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Showing 1 to 20 of 568 Records
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2003 (10) TMI 700
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... ... ..... e Land Acquisition Act. 23. So far as the other Khasras are concerned, i.e., Khasra Nos. 313, 319, 323, 324 and 329, there appears to be a doubt as to whether they were, on the date of notification dated 23rd January, 1965, composite properties and/or whether they were acquired properties by Notification dated 7th January, 1955. If these are acquired properties under this Notification, a further question would arise as to whether Respondents had acquired title to these lands before this date or thereafter. In our view, this is a matter which should have been considered by the High Court. Therefore, so far as these Khasra numbers are concerned, the Writ Petition is sent back to the High Court. 24. We clarify that it will be open for the parties to file additional affidavits/documents and urge all contentions available to them in law. The High Court to decide on the principle set out above. 25. The Civil Appeal stands disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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2003 (10) TMI 699
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... ... ..... uld warrant a conviction. If the evidence of PWs. 1 to 3 were swallowed without applying the discretion available to the court, it can certainly be said that the allegations made in their testimony, if accepted, would amount to a valid indictment. But that certainly is not the consideration. A mechanical ascertainment whether the evidence legally admissible is available is not the only function of the court under Section 245(1) Cr. P.C In these circumstances I am satisfied that the impugned order, reckoned as an order under Section 245(1), does not warrant interference. 20. I am conscious of the fact that the learned Magistrate was labouring under some confusion whether Section 245(1) or Section 245(2) has to be applied. In any view of the matter, I am satisfied that invocation of the revisional powers are necessary to interfere with the impugned order of discharge even when the same is reckoned as one under Section 245(1) Cr.P.C. 21. In the result this petition is dismissed.
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2003 (10) TMI 698
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... ... ..... Apex court in the case of Kanataka Power (Supra). 6. No doubt, appeals against any decision or order including a B/E can be filed under Section 128(1) of the Customs Act, 1962. But obviously, no modern customs administration worth the name should either refuse to pass an appealable order in a disputed case or insist on filing of appeal against a bland assessment order on a B/E. Such an appeal, in any case, would deprive the appellate authority of knowing the department's view point in the absence of a reasoned order and also push up the level of first consideration to the appellate level, both outcomes are clearly avoidable in the interest of sound tax administration. 7. In view of my findings as above set aside the impugned orders passed by the lower authorities and remand the case back to the original authority for consideration of the refund claim on merits, including the question of reassessment under a different classification. 8. Appeal is allowed by way of remand.
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2003 (10) TMI 697
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... ... ..... 8 of the Negotiable Instruments Act pertains to those cheques which are towards liability. Once the said liability stands discharged the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act ceases to exist. Proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act cannot be converted into civil suit for recovery. These are specific proceedings and confine only to cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part or other liability. 5. In the instant case, the liability of Rs. 40 lac created by way of postdated cheques was duly discharged by way of aforesaid demand drafts and Therefore there was no occasion for the learned trial court to reject the application for dropping the proceedings. The impugned order suffers from inherent infirmity. In the result, petition is allowed. Impugned order is set aside. Proceedings are dropped.
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2003 (10) TMI 696
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... ... ..... tigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 21. While parting with the order, I would say that the rulings relied upon by Sri Das, appearing for the opposite party (respondent) are inapplicable to the present case in view of the facts and circumstances indicated above. The delay reported by the Stamp Reporter in filing the appeal under consideration has to be condoned in order to render substantial justice to the parties by this Court and non-explanation of each day's delay does not stand on its way. 22. In the ultimate result, the delay of 39 days in filing the appeal is hereby condoned in the light of the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner (appellant). No costs. Misc. Case is disposed of accordingly.
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2003 (10) TMI 695
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... ... ..... bove is closely inter-linked with question No. 3 as it relates to the expenses incurred by way of payment of lease money paid for building used in research and development division of the assessee and which has been denied by the AO on the like ground viz., closure of fast food business of the assessee. However, the reason which prevailed while affirming the order of the Tribunal in respect of allowing the deduction on account of depreciation on the assets of the research and development division of the assessee, applies equally to the claim made by the assessee in respect of lease amount paid for the building which was used by the assessee in its R&D division. Accordingly, it must also be held that the Tribunal was right in allowing deduction of Rs. 38,442 by upholding the contentions made by the assessee on account of lease expenses in respect of the R&D division building. 13. In view of the aforesaid finding, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with no costs.
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2003 (10) TMI 694
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... ... ..... a Reddi, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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2003 (10) TMI 693
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... ... ..... elony if it is a step intentionally taken, for the purpose of "effecting that felony. (Russel on Crime 12th Edn. Vol.1 pp.487 and 488). In Shankarlal Kacharabhai and Ors. v. The State of Gujarat 1965 CriLJ 266 this Court has interpreted the word "furtherance" as 'advancement of promotion'. 13. In view of the cogent, credible and trustworthy evidence of PWs 1 to 4 about overt acts and the instigations, Section 34 has been rightly applied by the High Court. Having regard to the nature of disputes between the two families of the accused and victim, the happening of extents immediately before the incident in question, the role found to have been played by them and the utterances said to have been made during the course of the assault are sufficient to provide a safe and sound basis for an inevitable inference of the existence of common intention in this case. Judgment of the High Court consequently does not need any interference and the appeal is dismissed.
