Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 255 Records
-
1984 (8) TMI 364
... ... ... ... ..... e available. If the respondent was in fact appointed as per Ext. P 1 order by the General Manager, it cannot be disputed that the impugned order is in violation of Article 311 of the Constitution and is therefore inoperative. However, in the view which we have formed, it is unnecessary to go into the merits of the contention. We are also not considering the other arguments advanced by the respondent in support of the order on the basis of the other grounds taken up in the original petition. For the foregoing reasons the appeal is dismissed, in the circumstances without costs. Immediately after the pronouncement of the judgment the learned Counsel for the appellant made an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the case was posted before the Division Bench today. We are not satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance which requires to be settled by a decision of the Supreme Court. Hence leave is refused.
-
1984 (8) TMI 363
... ... ... ... ..... ntempt of court is made by a Bench, an appeal lies as of right to the Supreme Court. Where an appeal is filed against the order of the learned Single Judge to a Division Bench, the statutory right of appeal gets exhausted and there is no further right of appeal to the Supreme Court Shri Keshwani cited to us Purushottam Dan God v. Hon. Justice R.S. Dhillon 1978CriLJ772 . The decision is entirely irrelevant. 4. On merits, the learned counsel submitted that the undertaking given was not in respect of the property concerned and that in any case the learned Single Judge was not justified in giving certain directions in addition to punishing the petitioners for contempt of court. We find no substance in the submissions made by the learned counsel. There was a clear breach of the undertaking given by the petitioners and we are of the opinion that the Single Judge was quite right in giving appropriate directions to close the breach. The Special Leave Petition is, therefore, dismissed
-
1984 (8) TMI 362
... ... ... ... ..... (2) of the Act are hereby quashed. The first respondent is directed to dispose of the proceedings initiated under Section 6A of the Act, against each of the petitioners expeditiously in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this order. Pending the disposal of the aforesaid proceedings initiated under Section 6A of the Act, against the petitioners, the seized essential commodities in question shall not be disposed of. 13. Since several matters of this nature are coming up before this court, it is necessary that all the Deputy Commissioners who are empowered to exercise power under S. 6A of the Act must be posted with this order. Therefore Sri Achar learned Government Advocate submits that he be permitted to send the copies of the order to all the Deputy Commissioners. He is permitted to do so. 14. Sri M. R. Achar, learned Government Advocate, is permitted to file his memo of appearance on behalf of the respondents in six weeks. 15. Petitions allowed.
-
1984 (8) TMI 361
... ... ... ... ..... sustained. 13. Since the petitioner came to know of the ex parte final decree on 28-9-1978, the petition is not barred by Article 123 of the Limitation Act. 14. Before parting with the case I would like to observe that material documents were referred to and relied upon by the Courts below in formulating their findings without those documents being admitted into evidence and duly exhibited. The documents were public as well as private. There was no difficulty to admit and exhibit the public documents. It would be a salutary practice if the Courts exhibit documents admitted into evidence by putting specific identifying marks. 15. For the foregoing reasons, I hold that there was no service of notice of the Final decree proceeding on the petitioner and otherwise he had no knowledge thereof. Therefore, the ex parte final decree is set aside subject to payment of costs of ₹ 150/- by the petitioner to the opposite party in the trial court. The revision is accordingly allowed.
-
1984 (8) TMI 360
... ... ... ... ..... ant for different purposes. The purpose of acquisition under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act is to provide for acquisition of land in excess of the ceiling limit with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution, whereas under the Land Acquisition Act land is acquired by the State Government for public purposes. The title of a land notified under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act does not extinguish till possession is taken by the authorities under Sections 16 and 17 of the said Act. The respondent continued to be the owner of the land till the decision of the Competent Authority and the subsequent possession under Sub-section (3) of Section in of the Act. 11. For these reasons all the three writ petitions succeed and are allowed. The orders of the learned District Judge, Meerut, in Ceiling Appeals Nos. 51, 52 and 53 of 1980 are quashed. The stay orders passed in Writ Petitions Nos. 5106, 5107 and 5108 of 1982 are discharged. No order as to costs.
