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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 231 Records
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1984 (12) TMI 339
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... ... ..... n talking the view in favour of applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act to the facts of this case. Since the maximum period of remand of an accused person in custody by the Magistrate during investigation is fixed at 90 days under the statute, the inaction of the investigating agency in submitting the charge-sheet till 90th day cannot be questioned. If the authority had right to submit charge-sheet on the 90th day, which happened to fall on a holiday then by all standards of justice and fairness, he should be held to have complied with the mandate of law, if he has taken the action at the earliest instance which could be only on the working day following the holiday. 5. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that Section 167(2)(a), Cr. P. C. has been infringed in the facts and circumstances of the case. Accordingly, the application for bail is rejected. R.C. Patnaik, J. 6. I agree.
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1984 (12) TMI 338
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... ... ..... g constructed thereon by the lessor. There is no shred of evidence on the record to show that this aspect of the matter was ever considered by the Lt. Governor. (32) TO sum up, therefore, I am constrained to hold that the order of forfeiture and re-entry passed by the Lt. Governor on 20th September 1974 (Ex. D24) and the subsequent order of the President dated 12th December 1974 (Ex. D14) cannot be sustained as being bad in law. (33) AS a result, I decree the suit of the plaintiff against the defendants for a declaration to the effect that the impugned order of forfeiture of lease and re-entry upon the leasehold plot and the buildings constructed by the plaintiff thereon passed by defendant No. 2 for and on behalf of the lessor viz. the President of India, vide letter dated, 12th December 1974 (Ex. D14) being null and void is ineffective and not binding on the plaintiff. However, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1984 (12) TMI 337
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... ... ..... Court, the criminal court should not be allowed to invoke its jurisdiction particularly when possession is being examined by the civil court and parties are in a position to approach the civil court for interim orders such as injunction or appointment of receiver for adequate protection of the property during dependency of the dispute. Multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. We are, therefore, satisfied that parallel proceedings should not continue and the order of the learned Magistrate should be quashed. We accordingly allow the appeal and quash the order of the learned Magistrate by which the proceeding under Section 145 of the Code has been initiated and the property in dispute has been attached. We leave it open to either party to move the appellate judge in the civil litigation for appropriate interim orders, if so advised, in the event of dispute relating to possession.
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1984 (12) TMI 336
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... ... ..... stated that at the time he signed as a witness the contents therein were not written. For the reasons already stated, we do hold that Ex. B1 was not executed by P,W. 1 voluntarily. If so, she cannot be held liable under Ex. B1. 32. The result is that these appeals succeed; the judgment and decree of the learned single Judge. are set aside and those of the trial Court restored only as regards the appellant with costs here and in A.S. 843 of 1971. Advocate's fee one set. 33. This matter having been set down for being mentioned this court made the following Order - At the time when the judgment was rendered, we have not provided for any directions as regards payment of court-fee, since the appeals have been presented by the appellant as an indigent person. The appellant has succeeded in the appeals. Accordingly, we direct the legal representatives of the first respondent in these appeals to pay the court fee due to Government in the L. P. Appeals. 34. L. P. Appeals allowed.
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1984 (12) TMI 335
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... ... ..... th of a respondent, the legal representatives have to be brought on record within a certain time. The ends of justice require that the application for bringing the legal representatives of the deceased respondent No. 5 should have been granted. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and direct that the abatement, if any, shall be set aside, and the legal representatives of deceased respondent No. 5 shall be brought on record and the writ petition shall be remanded to the high Court for disposal according to law. We may make it clear that in making this order we must not be presumed to have expressed any opinion on the merits of the controversy raised in the writ petition. It will be for the High Court to decide the writ petition according to law. We would request the High Court to dispose of the writ petition at a very early date and as far as possible, before the end of February, 1985, The ex parte order of stay made by us will stand vacated.
