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Showing 1 to 20 of 675 Records
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2000 (11) TMI 1264
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... ... ..... ral justice should be followed. We, therefore, remit the matter to the disciplinary authority, being Secretary, Shibarampur Madhyamik High School for Girls, Shibarampur, Calcutta 700 061 for the aforesaid purposes. The termination order already passed will remain, but subject to the result of the fresh consideration as directed above. 5. The abovesaid disciplinary authority is directed to give a copy of the enquiry report to the appellant within one month from the receipt of a copy of this order and thereafter grant four weeks for filing an explanation. On receiving the same the disciplinary authority may decide the matter within six weeks thereof. If the appellant is entitled to any subsistence allowance from the date of her removal till the date of termination already made, she may make appropriate application therefor. If the application is so made, the disciplinary authority will consider the same on its own merits. 6. The civil appeal is allowed accordingly. 7. No costs.
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2000 (11) TMI 1263
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... ... ..... eat of dire consequences. From the nature of transactions between the parties, happening of such an event cannot be ruled out. 20. I, therefore, make the chamber summons absolute in terms of prayer clause (a). As I am dismissing the execution application no other prayers and no other chamber summons would survive. Hence the Chamber Summons Nos. 956 of 2000 and Chamber Summons No. 1251 of 2000 are hereby dismissed. Ad interim order dated 23.8.2000 to continue for further eight weeks. Needless to say that I have not decided the rights of the third party here. She will be free to pursue her remedy if any, in accordance with law. Parties to bear their own cost. 21. All concerned to act on a copy of this order duly authenticated by the Chamber Registrar. 22. The Prothonotary and Senior Master is hereby directed to keep in her safe custody the original proceedings of the learned Arbitrator and permit the parties to take inspection of those proceedings in her personal presence only.
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2000 (11) TMI 1262
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... ... ..... r to rejoin duty but there does not appear to be any record with the bank nor the respondent is in a position to produce any proof of his having sent such letters. We do not also find any material on record to show that he had reported for duty within the period indicated in the notice issued in terms of clause XVI of IV Bipartite Settlement. In the circumstances, we find the High Court had proceeded on an erroneous basis of non-compliance with the principles of natural justice, whereas the true content of the principles of natural justice should have been borne in mind, particularly when there was an agreement between the parties as to the manner in which the situation should be dealt with and the consequence that would ensue thereof. 6. In the circumstances, we allow this appeal, set aside the order made by the High Court and dismiss the writ petition filed by the respondent. However, in the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs.
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2000 (11) TMI 1261
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... ... ..... proven cases of hostile discrimination. But in the case on hand, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the position of law stated above, the Division Bench of the High Court was not right in granting the relief itself, straightaway to the respondent; that too, without examining the implications and impact of giving such directions on other cadres. However, we make it clear that the rejection of the claim of the respondent need not be taken as an issue closed once and for all. It is always open to the Government to consider the issue either by making reference to the Pay Commission or itself once again as to the grant of pay-scales to the respondent. It is open to the respondent to make further and detailed representation. 15. In the result, for the reasons stated above, this appeal is entitled to succeed. Accordingly, it is allowed. The judgment and order under appeal are set aside and the judgment of the learned Single Judge is restored. 16. No costs.
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2000 (11) TMI 1260
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... ... ..... ;likelihood of the petitioners being released on bail' that however is not available in the reasonings as provided by the concerned officer. The reasoning available is the 'likelihood of his moving an application for bail' which is different from 'likelihood to be released on bail'. This reasoning, in our view, is not sufficient compliance with the requirements as laid down. 7. The emphasis however, in Binod Singh's case (supra) that before passing the detention order the concerned authority must satisfy himself of the likelihood of the petitioner being released on bail and that satisfaction ought to be reached on cogent material. Available cogent material is the likelihood of having a bail application moved in the matter but not obtaining a bail order. 8. On the wake of the aforesaid, we do not feel inclined to record our concurrence with the order of detention passed in the matter. As such the same is quashed. The appeals are disposed of accordingly.
