothers v. Additional Judge (Revisions) Sales Tax, 1981 UPTC 274. Reference may also be made to Babu Lal Mahadeo Prasad v. Commissioner, Sales Tax, 1981 UPTC 31. In my opinion, therefore the accounts could be rejected on account of the failure of the assessee to comply with the provisions contained in section 8-A (3) of the Act. Since the other aspects of this other question are to be examined by the revising authority afresh it will consider this aspect as well while deciding this question. 5. In the result, therefore, the revision is allowed and the order of Revising Authority is set aside, the case is remanded to the Revising Authority for decision afresh according to law. There will be no order as to costs.
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1980 (10) TMI 208
... ... ... ... ..... rs similarly situated as them, shall be promoted to the Selection Grade/ Head Clerks Cadre with effect from the dates on which they were due for promotion, by applying the test of seniority-cum-fitness. Since we have upheld the provision in Column 10 of item 3 of the Schedule to the Recruitment Rules, 1969, the petitioners will have become eligible for promotion after completing 10 years' service in SBCO-ICO. Since the demotion of the respondents or any of them is likely to lead to undue hardship to them and to some administrative confusion, the Government may create supernumerary posts to which the petitioners and others similarly situated as them, may be promoted. We are informed that consequent upon the judgments of the High Courts of Kerala and Karnataka, the Government has adopted a similar course in the Kerala and Karnataka Circles. The Writ Petition thus succeeds partly. The petitioners will be entitled to their costs from the first respondent, the Union of India.
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1980 (10) TMI 207
... ... ... ... ..... ion learned advocates appearing for them should be called upon to nuke good the deficit Court fee by or before October 31, 1980. 3. In the deficit Court-fee is not paid to any case by the learned advocate appearing for such party, in order to avoid any hardship and injustice to the innocent parties the office should bring the matter to the notice of the Court and seek a direction whether a notice be issued to each of such petitioner in respect of whom deficit Court-fee it not paid intimating to him that he should pay up the deficit Court fee within the time to be specified in the notice and giving further intimation that if the deficit Court fee is not made on or before the specified date the petition will be posted for further orders before the Court on November 4, 1980. 4. We also hereby direct that all cases shown in the office report in any event be posted before the Court on November 4, 1980, with a report whether the deficit Court fee in each case has been paid or not.
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1980 (10) TMI 206
... ... ... ... ..... oner. 6. Coming to the question of limitation, the learned counsel has reiterated the same argument as was advanced before the Court below that the Corporation learned about the proceedings on January 3, 1974, when it received summons for execution of the decree. The Courts below have gone into this matter and have held that the Corporation did not lead any evidence whatsoever to prove this allegation. In the absence of cogent evidence to this effect, the mere oral statement of the officer in this behalf could not be accepted. The petitioner, therefore, fails on the question of limitation also and the relevant issues No. 3 has been correctly decided against it by the Courts below. 7. There being no material irregularity, nor an allegation about the lacks of jurisdiction vesting in the Courts below, the present Revision Petition is without merit and is consequently dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs. 8. Revision dismissed.
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1980 (10) TMI 205
... ... ... ... ..... of the High Court under Article 226 could have been obtained by proceeding in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act. In this situation, if the High Court declined to entertain the writ petition, no exception can be taken to it. Further the indenture of lease constitutes a contract between the parties. Right to excavate lime stone from leased area and obligation to pay royalty under the relevant Minor Mineral Rules arise from the contract. The contract provided for resolution of dispute arising out of the carrying out of contract. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred (see Har Shankar. The Dy. Excise and Taxation Commissioner 1975 3SCR254 . 11. The High Court, in our opinion therefore, rightly declined to entertain the writ petition. This appeal must accordingly be dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, with no Order as to costs.
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1980 (10) TMI 204
... ... ... ... ..... to the preponderance of judicial opinion, with which I respectfully agree, I hold that the decision of the Singapore High Court in suit No. 2598 of 1975 cannot be taken to be a judgment on merits as contemplated by Section 13(b) C. P. C. and, therefore, it cannot be taken to be conclusive. 10. In the result, the appellant succeeds and the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the Singapore High Court in the said suit so far as it relates to the appellant cannot be executed in India. As the second respondent herein, who was the first defendant in the suit and the first respondent in the execution petition has not challenged the lower Court's order passed in execution, that order so far as he is concerned has become final and therefore, the order passed by the executing Court as against him will have to stand. There, will, however, be no order as to costs. The first respondent is at liberty to proceed with the execution as against the second respondent, 11. Appeal allowed.