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1984 (12) TMI 334
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... ... ..... 24-11-1978 speaking through Alladi Kuppuswami, J. (as he then was) that the Court constituted under the Act cannot go into ultra vires of the provisions of the Act. Appeal being continuation of the original proceedings, equally this Court cannot go into the question of ultra vires while deciding the matter on appeal. The Bombay case referred to above is a case in which ultra vires of the notification was challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under those circumstances, we cannot accede to the contention that the notification is ultra vires and accordingly, we uphold the notification. The Court has held that the demand is proper and valid. It is not contended before us that the demands of the contributions made from the respondents are, in any, vitiated or excessive. Under those circumstances, we allow the appeals, set aside the orders of the Court and dismiss their applications under Section 75 of the Act. in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1984 (12) TMI 333
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... ... ..... ions Court is constituted under the Criminal P.C. and indisputably it is an inferior criminal Court in relation to High Court. Therefore, against the order made in exercise of powers conferred by S. 6C a revision application would lie to the High Court ............" 12. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a "Court" subordinate to the High Court within, the meaning, and for purposes of S. 24 of the Civil P.C. Transfer of a case from one Tribunal in the State to another is permissible. 13. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the opinion, that it is a fit case in which the power of transfer should be exercised. We, accordingly, allow this civil petition; transfer the proceedings in MVC 51 of 1981 now pending before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Gulbarga, to the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Bangalore Metropolitan Area, for disposal in accordance with law. No costs. 14. Petition allowed.
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1984 (12) TMI 332
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... ... ..... ations. We have set out these allegations only for the purpose of showing the nature of the case against the accused in the police challan case. The complaint presents a different picture altogether. The prosecution case as set out in the complaint is at complete variance with that in the police challan. In our judgment, it is not permissible for the Court under Section 223 of the Code to club and consolidate the case on a police challan and the case on a complaint where the prosecution versions in the police challan case and the complaint case are materially different, contradictory. and mutually exclusive. 10. For these reasons, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Barnala dated April 24, 1984 as modified by the High Court by its order dated May 9, 1984, is set aside and the learned Additional Sessions Judge is directed that the two cases be not consolidated but tried together with advertence to the observations made above.
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1984 (12) TMI 331
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... ... ..... estly paid, it will be payment good faith. It affords full indemnity to the banks under the Presidency Banks Act. If any one refuses to pay the debts to the holder of the certificate, he will become liable to pay interest. It entitled the holder to institute a suit to recover the debt." In this case, the judgment-debtor rightly or wrongly has been refusing to pay the amount mentioned in the certificate to the grantee i.e., the decree-holder. Therefore, the only remedy available to the so, called decree-holder is to file it Suit for the recovery of the amounts mentioned in the succession certificate. 10. Therefore, under these circumstances, the order passed by the Court below is unsustainable. It is accordingly set aside. The revision is allowed. The execution petition is dismissed. If the grantee of the succession certificate i.e., the decree-holder wants to recover the amount in question, his only remedy is by filing it suit. No costs throughout. 11. Revision allowed.
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1984 (12) TMI 330
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... ... ..... ;first instance. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Amarjit Kaur v. Pritam Singh 1975 1SCR605 where effect was given to a change in the law during the pendency of an appeal, relying on the proposition formulated as long ago as Kristnama Chariar v. Mangammal ILR (1902) Mad 91 by Bhashyam lyengar J., that the hearing of an appeal was, under the processual law of this country, in the nature 'of a re-hearing of the suit. In Amarjit Kaur (supra) this Court referred also to Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri in which the Federal Court had laid down that once a decree passed by a Court had been appealed against the matter become sub judice again and thereafter the appellate Court acquired seisin of the v. hole case, except that for certain purposes, for example, execution, the decree was regarded as final and the Court below retained jurisdiction. 10. It is apparent that this appeal cannot succeed. 11. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
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1984 (12) TMI 329
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... ... ..... ng decreed at 6 per cent by not preferring any cross objections in the High Court it could not be proper for us to enhance the rate to 12 per cent per annum which we were otherwise inclined to grant. We are also of the view that the State Government is being rightly saddled with a liability for the culpable neglect in the discharge of his duty by the District Treasury Officer who delayed the issuance of the L.P.C. but since the concerned officer had not been impleaded as a party defendant to the suit the Court is unable to hold him liable for the decretal amount. It will, however, be for the State Government to consider whether the erring official should or should not be directed to compensate the Government the loss sustained by it by his culpable lapses. Such action if taken would help generate in the officials of the State Government a sense of duty towards the Government under whom they serve as also a sense of accountability to members of the public. Petition dismissed.