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2000 (11) TMI 1259
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... ... ..... refore, the appropriate forum wherein such question of back wages could be decided is only in a proceeding to whom a reference under Section 10 of the Act is made. To state that merely upon reinstatement, a workman would be entitled, under the terms of award, to all his arrears of pay and allowances would be incorrect because several factors will have to be considered, as stated earlier, to find out whether the workman is entitled to back wages at all and to what extent. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court ought not to have presumed that the award of the Labour Court for grant of back wages is implied in the relief of reinstatement or that the award of reinstatement itself conferred right for claim of back wages. Hence, we allow the appeal, set aside the order made by the Labour Court, as affirmed by the High Court and dismiss the application filed under Section 33C(2) of the Act. However, in the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.
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2000 (11) TMI 1258
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... ... ..... the above said I.A. cannot be accepted. 7. Now that the Stamp duty and penalty have been paid, as directed by this Court on 3-11-2000, an endorsement to the above effect under Sub-clause (1) of Section 42 is to be made Under Section 42(1). Such an endorsement has been made by the Registrar of this Court already on 10-11-2000, I certify that the said endorsement falls within Sub-clause (1) of Section 42 of the Indian Stamp Act. 8. Inasmuch as the Original Power of Attorney is required by the petitioners, for day today(sic) use in their business, a request has been made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner for return of the same. A duly certified copy of the same is already on record. 9. The Registry is directed to return the Original Power of Attorney to the petitioner. Whenever the said document is required for any other purpose, in any further proceedings, it will be necessary for the petitioner to produce the same. 10. With above observations, the I.A. is disposed of.
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2000 (11) TMI 1257
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... ... ..... stence. The self-preservation is the most pervasive aspect of sovereignty. To preserve its independence and territories is the highest duty of every nation and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated. Of course, it is for the State to consider these aspects and take a conscious decision. In the present case, without consideration of these aspects the decision was taken to withdraw the TADA charges. It is evident from material now placed on record before this Court that Veerappan was acting in consultation with secessionist organisations/groups which had the object of liberation of Tamil from India. There is no serious challenge to this aspect. None of the aforesaid aspects were considered by the Government or the Public Prosecutors before having recourse to Section 321 Cr.P.C. 46. With these additional reasons, I am in complete respectful agreement with the conclusion and opinion of my senior colleague Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.P. Bharucha.
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2000 (11) TMI 1256
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... ... ..... benefit to the revenue. The Court also held that the powers exercisable by the ITO and the orders that could be made by him, could be exercised and made by the Tribunal in appeal. 3. In the light of the finding of the Tribunal that the revenue would not have secured any benefit if the dividend had, in fact, been distributed within the period of twelve months referred in section 104(1), the Tribunal was right in holding that the order under that provision should not have been made by the ITO. 4. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us, namely, 'Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the provisions of section 104(2) of the Income-tax Act, the Appellate Tribunal was right in holding that the dividend declared after the expiry of the period of twelve months from the end of the relevant previous year, should also be treated as dividend declared for the purposes of section 104 ?' in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
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2000 (11) TMI 1255
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... ... ..... stic person. At best they are only the joint promissors. Therefore, in my considered view, they cannot come within the expression "other association of individuals". The contention of learned counsel in this regard cannot be countenanced. 16. Since A2 in this case is obviously not the drawer of the cheque and as the cheque has been drawn by A1 in the capacity of the proprietor of Columbus and Brothers on the account maintained in regard thereto, a fortiori, the contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the account has not been maintained by the group of individuals. In any view of the matter, no criminal liability as enjoined under Section 138 of the Act can be fastened on a person who is not the drawer of the cheque, except in accordance with Section 141 of the Act. 17. For the foregoing reasons, the complaint against the petitioner, who is A2, cannot legally be sustained and, therefore, is liable to be quashed. The petitions are allowed accordingly.
