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1996 (4) TMI 538
... ... ... ... ..... nbir Singh and his family. We direct the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 6 to deposit a sum of Rs. 10,000/- towards interim compensation for the illegal detention with the Registrar (Judicial) of this court within one month from today. The amount, on being so deposited, shall be paid to the petitioner who may take such further legal action, as advised, in the proper forum. 31. Before we conclude, we would like to mention that, looking to the age of Dr. Brinder Jeet Kaur and Dr. Amrit Pal Singh as also heir profession and family status, we made attempts for reconciliation on 13-2-1995 in our Chamber wherein Dr. Amrit Pal Singh had handed over fourteen certificates and a big packet containing of books and notes to his wife Dr. Brinder Jeet Kaur, but we record with regret that all our attempts for reconciliation failed. 32. The writ petitions are thus disposed of accordingly. We direct the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 6 to pay Rs. 1,000/- as costs to the petitioner. 33. Petition allowed.
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1996 (4) TMI 537
... ... ... ... ..... o be in contravention of some statutory provision in some other enactment. 13. Since I am taking this view of the matter, it is not necessary to deal with the submission urged before me by learned Counsel Kum. Shah for the petitioner to the effect that, under the scheme of the Rules, the Deputy Collector has no power of revision qua the entries certified by the Mamlatdar. In view of my aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the impugned orders at Annexures D, E and F to each petition cannot be sustained in law. They have to be quashed and set aside. 14. In the result, each petition is accepted. The impugned orders at Annexures D, E and F to each petition are quashed and set aside. This judgment of mine shall not preclude the concerned authority to take action according to law for examining the validity of the transaction in each case if it is so permissible and desirable after so many years. Rule on each petition is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs.
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1996 (4) TMI 536
... ... ... ... ..... Sen, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (4) TMI 535
... ... ... ... ..... the date of taking the complaint on file and examining the complainant, the Magistrate instead of taking cognizance of the offence and proceeding further, should have straightway returned the complaint. At the most, he should have, after examining the complainant, dismissed the complaint under Section 203, Cr.P.C. 18. We are, therefore, of the view that the question referred to the Division Bench does not really arise because the factum of completion of the offence had not come to the notice of the Magistrate by way of a complaint in writing before proceeding with the trial. In any case, the Magistrate should not have acted upon the premature complaint which is not a complaint at all in the eye of law. We do not, therefore, find any merit in the appeal though we have expressed our disapproval of the procedure followed in taking cognizance of the offence, proceeding with the case and ultimately acquitting the accused. 19. The Criminal Appeal is dismissed. 20. Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (4) TMI 534
... ... ... ... ..... after the plans should be finalised by the Ministry of Environment, if necessary, by carrying out such modifications as may be required. The decision by the Ministry of Environment and Forests in this regard shall be final and binding. A report with regard to the submission and the finalisation of the plans should be filed in this Court and the case will be listed for noting compliance in September, 1996. 5) Pending finalisation of the plans, the interim orders passed by this Court on 12.12.1994 and 9.3.1995 shall continue to operate. 6) Four States, namely Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka and Kerala have not yet submitted their Management Plans to the Central Government. There is thus a clear non-compliance with the direction issued by this Court on 12.12.1994 and 9.3.1995. We issue notices to the Chief Secretaries of these States to explain and show cause why further appropriate action be not taken for this non-compliance. The notices are to be returnable after six weeks.
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1996 (4) TMI 533
... ... ... ... ..... characterised as job work. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that the manufacture is an essential link to the Notfn. No. 119/75 and merely because a new distinct article emerges would not be the reason enough to deny concession under this Notfn. The ratio of the judgment was followed by Tribunal in the case of Collector of Central Excise, Bombay v. Pressure Cookers & Appliances Ltd. 1995 (59) ECR 330 (T) . 6. Considering that the additions made by the appellants in the form of clipping and sliting would not be of substantial value and the manufacture appears to have resulted mainly from the raw-material contributed by the appellants, we are of the view that the ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Prestige Engineering (India) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Meerut 1994 (54) ECR 519 (SC) squarely applies to the case of the appellants. 7. In view of this, we set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal. (Dictated and pronounced in the open Court.)