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1984 (12) TMI 328
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... ... ..... a competent supervisory officer from the higher ranks of the State police with expertise in investigation to supervise the investigation in the present case. The police authorities will, we hope, avail of any credible/material collected by Secret Eye, if such material is made available to the police authorities. We hope and trust that a determined effort would be made by the State Government and its Police authorities to get at the truth and in the event of this case appearing to be a case of murder, the murderer would be proceeded against the A dealt with according to law. We are sure that the police authorities would take it as a matter of challenge, rise to the occasion and by their performance, justify their stand in these proceedings that they were competent to investigate and there was no necessity of the CBI being called in, as was done by the High Court. In view of what we have decided, no orders are necessary in the connected special leave petition. Appeal allowed.
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1984 (12) TMI 327
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... ... ..... self a question of law. Then he argues that there was no case of the assessee at any stage that the assessment orders and the demand notices were not property addressed and that being so, the Tribunal cannot be directed to refer a question in this regard. The Tribunal has drawn a presumption of valid service assuming to basic fact that the order and the notice were properly addressed. But this assumption is not supported by the record, inasmuch as the Departmental representative clearly stated before the Tribunal in the proceedings, of s. 256 (1) that the notices had been addressed only to the assessee-company. The Tribunal having recorded a finding, which is apparently contrary to the record, we are of the view that question No. 5 is a question of law and that does arise from the Tribunal's order. 7. Our answer to the question No. 5 only as referred in these reference is in affirmative and in favour of assessee. All the assessee are entitled to cost or ₹ 200 each.
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1984 (12) TMI 326
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... ... ..... t the tax. The Courts cannot, except rarely and in clear cases, help the draftsmen by a favourable construction. (p. 1020) It is for the Legislature to avoid the anomalies which, according to us, spring not from our interpretation but from the language employed."- CIT v. Elphinstone Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. AIR 1960 SC 1016, 1022. 23. For the foregoing, we conclude that the case of the assessee is not covered by clause (b) of section 23(1). It follows that the annual value of the licensee occupied property has to be determined under clause (a) of section 23(1). As the authorities below have not proceeded in that direction, we direct that the assessments be made fixing the annual value applying the principles applicable to section 23(1)(a). 24. In the result, the orders passed by the authorities below are set aside and the cases are remitted back to the ITO to redo the assessments in the light of the conclusion in the earlier paragraph. 25. The appeals are allowed.
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1984 (12) TMI 325
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... ... ..... even if it had taken place, could not be a 'transfer' for the purpose of charging capital gains. 2. By entering into an agreement with the builders Ansal Properties & Industries (P.) Ltd., the assessee did not enter into a partnership agreement and the two parties were to deal with each other on principal-to-principal basis. The important elements of the partnership were absent in this activity. 3. The assessee did not bring in his immovable property as a contribution towards his joint venture with the builders and the agreement contemplates the continued ownership of the assessee in respect of the immovable property. 4. There has thus, been no transfer by the assessee of the immovable property and the so-called firm or joint venture was not concerned with the notional valuation of the property as far as the venture's accounts were concerned. The addition in respect of the capital gains has, therefore, to be deleted. 25. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1984 (12) TMI 324
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... ... ..... be rendered illegal. 23. Before we proceed to pass the final order in this petition we may only note one feature of the letter written by the Secretary of the Advisory Board to the petitioner. At the foot of the said letter it has been mentioned that the Secretary has written this letter "by order of the Chairman." We presume that the decision communicated by the Secretary to the petitioner was taken by the Board as a whole and communicated by the Chairman. 24. In the result, this petition is allowed. The order of detention dt. 29th June, 1984 passed by the Government of Maharashtra against the petitioner under S. 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act is set aside. We have also held that the continued detention of the petitioner is rendered illegal. On both these grounds, the petitioner is entitled to be set at liberty and he shall be set at liberty forthwith, unless required in any other case. 25. Petition allowed.
