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Case Laws
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2000 (7) TMI 1015
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... ... ..... ssion and mandatory injunction were added later on. These reliefs, even according to the plaintiff, are in fact based on the subsequent cause of action. In these circumstances, it has to be held that the relief of possession constitutes the main relief and any other reliefs of injunction either perpetual or mandatory fall behind the same and become ancillary to the same. Even if the suit is to be treated as a comprehensive one including the reliefs of injunction and possession, apart from basing upon different causes of action, it only calls for payment of the highest Court fee leviable on the reliefs as per Section 6(2) of the Act viz., possessory relief. 8. Accordingly, the lower Court is right in calling upon the plaintiff to pay the Court fee as per Section 24 of the Act on the substantiation of the market value by necessary certificates as contemplated. 9. In view of the aforesaid reasons. I do not find any merits in the revision and it is therefore, dismissed. No costs.
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2000 (7) TMI 1014
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... ... ..... d counsel for the respondent, would be of no help to the respondent. 25. In view of my detailed discussion above, Civil Revision No. 5618 of 1999 is dismissed with no order as to costs. 26. So far as Civil Revision No. 2534 of 1999 is concerned, it is partly dismissed and partly allowed. So far as the portion of the industrial shed which was the subject-matter of the licence deed dated 2-1-1996 and the arbitration award dated 28-7-1997 is concerned, the plaintiff-petitioner would not be entitled to the grant of any ad interim injunction. So far as the remaining portion of the industrial shed in question is concerned, the plaintiff-petitioner would not be dispossessed therefrom during the pendency of the suit, except in due course of law and resultantly, the defendant is restrained from interfering in the possession of the plaintiff over that portion of the industrial shed till the disposal of the suit except in due course of law. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
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2000 (7) TMI 1013
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... ... ..... ion proceedings initiated against them alleging offences punishable under Sections 7 and 8 of the Kerala Gaming Act are liable to be quashed since there is absolutely no allegation in the charge-sheet laid against them or any material on record to the effect that they were engaged in gaming in a common gaming house and the alleged search, seizure and arrest of the Petitioners are illegal for non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 5 of the Act, cannot be accepted at this stage. Those contentions are to be established before the trial Court at the stage of trial. Therefore, I find absolutely no ground to quash the proceedings initiated against the Petitioners by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, these Crl. M. Cs. are dismissed. The Petitioners will be at liberty to urge all the contentions raised by them in these petitions before the trial Court. A reproduction from ILR (Kerala Series)
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2000 (7) TMI 1012
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... ... ..... rs are concerned. The averments do not attract the ingredients of Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act. There is no allegation as such against the petitioners herein suggesting their involvement in any manner whatsoever attracting Section 141 of the Act. May be the offence was committed by the company and others who are in charge of the affairs of the company and responsible in its management. No opinion need be expressed on the question as to whether the other accused are responsible for the offence, if any, committed by the company. 29. For all the aforesaid reasons, the proceedings so far as the petitioners are concerned, are is liable to be quashed and the same are accordingly quashed. 30. This order shall have no bearing whatsoever on the merits so far as it concerns the other accused. The trial court shall proceed with the inquiry and trial in accordance with law uninfluenced by any of the observations made in this order. 31. The petition is accordingly ordered.
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2000 (7) TMI 1011
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... ... ..... fence then the charge can be quashed. From the decisions referred to in the same paragraph and the decisions already referred to above there was no bar to consider the material on record in the case on hand, which was collected during the course of investigation and produced before the court and particularly in view of the directions given earlier by the High Court. In this view, the High Court looking to the material and documents that were made available at the stage of framing charges on their face value in the light of the directions given earlier in Criminal Revision No. 337/97 and bearing in mind the position in law concluded that charges could not be framed against the respondent, consequently, set aside the order of trial court and discharged the respondent. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and having regard to the legal position stated above, we see no good reason or valid ground to upset the impugned order. Hence the petition is dismissed. No costs.
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2000 (7) TMI 1010
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... ... ..... JJ ORDER Delay condoned. The Civil Appeal is dismissed.
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2000 (7) TMI 1009
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... ... ..... ancellation of the allotment In favour of the respondent by the authorities on 15-12-1994 was therefore. Justified. 14. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the orders passed by the District Forum, the State Commission and the National Commission and uphold the order of cancellation of allotment. 15. In view of the fact that the statement made by the respondent In her affidavit is bona fide, it is contended for the respondent that the amount of deposit made by the respondent should be refunded to her. 16. But, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contends that the relevant Regulation permits forfeiture of the deposit amount. On the peculiar facts of this case, we are permitting the respondent to get back the amount deposited by her but without interest. This will not be treated as a precedent in any other case. 17. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed, subject to the direction with regard to the refund of the amount as mentioned above.
