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2001 (3) TMI 1088
... ... ... ... ..... rection is issued. Conclusion 23. The petitioner in Probate C.P. No. 8 of 1998 respondent herein seeks letters of administration in regard to alleged Will of Muni Narayanappa. That was challenged and resisted by Anjanamma, wife of Muninarayanappa, by contending that she succeeded to the properties of Muni Narayanappa. She died and appellant claims to be the legatee in possession of the property which is claimed by the petitioner in Probate C.P. No. 8 of 1998, under the Will of Muni Narayanappa. If the appellant is not permitted to come on record, there Will be no one to continue the contest put up by Anjanamma. We therefore find that the appellant is a necessary party to the proceedings in Probate C.P. No. 8 of 1998. 24. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the order dated 6-1-1999 on I.A. No. VIII is Probate C.P. No. 8 of 1998 is set aside. I.A. No. VIII in Probate C.P. No. 8 of 1998 shall stand allowed. The respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 2,500.00 as costs to the appellant.
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2001 (3) TMI 1086
... ... ... ... ..... 4 was dismissed though as withdrawn. 7. May be that the judgment debtor wanted to gain time first by moving the application under Section 34 of the Act and then by filing objections under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code thereby challenging the validity of the award. No doubt any judgment debtor has the right to challenge the validity of the decree when it is sought to be executed but in the instant proceedings such a recourse is provided under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act whereby the judgment debtor can challenge the validity of the award on the ground of its being in violation of any law and Therefore being a nullity. As a matter of fact, the provisions of Section 34 are substitute or provisions parallel to the provisions of Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. 8. For the aforesaid reasons I do not find any merit in the application and dismiss the same. 9. Since decretal amount was already been paid, the execution petition is disposed of having been satisfied.
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2001 (3) TMI 1084
... ... ... ... ..... cturer in another institution and after lapse of two years his re-transfer was permitted. In the present case, the petitioner had not left the institution after selection in another institution on substantive post. The nature of appointment in Balrampur Degree College, Gonda, in respect of the petitioner, is not on record. The extraordinary leave had been sanctioned by the college and, thus, there was no question of any break in service. 27. In view of foregoing discussions, the irresistible conclusion is that the petitioner was appointed on the post of lecturer (Biology) on 31.7.1970 and there has been no break in his service and on other hand, the respondent No. 5 had been promoted on the post of lecturer (Logic) only on 1.7.1972. Thus, the petitioner is senior to the respondent No. 5. Therefore, the impugned order dated 27.4.2000 passed by the Joint Director of Education, cannot be sustained and is hereby set aside. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed.
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2001 (3) TMI 1083
... ... ... ... ..... absolve himself from the criminal liability for the offence committed." 10. The Supreme Court has thus ruled that if the complaint is found to be premature, it can await maturity or be returned to the complainant for filing later and mere presentation at an earlier date need not necessarily render the complaint liable to be dismissed or confer any right upon the accused to absolve himself from the criminal liability for the offence committed. In view of this clear law so laid down by the Supreme Court, the objection raised for the petitioners-accused against maintainability of the complaint will have no legal force. For the same reason, the decision rendered by this court in the case of Ashok Hegde v. Jathin V. Attawan could be no longer a good law. 11. There was no other substantive objection or ground of attack raised against the criminal proceeding initiated against the accused, meriting serious consideration. 12. Therefore, the petition is bound to fail and it fails.
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2001 (3) TMI 1082
... ... ... ... ..... o the conclusion of the Tribunal about the proper method to be applied for valuation of the gifted property. The Tribunal held that taking into account the peculiar circumstances that the property was tenanted and the tenant was occupying house since long and was continuing even after the gift, indicated that rent capitalisation method was the proper method. The learned counsel for the revenue submitted that the position would be different after 1989, but when the proceedings related to an earlier period, the method adopted by the Tribunal would not be proper. 4. It is not in dispute that rent capitalisation method is one of the approved methods of the valuation of an immovable property, which is let out. Findings of the Tribunal to which we have made reference above are essentially factual. That being the position, in our view, no question of law arises which is to be answered. We, Therefore, decline to answer the question referred. 5. Reference is, accordingly, disposed of.
