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Case Laws
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1995 (5) TMI 295
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... ... ..... d of for which the review has been sought, is appealable under S. 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure and also under Art. 133 of the Constitution of India. As such in view of the principle laid down in the case of Devaraju Pillai, AIR1987SC1160 (supra) by the Supreme Court the review application is not maintainable. Regarding the merit of the application, the learned Judge held in revision that the two applications for local inspections are made on two different points. That is not an error apparent on the face of the record. That is the view taken by the learned single Judge in the revision. Even if it is assumed that that view is wrong, even then the review is not maintainable for the same in view of a single Bench decision of this Court in the case of Chandmall Chopra, AIR1986Cal111 (supra). 23. I accordingly find no merit in this review application and hence the review application stands rejected. 24. There will, however, be no order as to costs. 25. Application dismissed.
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1995 (5) TMI 294
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... ... ..... . SEN, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (5) TMI 293
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... ... ..... y can be inferred only on an over all view of all the materials collected during investigation and not in isolation as has been done by the learned Courts below. That apart in a case instituted upon a Police Report the Court is required, at the time of framing of the charges, to confine its attention to documents referred to under Section 173 of the CrPC only. In that context the Court was not justified in referring to, much less, relying upon the letters purportedly written by the accused when their authenticity and veracity are yet to be gone into. 6. For the foregoing discussion we allow this appeal set aside the impugned orders and direct the learned Trial Judge to proceed with the matter afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made hereinbefore. By way of abundant caution we make it clear that in dealing with the matter the learned Judge shall not allow himself to be influenced by anything said in this order in regard to the merits of the case.
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1995 (5) TMI 292
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... ... ..... ction was made pending suit and the tenants were inducted into possession without leave of the court. It is settled law that a tenant who claims title, right or interest in the property through the judgment debtor or under the colour of interest through him, he is bound by the decree and that, therefore, the tenant need not eo nominee be '. impleaded as a party defendant to the suit nor it be an impediment to remove obstruction put up by them to deliver possession to the decree. What is relevant is only a warning by the bailiff to deliver peaceful possession and if they cause obstruction, the bailiff is entitled to remove the obstruction; cause the construction demolished and deliver vacant possession to the decree holder in terms of the decree. Thus considered, we hold that the High Court and the executing court have not committed any error of law in directing demolition of shops and delivery of the possession to the decree holder. 6. The S.L.P. is accordingly dismissed.
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1995 (5) TMI 291
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... ... ..... tion was in progress. Neither of these two circumstances can lead to the conclusion that the bank guarantees cannot be invoked while the arbitration is pending. The bank guarantees are unconditional and payable on demand. The circumstances pointed out by learned counsel for the first-respondent do not constitute a bar on the right of the appellant to encash the bank guarantees. In the present case there is also no circumstance pointed out which would result in any irretrievable injustice to the first- respondent of the kind referred to in the case of Itek Corporation (supra) if the bank guarantees are realised. In the premises, the Delhi High Court was not justified in issuing an order of injunction to restrain the realisation of the bank guarantees by the appellant. The appeals are, therefore, allowed. The order of the Delhi High Court dated 20.10.94 is set aside and the order of injunction is vacated. The first-respondent shall pay to the appellant the costs of the appeals.
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1995 (5) TMI 290
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... ... ..... on of duty or date of retirement. The appeals succeed accordingly and the original writ petition will stand dismissed. We are satisfied beyond any manner of doubt that the petitions filed by the three police Inspectors were, to say the least, motivated with a view to deriving personal benefits and not in public interest. Their idea was to paralyse the working of the Tribunal and benefit from the delay at the cost of other litigants. Otherwise how were they concerned with the legality of their appointments? This, in our view, is a glaring case of abuse of the process of the Court in the name of public interest. Can such petitioners be allowed to get away unscathed? We think they must be saddled with exemplary costs. We, therefore, direct that each petitioner shall pay a sum of ₹ 15,000/- by way of costs. The amount of cost may be recovered from the provident fund/gratuity or any other future monetary benefit including pension or in ordinary course by executing the order.
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1995 (5) TMI 289
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... ... ..... viction and sentence of the appellants. We cannot loose sight of the fact that since the mere possession of an arm, as specified in the schedule, without a licence, in a notified area, attracts the provisions of Section 5 of TADA with stringent punishment, the quality of evidence on which the conviction can be based has to be of a much higher order than the one we find available in the present case. Our independent appraisal of the evidence on the record has created an impression on our minds that the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge to the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt. 13. Since, we find that it is not safe to rely upon the evidence relating to the alleged search and recovery, the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt. Their conviction and sentence cannot be sustained. We therefore accept these appeals and set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellants. They shall be released from custody forthwith if not required in any other case.
