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Showing 1 to 20 of 312 Records
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1998 (5) TMI 422
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... ... ..... , the date of knowledge of the commission of offence to the concerned officer under Section 469(1)(b) but not from February 29,1988 (the date of collection of samples by the Drugs Inspector) and as the complaint was filed on June 28, 1991 which is within three years so the complaint is not barred by limitation under Section 468(2)(c). The High Court has missed this germane aspect erroneously took the date of commencement of the limitation as February 29,1988, the date on which the samples were collected by the Drugs Inspector from accused No. 16. It is thus clear that the High Court has committed illegality in so computing the period of limitation, which results in miscarriage of justice. 14. In the result, we set aside the impugned order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated April 11,1996, allow the appeal and remand the case to the learned Additional Civil Judge and Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 6 Jaipur City Jaipur, for disposal in accordance with law.
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1998 (5) TMI 421
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... ... ..... an application seeking condensation and may decline to condone the delay but at the same time, passing of any other appropriate order including imposition of cost can be considered by the court to compensate the other party from delay which may occur on account of refiling of the application. 9. On the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that ends of justice would be met, if the delay in refiling the application for leave to defend is condoned on payment of costs by the appellant to the respondent. Therefore, we allow the appeal and condone the delay in refiling, as prayed in is 4380/96 subject, however, to payment of costs of Rs. 10,000/- by the appellant to the respondent. On the payment of costs by the next date before learned Single Judge, the application for leave to defend would be considered on its merits. Parties are directed to appear, for directions, before learned Single Judge on 13th July, 1998. The appeal is allowed in the above terms.
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1998 (5) TMI 420
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... ... ..... f equity, justice and fairplay". The High Court then stated "The party has to approach the Court with clean hands. The contract sought to be enforced must be established. As the agreement pleaded by the plaintiff has not been established, on Point No. 3, it is held that the plaintiff is not entitled for a decree for specific performance." Having regard to the principles laid down in Gonesh Ram's case AIR 1924 Cal 461 , Ziaul Haque's case AIR 1966 Cal 605) Halsbury's Laws of England. Fry on Specific Performance and Corpus Juris Secundum as set out under Point 3, we are unable to say that the discretion exercised by the High Court in refusing specific performance is contrary to established principles. Nor can we say that discretion has been exercised in a perverse manner. Finally, we do not also think that this is a fit case for exercising our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The appeal fails and is dismissed without costs.
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1998 (5) TMI 419
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... ... ..... ndia in the case of India Carbon Ltd. Vs. State of Assam AIR1997SC3054 , wherein their Lordships have held that there being no substantive provision in the Central Sales Tax Act requiring the payment of interest on Central Sales Tax, the Sales Tax Authorities of the State cannot, for the purpose of collecting and enforcing payment of Central Sales Tax, charge interest thereon. 17. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is allowed. The impugned orders of assessment dated 28.3.88 (Annexure P-2) made under Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975 and the one made under Section 9 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 for the period 1983-84 are both set aside. The orders passed in revision and review sustaining the above said orders are also set aside. The Assessment Officer shall be at liberty to take up the assessment and frame an order afresh consistently with the principles of law laid down hereinabove and after affording the petitioner-assessee an opportunity of hearing. No order as to costs.
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1998 (5) TMI 418
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... ... ..... ore Kirloskar Ltd. is no longer good law. 5. We have also considered the plea about intermediate product as contended by both sides. We agree with the submissions of the ld. Chartered Accountant that the same product may be a final product in respect of a particular goods but the same may be an intermediate product in respect of other goods. Thus, we have to examine whether in the instant case the GP Cylinders are final product or intermediate product. No doubt they are final product if they are cleared on payment of duty but if they are captively used in the factory itself for printing laminated plastic film, they become intermediate product. Intermediate product if they come into existence and even if for the time being, they are exempted from payment of duty, Modvat credit taken on the inputs used in the manufacture of the GP Cylinders will be admissible in terms of Rule 57D(2). Having regard to the above discussions, we uphold the impugned order and reject these appeals.
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1998 (5) TMI 417
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... ... ..... ed to be normal prices of such goods, if such buyers are not related persons; that the Assistant Commissioner could not establish any relationship between M/s. T.E.L.C.O. and the assessee. The Commissioner (Appeals) also observed that whether a particular buyer constitutes a class of buyers or not, will depend upon the trade practice. Each buyer is a class by itself since he can be distinguished from other buyers. The Commissioner (Appeals), therefore, set aside the Assistant Commissioner's Order. The very fact is that the law provides for filing of different prices for different classes of buyers and also the different forms for filing the price lists. There is no reason not to accept the price filed in Part-II until and unless it is shown that the low prices have been charged on extraneous circumstances. 5. In view of this fact, we do not find any infirmity in the Order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) and accordingly, the appeal filed by the Department is rejected.