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2000 (11) TMI 1254
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... ... ..... re not the tenants of the holding because they had no interest in it, is, with respect, fallacious. In law, the members of the joint Hindu family together become the tenants of the holding. The coparcenary body as such, and as an entity apart from its members, does not own property. The property does not vest in the coparcenary but in its members, though collectively. But this position far from supporting the claim of the appellants negatives their claim. As the khatas in question which now comprise of Bhumidari and Sirdari lands, could not be held in the name of the joint family which is not a juristic person, they stand in the names of the members of different branches of the family and the khatedars ought to be taken as holding collectively for the benefit of all the members of the family. For the above reasons, the judgment and order of the High Court does not suffer from any illegality to warrant interference by this Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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2000 (11) TMI 1253
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... ... ..... regard thereto affectation of the cause of justice would be the effect. 12. In any event by reason of the factum of the non-availability of any opportunity to any of the parties, we do not feel it inclined to proceed with the matter in any further detail. The words and phrases used also to say the least are not very apposite. The judgment thus in any event cannot be sustained. 13. In that view of the matter, this appeal is allowed. The order under challenge is set aside. 14. Considering however, the nature of the allegation leveled and by reason of the involvement of high public officials, we do feel it expedient to refer the matter to the Central Vigilance Commission for dealing with the eight instances of sanction of prosecution as adumbrated in the judgment and take appropriate steps in accordance with law, preferably within a period of one year from the date of communication of the order. Costs directed to be paid in terms of the judgment, however shall not be recovered.
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2000 (11) TMI 1252
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... ... ..... he agreement by the respondent. Once the respondent had handed back the keys of the business centre and declared in no uncertain terms that it did not desire to avail of the facilities any further, the deposit became immediately repayable. That was the intention of the agreement. If. thereafter, on certain grounds, which have been found to be unsustainable by the arbitral award, the deposit was wrongfully withheld by the appellant, we see no reason why the Arbitral Tribunal should not award interest from the date ascertained as the date on which the money was refundable, in our judgment, therefore, the learned Judge was right in declining to interfere with the award. We do not find any substance in the appeal. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. 37. We quantify the costs of both the appeals together at ₹ 10,000. 38. Since both the appeals are dismissed, Notice of Motion No. 2591 of 2000 has become infructuous and is hereby dismissed. 39. Certified copy expedited.
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2000 (11) TMI 1251
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... ... ..... Bombay alone shall have jurisdiction to try the proceedings relating to arbitration was binding between them. 11. Hence we hold this second question in favour of the Appellant that in view of Clause 34 of the agreement it is the courts at Calcutta alone would be competent Court to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and hence finding to the contrary given by the Courts below is hereby set aside. 12. For the aforesaid reason the present appeal is allowed. The judgment and order dated 16th July, 1999 passed by the High Court is set aside. We hold that in case Respondent pay ₹ 5,00,000/- by demand draft either to the Appellant directly or to its Bhubaneswar office or to the said Receiver within a period of two months from today, any proceedings for recovery of amount under dispute shall stand satisfied and concluded and no proceedings shall be taken by the Appellant in this regard. With the aforesaid observation the present appeal is allowed. Costs on the parties.
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2000 (11) TMI 1250
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... ... ..... rough the same means. 20. In the present case, how could the mere fact that this case was pending for such a long time be considered as a "special reason"? That is a general feature in almost all convictions under the PC Act and it is not a speciality of this particular case. It is the defect of the system that longevity of the cases tried under the PC Act is too lengthy. If that is to be regarded as sufficient for reducing the minimum sentence mandated by the Parliament the legislative exercise would stand defeated. 21. The High Court unfortunately did not look at the sentencing aspect with the seriousness which the Parliament wanted the court to exercise in such situations. 22. In our view, there was absolutely no special reason in this case as for the appellant to entitle to get a sentence less than the minimum prescribed by law. Accordingly, we restore the sentence passed by the trial court on the appellant for the offence under Section 5(2) of the Act of 1947.