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2003 (10) TMI 692
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... ... ..... That is only a restriction in regard to blanket anticipatory bail for an unspecified period. This judgment in our opinion does not support the extreme argument addressed on behalf of the learned counsel for the respondent-State that the courts specified in Section 438 of the Crl.P.C. are denuded of their power under the said Section where either the cognizance is taken by the concerned court or charge sheet is filed before the appropriate Court. As stated above this would only amount to defeat the very object for which Section 438 was introduced in the Crl.P.C. in the year 1973. 12. As observed above and having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the considered opinion that the appellants in this case should be released on bail, in the event of their being arrested, on their furnishing a self bond each for a sum of ₹ 5,000/- and a surety to the like sum. The appellants shall abide by the conditions enumerated in Section 438 of the Code. Appeal allowed.
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2003 (10) TMI 691
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... ... ..... ted in para 7(a) of the aforesaid report. (C) The admitted amounts mentioned in Annexure 3 of the report, with interest at the rate applicable to savings bank accounts as indicated in para 7(b) in Chapter 13 of the Committee report, that is Savings account interest rate applicable for the relevant period, if not already paid to the original petitioners-respondents in these appeals, shall be permitted to be withdrawn by them. (D) The appellant banks shall carry out the aforesaid directions regarding re-payments of fixed deposit receipt amounts to the respondent cooperative societies/ cooperative banks by November 30, 2003. In case of any delay, the appellant banks shall pay the respondent cooperative societies/ cooperative banks interest at the rate of 9% per annum from December 1, 2003 till the date of payment. (E) The parties shall bear the costs of the writ petitions as well as these appeals throughout. All these appeals are disposed of in terms of the aforesaid directions.
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2003 (10) TMI 690
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... ... ..... judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the process, it is a compelling reason for interference. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra 1973CriLJ1783 , Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat 1996CriLJ2867 , Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana 2000CriLJ2212 , Raj Kishora Jha v. State of Bihar and Ors. 2003CriLJ5040 , State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh 2003CriLJ3892 and State of Punjab v. Pohla Singh and Anr. 2003CriLJ5010 . 20. The inevitable conclusion because of the factual and legal panorama noted above is that the High Court was not justified in directing acquittal. The same is set aside. Respondents are convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and are sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. As they are on bail, they shall surrender forthwith to suffer remainder of the sentence. The appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms.
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2003 (10) TMI 689
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... ... ..... in the Code of Criminal Procedure which would enable the High Court to review the same or to exercise revisional jurisdiction. In the same way, the subordinate Criminal Courts have no inherent power to invoke under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. which vests such power only with High Courts. There is no provision in the Cr.P.C. which would enable the learned Magistrate to review or recall the order dated 4.10.2000. 13. In view of the above discussion, we hold that, firstly a Magistrate has no power to dismiss a petition under Section 125, Cr.P.C. for default, and secondly, for any reason, if it is dismissed, the said Court will become functus officio and it has no power to set aside the default order, the earlier order is illegal notwithstanding. In such a case, the affected party has to take recourse to the revisional jurisdiction as contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Reference is answered accordingly. We appreciate the assistance given by Mr. C. Padmanabha Reddy.
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2003 (10) TMI 688
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... ... ..... t occupying the premise or was not very keen on occupying the same. Though in revision we are not expected to make de novo reappraisal of the evidence, in the instant case, we have reappreciated the entire evidence since the findings of the authorities below have been divergent. The result of such reappreciation is that we feel that the case of the landlord in the context of Section 11(4)(v) is much more probable than that of the tenant and the evidence brought on record by the landlord was sufficient enough to shift the burden over to the tenant and also that the tenant has not discharged that burden by adducing satisfactory rebuttable evidence including evidence which was available at his disposal. The result is that we set aside the Judgment passed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority and restore that of the Rent Control Court. The R.C.R stands allowed under Section 11(4)(v). The parties will suffer their costs. The tenant will vacate the building by 31st December 2003.
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2003 (10) TMI 687
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... ... ..... sdeclare to the Department, the action of the Department is justified in imposing penalty on the appellants. She also pleaded that penalty is justified for misdeclaration in the shipping bills. 4. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that there was no misdeclaration of the goods in the shipping bills but there was a mistake to mention that export is under DEPB instead of from 100% E.O.U. 5. On going through the submissions made by both sides, I find that the appellants have not mentioned in the shipping bills that the export is from 100% E.O.U., but claimed benefit under DEPB by mistake of their CHA. However, they themselves detected the mistake and did not claim DEPB benefit but got converted the shipping bills into clearance from 100% E.O.U. by approaching the Department. Therefore, the plea of double benefit taken by them is not correct. There is no justification in imposing the penalty on the appellants. Accordingly the appeal is allowed.