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1998 (5) TMI 416
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... ... ..... n the case of Purolator India Limited (supra) becomes relevant. The Tribunal observed therein that the Notification No. 46/81 considered in that decision is with reference to the place of manufacture and not with reference to the fact as to who is the manufacturer. Again in the Tribunal decision in the case of Diamond Cement v. Collector the clinker unit of the assessee was separated from grinding unit by some distance and separate Central Excise Licence was issued to them, and the Tribunal held that clinker unit used for production of cement, not being manufactured in the same factory it was held that assessee therein was not eligible for exemption under Notification 127/87. Therefore for the reasons stated above and in the light of the case law referred to (supra), we hold that the impugned order of the Commissioner of Central Excise, Vadodara is legal and proper and there is no infirmity in that order to call for its review. The appeal is rejected. Pronounced in the Court.
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1998 (5) TMI 415
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... ... ..... /- per month to the Court Receiver, so that from the balance amount, the Court Receiver can try to meet other expenses of his office. 8. I, therefore, made the Chamber Summons absolute in terms of prayer Clause (b) and (c). The defendant No. 1, however, has to abide by the other orders of the Court Receiver, such as, deposit of 3 months by way of security deposit and for execution of the agency agreement. The Court Receiver shall adjust the account of the defendant No. 1 on the basis of the aforesaid directions in respect of payment of the royalty by the defendant No. 1. The defendant No. 1 to execute the Agency Agreement, within four weeks from today, failing which, the Court Receiver shall be entitled to take forcible possession of the premises. The Chamber Summons is disposed of. No order as to costs. Certified copy is expedited. The Court Receiver shall act on an ordinary copy of this Order duly authenticated by the Associate of this Court. 9. Chamber Summons disposed of.
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1998 (5) TMI 414
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... ... ..... erors or transferees whereas their names should feature both as transferor and transferee. As such the exemption is not available to these transfers. Consequently, we have no hesitation in holding that the trans- fers are in clear violation of SEBI guidelines imposing restriction on transfer and prescribing a lock-in-period. Accordingly, the prayer of the petitioners for rectification of the register of members has to be allowed. Accordingly the company is directed to rectify the register of its members by removing the names of transferees as recorded in the register and restore the name of the petitioners in respect of the impugned shares within 10 days of the receipt of a copy of this order. The relevant share certificates shall also be delivered to the petitioners as per the legal provisions. This is without prejudice to the right of the transferees to recover the consideration if any paid to the petitioners for which they may resort to appropriate proceedings if advised.
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1998 (5) TMI 413
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... ... ..... ke notice of the aforesaid affidavit. Since the respondent was neither asked for nor was given any liberty to file any such affidavit during the course of arguments nor any order in respect of the same was recorded on 1.5.1998, the said affidavit, in my considered opinion, cannot be noticed. 17. On consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case I am satisfied that there was an acknowledgement of debt by the respondent which the respondent has failed to pay to the petitioner and therefore, the orders passed by this court admitting the company petition to hearing and finally winding "up the respondent company are valid and justified. No ground has been made out to either recall or review any of the aforesaid orders passed by this court and therefore, no interference is called for. The applications stand dismissed as such. The case be now listed before the Hon'ble Company Judge for further orders after obtaining orders of Hon'ble the Chief Justice.
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1998 (5) TMI 412
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... ... ..... he amount of unearned increase is hereby quashed and set aside. The respondent-DDA is directed to calculate the unearned increase by reference to the rates applicable for the year 1984-85 in view of the valid application seeking permission to sell the plot having been made by the petitioner on 20.12.84. The sub-letting charges must be cleared before the petitioner may sell the property, the permission to sell dated 23.6.91 already granted by the respondent-DDA shall be valid and effective subject to payment of the unearned increase worked out as per the above said direction. 23. The respondent-DDA shall within four weeks from today calculate and deliver a fresh demand of unearned increase to the petitioner. On depositing the amount of unearned increase and compliance with usual formalities, if any, the DDA shall within eight weeks thereafter execute the requisite conveyance deed of the property and then mutate the property in the name of the transferee. No order as to costs.