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2000 (7) TMI 1008
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... ... ..... additional witnesses in the list earlier filed under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1. I do not find any justification to interfere with the impugned order that too on the assertions made by the petitioner in this revision petition. Hence, the petitioner has no case on merits to invoke revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. (17). As a result of the above discussion, this civil revision petition being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. The impugned order dated 10.1.99 of the trial Court in civil suit No. 257/96 (Old No. 48/93) allowing defendant's (respondent) application for summoning two additional witnesses, is upheld. However, since the revision petition arises out of suit for ejectment which is pending since 1993, the trial Court is directed to expeditiously decide the suit, itself, but not beyond three months from the receipt of this order. A copy of this order be sent to the trial Court forthwith, The record be sent back to the trial court.
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2000 (7) TMI 1007
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... ... ..... wo sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court in FIR No. 226/98 under Sections 420/406/409/120 IPC registered at Police Station Prasad Nagar, Delhi. ii. The petitioner shall surrender his passport with the trial court, if not already deposited. iii. The petitioner shall not leave the National Capital Territory of Delhi without prior permission of the court unless he is required by any other court to remain present in any case. iv. The petitioner shall not interfere with the investigation and trial of this case in any manner. v. The petitioner shall not directly or indirectly intimidate, allure or influence the prosecution witnesses in any manner whatsoever. 9. It is however, abundantly made clear that in case the indulgence granted to the petitioner by this court is misused in any manner then the respondent would be at liberty to move this court for cancellation of the bail granted to the petitioner. This petition is accordingly disposed of. 10. Dasti.
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2000 (7) TMI 1006
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... ... ..... t and 22nd November, 1966. Not only that, because of the litigation the defendants have been forced to keep in safe custody the balance quantity of material for over a period of 33 years by now for no fault on their part. In these circumstances, the plaintiffs are not entitled to pursuit and pendente lite interest on the amount of ₹ 1,56,700/- to be refunded. Defendants 2 & 3 are the functionaries of defendant No. 1 and, Therefore, decree for the said amount is to be passed only against defendant No. 1. Issues are answered accordingly. ISSUE NO. 7 In view of my findings on the said issues, a decree for ₹ 1,56,700/- with proportionate costs is passed against Union of India, defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 1 is, however, allowed one month time to pay the decretal amount to the plaintiffs. In case the payment is not made within the said period, the plaintiffs will be entitled to future interest @ 6% per annum till realisation on the said sum of ₹ 1,56,700/-.
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2000 (7) TMI 1005
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... ... ..... age papers from of the file of suit no. 47/97 were removed from the main file and were not placed back in the file. Further at page no. 9 of the plaint, in this suit, some figures appear to have been typed again after using white fluid. Copy of the original page no. 9 is also available on record. Other file was also not complete. It is a serious matter and calls for a proper enquiry. Therefore, we direct the trial court to hold an enquiry and take an appropriate action against the erring officials without delaying the disposal of the suit. In fact it ought to have been noticed by the trial court earlier. The trial court record be sent back in a sealed cover. 16. With the above directions, appeals are allowed with costs; impugned Judgments and decrees are set aside. Suits are remanded for trial in accordance with law. Parties are directed to appear before the trial court on 28th July, 2000. Registry to issue necessary certificates to the appellant for refund of the court fees.
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2000 (7) TMI 1004
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... ... ..... circumstances placed before me do not suggest that the appellants had acted diligently. 76. From the legal and factual position discussed above, it is clear that the appellants as Bankers to an Issue were duty bound to wait for the decision on the company’s application from both the stock exchanges mentioned in the prospectus and only after ensuring compliance of the statutory requirements, they should have decided to release the collection money to the company. Since they were holding the application money in trust they were accountable for its safe up keep and return. They cannot escape the liability for misapplication of money. The liability to refund the money is now on them. The appellants are not out of the reach of section 11B and the respondent is not short of power to reach them. 77. For the reasons discussed above, I have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order is legally valid and there is no merit in the appeals. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
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2000 (7) TMI 1003
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... ... ..... ed in the impugned order is set aside”. 2. We also find that the Bombay Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Victoria Mills Ltd. v. C.C.E., Bombay-II - 1999 (35) RLT 656 has held that for raising demand under Rule 223A of Central Excise Rules, 1944 reasonable time limit of six months or 5 years is to be read into it inasmuch as the demand was beyond six months and there was no allegation of suppression, mis-statement etc., the same was held to be time barred. 3. We find that the ratio of all the above decisions squarely apply to the facts of the instant case. The Commissioner has observed in the impugned order that there is no allegation of suppression of facts, mis-statement, collusion or fraud in the show cause notice so as to invoke proviso to Section 11A(1) for recovery. There is nothing in the Revenue’s appeal contrary to the above findings of the Commissioner. Accordingly we do not find any merits in the Revenue’s appeal and reject the same.
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2000 (7) TMI 1002
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... ... ..... 7. After giving our careful consideration to the material and the record, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order made by the State Bar Council and upheld by the Bar Council of India and dismiss this appeal. 8. Before parting with this appeal, we would, however, like to observe that respondent ought to have, according to the best traditions of the Bar, disclosed to the appellant that he had been retained by the defendant in O.S. No. 119/1986. There may not have been any clash of interest but since the defendant in O.S. No. 237/1986 was his client as a plaintiff in O.S. No. 119/1986, the information should have been disclosed to the appellant. It is just plain and simple obligation of a counsel to disclose such facts to his client. Though, withholding of the information may not amount to professional misconduct, nonetheless the action does not speak well of the conduct of the respondent. On this account we leave the parties to bear their own costs in this appeal.