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1995 (5) TMI 288
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... ... ..... anohar, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (5) TMI 287
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... ... ..... tition in his representative capacity the shares ought to be registered in the name of BoB Fiscal. Accordingly, we direct the company to register the transfer of 7,42,400 equity shares in the name of BoB Fiscal within 30 days from the receipt of a copy of this order. Dunlop shall also pay to BoB Fiscal all the dividends on the above shares for the years 1988-89 and thereafter any dividend which is transferred to the credit of the Government can be claimed by BoB Fiscal from the concerned authorities. BoB Fiscal shall also be entitled to any bonus and rights shares issued in the interregnum. The rights shares/debentures if any shall be offered to BoB Fiscal within 30 days of receipt of a copy of this order and a period of one month shall be allowed for making remittance against these shares. The prayer regarding a direction for enquiry by the Department of Company Affairs is in our opinion unnecessary keeping in view the facts presented in this petition. No order as to costs.
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1995 (5) TMI 286
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... ... ..... ow. Similarly, the failure on the part of SIPCOT to give intimation to respondent No. 1 before accepting the offer of ₹ 38 lakhs made by respondent no. 2, is of little consequence in the facts of this case because respondent No. 1 has had sufficient opportunity both before the High Court as well as in this Court to obtain a higher offer, but he has failed to do so. 14. In these circumstances no fault can be found with the action of SIPCOT in selling the unit to respondent No. 2 for ₹ 38 lakhs and the Judgment of the High Court, it setting aside the said sale cannot be upheld. 15. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The Judgment of the Division Bench dated February 23, 1994 in Writ Petition No. 97 of 1994 as well as Judgment of learned single Judge dated December 1, 1993 in Writ Petition No. 18048 of 1993 are set aside and the said writ petition filed by respondent No. 1 is dismissed. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, there will no be order as to costs.
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1995 (5) TMI 285
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... ... ..... d as members and those which the respondents have relied on in their replies. The inspection will be given within a period of one month from the date of receipt of this order. 22. In regard to Application No. 71 of 1995 seeking to incorporate amendments to the main petition, we allow the same except that portion relating to the extraordinary general meeting held on June 20, 1994, since we have already considered the same in this order. The respondents will file their replies to the amended application by July 15, and rejoinder, if any, will be filed by August 15, 1995. We also find that the petitioners are yet to file their replies on C. A. No, 236 of 1994 filed by the respondents on maintainability of the petition. As such, the petitioners will file their replies to this application by July 15, and rejoinders if any will be filed by August 15, 1995. As already indicated, the petition will be finally heard on September 25, 1995, to September 27, 1995, at 10.30 a.m. each day.
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1995 (5) TMI 284
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... ... ..... nt and Castle Douglas Industries Limited. Having failed in open competition, the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 invoked the writ jurisdiction first indirectly, and thereafter directly, to frustrate the appellant's bid to secure the contract. They have successfully frustrated the effort of the appellant to obtain the contract by this process so far. Their attempt has now failed. Costs must follows the event. Having regard to the facts, we have decided to award exemplary costs in this case. 27. The appeal is allowed. The respondents Nos. 1 and 2 will pay costs assessed at ₹ 20,000 (Rupees twenty thousand only) to the appellant. I.A.No. 5 of 1995 in S.L.P. (C) No. 3725 of 1994 The above LA. is also disposed of accordingly. Civil Appeal No. 5527 of 1995 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 13534 of 1994) 28. Leave granted. 29. In view of our judgment in Civil Appeal No. 5526 of 1995 (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 3725 of 1994), no further order need to be passed in the above case.
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1995 (5) TMI 283
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... ... ..... ith tested devotion and integrity may be available at one point. They must have access to records Prospective buyers and investors may approach them for advice whether the property with which they propose to deal satisfies all requirements of law and can they deal therewith without any risk. This would protect the innocent buyers and investors and avoid litigation. The vigilant eyes of such agency would also act as a cross check on unwanted builder- bureaucracy align. (127) Public bodies like DDA, MCD and NDMC should also think of appointing standing counsel with a publicly known address or notifying an official of theirs on whom service of advance notice of any application seeking ad interim relief from the court may be insisted on as a condition precedent to the grant of any interim relief by judicial forum. (128) Result Prayers for the grant of ad interim injunction are rejected in both the suits. The interim order dated 19.11.94 passed in suit No. 2581/94 stands vacated.