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1980 (10) TMI 203
... ... ... ... ..... he submission of Shri Sibal that the Magistrate acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the offence and issuing process to the accused notwithstanding the fact that the police report was to the effect that no case had been made out. We do not propose to say a word about the merits of the case since it was entirely a matter for the learned Magistrate to take cognizance or not to take cognizance of the several offences. We however wish to observe that it was wholly unnecessary for the Magistrate to write such an elaborate order as if he was weighing the evidence and finally disposing of the case. We also desire to say that some of the observations of the learned Magistrate about the District Magistrate were wholly uncalled for as the latter was yet to appear before him as a witness. We are told that the case has already been transferred to some other Magistrate. It is, therefore, unnecessary to say anything further in the matter. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
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1980 (10) TMI 202
... ... ... ... ..... result, both the writ petitions succeed and are allowed. In Writ Petition No. 1322 of 1979 by Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. the notices dated 15th September, 1978 and 12th February, 1979 (Annexures 2 and 5) respectively calling upon the petitioner to pay market fee on cotton waste are quashed. In Writ Petition No. 9773 of 1978 M/s Badri Prasad Shyam Sunder v. State of U. P. and another, the notices dated 18th September, 1978 and 7th November, 1978 (Annexures 3 and 5) respectively are quashed. 34. The respondents are restrained from charging or demanding any market fee on any transaction relating to cotton waste under the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 from the petitioners. 35. It is further ordered that any amount paid to the respondents by the petitioners as market fee on the cotton waste will be refunded to the petitioners. If any amount has been paid or deposited under the interim orders passed by this Court, the same shall also be disbursed accordingly.
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1980 (10) TMI 201
... ... ... ... ..... firm. Nor are there other materials to infer that it was for the firm. For these reasons we hold that the court below was not justified in passing a decree against all the defendants. In the circumstances of the case a decree can be passed only against the executants of the notes. 17. Exts. A1 to A4 were executed by the 1st defendant alone and Ext. A5 was executed by the 1st and 2nd defendants. There will be a decree against the 1st defendant for the amounts covered by Exts. A1 to A4, and a decree against the 1st and 2nd defendants for the amount covered by Ext. A5. In the result we set aside the decree passed by the trial court against the 2nd defendant for the amounts covered by Exts, A1 to A4 and against the 3rd defendant for the amounts covered by Exts. A1 to A5. 18. The appeal against the plaintiff by the 1st defendant fails. The 3rd defendant succeeds in the appeal. The 2nd defendant succeeds in part. There is only one appeal. We direct the parties to suffer the costs.
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1980 (10) TMI 200
... ... ... ... ..... 16(5) of the Act and that there is no justification for the construction that the limit placed by Section 16(5)(a) should be imported into clause (b). A similar view was taken by a single Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Jay Krishna Saha and Another v. D N. Lal and Others, A.I.R. 1977 Cal. 468 wherein it was ruled that there is no warrant for breaking up of this total holding of 4000 grammes of both articles and ornaments into any particular ratio or proportion in a case where clause (b) of Section 16(5) of the Act is attracted. Respectfully agreeing with the ratio of these decisions, I also hold that when the provisions of Section 16(5)(b) are attracted, the limit on the weight of the gold articles provided in Section 16(5)(a) would not be applicable. 5. For the reasons recorded above, this petition is allowed and the impugned orders quashed. The respondents are further directed to return the disputed sovereigns to the petitioners in accordance with the rules. No costs.
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1980 (10) TMI 199
Release of the three detenus whose detention under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 challenged
Held that:- We have no doubt that the communication dated July 27, 1980 was a representation which was in law required to be considered by the detaining authority. Quite obviously, the obligation imposed on the detaining authority, by Art. 22(5) of the Constitution, to afford to the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation, carries with it the imperative implication that the representation shall be considered at the earliest opportunity. Since all the constitutional protection that a detenu can claim is the little that is afforded by the procedural safeguards prescribed by Art. 22(5) read with Art. 19, the Courts have a duty to rigidly insist that preventive detention procedures be fair and strictly observed. A breach of the procedural imperative must lead to the release of the detenu. The representation dated July 27, 1980 was admittedly not considered and on that ground alone, the detenu was entitled to be set at liberty.
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1980 (10) TMI 198
Whether the Court was justified in the facts and circumstances of the case in exercising its discretion in favour of the respondent?
Held that:- Section 3 of 1937 Act is in pari materia with s. 3 of 1961 Act. It, therefore, becomes crystal clear that s. 3 of the 1937 Act would only be attracted if there is a submission pursuant to an agreement to that effect. In fact, the decision in V/O Tractoro-export, Moscow, (Supra) made it necessary for the Parliament to amend s. 3 of the 1961 Act. In this case we are concerned with s. 3 of the 1937 Act which is not amended. It must, therefore, receive the same interpretation which an identical provision received at the hands of this Court. Viewed from that angle, in this case while there is an agreement as contemplated by First Schedule to 1937 Act, there is no submission made in pursuance of such agreement and, therefore, the application of the respondent could not have been entertained under s. 3 of the 1937 Act. As far as the 1961 Act is concerned, Mr. Majumdar conceded that Yugoslavia has not ratified the protocol pursuant to which 1961 Act was enacted and, therefore, the respondent cannot maintain its application under s. 3 of the 1961 Act.
