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1997 (4) TMI 545
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... ... ..... . Electricals Ltd. 1994 (73) E.L.T. 263 (S.C.) 1994 (6) SCC 149 , this appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1997 (4) TMI 544
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... ... ..... the direction to the auditors to ensure compliance with the directions, it is necessary that board meetings and general meetings are allowed to be held so that the company is put on the rails once again. Hence, we not only vacate our interim orders but also direct the board of directors including the petitioner to finalise the accounts and convene the annual general meeting in respect of all the years from 1989-90 to 1995-96 before July 30, 1997. We also grant liberty to apply in case of any difficulty in implementing this order. 37. With the above directions the allegations of the petitioner have been adequately taken care of. Since there are no other activities of the company, we consider that there is no need for any further investigation into the affairs of the company as prayed for by the petitioner. We dispose of the petition on the above terms with the fervent hope that the four brothers of the family will manage the affairs of their family company smoothly in future.
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1997 (4) TMI 543
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... ... ..... lready allowed earlier. It must, therefore, be held with respect, that the decision of this Court in Mithilesh Kumari case (AIR 1989 SC 1247) does not lay down Correct law so far as the applicability of Section 4(1) and Section 4(2) to the extent hereinabove indicated, to pending proceedings when these sections came into force, is concerned. ....." 9. There is no doubt that a bare reference to the judgment under review, it would appear that judgments and decrees of both the Courts below were set aside solitarily on the basis of ratio laid down in the case of Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare (AIR 1989 SC 1247) (supra). To my mind, these are not the matters to be considered and examined while hearing a petition for review. The petitioner, therefore, could have availed the remedy of appeal etc. if she was aggrieved by such judgment. 10. For the reasons stated above, I have no option but to dismiss this review petition. However, parties are left to bear their own costs.
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1997 (4) TMI 542
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... ... ..... , JJ. ORDER Appeal is dismissed.
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1997 (4) TMI 541
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... ... ..... ew of Sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Acquisition Act, the claim with respect to the period prior to the appointed day can only be lodged with the prescribed authority. In that view of the matter, the award of the Labour Court cannot be sustained for the whole of the claim of the Respondent. 15. In that view of the matter, the award is set aside and the writ petition is allowed to the above extent. The Labour Court shall proceed with the computation afresh in the light of the observation made above in respect of the existing rights of the Respondent No. 1 as held above. I, however, make no observation with regard to the claim of Respondent No. 1 in respect of the period prior to the appointed day. This Court hopes and trusts that the Labour Court would complete its enquiry and the computation as early as possible preferably within a period of six months from the date of production of certified copy of this order before him by giving proper opportunity to both the parties.
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1997 (4) TMI 540
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... ... ..... ort, he merely posed questions that arose for decision, in a manner different from the wording used in the charges but it is a way of expression in considering the issue. It is not a sign to show that the enquiry officer was biased or that he was prejudiced against the respondent. Thus we hold that the charge No. 1 stands established from the evidence on record. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary go into other charges. 19. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The order of respondent's dismissal stands confirmed and the writ petition stands dismissed. No. costs. D.P. Wadhwa, J. 20. I agree that appeal be allowed and the writ petition filed by Respondent No. 1 dismissed. However, with utmost respect at my command for my learned Brother I do not associate myself with the views expressed by him on corruption. If a certain matter is not relevant for decision on the issue in the case I would refrain from saying anything on that howsoever strongly I may feel about it.
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1997 (4) TMI 539
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... ... ..... y anxious consideration in the light of the principles and ratio of Supreme Court decision in the cases of Baldev Krishna Sahi (supra) and Abhilash Vinodkumar Jain (supra), I am inclined to hold that this is a fit and proper case for invoking the inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.PC to direct the respondent No. 2 to vacate the flat concerned in favour of the petitioner-company under Section 630. The respondent No. 2 is hereby given one month's time to vacate the flat failing which the petitioner will be at liberty to take such proceedings as the law provides. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, is also hereby directed to proceed with the trial of the criminal case and dispose it of as expeditiously as possible and, in any event, not later than four months from this date. Let this order be communicated to the learned magistrate forthwith. 29. The application under Section 482 read with Article 227 of the Constitution is thus disposed of.