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1984 (12) TMI 323
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... ... ..... held ever since the leading case of Abbot v. Minister for Lands LR (1895) AC 425 that a. mere right to take advantage of the provisions of an Act is not an accrued right. Abbot's case has been followed by this Court in a number of decisions. In such a situation, the Court is bound to take into consideration the subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly. The decision in Rameshwar's case clearly turned on the legal fiction contained in Section 18(4)(b) of the Act and the death of the large landholder Teja during the pendency of the appeal before the Financial Commissioner on which inheritance opened and his legal heirs became small landholders, could not impair the vested rights acquired by the tenants by virtue of the order passed by the Prescribed Authority and the deposit by them of the first instalment of the purchase price as required under Section 18(4)(a). 11. In view of the foregoing, the appeal must fail and is dismissed without any order as to costs.
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1984 (12) TMI 322
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... ... ..... ned from preventing exhibition of motion pictures at the club on the ground that the petitioner club has not paid entertainment duty in pursuance of those two letters. However, it is clarified that the respondents will be at liberty to determine what amount of the lump sum payment as subscription or of guest charges represents the right of admission to entertainment shows, after calling for relevant particulars and data from the petitioner and after giving a reasonable opportunity of presenting its case before the State Government, decides the question and make any fresh demand. The petitioner, of course, will be at liberty to challenge such decision if it is aggrieved thereby. Rule is made absolute with costs. 8. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that the petitioner has deposited a sum of ₹ 1,00,000/- in a scheduled bank as per the interim order of this Court in the present proceedings. The said amount is directed to be refunded to the petitioner.
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1984 (12) TMI 321
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... ... ..... nd detained on a criminal charge, the litigant has no fundamental right to be represented by a legal practitioner. For aught we know the legislature felt that for the implementation of the legislation, it would not subserve the public interest if lawyers were allowed to appear, plead or act on behalf of the non-tribal transferees. It cannot be denied that a tribal and a non- tribal are unequally placed and non-tribal transferee being a person belonging to the more affluent class, would unnecessarily protract the proceedings before the Collector under ss.3(1) and 4 of the Act by raising all kinds of pleas calculated to delay or defeat the rights of the tribal for restoration of his lands The proceedings before the Collector have to be completed will sufficient despatch and the transferred lands restored to a tribal under sub-s.(l) of s.3 and s.4 of the Act without any of the law's delays. In the result, the appeals must fail and are dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1984 (12) TMI 320
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... ... ..... B of the Customs Act, 1962. 7. On merits, Shri T. Banerjee, the learned advocate has reiterated the facts and has pleaded that questions of law do arise and has requested this Court to refer the proposed questions of law to the High Court. 8. In reply, Shri A.K. Chatterjee, the learned J.D.R. has pleaded that no question of law does arise and has pleaded for the rejection of the reference application. 9. In reply, Shri T. Banerjee, the learned advocate has again submitted that the questions of law do arise and prayed for referring to the High Court. 10. After having considered the submissions of both the sides. I have come to the conclusion that no question of law does arise. The Tribunal, while disposing of the miscellaneous application, had considered all the facts and circumstances and law and I hold that no question of law is involved and the finding of the Tribunal is the finding of fact. 11. In the result, the reference application is rejected.
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