Having examined the matter from all angles it is clear that both the learned single judge and the division bench of the High Court were in error in granting stay of the suit in this matter and, therefore, Civil Appeal is allowed and the stay of suit granted by the learned single judge and affirmed by the division bench of the Calcutta High Court is vacated.
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1980 (10) TMI 197
... ... ... ... ..... aning of fodder so as to include every thing that can be used as cattle feed, cannot be accepted as laying down the correct law. We have reproduced the above passages from the Full Bench judgment to show that before the Full Bench, similar argument was advanced which is advanced before us, but the Full Bench has rejected all the submissions made before it. We also cannot accept any. 6.. The result, therefore, is that our answers to the law points referred are as under (1) Chunni sold by the applicant is not exempted from imposition of sales tax under entry No. 16 of Schedule I to the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958. (2) Chunni sold by the applicant is not exempted from imposition of sales tax under Notification No. 1069-V-ST dated 22nd April, 1963, issued under section 12 of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act. The answers are in favour of the revenue and against the applicant. The Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, will have costs of this reference. Hearing fee Rs. 250.
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1980 (10) TMI 196
... ... ... ... ..... uable on both sides. In the view, however, we have expressed in the foregoing paragraphs that the time for claiming and affording relief under section 15(b) is only after the assessments are completed, one under the Central Sales Tax Act and the other under the State sales tax law and only after demand raised under the latter enactment is paid, we do not wish to enter into any discussion. The occasion for it, as we earlier pointed out, is yet to arrive in this case. Even then, the authority to take the decision is the assessing authority, in the first instance. We ought not to be making up the assessing authority s mind for him and in advance of the time. As we earlier indicated, we express no view in this revision, one way or the other, on the merits of the assessee s claim for double tax relief. In the result, the revision is allowed, the order of the Tribunal is set aside and the assessment order is restored. The State will be entitled to its costs. Counsel s fee Rs. 250.
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1980 (10) TMI 195
... ... ... ... ..... he petitioner is that those goods do not belong to it and that it has nothing to do with those goods. We have in this case, without expressing any opinion on this controversy, proceeded to decide the case on the assumption that even if all the 80 bags of zinc oxide belonged to the petitioner, it still is entitled to have 40 bags of zinc oxide, covered by goods receipt No. 44260, released in its favour. The controversy whether the petitioner has incurred any liability in respect of the remaining 40 bags of zinc oxide can properly be resolved only in appropriate proceedings. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. Respondent No. 2 is directed to forthwith release any 40 bags from out of 80 bags of zinc oxide seized by him to the petitioner. The order made by us shall not affect the proceedings that are being taken for imposition of penalty in respect of the remaining 40 bags of zinc oxide which were validly seized by respondent No. 2. Petition allowed.
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1980 (10) TMI 194
... ... ... ... ..... this stage is whether the question sought to be called from the Board of Revenue is a question of law or not. A Bench of this Court in Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer v. Ramesh Leather Stores (D.B. Civil Misc. Sales Tax Case No. 18 of 1976 decided on 3rd July, 1979) 19821 49 STC 79 has taken a view that the question as to whether certain goods fall within a particular entry or not is a question of law. In our opinion for the articles in question there is no authority of this Court or the Honourable Supreme Court of India taking one view or the other. We, therefore, allow the application and direct the Board of Revenue to state the case and refer the following question of law to this Court for decision. The parties are left to bear their own costs of this proceeding Whether the sale of flat bar on the proper interpretation of the notification dated 1st July, 1975, and section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act falls within the category of iron and steel. Application allowed.
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1980 (10) TMI 193
... ... ... ... ..... t July, 1979, is quashed. The Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 235 of 1980 also succeeds and is allowed in part. The petitioner shall not be liable to pay any interest on the first two quarters of 1972-73. In respect of the remaining two quarters it shall be decided by the assessing authority on the law laid down above whether the petitioner had knowledge of the decision given by this Court and whether the disclosure of the tax payable in the return was bonafide and in accordance with the Act. Writ Petition No. 163 of 1979 fails and is dismissed. Writ Petition No. 503 of 1979 succeeds and the direction of the assessing authority in respect of payment of interest only is quashed. The petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 318 and 503 of 1979 shall be entitled to their costs. In Writ Petition No. 235 of 1980 the parties in view of divided success shall bear their own costs. In Writ Petition No. 163 of 1979 the respondents shall be entitled to their costs. Ordered accordingly.
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