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1996 (4) TMI 532
... ... ... ... ..... pal, JJ. ORDER Appeal admitted
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1996 (4) TMI 531
... ... ... ... ..... utant while divesting herself of the title to the property could create a life estate for her enjoyment and the property would devolve on the settlee with absolute rights on settlor's demise. A reading of the documents together with the Schedule would give an indication that she had created right and interest in praesenti in favour of her daughter Vimlavathy in respect of the properties mentioned in the schedule with a life estate for her enjoyment during her life time. Thus, it could be construed rightly as a settlement deed but not as a will. Having divested self thereunder, right and title thereunder, she had, thereafter, no right to bequeath the same property in favour of her daughter Hymavathy. 6. The trial Court and the learned single Judge rightly negatived the claim. The Division Bench was not, therefore, correct in law in interfering with the decree of the trial Court. 7. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The decree of the trial Court stands confirmed. No costs.
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1996 (4) TMI 530
... ... ... ... ..... hat an opportunity should be afforded to the present petitioners resist the claim of the opp. party-plaintiff simultaneously I cannot ignore the hardship that would be caused to the plaintiff when the ex parte decree is set aside. To strike a balance I am of the firm view, the plaintiff is to be compensated. Taking into consideration the nature of litigation I set aside the ex parte decree passed by the Courts below subject to payment of cost of ₹ 1500/- by the defendants-petitioners to the plaintiff in the Court below within a period of six weeks from today. As the suit is pending for last six years. I direct that the same should be disposed of expeditiously. In the event of cost being paid and the ex parte decree being set aside the suit should be disposed of by end of October, 1996. If the cost is not paid within the time stipulated above, the ex parte decree would become operative. 7. In the result, the Civil Revision is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1996 (4) TMI 529
... ... ... ... ..... not be granted in favour of the plaintiff. He has not come to Court with clean hands. The defendant is a foreign national. She being a non-citizen, plaintiff is well aware that the defendant cannot hold the property in India except with the permission of R.B.I. That position is exploited by him as a tenant in possession, and also the absolute faith which the defendant had reposed in him. 58. We may also note that even before the present suit was instituted, defendant had earlier instituted a suit for eviction, and this is only a counterblast for the eviction suit. 59. For all the reasons mentioned above, we hold that the suit filed by the plaintiff is misconceived, and this Court should not lend its support to him by granting the relief prayed for in the suit. 60. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the learned Judge is set aside. The suit is dismissed. The appellant is allowed her costs. We fix the counsel's fee at ₹ 5,000 (Rupees Five thousand).
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1996 (4) TMI 528
... ... ... ... ..... der the Municipal decree of 1880, a competent Legislature could impose a tax and Section 7 of the Pondicherry Administration Act does not in any way prohibit such imposition. Furthermore, in Section 3 of the Validation Act itself it is stated that the tax may be levied notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of the Pondicherry Administration Act or any other provision of any Act passed by the Legislature or the Union Territory of Pondicherry. The levy under Sections 3 and 4 of the Validation Act cannot be said to be repugnant to Section 7 of the Pondicherry Administration Act, 1962. For that very reason there is also no merit in the contention that the Validation Act is repugnant to Section 21 of (The) Government of Union Territories Act, 1963, which section deals with inconsistency between the laws made by the Parliament and the Laws made by the Legislative Assemblies. 21. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in these appeals and the same are dismissed with costs.
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1996 (4) TMI 527
... ... ... ... ..... r has to be exercised with great care and circumspection keeping the interest of the society at large. This is an age of human rights violation and terrorism also. 28. State security is at risk, social tensions are arising. Ordinary crime is on increase and ultimately the Courts are to become more pragmatic keeping the larger interest of the society while entertaining the application and the framers of Indian Constitution gave the powers to the High Court under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution with respect to protection of fundamental right of the individual keeping the interest of the society paramount and not giving blanket licence to the individual at the altar of the society. 29. In view of the discussion above, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances this is not a case where the discretion for granting relief is made out. The question of quashing the F.I.R. is also declined at this juncture. 30. With this observation the writ petition is disposed of.
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1996 (4) TMI 526
... ... ... ... ..... ripoornan, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (4) TMI 525
... ... ... ... ..... on of Regulations 3 and 24. We must mention that Sri V.A.Mohta, learned counsel For the respondent, stated fairly before us that it is not possible for him to sustain the reasoning and approach of the High Court in this case. His only submission was that having regard to the age of the respondent 37 years and the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court may substitute the punishment awarded to the respondent by a lesser punishment. The learned counsel suggested that any punishment other than dismissal may be imposed by this Court. We considered this request with the care it deserves, but we regret that we are unable to accede to it. Learned counsel for the Bank, Sri V.R.Reddy, Additional Solicitor General, also stated, on instructions of the Bank, that it is not possible for the Bank to accommodate the respondent in its service in view of his conduct. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1996 (4) TMI 524
... ... ... ... ..... sification as parts of Items under Chapter 84 would be ruled out. We also find, as rightly contended by Revenue and fairly conceded by the Ld. Advocate, that the Revenue were not put on notice in classifying both the products under Tariff Item 39.25 by Collector (Appeals) when the claim of the assessee for 3925 was only in regard to Polyurethane Foam doors and not for panels which the respondents had claimed classifiable under Heading 3926.10. 7. In view of this we are of the view that the matter would have to go back to the original adjudicating authority for arriving at findings in regard to inherent character of the products and their use and thereafter determining proper classification. 8. In view of this we set aside the impugned order and remand the matter to original adjudicating authority for de novo decision after observing principle of natural justice in the light of the observations made by us in the order. 9. In the result, both the appeals are allowed by remand.
