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1996 (11) TMI 490
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... ... ..... ollowing the law laid down by this Court in Shiv Sagar Tiwari v. Union of India (re. Capt. Satish Sharma and Smt. Sheila Kaul) Writ Petition No. 585 of 1995 . 8. We further direct that pending the finalisation the contract pursuant to the tenders to be floated hereinafter pursuant to the directions made herein, the present temporary arrangement shall continue. Though Sri Sibal has questioned the correctness of the Commissioner's Order dated October 14, 1996 awarding the contract for the interim period to Indo Merchantiles, we are not prepared to accept the criticism. In our opinion, the Commissioner has given valid reasons for preferring Indo Merchantiles over the appellant when both were prepared to supply at the same rate of Rs. 9.20 per LPL. We further direct that fresh tenders should be floated within two months from today and the entire process finalised within four months from today. 9. The appeal is accordingly dismissed subject to the above observations. No costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 489
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... ... ..... trate takes cognizance of the offence or even after he passes an order committing the case to the Sessions Court. 26. The learned Public Prosecutor on the other hand has relied upon the observations of a Single Judge of Guwahati High Court as reported in Sarat Kumar Phukan v. Charan Deka Anr., 1984 Cri. L.J. 733. We have very carefully examined the facts of the said case. According to the facts of the said case a non-bailable warrant was issued against the petitioner Sarat Kumar Phukan. He in response thereto surrendered before the Court with an application for cancellation of warrant of arrest. His application for cancellation of warrant was rejected. Hence the learned Judge, in view of the above; held that an application for anticipatory bail was not maintainable. Thus the ratio of the said case is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the above circumstances, we hold the applications to be maintainable. The Reference is answered accordingly.
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1996 (11) TMI 488
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... ... ..... ment compensation to the workmen. Therefore, the employees have no right under Section 25FF to claim any compensation from the Board. Nor do they have any right to claim to be in continuous employment on same terms and conditions, even after the purchase of the undertaking by the Board. The High Court in appeal was right in holding that the employees were entitled to retrenchment compensation under the provisions of Section 25FF. But the High Court was in error in holding that the Board even after payment of the purchase price to the transferor-Company was liable to pay retrenchment compensation to the employees. The assertion of the Board that the purchase money was more than adequate to pay retrenchment compensation to the employees has not been denied. 13. In view of the aforesaid, we allow Civil Appeal No. 10220 of 1995, preferred by the Board, and dismiss Civil Appeal No. 10219 of 1995, preferred/by the employees. There will be no order as to costs in both these appeals.
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1996 (11) TMI 487
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... ... ..... asses in Kerala State in the light of the ruling of this Court in Mandal case and forward the report to this Court within 3 months form the date of this order. We direct the State of Kerala to extend all cooperation including the expenses in this regard. The learned Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court will fix the terms of the Commission including the honorarium. The State pf Kerala will meet with the financial obligation. A Copy of the Office Memorandum issued by Government of India. Ministry of Personal, Public Grievances and Pensions (Department of Personnel and Training) dated a 8.9.1993 pursuant to the directions of this Court in Mandal Case (available at pages 37 to 43 of the paper book in Writ Petition No.699/95) may be sent by the Office along with a Copy of this Court s order for use and guidance of the members of the High Level Committee in identifying the creamy layer among other Backward Classes in the State of Kerala. List the matter after the report is filed.
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1996 (11) TMI 486
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... ... ..... e that in case of violation of any of those conditions, the land shall be resumed by the government. Not only such conditions should be stipulated but constant monitoring should be done to ensure that those conditions are being observed in practice. While we cannot say anything about the particular school run by the respondent, it is common knowledge that some of the schools are being run on totally commercial lines. Huge amounts are being charged by way of donations and fees. The question is whether there is any justification for allotting land at throw-away prices to such institutions. The allotment of land belonging to the people at practically no price is meant for serving the public interest, i.e., spread of education or other charitable purposes; it is not meant to enable the allottees to make money or profiteer with the aid of public property. We are sure that the government would take necessary measures in this behalf in the light of the observations contained herein.
