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Showing 81 to 100 of 658 Records
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2008 (10) TMI 653
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... ... ..... the present issue which was subject matter of order u/s 263 passed by the learned CIT, Further, From the order of the learned CIT, It is seen that the learned CIT himself had occasion to deal with the entire facts and the details. We had occasion to go through the details filed by the assessee before the AO. We have also seen details of Wipro Net Division in the Profit and Loss Account for the period ending 31-3-2003 which was enclosed with Setter dated 11-11-2005 send by the assessee. Considering this factual matrix, we are of the view that the order passed by the AO is not erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of revenue as held by the learned CIT. We, therefore, quash the order of the learned CIT dated 26.9.2007 passed u/s 263 of the act. In view of the above, we restore the order of the AO on this issue. It is ordered accordingly. 35. In the result, the appeal filed by the assessee (ITA No.1178/Bang/2007) is allowed. Order Pronounced in the open court on 31.10.2008.
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2008 (10) TMI 652
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... ... ..... ed in favour of the assessee. 7. In view of the above discussion, the legal issues are decided in favour of the assessee. However, the assessee has furnished a chart stating certain factual discrepancies which needs verification. Therefore, the order of the CIT(A) regarding ITA No. 8471/M/04 is modified and the matter is remitted to the file of the Assessing Officer for limited purpose of verifying the facts relating to discrepancies mentioned. If the factual aspects are found to be correct, then no further addition is required to be made. In case the assessee is not able to explain about the factual discrepancies mentioned above, then appropriate order may be passed by the Assessing Officer in this regard. 8. As far as ITA No. 245/M/05 is concerned, the order of the CIT(A) is upheld since the income is duly assessed in the hands of non-resident. 9. Subject to the observations made above, the appeals of the revenue stands dismissed. The order pronounced on 27th October 2008.
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2008 (10) TMI 651
Removed of the appellant from service - Application filled u/s 55 of the Madhya Pradesh Co- operative Societies Act, 1960 (Act) - barred by limitation - Power of the Registrar, authority or jurisdiction to entertain such dispute - Manager of a Co-operative Bank involved in Financial irregularities - Principle of Res Judicata - concession made on behalf of the Bank - It was also submitted that had it been contended before the Registrar that the application was not within the period of limitation prescribed by law, the appellant could have satisfied the authority or would have taken other steps, but he was deprived by the concession on behalf of the Bank. It has caused serious prejudice to the appellant and the Bank cannot be allowed to `blow hot and cold' by taking inconsistent pleas and by raising `technical' defence of limitation.
HELD THAT:- Admittedly, the order of removal was passed by the Bank against the appellant on April 29, 1982. Even the first petition u/s 55 of the Act was filed by the appellant/applicant on June 30, 1982, i.e. after two months which was time- barred. The High Court considered the first petition filed by the appellant herein before the Registrar, but even that petition was barred by time. The High Court was, therefore, right in dismissing the writ petition holding that the application filed by the applicant was not within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 55 of the Act.
The ld counsel for the respondent-Bank rightly submitted that the plea raised by the appellant has no force. It was submitted that there was no concession by the Bank. Relying on Zimni, the counsel submitted that on July 06, 1993, i.e. the day on which the concession was said to have been made, the Presiding Officer was not present as he was on a tour. No proceeding took place on that day. It was, therefore, factually incorrect to state that a concession was made on behalf of the Bank and it did not object that the application was barred by time.
But even otherwise, according to the counsel, if the application was not within the period of limitation, the so-called concession would neither bind the Bank nor invest jurisdiction or power in the authority to entertain such application which was barred by limitation. In other words, according to the counsel, the concession was against the provision of law, which would not bind the Bank.
In our opinion, the appellant is right in submitting that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the application filed by the appellant was barred by res judicata. It is clear from the facts that the application was filed by the appellant to Joint Registrar, Raipur. It was pending. Meanwhile, however, District Bastar had its own Registry and hence, an application was submitted to District Registrar, Bastar. The application preferred by the appellant to the Joint Registrar, Raipur, in the circumstances, became infructuous. It was not decided on merits.
Section 55 allows an aggrieved party to approach the Registrar within a period of thirty days. There is no provision analogous to Section 5 of the Limitation act, 1963 allowing the Registrar to condone delay if "sufficient cause" is shown. In view of this fact, in our opinion, the contention of the ld counsel for the Bank is well founded that the application submitted by the appellant was barred by time.
To us, the High Court was right in observing that the Tribunal was in error in allowing the appeal and dismissing the claim of the appellant on the ground of res judicata. The High Court, therefore, considered the said question independently and held that the Bank was right in submitting that the appellant had not approached the Registrar within the period prescribed by law and his application was liable to be dismissed.
So far as the prayer by the appellant that he has sufficiently suffered and should be re-instated in service without back wages also cannot be accepted. The appellant was holding position of trust and was Manager of a Bank. The charges leveled against him were serious in nature concerning misappropriation of money. It is true that the amount was not big and it was also repaid and the Bank has not suffered. But even then the Manager of a Co-operative Bank was involved in financial irregularities. The Bank was satisfied that he should not be retained in service and passed an order of removal.
We, therefore, see no infirmity even in the final decision taken by the Bank which deserves interference by this Court.
Appeal deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed, however, without any order as to costs.
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2008 (10) TMI 650
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... ... ..... . This statement gives us guidance in two areas. First, the allegations of misuse of POTA 2002 were directed at some of the State Governments. This is relevant because it shows that the Parliament wanted a mechanism by which it could reverse the State Governments' alleged misuse of POTA 2002. Subjecting the Central Review Committee's decision to the will of the State Government's Public Prosecutor, as is done when section 321 of Cr.P.C. applies, clearly goes against the very objective of POTA (Repeal) 2004. 54. It is reiterated that those aggrieved by the Review Committee's decision are not without any remedy, they can have recourse under Article 226 of the Constitution. In this view of the matter, the basic principle of separation of power is not violated. No provisions of the Constitution are violated by repealing the Act by the Parliament. 55. I agree with the conclusions arrived at by Hon'ble the Chief Justice. The appeals are accordingly disposed of.