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2001 (3) TMI 1081
... ... ... ... ..... se the amount from the defendant as per the accounts given in the plaint. The plaintiff further states in the plaint that the amount stated in the plaint is the amount due to him as per the dealings. 18. As already stated, the plaintiff was not able to establish his case. The cheque issued is not a cheque issued by the fourth defendant. It is a cheque of the Firm. It is true that the fourth defendant was not able to prove his case that the cheque was given as security for the loan granted to the fourth defendant. That does not mean that the plaintiff's to be given a decree. The plaintiff has not come with clean hands to the Court. He has not told the true story before Court. The only cause of action stated is business transaction with the plaintiff. Hence, according to us, the decree granted against the fourth defendant is wrong. In the above view of the matter. A.S. No. 105 of 1991 is allowed, A.S. No. 180 of 1991 is dismissed. Parties are to bear their respective costs.
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2001 (3) TMI 1080
... ... ... ... ..... ion, and thereby show mercy to the defendant by enabling him to try to prove a defence." The amount equivalent to the aforesaid amount shall be computed by the Prothonotary & Senior Master on the basis of the rate of exchange as prevailing today and shall be deposited within a period of 8 weeks from today, in this Court. 16. On such deposit, the suit be transferred to the list of Commercial Causes. The Defendants shall file their Written Statement within 8 weeks thereafter. Inspection and discovery will be completed within 8 weeks thereafter. 17. In the event the amount are deposited as aforesaid, the Prothonotary & Senior Master to initially deposit the said amount in a Nationalized Bank, for a period of one year and thereafter, for equal successive periods, till the disposal of the suit. 18. On failure to deposit the aforesaid amount, liberty to the Plaintiffs to apply for further orders. 19. Summons for Judgment is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. No costs.
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2001 (3) TMI 1077
... ... ... ... ..... would out weigh the ‘Criminal outfit’. 14. Analysis of the complaint would show that the petitioners have entered into an agreement by way of Hypothecation Deed and have borrowed monies and repaid a portion of the same and a portion of the debt is yet to be satisfied. The complainant's grouse is that he attempted to take possession of the properties as per the clause contained in the Hypothecation Deed, but the petitioners obstructed to his taking possession. The case is not one for removal of obstruction but the case is registered under Section 403, 405, 420, I.P.C i.e criminal breach of trust and cheating. What the petitioners had complained is of breach of agreement in which case has to exercise his remedy in a Civil Court. He cannot adopt a short-cut method of preferring a complaint for criminal breach of trust, cheating with ingredients, which axe prima facie absent. 15. Hence the O.P is allowed, further proceedings in F.I.R No.459 of 2000 stands quashed.
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2001 (3) TMI 1074
... ... ... ... ..... ss of reasoning and the High Court should not exercise jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. In this connection the observations made by the Apex Court in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Malllkarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, need to be noticed. Where two views are possible and, the Trial Court has taken one view which is a possible and plausible view, merely because another view is attractive, the High Court should not interfere and would be in error in interpreting with the finding of the Trial Court or interfering under Article 227 of the Constitution over such decision. Conclusion 20. In the aforesaid view of the matter, I am clearly of the opinion that in view of the intention of the parties reflected through the document in question and facts and circumstances of this case, it was a lease and not a licence. The petition, therefore, fails and deserves to be dismissed. 21. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed. Rule stands discharged with no order as to costs.
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2001 (3) TMI 1072
... ... ... ... ..... the mischief of the Act. Therefore, I do not find any substance in the contention of the defendant that the transaction in question is hit by the provisions of the Act and as such, no declaration in favour of the plaintiffs could be granted, There is no prohibition in law for declaring the plaintiffs along with the defendant as co-owners of the suit schedule property. For the foregoing reasons. I pass the following order 32. Appeal is allowed. Plaintiffs suit is decreed declaring that the plaintiffs 2 to 4 and the defendant are co-owners to the suit schedule property to the extent of their contribution as such, all of them are entitled to equal share. Consequently the plaintiffs are also entitled to a decree of injunction restraining the defendant from dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit schedule property. However, it is open to the defendant to take appropriate legal proceedings to carve out his share and possession of his share in the suit schedule property. No costs.