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2000 (7) TMI 1001
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... ... ..... e application of principles of natural justice is limited to the provisions already made in the statute. Further, apart from the fact the respondent is not entitled to any notice before extending the time for concluding the investigation under Rule 17, we also notice that the respondent has not established any prejudice suffered by it whatsoever. Here we notice with approval the observations of the Tribunal to the effect that the respondent, though, was aware of the extension granted to the Authority by the Central Government, did not object to the same when the proceedings before the Authority continued after the extension of time and having suffered an adverse order cannot be permitted to raise this question subsequently at an appellate stage. Accordingly, this objection of the respondent also fails and the same is rejected. For the reasons stated above, these appeals succeed and the orders of the Tribunal, impugned herein, are set aside. The appeals are allowed with costs.
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2000 (7) TMI 1000
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... ... ..... on the merits of the controversy submitted for Arbitration. Consequently, the post Award proceedings cannot be considered by any means, to be a suit or other proceedings to enforce any rights arising under a contract. All the more so when, as in this case, at all stages the respondent was only on the defence and has not itself instituted any proceedings to enforce any rights of the nature prohibited under Section 69 of the Partnership Act, before any Court as such. We see no infirmity or error whatsoever in the decision of the courts below to call for our interference in this appeal. The appeal fails and shall stand dismissed. 10. We make it clear that we have decided only the point relating to the preliminary issue raised and decided by the trial judge as well as by the High Court, and all or any other objections and contentions may be raised and pursued by the respective parties in the proceedings pending before the trial court. The parties will bear their respective costs.
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2000 (7) TMI 999
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... ... ..... tioner submitted that intimation in regard to closing of firing till the second season with effect from 25th January, 1979 was given on 25th February, 1979 and, therefore, no adverse inference can be drawn against the applicant. 6. The Tribunal has discussed the fixation of firing period in detail and has recorded finding that even though there was no requirement for giving intimation of closer of firing but when the applicant has given intimation so belatedly, no inspection could have been made to verify the correctness of closer of firing on 25th January, 1979 and taking into consideration, the stock of coal found in the survey made on 7th January, 1979 it can safely be presumed that the firing continued beyond the disclosed period. Further, the proper accounts have not been maintained by the applicant. The findings recorded by the Tribunal are finding of fact and do not call for any interference under Section 11 of the Act. The revision lacks merit and is hereby dismissed.
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2000 (7) TMI 998
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... ... ..... evidencing higher value in respect of contemporaneous imports of similar goods of like kind, quality. In the instant case, the order impugned does not adduce any such evidence to support the story of Customs. As regards glassware, we observe that the appellant has made a proper declaration in the Bill of Entry with regard to description of goods. The relevant invoice which is enclosed to the Bill of Entry describes the goods as "Glassware". Absence of the expression "of lead crystal" does not alter the position as the invoice itself is enclosed to the Bill of Entry. As regards licensing angle, we find that the impugned glassware falls under the Exim Code 701331.00 and as such freely importable under the OGL. Hence, the finding of the Commissioner that special import licence is required is not correct. 5. In view of the above observations, we set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellant in accordance with law.
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2000 (7) TMI 997
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... ... ..... ness expenditure. The liability under the mercantile system of accounting followed by the assessee-firm had accrued, undisputedly under the U.P. Government (Labour Department) order dated 1st May, 1962. Accordingly, we allow this contention.” 5. Issue similar to one involved in the first question has come up for consideration of various High Courts and the Apex Court. In view of the decision of the Apex Court in Kedarnath Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1971 82 ITR 363 , the question has to be answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee. Accordingly, we answer the first question in the negative. 6. So far as the second question is concerned, the decisions in CIT v. Swadeshi Cotton & Flour Mills (P.) Ltd. 1964 53 ITR 134 (SC) and Laxmi Devi Sugar Mills v. CIT 1993 200 ITR 6031 (SC) are squarely applicable. The question has to be answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue by answering it in the affirmative. Reference is, accordingly, answered.
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2000 (7) TMI 996
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... ... ..... f employees employed by him or to any establishment as provided under the Act. Therefore, whether the employees are employed directly by the principal employer or through an immediate employer, a duty is cast upon them to maintain a register of employees and cannot be heard to say that such employees are not identifiable. 22. In the present case, it cannot also be disputed that engaging a particular individual as a loadman or not is completely within the discretion of the appellant. If the work of the concerned employee is not satisfactory, the appellant would be certainly entitled to refuse to provide employment to the particular employee. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant's company do not exercise any supervisory control over the employees. 23. Therefore, viewed from any angle I am unable to find any justification to interfere with the order of the E.S.I. Corporation. 24. In the result, there are no merits in the appeal and the same is dismissed. No costs.
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