-
1984 (8) TMI 359
... ... ... ... ..... al court to determine the state of the employee at all. In this case the fact and the point at issue being different, the said decision can be of no help. 22. In the second decision of Gidwani v. Wagh 1982 52 Comp Cas 1 the main question was whether a person, not an employee of the company at the date of the complainant, was covered under s. 630 of the Companies Act, the court holding on the wording of the said section that he was equally liable under the said section for withholding company's property. The said decision equally has no application to the point at issue before me. 23. Under the circumstances, the finding of the learned Session Judge was correct. The appeal would stand dismissed. 24. Declaratory Suit No. 1366 of 1983 filed by the accused against the company in the court of mall Caused at Bombay, claiming to be a tenant of the premises, is expedited. So also the dispute before the Labour Court, being I.D.A. No. 199 of 1980 by the accused, is also expedited.
-
1984 (8) TMI 358
... ... ... ... ..... ; and Section 10 of the Nationalisation Act to counteract this conclusion cannot avail the appellants. Indeed, the submission advanced on behalf of the appellants is so much opposed to common sense logic of the matter that in the absence of a legislative mandate we have no hesitation in rejecting it. 13. Much of the controversy could have been avoided if reference had been made to the statutory form. Statement 8 in the prescribed form clearly indicates that the stock as on April 30, 1972, had to be taken into account. We are sorry to observe that the High Court omitted to make a reference to it, and are equally sorry to note that the Government companies have failed to do their duty as cast on them by law and driven the owner to unnecessary litigation 14. In view of what we have said, there is absolutely no substance in the stand taken by the appellants before us. Both the appeals fail and they are dismissed with costs. Consolidated hearing fee is assessed at ₹ 10,000.
-
1984 (8) TMI 357
... ... ... ... ..... hip and, therefore, it was the Civil Court which had to decide about the rendition of accounts. That part of the decision was wrongly distinguished by the Court below. The wording of the arbitration clause in the two cases is almost identical. Even if the partnership had stood dissolved, the question of rendition of accounts could not be gone into by the arbitration after the dissolution of partnership and had to be decided by the Civil Court. This part of the judgment of the Court below is also reversed. 5. For the reasons recorded above, this appeal is allowed, the judgment of the Court below is hereby set aside and the application of Hardial Singh Dhillon defendant filed under S. 34 of the Arbitration Act is hereby dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their own costs. 6. The parties through their counsel, who are represented before me, are directed to appear before the trial Court on the 27th day of August, 1984 for proceeding with the suit. 7. Appeal allowed.
-
1984 (8) TMI 356
... ... ... ... ..... through different levels of a hierarchical judicial structure by the very nature of things it take sometime before the true value can be finally determined. The fact that it is determined later does not mean that the right to the amount comes into existence at a later date. And if, as the High Court has held, interest at 6 per cent per annum rules from the date procession was taken in the case of compensation determined by the learned District Judge, there is no reason why the same rate should not be applied from the date possession was taken in the case of the enhancement effected by the High Court. We hold that the appellants are entitled to interest at 6 per cent per annum on the amount of ₹ 17,919.30 for the entire period from the date possession of the land was taken to the date of payment. The appeal is allowed, and the order dated April 21, 1977 passed by the High Court is modified accordingly. The respondents will pay the costs of the appellants. Appeal allowed
-
1984 (8) TMI 355
... ... ... ... ..... ose of Income Tax. 23. W. P. N. 3635 of 1984 is allowed in part and the order dated 23-1-1984 rejecting his claim is set aside and the Director of Tamil Nadu Raffles Scheme is directed to re-examine this petitioner's claim, uninfluenced by the observations of the criminal court and unconcerned by the payment of the prize amount to the first petitioner (Petitioner in W. P. No. 1384 of 1984). In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. With reference to Art. 134A of the Constitution, the learned Government pleader made an oral request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We have accepted the finding that the winning ticket had not been shown R6 be a forged one. No question of law much less a substantial question of law which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court, can be said to arise in the proposed appeal to the Supreme Court. In the circumstances, we reject the request for grant of leave against our judgment in WP No 1384 of 1984. Order accordingly.