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1996 (4) TMI 523
... ... ... ... ..... assessee was clearly falling under the provisions of sub-section (2A) of section 8 of the C.S.T Act. This view of the Tribunal is contrary to what the Supreme Court said in Pine Chemical Ltd's case (96 STC 355) and in the case of Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. (89 STC 473). 31. We, therefore, answer the first question in negative in favour of the assessee and against the respondent holding that the sales in question were not in course of inter-State trade or commerce and were in fact an intra-State sales. We answer question no. 2 again in negative but against the assessee and in favour of the respondent and would hold that the assessee was liable to pay Central Sales Tax and that provision of sub-section (2-A) of section 8 read with Explanation of the C.S.T Act did not apply as there was no general exemption from payment of sales tax under the State law. 32. In view of the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. 33. S.J Mukhopadhaya, J. - I agree.
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1996 (4) TMI 522
... ... ... ... ..... mma. The only contention raised was that there were no Beda Jangammas in Gulbarga District. That question was gone into and it was found that there were Beda Jangammas in Gulbarga District. On that basis, the decision was given by the civil Court. The foundation on which the appellant claimed the status was the certificate issued by the Assistant Municipal Commissioner that he is Beda Jangamma. The High Court found that the Assistant Commissioner has no jurisdiction to issue the certificate. Once the status based upon the certificate issued by the Assistant Commissioner was found to have lacked jurisdiction, the basis has been knocked off to bottom. The judgment of the civil Court is not a judgment in rem nor is the High Court bound by the said judgment. Thus considered, we hold that there is no warrant for finding that the appellant belongs to Scheduled Castes entitling him to contest the election as a Scheduled Caste Candidate. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (4) TMI 521
... ... ... ... ..... the court. Under these circumstances, the District Judge and the High Court are not right and their finding that the appellant is not entitled to raise objection in the execution, is wrong in law. It should be considered in execution only under section 47 CPC and not by a separate suit. The orders of the District Judge and the High Court stand set aside. The executing Court is directed to recompute the liability of the appellant to pay the compensation and interest @ 6% from the date of taking possession i.e., June 22, 1965 and order execution accordingly. In case it finds that the appellant is entitled to restitution the same would be ordered under Section 144, CPC as prayed for. The District Judge is directed to correct the decree accordingly and recompute the liability to pay compensation in the light of the law declared above and pass appropriate orders according to law. The appeal is allowed accordingly. In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1996 (4) TMI 520
... ... ... ... ..... that the order suffers from incurable and grave illegality and the same is liable to be set aside. I am rather pained to see that some of the observations which have been made by the Magistrate are not warranted. The Magistrate had gone to the extent of saying that "Vernacular matter - Omitted." 16. I am at a loss to understand how the Magistrate would come to such conclusion without any material whatsoever, that too before the evidence was let in. So, the way in which the Magistrate has handled the issue in this judgment clearly reveals that he has exceeded his limit, which causes serious concern in the mind of this Court. With these observations, the order of the learned Magistrate discharging the accused under Sections 251 and 255(1) of Cr.P.C. is set aside and the revision is allowed and the matter is remitted back to proceed on with trial and disposal. The learned Magistrate is directed to dispose of the case as expeditiously as possible. 17. Revision allowed.
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1996 (4) TMI 519
... ... ... ... ..... s. But at the same time it is difficult for us to sustain the direction given by the High Court since, admittedly, the life of the select list prepared on 4.4.87 had expired long since and the respondents who claim their rights to be appointed on the basis of such list did not have a subsisting right on the date they approached the High Court. We may not be understood to imply that the High Court must issue such direction, if the writ petition was filed before the expiry of the period of one year and the same was disposed of after the expiry of the statutory period. In view of the aforesaid conclusion of ours it is not necessary to deal with the question whether the stand of the State Government that there existed one vacancy in the year 1987 is correct or not. 11. In the aforesaid premises the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgments are set aside and the Writ Petitions filed by the respondents stand dismissed. But in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.
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