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2000 (11) TMI 1249
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... ... ..... ths from the date of receipt of this order. As possession is not yet taken it will be appropriate if the petitioner is awarded an additional amount of compensation for the delay in passing the award to be calculated at the rate of 6% p.a. from 8-8-1998 (that is from the date of expiry of two years from the date of final declaration) to date of making the award. It is made clear that this additional amount has to be granted under a separate head, on account of unexplained delay in making the award in the case of petitioner, and is not to be considered as an increase in market value for purpose of Section 28-A of LA Act. 21. In view of the above the prayer for declaration that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed under Section 11-A of LA Act is rejected. The petition is disposed of subject to the observations in the preceding para in-regard to the passing of the award within three months of receipt of the order with additional relief. Parties to bear their respective costs.
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2000 (11) TMI 1248
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... ... ..... legations regarding absence of movement of goods. Under the circumstance, it was held that non-movement of the goods by seller could be due to the variety of tenable and untenable reasons the seller may be in breach of contract but that by itself does not permit the plaintiff to use the word 'fraud' in the plaint. Facts in this case are entirely different. It may be recalled that the whole suit is based on the agreement dated 19th July, 1996. The suit is for recovery of payments received by the defendant towards rent differential and towards renovation etc. on misrepresentation. It is alleged that the defendant thereby got himself unjustly enriched. In view of the averments made in the plaint I am of the view that at this stage it cannot be said that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action. 11. For the aforesaid reasons, I find there is no merit in the application and the same is dismissed. Any observation made herein shall not effect the merits of the case.
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2000 (11) TMI 1247
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... ... ..... e profits. 36. By the impugned order learned single Judge had ordered symbolic possession to be given to the auction-purchaser as prescribed under Order 21, Rule 96, C.P.C. While maintaining that part of the order, present appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs making it clear that we are not making any adjudication on the legality and validity of the tenancies since the said question, if raised in any appropriate proceedings, will have to be decided, therein, in accordance with law and for that reason alone, we further make it clear that findings recorded thereon by learned single Judge in the impugned judgment on the legality and validity of the tenancies of the surviving respondents will neither come in the way nor cause any prejudice to the appellant or the respondents in those proceedings. In view of this position, there is no need for us to make any adjudication on the questions raised in the cross-objections, which also stand disposed of along with this appeal.
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2000 (11) TMI 1246
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... ... ..... of title declaring for future what rights in what properties the parties possess. (VII) If the family arrangement is stamped but not registered, it can be looked into for collateral purposes. (VIII) Whether the purpose is a collateral purpose, is a question of fact depends upon facts and circumstances of each case. A person cannot claim a right or title to a property under the said document, which is being looked into only for collateral purposes. (IX) A family arrangement which is not stamped and not registered cannot be looked into for any purpose in view of the specific bar in Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act. 43. In the result, the appeal viz., OSA.No.237 of 2000 stands allowed and the Judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 14.8.2000 in C.S.No.545 of 1985 is hereby set aside. In view of the above finding, the appeal viz., O.S.A.No.274 of 2000 has to be dismissed and consequently, the same is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to cost in both the appeals.
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2000 (11) TMI 1245
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... ... ..... asoning applies to the case cited by petitioner for its distinction. So far another cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner which are mostly of various High Courts they need not be dealt with case wise as in my considered view all these cases no longer considered to be good law after the pronouncement of the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Orient Enterprises Case (Supra) and in any event, perusal of these cases also exhibit distinguishing features. 10. Since, admittedly, this is not a petition arising out of a claim of interest claimed on delayed refund made after the insertion of Section 11BB of Section 75 of the Finance Act, 1995 (22 of 1995) in the Act, no benefit can be extended to petitioner of this newly inserted Section which has a prospective operation. 11. In view of aforesaid discussion, I do not find any merit in this writ. It is accordingly dismissed as not maintainable. No costs, Security amount, if deposited by the petitioner be refunded.
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