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1997 (4) TMI 538
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... ... ..... plaintiff that the said arbitration clause is vague and uncertain to be well-founded.. d) The second petitioner has not signed the aforesaid lease agreements containing the said arbitration clause and as such the said petitioner cannot enforce the arbitration agreement. In this connection reference was made by learner Counsel for the plaintiff to S. 7(4)(a) of the said Act. It was therefore submitted that the claim of the plaintiff in this suit which is against both the first and second petitioners cannot be referred to arbitration. I have already held that the second petitioner is a necessary and proper party to this suit (supra). The claim of the plaintiff cannot be adjudicated in the absance of the second petitioner. I therefore find that the aforesaid submission of the learned Counsel for the plaintiff to be equally well-founded. 7. For the foregoing reasons. I dismiss this application of the petitioners. There will however be no Order as to costs. 8. Petition dismissed.
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1997 (4) TMI 537
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... ... ..... uthority over the Selection Committee. The selection of the candidates was not quashed on any other ground. The Tribunal fell in error in arrogating to itself the power to judge the comparative merits of the candidates and consider the fitness and suitability for appointment. That was the function of the selection committee. The observations of this Court in Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke's case (supra) are squarely attracted to the facts of the present case. The order of the Tribunal under the circumstances cannot be sustained. The appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 10th December, 1992 is quashed and the matter is remitted to the Tribunal for a fresh disposal on other points in accordance with the law after hearing the parties. 5. We are informed that both the appellants and the contesting respondent are in service. They shall not be disturbed till the matter is finally disposed of by the Tribunal. 6. The Appeal is disposed of in the above terms. No costs.
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1997 (4) TMI 536
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... ... ..... 302 this court has upheld shortlisting of candidates on some rational and reasonable basis. In that case, for the purpose of shortlisting, a longer period of experience than the minimum prescribed was used as a criterion by the public service Commission for calling candidates for an interview. This was upheld by this Court. In the case of Govt. of A.P. vs. P. Dilip Kumar & Anr. JT (1993) 2 SC 138 also this court said that it is always open to the recruiting agency to screen candidates due for consideration at the threshold of the process of selection by prescribing higher eligibility qualification so that the field of selection can be narrowed down with the ultimate objective of promoting candidates with higher qualifications to enter the zone of consideration. The procedure, therefore, adopted in the present case by the commission was legitimate. The decision of the Tribunal is, therefore, set aside and the appeal is allowed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1997 (4) TMI 535
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... ... ..... rder of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar, dated 30-11-1992 is quashed and set aside. It is directed that the learned Magistrate shall pass afresh order after hearing all concerned and decide the same in light of the law laid down by this Court. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent. (C) Criminal Revision Application No. 2/93 and No. 3/93 are allowed and the impugned order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar, dated 31-12-1992 is quashed and set aside. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent. (D) Special Criminal Application No. 1431/ 96 is allowed and the impugned order of the learned J.M.F.C.-Deodar, dated 27-6-1996 and the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Banaskantha, at Palanpur, dated 20-8-1996 are quashed and set aside. The learned Additional Sessions Judge is directed to rehear the Revision Application and decide the same afresh in light of the law laid down by this Court. Rule made absolute to the aforesaid extent.
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1997 (4) TMI 534
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... ... ..... as been remitted to the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, New Delhi. The appeal is dismissed.
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1997 (4) TMI 533
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... ... ..... basically based on the findings of fact and hence dismissed.
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1997 (4) TMI 532
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... ... ..... economic venture or a commercial enterprise as it is not its object to produce and distribute services which would satisfy wants and needs of the consumer community. It is more an institution discharging Governmental functions and a domestic enterprise than a commercial enterprise. We are, therefore, of the opinion that PRL is not an industry even though it is carrying on the activity of research in a systematic manner with the help of its employees as it lacks that element which would make it an organisation carrying on an activity which can be said to be analogous to the carrying on of a trade or business because it is not producing and distributing services which are intended or meant for satisfying human wants and needs, as ordinarily understood. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the award passed by the Labour Court at Ahmedabad in Reference No. LCA 105 of 1982. However, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.
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1997 (4) TMI 531
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... ... ..... e reason that in case of unsettled accounts suit, Rule 3 of the Rules framed under Section 9 of the Suits Valuation Act has no application whatsoever. Such suits are governed by Rule 4 of the Rules framed by the High Court and the plaintiff can value the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction as he wishes it to be valued. (6) A Division Bench of this Court in M/s Commercial Aviation & Travel Co. (Inc.) v. Vimla Panna Lal, AIR1986Delhi439 , has already held that suit for unsettled accounts have to be valued under Rule 4. While so holding, it followed a Full Bench judgment of this Court in 2nd 1974 (2) Del 491 as also the judgment of the Supreme Court in 1979 3SCR385 . (7) For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside. It is made clear that in suits for unsettled accounts, fixed court fee is payable, and for jurisdictional purposes, such a suit can be valued in terms of such valuation as is fixed by the plaintiff. (8) No order as to costs.