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1996 (11) TMI 485
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... ... ..... ully if it is not capable to have efficient managerial cadre with unimpeachable integrity and the requisite vision, who enjoy the fullest confidence of the policy makers of such undertakings but for workmen cadre, they are simply to be made to work by managerial cadre. In cases of workmen cadre, their reinstatement should be rule and payment of compensation in lieu thereof should be a rare exception whereas in case of managerial cadre or similar high level cadre, compensation should be taken to be a rule and reinstatement as an exception. In the case on hand, since the petitioner is a Clerk-cum-Typist, hence, he deserves to be reinstated. 49. As a result of the afore-mentioned discussion, the impugned order dated 23.1.1990 Annx.29 and appellate order dated 19.4.1990 Annx.33 to the writ petition are hereby quashed and the instant writ petition is allowed with costs directing the respondents to reinstate the petitioner with back-wages in service with all consequential benefits.
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1996 (11) TMI 484
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... ... ..... judgment which may be bifurcated as Rs. 45,000/-, as general damages and Rs. 5,000/- as special damages for medical expenses etc. The appellant will be entitled to interest at the rate of 9% on unpaid amount so far and also on enhanced amount of compensation. The amount that has already been deposited, the interest will remain at the rate of 6% p.a. The respondents 1 to 3, on one hand shall be liable to bear and to pay amount under modified award to the extent of 50%, while respondent Nos. 4 and 5 shall be liable to pay to the extent of 50% of the amount of compensation and interest awarded thereon. The amount if already been paid towards compensation that may be adjusted with reference to the amount awarded. The appeal is thus partly allowed. The costs of this appeal shall be borne by all the parties proportionately, but costs of the Subordinate Court or Tribunal shall be realisable from the respondents in proportion of 50%, as the liability has been indicated in the award.
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1996 (11) TMI 483
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... ... ..... e women and belonged to Scheduled Castes; they represented separate electoral wards indicating non-competing groups or categories of membership and as both of them were not at par they could not contest on an equal footing for the post of President. As admittedly appellant was the sole returned candidate from the ward reserved for Scheduled Castes women and as the post of President was also by rotation reserved only for a member belonging to Scheduled Castes women category she was the sole contestant for the said post and was rightly held to be entitled to be the President of Loharu Municipality. 6. In the result this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court are quashed and set aside. The writ petition filed by Respondent No. 1 stands dismissed. The appellant will be entitled to continue as the President of the Loharu Municipal Committee for her full term of office. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be nor order as to costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 482
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... ... ..... l No. 2660/85. A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was published on December 8, 1979, acquiring 71 acres 12 cents of land for the public purpose, namely, erection of National Thermal Power Corporation. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded Rs. 4000 and Rs. 4500 per acre for Group I and Group II of the lands. On reference, the subordinate Judge enhanced the compensation to Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 11,500 per acre for Group I and Group II respectively. On appeal, the High Court set aside the judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court for reconsideration. Thus this appeal by special leave. 5. It is seen that all the lands were agricultural lands at the time of acquisition and their prevailing market value varies between Rs. 6,000 to Rs. 6,500 per acre. Under these circumstances, it would be just and proper if the compensation is fixed at Rs. 6,000 per acre uniformly to all the lands. It is ordered accordingly. 6. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 481
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... ... ..... oks in the Court. Moreover except the suit pro-note, there is no other pro-note to show that ₹ 12,000/- was paid to the accused. PW1 further, admitted that he and Mr. Purna Chander another partner settled the accounts. In the cross-examination, he further denied the suggestion that Ex.P3 was a blank cheque given in connection with the earlier transaction and he has used the cheque in respect of this transaction. But as observed by the Court below, the complainant has not produced any account books to substantiate their stand and also failed to prove the debt for which the cheque is alleged to have been issued. Having regard to these circumstances, only the Court below concluded that the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, is not proved and the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. 11. Having gone through the entire evidence on record, I find no infirmity or illegality in the order of the Court below. 12. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
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1996 (11) TMI 480
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... ... ..... ded reconsideration he had no answer to the correctness of the decisions. Such a casual approach to considered decisions of this Court even by a person well-versed in law would not be countenanced. Instead, as pointed out earlier, he referred to decisions having no bearing on the question, like the decisions on cow slaughter cases, freedom of speech and expression, uniform civil code, etc. we need say no more except to point out that indiscriminate use of this important lever of public interest litigation would blunt the lever itself. 19. We would have ordered the petitioner to pay the cost of this petition but we refrain from doing so on this occasion in the hope that he will exercise restraint in future, failing which he may in a similar or like case be visited with an order of cost. With these observations we dismiss the petition. The interim order staying proceedings pending elsewhere shall stand vacated with a direction that they shall be disposed of in the light hereof.