-
1984 (8) TMI 354
... ... ... ... ..... on thereby. No doubt, the onus is on the assessee to prove that he has not imported the brass scrap, but made purchases within U. P. To discharge his burden, the assessee furnished the details of the transactions ; some of them contained the addresses and some not. No enquiry was made by the assessing officer to demolish the case of the assessee that the purchases had not been made from the persons, whose addresses have been given and that the assessee was not able to furnish the addresses of the persons, whose names are mentioned, but the addresses are not given. From the evidence by the assessee, the onus was shifted to the Revenue, but it failed to rebut the case of the assessee. 3. On the facts and circumstances of the case, I agree with the clear finding of the Tribunal that the assessee is neither a manufacturer nor an importer of the brass scrap and hence not liable to tax. 4. In the result, both the revisions are dismissed, and the parties will bear their own costs.
-
1984 (8) TMI 353
... ... ... ... ..... ration of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry is a commercial establishment within the meaning of the Delhi shops and Commercial Establishment Act, 1954. This Court pointed out that the definition of 'commercial establishment' in that Act is so wide that the activities of a registered society or a charitable trust would also fall within the purview of that definition. The learned single Judge and the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court have dealt with the questions arising in this appeal with care. We agree with their reasoning and hold that the office of a lawyer or of a firm of lawyers is not a 'commercial establishment' within the meaning of section 2(4) of the Act. The Bar Council of Kerala and Clerks Association of the Supreme Court Bar had intervened in this matter. We must express our thankfulness to them for the assistance rendered by them. In the result, the appeal is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. M.L.A. Appeal dismissed.
-
1984 (8) TMI 352
... ... ... ... ..... urt of equity as well, it will be impossible for us to deny this relief to the appellants. After taking into consideration the various shades and aspects of the case we are clearly of the opinion that apart from the compensation which may be awarded by the Collector or enhanced by the Judge or a higher Court, the appellants should get an equitable compensation in the form of interest calculated at the rate of 7/1/2 per cent per annum for two years on the value of land owned by each landowner. This equitable compensation has been awarded in the special facts of this case and will not be the subject matter of appeal, if any, under the Act on the amount of compensation. As the points involved in these appeals and writ petitions are the same we decided to dispose them of by one common judgment. For the reasons given above, the appeals the special leave and the writ petitions are disposed of accordingly but without any order as to costs. S.R. Appeals and Petitions partly allowed.
-
1984 (8) TMI 351
... ... ... ... ..... averted by holding that, considering the object and purpose of the Act, the learned Magistrate ought to take cognizance of the offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if any such period is applicable, because the interest of justice so requires. We believe that in case of this nature, Courts which are confronted with provisions which lay down a rule of limitation governing prosecutions, will give due weight and consideration to the provisions contained in section 473 of the Code. We confirm the view of the High Court that in passing the impugned order, the learned Magistrate has not in any manner reviewed his earlier order dated September 20, 1976. In the result, these appeals are dismissed. The prosecutions will proceed and be disposed of expeditiously in accordance with law. The learned Magistrate will dispose of these cases by considering all the points together, that is to say, without treating any particular point as a preliminary point. Appeals dismissed.
-
1984 (8) TMI 350
... ... ... ... ..... that no guide-lines laid down by a court can ensure the selection of really worthwhile books. This must necessarily depend upon the social consciousness and moral fibre of the members of the committee. Similarly, no judgment of a court can eliminate the evil of behind-the-scene influence. Here, one must perforce trust the sense of responsibility of the members of the committee in the discharge of the important duty with which they are entrusted. For the reasons mentioned above, we allow this Appeal and direct the State of Orissa to amend suitably the Government Resolution dated November 24, 1983, or to issue a fresh notification in supersession of that notification, incorporating the guide-lines laid down by us above, as expeditiously as possible and in any event before the next selection of books is made, without affecting any selection already made. In the particular facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to the costs of this Appeal. Appeal allowed.