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1995 (5) TMI 282
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... ... ..... ner as to how Articles 14, 19(1 )(g) and 21 of the Constitution are infringed by in house assessment of claims which are below ₹ 20,000.00. The policy to have such claims settled by an insurer itself without seeking a report from a surveyor or assessor cannot be said to be arbitrary or violative of Article 14. Settlement of claims below ₹ 20,000.00 by the insurer without intervention of surveyor or loss assessor saves, as already noticed, unnecessary expenditure and lime. Thus the settlement of such claims by this method is not arbitrary or violative of the equality clause. Approved surveyors or loss assessors are not debarred from surveying the claims of the value of ₹ 20,000.00 or more. Accordingly, they arc not debarred from carrying on their trade or business as approved surveyors or loss assessors. (30) In view of the above discussion, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief. The writ petition is,therefore, dismissed but with no order as to costs.
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1995 (5) TMI 281
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... ... ..... nsel for the State of Madhya Pradesh sought to support the sustainability of the validation Act olacing reliance on the cecision of this Court in Govt. of A.P. v. H.M.T. 1975 Suppl. S.C.R. 394, where this Court had upheld the provisions of a Validation Act by which duty made payable in respect of a building premises retrospectively. Prima facie, the cecision of this Court appears to support the stand of learned counsel for the State. But, when the judgment and order of the High Court under the present appeal, which is sought to be made ineffective by the Validation Act, is held to be unsustainable by us in the present appeal, we find it unnecessary, to examine the constitutionality of the Validation Act. In the result, we not merely allow this civil appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court in W.P. No. 520 of 1980 (reported in AIR 1982 m.p. 225) appealed against and dismiss that writ petition, but also dismiss the writ petition filed in this Court. No costs.
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1995 (5) TMI 280
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... ... ..... S.C. Sen, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (5) TMI 279
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... ... ..... ng his sons, grandsons and granddaughters and all of them were joint in home, hearth and estate, and that consequently, there was no surplus area with him. Therefore, second notice was necessary to enable to file a separate return claiming appropriate computation of holding. So the ratio is inapplicable to the facts in this case. It is next contended that under s.133-A of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 1950, the lease covered under the Act was treated to be Government lease and the appellants were entitled to hold the same in accordance with the terms and conditions of the lease relating thereto. It is contended that this Act was extended to Nainital after 1.7.1969 and, therefore, the notice issued is also illegal. We find no force in the contention. In this case, since the lease itself was granted by the Government under the Government Grants Act, s.133-A has no application. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. But in the circumstances without costs.
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1995 (5) TMI 278
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... ... ..... viction and sentence of the appellants. We cannot loose sight of the fact that since the mere possession of an arm, as specified in the schedule, without a licence, in a notified area, attracts the provisions of Section 5 of TADA with stringent punishment, the quality of evidence on which the conviction can be based has to be of a much higher order than the one we find available in the present case. Our independent appraisal of the evidence on the record has created an impression on our minds that the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge to the appellants beyond a reasonable doubt. 13. Since, we find that it is not safe to rely upon the evidence relating to the alleged search and recovery, the appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt. Their conviction and sentence cannot be sustained. We therefore accept these appeals and set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellants. They shall be released from custody forthwith if not required in any other case.
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1995 (5) TMI 277
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... ... ..... there are two separate and independent business carried on by the same assessee, if the assessee chooses to close one business and carry on the other business, the retrenchment compensation paid as a result of the closure of one business cannot be claimed as an allowable deduction as against income from the other business which is being carried on by the assessee. Such a claim for deduction can be upheld only if it is shown by the assessee that both these businesses are interconnected, inter dependent and not independent" (emphasis given by us) From the above observations it is clearly shown that in the present case, assessee is entitled to the deduction and these observations are not helpful to the revenue in view of the finding given by us. Similar is the position in respect to the Calcutta High Court judgment. 8. In view of the above discussion, the issue is decided in favour of the assessee. 9 to 11. These paras are not reproduced here, as they involve minor issues.
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1995 (5) TMI 276
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... ... ..... It was stated that a casual solitary transaction would not make a person a dealer. There being nothing on record to show if there was continuity in transactions of sale of coal dust or rejected coal by the respondent, we agree with the High Court that the respondent was not in the business of sale or storage for sale of coal. What has been stated in the concluding part of the definition of "dealer" also lends assurance to the view taken by the High Court. 9. Having been satisfied that there is nothing on record to show if the respondent was in the business of sale or storage for sale of coal, it is not necessary to express our views on the second reason of the High Court in accepting the case of the respondent. We dismiss the appeal on the limited ground that the respondent could not be proved to be in the aforesaid business. We leave open the legal question covered by the second reason. 10. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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