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1996 (11) TMI 479
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... ... ..... . The assessee's income tax liability became smaller and consequently the chargeable profits could not be treated as validly computed when deduction had been made for Income Tax which was not actually payable. Therefore, the Income Tax Officer was justified in invoking the provisions of Section 13 and correcting the error in the order passed on 16th September, 1968. The Income Tax Officer by the second order of rectification was not trying to rectify the original order of assessment passed on 30th March, 1965. but was seeking to restore it by rectifying the error in the amended order passed on 16th September, 1968. 9. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary to go into the contention of the assessee that Section 14 of the Surtax Act was amended only on 1st April, 1971 and the power under the amended Section could not be utilised for passing a second rectification order on 21st April, 1971. 10. The appeal, therefore, is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 477
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... ... ..... ection (2) of Section 310 there will be a deemed grant of completion certificate. 4. Sub-section (2) of Section 310 reads thus - “(2) No person shall occupy or permit to be occupied any such building or part of the building or use or permit to be used the building or part thereof affected by work, until,- (a) Permission has been received from the Commissioner in this behalf; or (b) The Commissioner has failed for 30 days after receipt of the notice of completion to intimate his refusal of the said permission”. 5. The foundational facts stated on behalf of the petitioner has not been controverted by the respondent-Corporation by filing any counter-affidavit. Accordingly, the present writ petition being disposed of with a direction to the respondent-Electricity Board to supply energy to the complex of the petitioner immediately provided he has complied with the other statutory requirements requiring such completion. 6. Writ petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 476
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... ... ..... far as the first question is concerned, there is no difference of opinion on the question that the period of limitation would start to run from the date of the reference court's order on the basis whereof the re-determination is sought. In the present case, the re-determination was sought on the basis of the reference court's order long after three months even from the time the last order had elapsed and hence the applications were clearly time-barred. We, therefore, do not see any need to keep these matters pending for decision by a five-Judge Bench. 8. On the second question, there was a difference of opinion as the three-judge Bench in Pradeep Kumari's case had departed from the view taken earlier in two cases by the Two-judge Bench. If and when that question arises in an appropriate case, perhaps a reference to a five-judge Bench may become necessary. 9. For the above reasons, we see no merit in these appeals and dismiss the same but with no order as to costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 475
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... ... ..... Patent appeals. The adverse comment attracted by the learned Single Judge from the Letters Patent Bench in allotting 15 days' time to the State of Manipur and others to appeal against the orders may well be deserved but the fact remains that the time prior thereto had to be deducted towards computation of limitation. It is stated at the Bar that the period of limitation prescribed for filing the Letters Patent appeal was 30 days from the date of the order. On the above analysis of facts the appellants were obviously within limitation. In any case the delay had appropriately been explained. For these reasons we allow these appeals, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and request it to ignore the delay, if any, and entertain the appeals in order to decide them on their merit. We further request the High Court to dispose them of most expeditiously after hearing both parties as the judgment of the learned Single Judge affects a large number of persons. 4. No costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 474
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... ... ..... and illegal. On the other hand, the view expressed by the Bombay High Court in Shivraj Fine Art Litho Works, Nagpur v. Director, Regional Office Maharashtra, Bombay & Ors. 1974 Lab. IC 328) (V 7 C72), by Delhi High Court in E.S.I.C. New Delhi v. Birla Cotton, Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., Delhi 1977 II LLJ 420 and by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in M/s. The Hyderabad Allwyn Metal Works Ltd. v. Employees State Insurance Corporation 1981 Lab. IC 457 and the earlier decision referred to are correct in law. The ratio in Braithwaite & Co. (India) Ltd. vs. ESI 1968) 1 SCR 771 , is no longer applicable, since it was prior to the amendment of the definition. As a result, it no longer operates as a ratio. Thus, we hold that the view taken by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh is in accordance with law laid down by this Court. We do not find any ground warranting interference. The appeals are dismissed. No costs. IN WP (C) NO.1554/87 Writ Petition is dismissed as withdrawn.