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1998 (5) TMI 411
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... ... ..... ns for judgment and passing the judgment in favour of the plaintiff if (a) the defendant has not applied for leave to defend or if such application has been made and refused or if (b) the defendant who is permitted to defend fails to comply with the conditions on which leave to defend is granted. 11. In our opinion, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court was in error in taking a different view. It had relied upon the decision of this Court in Harish Chandra v. Triloki Singh, 1957 1SCR370 . That was a case arising under the Representation of People's Act and, therefore, it was not proper to apply the interpretation of word 'trial' in that case while interpreting Section 10 in the context of Order 37 of the Code. 12. We, therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and restore the order passed by the learned Single Judge. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
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1998 (5) TMI 410
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... ... ..... loyee was employed and a supernumerary post in class IV be created for that purpose. The order passed by the District Inspectors of Schools for appointment of the respondents-applicants in appeals, other than Appeal arising out of S.L.P.(c) No. 2734 of 1992, are restored and the respondents-applicants in the said Appeal should be treated as having been appointed on a class IV post as per the orders for such appointment that were issued by the District Inspector of Schools. In Appeals, arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 2734 of 1993 the concerned District Inspector of Schools shall consider the application of the respondent-applicant for appointment and if no class III post was available on the date of the passing of the impugned judgment of the High Court, the said respondent-applicant should be appointed on a class IV post in the institution in which the deceased employee was employed with effect from the date of the impugned judgment of the High Court. No order IN THE MATTER OF
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1998 (5) TMI 409
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... ... ..... attanaik, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1998 (5) TMI 408
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... ... ..... was taken earlier. Further, we have noted that one of the Division Benches of Tribunal in Bombay in the case of Vile Parle Sanjivani Co-op. Housing Society (supra), copy of which has been filed by the ld. Departmental Representative, has taken the view that in similar circumstances action to charge interest under section 201(1A) does not get barred by time on the basis of provisions of section 231 and the assessee in default is bound to pay interest on not deducting tax at source. Hence we have taken a different view than what was taken in the cases of Salwan Construction Co. (Delhi Bench) and some other cases which were cited before us by the ld. counsel for the assessee. 39. To sum up, IT Appeal Nos. 4437 to 4441/Bom/87 filed by the assessee are dismissed. IT Appeal No. 4442/Bom/87 is allowed. 40. Revenue’s IT Appeal Nos. 5550, 5552, 5554, 5556 and 5558/Bom/87 are dismissed as infructuous. Its IT Appeal Nos. 5551, 5553, 5555, 5557 and 5559/Bom/87 are partly allowed.
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1998 (5) TMI 407
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... ... ..... n India in a capacity in which such specialised knowledge and experience are being actually utilised. It will not be enough to show that the applicant has some general knowledge and experience in the field of construction. In order to get the benefit of this section, the petitioner must be able to show that he has some special knowledge and he has been employed in a capacity where such special knowledge is required to be used. The petitioner’s case is that he has a degree in geology and he has acquired vast expertise and skill in the business of prospecting for and extraction of mineral oil. He does not have any special knowledge of any constructional operations. For all these reasons, this argument of the applicant also fails. We are, therefore, of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the applicant is not a “technician” and is not entitled to the benefits of section 10(5B) of the Income-tax Act. The application is disposed of as above.
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1998 (5) TMI 406
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... ... ..... e B.P. Jeevan Reddy and Venkatachala, JJ.), these appeals are allowed and the impugned orders are set aside. The appellant will be entitled to all consequential benefits in accordance with law.” 1993 (68) E.L.T. A157 (S.C.)
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1998 (5) TMI 405
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... ... ..... available on record commenced in the year 1967 only. The notice of forfeiture under Section 6 could not have been issued to the petitioner, there being no reason to believe available to the Competent Authority within the meaning of Section 6, providing jurisdictional foundation for issuance of notice of forfeiture; a decision adverse to the petitioner forfeiting her property could not have been taken solely by relying on the rule of evidence enacted by Section 8 of the Act and merely because of me petitioner being a relative of the detenu Basantlal. 22. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is allowed. The impugned notice of forfeiture dated 29.7.78 (Annexure-F), the impugned order of the Competent Authority dated 28.4.80 (Annexure-B) and the order of the Appellate Tribunal dated 1.8.94 (Annexure-A) are hereby quashed and set aside to the extent of ½ share of me petitioner in the house property bearing No. 1135, Chatta Madan Gopal, Maliwara, Delhi. Petition allowed.
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1998 (5) TMI 404
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... ... ..... id down by this Court in these recent judgments, it is absolutely necessary to have clear and elaborate findings on facts based on materials. In this circumstances, taking advantage of the pendency of the identical issue in Ref. No. 2/92 before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal at Calcutta, instead of directing the parties to go before the same Tribunal in this matter as well, to avoid delay and in the interest of both the parties, we direct the Central Government Industrial Tribunal to expedite the hearing of Ref. No. 2/92 and render the Award within six months. The parties shall avoid taking adjournments. The party, aggrieved by the Award of the Tribunal to be passed pursuant to the direction as given above, will be at liberty to move this Court. These appeals will be listed after the disposal of the Reference by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal as aforesaid alongwith the SLP, if any, filed against the Award of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal.
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1998 (5) TMI 403
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... ... ..... ss any opinion on the other points raised in the revision petition, we deem it appropriate to remand the matter to the High Court for deciding the Criminal revision petition, filed by Respondent No.1, afresh on merits after hearing the parties in the light of the observations made by us above." 17. The present one is an afortiori case. when a Special Court constituted under an enactment other than the Act of 1952 can continue the proceedings by virtue of Section 30(2) of the Act of 1988, it goes without saying that the special Court constituted under the Act of 1988 can take cognizance of the report filed before it and try the offenses particularly when this Court had in its judgment dated March 29, 1994 held that the filing of such report was not precluded (vide 1994 Supp. (2) S.C.C. 116). 18. We have no hesitation to hold that the special Judge (P.C. Act) Sikkim is competent to try the offenses for which the appellants stand charged. Hence these appeals are dismissed.
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