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2001 (3) TMI 1068
... ... ... ... ..... t and gave the absolute interest to the settlee. 16. In this case, the settlor retained the life Interest and settled the life interest to the first beneficiary to be enjoyed by him after the settlor's life time and thereafter to the first beneficiary's natural children, failing which it has to go to the appellant's son. When the right of the first beneficiary itself had not taken effect there can be no vesting of any right in favour of the appellant's son and therefore, the appellant cannot claim any title to the suit property, as is heir. 17. The questions whether the document is a settlement or a Will and whether the document was acted upon on the date of Ex-A1 have both been answered against the appellant by both the Courts. For the reasons given by me above, I am of the opinion that they have decided correctly. There are no merits in the second appeal. Both the second appeals are dismissed. But in the view of the relationship between the parties no costs.
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2001 (3) TMI 1065
... ... ... ... ..... ing officer. 6. Unlike usual cases under the Criminal Procedure Code, in cases under the NDPS Act, by the time of arrest, main part of investigation will be completed and duty of the investigating officer is mainly in sending the samples for chemical analysis and other routine work and there is no likelihood of any prejudice in usual circumstances. Therefore, we are of the opinion that merely because a detecting officer himself is investigating officer or the officer of the same ranks as that of the detecting officer is investigating the case and files report before the Court will not vitiate the proceedings under N.D.P.S. act in the absence of proof of specific prejudice to the accused. Therefore, legal position stated in Naushad v. State of Kerala 2000 (1) KLT 785 to the contrary is overruled. Since the term of imprisonment as imposed by the lower court is already over, no further orders are necessary in this Criminal Appeal. The Criminal Appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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2001 (3) TMI 1064
... ... ... ... ..... tival or procedural law and not of substantive law. It is a well established proposition that such a change of law operates retrospectively and the person has to go to the new forum even if his cause of action or right of action accrued prior to the change of forum. He will have a vested right of action but not a vested right of forum. If by express words the new forum is made available only to causes of action arising after the creation of the forum, then the retrospective operation of the law is taken away. Otherwise the general rule is to make it retrospective". (underlining is ours for emphasis). 14. Change of forum being a procedural law, thereby no substantive right has been taken away far less any right of life and liberty as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 15. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in these applications which are accordingly dismissed. But in the facts and circumstances of this case there is no order as to costs.
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2001 (3) TMI 1062
... ... ... ... ..... ingle Judge that there are basic features of similarities between the two marks which make misleading of the public a reasonable inference, we are of the view that this finding can not stand in view of the findings arrived at by us to the effect that taking into account the differences between the plaintiff/respondent's and defendant/appellant's marks and trade dresses there can be no legally relevant confusion in the marketplace. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The Order dated 23rd June, 1997 is set aside to the extent indicated above. The appellant /defendant's application, IA.7896/96 under Order 39 Rule 4 CPC is allowed and IA.6973/96 under 39 Rules 1& 2 CPC, filed by the plaintiff/respondent dismissed. Appeal stands disposed of accordingly. 24. Needless to add that the findings and conclusion arrived at by us are meant only for the purpose deciding the appeal and will not affect the case on me which of course will have to be decided in accordance law.
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2001 (3) TMI 1061
... ... ... ... ..... jeopardise the liberty of summoned persons and put them to extreme hardship and inconvenience. 7. The contention of learned counsel for the respondent that the liability of the petitioner may be presumed by virtue of sub clause (2) of Section 142 of the Act is without any merit. In a criminal case, it is for the complainant to allege and make out all the ingredients of the offence before calling upon the Court in proceed against an accused. Only those presumptions which are permissible under the law are permitted to be raised to be established by the complainant/prosecution. The accused can always rely upon the presumption of innocence in his favor. 8. In the result, I am of the considered view that the impugned order summoning the petitioner as an (SIC) the complaint No.118/97 titled DB Merchant Banking Services Ltd. Vs. Ganga Automobiles Limited and Others cannot be sustained. The petition is, Therefore, allowed and the summoning order against the petitioner is set aside.