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1996 (11) TMI 473
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... ... ..... this Court held that the value of the bonus shares does not have to be separately ascertained, particularly when the entire block of shares including bonus shares held by the shareholder has been sold or transferred. The whole cost of the shares, including the bonus shares, being a known figure, it would be unnecessary to ascertain the individual cost of each share, because by getting at the average cost of the bonus shares, the average cost of original shares must inevitably get reduced pro tanto. Inasmuch as the value of the cost of acquisition and the value of the shares worked out by the Tribunal, in the present case, are in accordance with the decision of this Court cited supra, we consider that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal in each of the assessee's cases in the matter of ascertaining the value of the original shares as well as the bonus shares. Accordingly, we answer the references in the affirmative and against the assessees. No costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 472
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... ... ..... d confidential procedure which is followed by the Union Public Service Commission, we are unable to hold that the decision of the DPC in grading the appellant as "very good" instead of "outstanding" can be said to be arbitrary. No ground is, therefore, made out for interference with the selection of respondent No. 4 by the DPC on the basis of which he has been appointed as Deputy Government Advocate. But, at the same time, it must be held that the Tribunal was in error in going into the question whether the appellant had been rightly graded as "outstanding" in the ACRs for the years 1990-91 and 1991-92. The observations of the Tribunal that out of the two "outstanding" gradings given to the appellant one "outstanding" grading does not flow from various parameters given and the reports entered therein, cannot, therefore, be upheld and are accordingly set aside. 6. The appeal is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 471
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... ... ..... order, such acquitted or discharged accused shall not be liable to be recalled for facing such trials pursuant to the present clarificatory order which qua such offences will be treated to be purely prospective and no such cases which are already closed shall be reopened pursuant to the present order. IV. Copies of this clarificatory order shall be communicated by the Office of this Court to all the High Courts, Chief Secretaries of all the States and the concerned administrative Heads of all the Union Territories. Registrars of the High Courts shall be requested by the Office to communicate copies of this clarificatory order to all the criminal courts under the control and superintendence of the respective High Courts with direction to send Compliance Reports to the High Courts concerned within three months from the date of receipt of communication of the clarificatory order at their end. LA. Nos. 3-6 of 1996 shall stand disposed of in the light of this clarificatory order.
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1996 (11) TMI 470
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... ... ..... able. In this context, I further make it clear that in terms of S. 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, another duly authorised complaint could be filed in time i.e. within one month from the date of cause of action. In this view of the matter, Ex. P-1, a letter of authorisation filed after one year cannot be taken as a proper ratification of the action initiated by P.W. 1. Because if it is taken that on the date of Ex. P-1, letter (filed after one year), a duly constituted complaint is filed, it would be barred by limitation of one month prescribed by S. 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Moreover nothing prevented the complainant to withdraw the complaint himself voluntarily and file another complaint with proper authorisation within the time permitted by S. 142 of the Act. 26. For the above reasons, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the order of the Court below and hence I pass the order as under 27. The Criminal Appeal is dismissed. 28. Appeal dismissed.
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