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2003 (10) TMI 685
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... ... ..... ed Mohd. Afzal being Crl. M. No. 470/2003. In view of our findings in the murder reference, grounds A to F stand dealt with, and therefore, nothing survives as regards the said grounds sought to be urged in support of the appeal. As regards grounds G and H, we are of the opinion that accused Mohd. Afzal in the garb of raising additional grounds cannot urge facts not stated by him in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The grounds G and H in the application in fact are additions to the statement made by him under Section 313 Cr.P.C. which cannot be allowed. The application in so far it seeks to urge grounds G and H is dismissed. Rest of the grounds have been considered by us while answering the murder reference. 453. Before ending, we would place on record our appreciation for the learned Senior Counsel who argued the matter, including the team of assisting counsels. We were rendered valuable assistance at the hearing of the murder reference and connected appeals.
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2003 (10) TMI 684
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... ... ..... ssion of the said inventory and rehabilitation plan before this Hon'ble Court. 5 months CPCB/ SPCBs/ PCCs 21 Preparation and publication of national inventory of HW generation and HW dump sites. 7 months MOEF/ CPCB 22 Fixing time-frame for implementation of rehabilitation plan by SPCBs/PCCs. 3 months SPCBs/ PCCs 23 National policy for landfill sites. 4 months MOEF/ CPCB 24 Guidelines for proper functioning and upkeep of disposal sites. 3 months CPCB 25 Guidelines for HW incinerators. 8 weeks MOEF/ CPCB 26 Institutional reforms - MOEF/CPCB/SPCBs/PCCs. 3 months MOEF/nodal Ministries 27 National policy documents on HW. 9 months MOEF/ CPCB 28 CPCB to do research and take up the matter with MOEF for requisite regulatory measures in regard to import of dirty technologies in industries - steps to be taken. 3 months MOEF/ CPCB 29 Various directions with regard to ship-breaking. 1 month MOEF/ State Maritime Boards/ SPCBs 56. With the aforesaid directions the matters are adjourned.
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2003 (10) TMI 683
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... ... ..... that the present accused appellant had not actually committed the rape. That cannot be a ground to warrant lesser sentence; more so in view of Explanation (1) to sub-section (2) of Section 376. By operation of a deeming provision a member of a group of persons who have acted in furtherance of their common intention per se attract the minimum sentence. Section 34 has been applied by both the trial Court and the High Court, to conclude that rape was committed in furtherance of common intention. Not only was the accused-appellant present, but also he was waiting for his turn, as evident from the fact that he was in the process of undressing. The evidence in this regard is cogent, credible and trustworthy. Since no other just or special reason was given by the trial Court nor could any such be shown as to what were the reasons to warrant a lesser sentence, the High Court was justified in awarding the minimum prescribed sentence. That being the position, this appeal is dismissed.
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2003 (10) TMI 682
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... ... ..... cide the said issue by the Civil Court as also by the High Court was entirely an exercise in futility. The question whether an Award requires stamping and registration is within the ambit of Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and not covered by Section 34 of the Act. For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment under challenge deserves to be set aside. Consequently, it is set aside. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed. Since the High Court has not dealt with other objections raised under Section 34 of the Act, we remit the matter to the High Court to decide the same. We make it clear that the issue with regard to the stamping and registration of the Award or documentation thereof, it would be open to the parties to raise the same before the Court at the stage of proceeding under Section 36 of the Act. The High Court may decide the mater expeditiously and also consider any interim prayer which may be made by the parties in the appeals. There shall be no order as to costs.
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2003 (10) TMI 681
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... ... ..... ion 119(2)(a), however, the circular as contemplated therein cannot be adverse to the assessee. Thus, the authority which weilds the power for its own advantage under the Act is given the right to forgo the advantage when required to weild it in a manner it considers just by relaxing the rigour of the law or in other permissible manners as laid down in section 119. The power is given for the purpose of just, proper and efficient management of the work of assessment and in public interest. It is a beneficial power given to the Board for proper administration of fiscal law so that undue hardship may not be caused to the assessee and the fiscal laws any be correctly applied. Hard cases which can be properly categorised as belonging to a class, can thus be given the benefit of relaxation of law by issuing circulars binding on the taxing authorities". 3. Therefore, for the reasons given in the said judgement, this appeal is liable to be rejected. Accordingly, it is rejected.
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2003 (10) TMI 679
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... ... ..... itration Agreement are different. 17. In view of the foregoing reasons, the Court is of the considered view that under the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, there are no good grounds for allowing the defendant' application under Section 8 read with Section 5 of the Act and refer the parties to Arbitration as played. 18. The application is, therefore, dismissed. 19. It is however made clear that nothing stated herein shall be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of the suit pending before this Court which shall be tried in accordance with law. The observations made herein are in relation to application under consideration only. Suit No. 1412/2003 Vide separate orders, the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 application (IA No. 8013/2003) under Section 5 read with Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, has been dismissed. List for disposal of remaining IA Nos. 9455/2003, 8952/2003 and 8690/2003 at the end of Short Matters on 16th January, 2004.
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