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1997 (4) TMI 530
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... ... ..... therefore, the Enemy Property Act, 1968 (Act No.34 of 1968) was applicable. The appellants claimed title to the property. Subsequently thereto, the appellants filed a suit for injunction to restrain the respondents from taking possession of the property. Ultimately they came to be successful in the revision before the High Court. Thus, this appeal by special leave. The only whether the appellants have acquired any valid title to the property from Mohd. Marghoob Siddiqui, a citizen of Pakistan? On his acquiring citizenship of Pakistan, M.M. Siddiqui ceased to be a citizen of India and thereby after the demise of his mother, he had no right, title or interest in the land to obtain bhumidari right. The proceedings and patta are void. Under these circumstances, since the purchaser cannot have a better title than the seller himself has, the appellants could not acquire any title by virtue of sale effected by Mohd. Marghoob Siddiqui. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1997 (4) TMI 529
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... ... ..... mes 434 (1996 Cri LJ 3153)(Kerala) is also distinguishable on facts. The reason is that, on the strength of a will alleged to have been executed by the father of the complainant, a complaint was filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, but the will was not filed and it was alleged that the will was not genuine. Under these circumstances, the learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court has held that without an adjudication regarding the validity of the will, the petitioner-accused could not be prosecuted. The learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court has not observed that, a person holding a power of attorney is incompetent to institute a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 7. For the foregoing reasons, the order of the lower Court cannot be faulted with. 8. No other or further point has been raised on behalf of the petitioner and, therefore, the revision, being devoid of substance, is hereby dismissed. 9. Revision dismissed.
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1997 (4) TMI 528
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... ... ..... o. 9 of 1996 (Shri M. C. Mittal v. Central Bank of India decided on 18-1-1996). Thus, the impugned order of the Tribunal refusing to stay the proceedings is subject to appeal under Section 20(1) to the Appellate Tribunal. 5. The Act provides an adequate and efficacious remedy for obtaining relief in respect of any improper order passed by the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The remedy provided under Article 227 of the Constitution is not intended to supersede the modes of obtaining relief before the Appellate Courts or Tribunals. In M. C. Mittal v. Central Bank of India (supra), it was held that a person who is aggrieved by an order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal cannot be permitted to abandon resort to the statutory remedy of appeal and to invoke constitution jurisdiction of this Court. 6. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed, Petitioner shall pay costs of the respondent Bank and bear its own. Counsel's fee is quantified at ₹ 10,000/- 7. Petition dismissed.
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1997 (4) TMI 527
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... ... ..... on stands excluded unless the fundamental principles of procedure are followed by the Tribunals constituted under the land reform laws. In this case, the Act concerned extinguishes the pre-existing right, creates new rights under the Act and requires Tribunals to enquire into the rival claims and a form of appeal has been provided against the order of the primary authority. Thereby the right and remedy made conclusive under the Act are given finality by the orders passed under the Act. Thereby, by necessary implication, the jurisdiction of the civil Court stands excluded. 4. That apart, in view of the law laid down by this Court in Vattichenikuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu and Ors. 1991 2SCR531 wherein entire case law including the law laid down in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam AIR1986SC794 was discussed, we held that the suit is not maintainable, as held by the learned single Judge. 5. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.
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1997 (4) TMI 526
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... ... ..... its by necessary implication stands excluded unless the fundamental principles, of procedure are not followed by the Tribunals constituted under the land reform laws. In this case, the Act concerned extinguishes the pre-existing right, creates new rights under the Act and requires Tribunals to enquire into the rival claims and a form of appeal has been provided against the order of the primary authority. Thereby the right and remedy made conclusive under the Act are given finality by the orders passed under the Act. Thereby, by necessary implication, the jurisdiction of the civil Court stands excluded. 16. Thus, it could be seen that the civil Court cannot unsettle the patta which has become final in the decree now passed pursuant to the declaration. 17. We are of the view that the Division Bench is not right in granting the decree for the properties gifted to her under the will dated 16.7.1972. 18. The appeal is accordingly allowed. But, in the circumstances, without costs.
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