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2001 (3) TMI 1060
... ... ... ... ..... asure of the party in charge of the litigation. On the top of this it was submitted on behalf of the Union that the petitioners should be compelled to continue in the litigation before the Industrial Court and that their fate would be finally decided in the complaint and that they should subject themselves and submit to the proceedings pending before the Industrial Court, I am unable to agree with the submissions of the learned Advocate. In these circumstances I allow the Petition and make the rule absolute in terms of prayer (a) of the Petition with costs which is quantified as ₹ 10,000/- to be paid by the Respondent No. 1 Union to the Petitioners. Interim order dated 20th July, 1996 stands vacated. It is needless to mention that the complaint pending before the Industrial Court can continue against the Respondent No. 2 in the Petition I.e. M/s. Salvi Super only. 7. All parties to act on an ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by the Associate of this Court.
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2001 (3) TMI 1055
... ... ... ... ..... ner dealing in any goods or services under any domain names containing the word TATA or any other mark/name identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trade mark TATA and (ii) An order of permanent injunction is passed in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, restraining the defendants, their principal officers, servants, representatives and agents or any of them, from using the trademark and name TATA in any manner whatsoever or operating any business, and making, selling, offering for sale, advertising and in any manner dealing in any goods or services, under any other domain names containing the word TATA or any other mark/name which is identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trademark TATA or containing the word TATA on the Internet or otherwise and from doing any other causing dilution of the trademark TATA. There shall be no orders as to costs. Decree sheet be drawn up accordingly. The suit is accordingly disposed of.
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2001 (3) TMI 1054
... ... ... ... ..... tachment before judgment of all or any of such assets. In case, the defendants neither furnish securities within the aforesaid period nor disclose their assets as directed above within the aforesaid period, then the right, title and interest of the defendants in the residential flat situated at flat No. 151/B, Maker Towers, G.D. Somani Marg, Cuffe Parade, Mumbai-5 shall stand attached, as also the right, title and interest of the defendants in the office premises at Edena Building, 9 Queens Road, Mumbai-400020 shall also stand attached, as also the right, title and interest of Rajesh Vora in the office premises at 4, Bibijan Street, Fida Mansion, Mumbai-400003 and the right, title and interest of Rajesh Vora in the office premises at 51, Cutch Castle, Opera House, Mumbai-400004, shall also stand attached. Notices of motion are disposed of. Parties to act on simple copy of the order duly authenticated by the Associate/Personal Secretary of the Court. Certified copy expedited.
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2001 (3) TMI 1052
... ... ... ... ..... erred from the aforesaid vague statement in the complaint. I have also perused the sworn statements of the complainants recorded by the learned Magistrate while taking cognizance of the offences. In those statements also there is absolutely nothing about the petitioner A-3 being in-charge of the affairs of the company at the lime when the offence was committed. 14. So far as the alleged offence under Section 420, IPC is concerned, there is not even a whisper, either in the complaint or in the sworn statement, about the facts that constituted the said offence. 15. For the aforementioned reasons, all the Criminal Petitions have to succeed and they are accordingly allowed. Consequently, the criminal proceedings in all the five Calendar Cases, i.e. Calendar Case Nos. 290, 291, 316, 282 and 283 of 1999, pending on the file of the 1 Additional Judicial Magistrate of 1 Class, Proddatur. Cuddapah District are quashed insofar as they relate to the petitioner A-3 accused is concerned.
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2001 (3) TMI 1050
... ... ... ... ..... mained on killa No. 15 of Rect. No. 45 in the capacity of a tenant at the time of the acquisition, then he is entitled to the compensation in the same ratio as has been awarded to Shri Ram Kumar and the judgment of Mangat Ram's case (Supra), which has been relied upon by the trial Court as well as by me, entitles the tenant to claim compensation to the extent of 3/4th share. ( 20. ) Thus , the finding of the learned trial Court on issues No. 2 and 4 are affirmed. ( 21. ) I have already held above that Gram Panchayat Kanehi is the owner of the land in question, therefore, it has rightly been awarded compensation to the extent of 1/4th share. ( 22. ) The net result is that the appeal as well as the application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. are totally devoid of any merit and the same are hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. The order dated 21.1.1997 passed by the trial Court viz-a vis Ram Kumar and Khem Ram is hereby affirmed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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