-
1984 (8) TMI 349
... ... ... ... ..... ect of being either pushed back or thrown out. Nothing more need to be said. The rules nisi are made absolute. Current gradation list of the Judicial Department of the Delhi Administration specially with reference to respondents Nos. 4 and 5 is quashed with a direction to the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 prepare the gradation list of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service on the basis of the principles indicated in this judgment. This, however, will not in any way prejudice the claim of seniority of respondent No. 4, Shri G.S. Dakha on the ground of his being member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. This direction will also not in any way affect the seniority of the promotee officers of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service amongst themselves. That position would be guided by the principles laid down by this Court in Joginder Nath and Ors.' case (supra) (indicated hereinbefore). In the fact and circumstances of the case, parties will bear their own costs. Petitions partly allowed
-
1984 (8) TMI 348
... ... ... ... ..... l of the respondents that c.v. duty cannot be said to be customs duty as referred in this charging section, namely Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962 is not sustainable. c.v. duty is as much a customs duty as basic customs duty and auxiliary duty, though under different Sections/Acts. 22. The Collector of Customs (Appeals), Bombay, has gone wrong while ignoring the latter Division Bench Decision of the Bombay High Court in Synthetics and Chemicals (supra) and also the decision of the Supreme Court in Prakash Cotton Mills (supra) touching the same point though they were available to him to arrive at the correct conclusion of the matter and therefore, we have no alternative but to set aside the impugned order passed by the Collector of Customs (Appeals), Bombay and to accept all these four appeals, we, therefore, set aside the Order No. S/49-213, 214, 240 and 241/80-R, dated 26-2-1980 passed by the Collector of Customs (Appeals), Bombay and accept all these four appeals.
-
1984 (8) TMI 347
... ... ... ... ..... dly imported in that they were either exempted from payment of duty or duty had been paid. In other words, they are not smuggled goods. No doubt, there was breach of the provisions of Chapter IV-A but that did not call for imposition of a penalty of ₹ 10,000/-. I, therefore, reduce the penalty to ₹ 2,000/- (Two thousand only). In the result, this appeal is allowed in part. The non-notified goods valued at ₹ 1675/- shall be released to the appellant unconditionally. 12. The notified goods of the value of ₹ 9,873/- which were imported on payment of duty shall also be released to the appellant on payment of fine of ₹ 9,873/-. 13. The personal penalty is reduced from ₹ 10,000/- to ₹ 2,000/-. 14. In other respects, the order of the Additional Collector confirmed by the Board is hereby confirmed. 15. The appellant shall be granted the consequential relief within three months from the date of communication of this order.
-
1984 (8) TMI 346
... ... ... ... ..... adverted to supra) except that we had occasion to rely upon the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court (a little lower down in the same para) indicating the marketable packing for the ordinary consumer as the true test for inclusion of primary packing in the assessable value. 6. We, accordingly, hold that the value of packing has, necessarily, to be included in terms of Section 4(4)(d)(i) of the Act, in the assessable value of china and porcelain, regardless of actual sales in a loose condition, inasmuch as, they are goods “ordinarily” sold in the course of wholesale trade in a packed condition. We are not, however, to be understood to say anything at all that can be construed to be applicable to a case where goods are sold in a variety of different packings. 7. In the premises, we allow the Appeal and set aside the Order of the Collector (Appeals). The order of adjudication is restored. The Appellant is entitled to consequential relief, if any.
-
1984 (8) TMI 345
... ... ... ... ..... is neither the duty payable nor is shown to be a deductible element would escape charge to duty despite its being part of the normal price. 9. We are in agreement with the Counsel for the appellants that a statutory notification is law and cannot be circumscribed by administrative instructions, guide-lines, press notes or trade notices. However, in the present case what is involved is not so much a question of the applicability of a trade notice, which, in terms, was struck down by the Delhi High Court, but the proper application of Section 4 of the Act to the facts of the case which is what the Appellate Collector has done. Our attention has been drawn by the Departmental Representative to two decisions of this Tribunal, one, reported in 1983 E.L.T. 548 and the other contained in Order No. C-441/84, dated 28-6-1984 in Appeal No. ED(SB)(T)235/81-C. Our decision in this case is in line with the said two decisions. 10. In the result, the appeal fails and is rejected.
........
|