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2008 (10) TMI 649
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... ... ..... unal is that the assessee is engaged in the business of operation of rigs for extraction of oil and undertaking other oil related activities. It is further recorded by the Tribunal that in the interest of assessee's business and in continuation of the business carried on by it, the assessee had to explore the chances of development in the field of oil exploration for which it had to submit itself for bidding and tenders. The tribunal has held that submitting tenders and bids in the field of oil exploration is a highly sophisticated technical task for which the assessee company had to incur substantial amount of expenditure before submitting its bid. If the assessee is not successful in obtaining bid, such expenditure is allowable as revenue expenditure. The Tribunal has held that merely because the assessee failed to secure a bid, the expenditure cannot be disallowed. The finding recorded by the tribunal is finding of fact. No question of law arises. Appeal is dismissed.
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2008 (10) TMI 648
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... ... ..... ue under our consideration is squarely covered by the order of the Pune Bench of the Tribunal (supra) and no interference is called for in the order passed by the learned CIT(A). As far as the other appeal in the case of Smt. Harshini (ITA No. 360/Bang/2008) is concerned, the assessee, a member and wife of Shri D. Sudhakar, has repaid ₹ 3 lakhs to D. Sudhakar (HUF), to enable D. Sudhakar (Indl.) to purchase a piece of land and property in Bangalore in his personal capacity. We have already held in ITA No. 359/Bang/2008 that payment by the D. Sudhakar (HUF) to D. Sudhakar (Indl.) cannot be construed as repayment of loan or deposit so as to attract penal provisions of s. 271E. The order of the Tribunal Pune Bench in the case of Sunil N. Kasliwal (supra) is squarely applicable in this case also and so no interference is called for in the order passed by the learned CIT(A). In the result, the appeals of the Revenue in ITA Nos. 359/Bang/2008 and 360/Bang/2008 are dismissed.
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2008 (10) TMI 647
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... ... ..... ase of shares i.e. 18th Oct., 2004. We are unable to agree to such a conclusion, particularly when the payment for such shares undisputedly had been made in the preceding financial year i.e., 2003-04. In fact even Circular No. 704, dt. 28th April, 1995 issued by CBDT provides that date of purchase of shares is the date of contract notes or date of payment of consideration and not the date of transfer of shares. In the instant case, the contract notes are dt. 1st Sept., 2003, therefore, we hold that the shares have been purchased by the assessee on 1st Sept., 2003. This is also supported by the fact that consideration for purchase of shares had also been paid by the assessee by cheques dt. 1st Sept., 2003, which is evidenced by the bank account. In light of the above facts, we hold that the assessee had correctly declared the gain on the sale of shares as long-term capital gain. In the result, appeal filed by the assessee is allowed and that filed by the Revenue is dismissed.
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2008 (10) TMI 646
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... ... ..... o the formula. Elimination should be from both the denominator and the numerator. We therefore find that the AO was not correct in excluding ₹ 40,93,493 from consideration received in convertible foreign exchange while calculating export turnover for the purpose of s. 10A of the IT Act." In the absence of any distinguishing feature brought on record by the Revenue and keeping in view the rule of consistency, we respectfully following the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Patni Telecom (supra), uphold the order of the learned CIT(A) on both the issues and consequently the grounds taken by the Revenue are rejected. Assessee's C.O. No. 6/Hyd/2008 (in ITA No. 142/Hyd/2008; Asst. yr. 2004-05) 7. At the time of hearing, the learned counsel for the assessee submitted that he does not want to press the cross-objection. Hence, it is dismissed being not pressed. 8. In the result, both the appeals of the Revenue and the assessee's cross-objection are dismissed.
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2008 (10) TMI 645
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... ... ..... er had not brought on record any instance of any expenditure being charged in another unit. The Tribunal noted that the assessee had maintained separate books of accounts and the expenditure exclusively incurred for the Parwanoo and non-Parwanoo businesses were identifiable and had been directly debited to their respective books. The common expenditure of the businesses were apportioned in the ratio of turnover and that the CIT (Appeals) had accepted this after examining the issue in detail. The Tribunal also noted that the department had not pointed out any item which had been incurred by the Parwanoo business and charged to the non- Parwanoo business so as to increase the profit of the Parwanoo business which resulted in higher deduction under Section 80 IB of the said Act. The findings returned by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal are pure findings of fact. No substantial question of law arises for our consideration. The appeal is dismissed.
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2008 (10) TMI 644
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... ... ..... tatutory period provided under s. 143(2), the AO had lost its jurisdiction to make assessment under s. 143(3) r/w s. 147." 7.8 Similarly, in the case of Whirlpool India Holdings Ltd. vs. Dy. Director of IT (International Taxation) (2005) 26 IT Rep. 214 (ITAT Del) (NOC) the Tribunal held'"that after amendment of 143(2) the notice was required to be served within 12 months from the end of the month of the filing of the return and not only issued. The Tribunal quashed the assessment as well as the demand raised along with the levy of interest". 8. Hence, respectfully following the decision (supra) it is held that as the notice under s. 143(2) has not been served upon the assessee within a statutory period of limitation as provided under proviso to s. 143(2) of the Act so the instant assessment framed by the AO is invalid and the same is hereby cancelled/quashed. 9. In the result, appeal filed by the assessee is partly allowed in the manner as indicated above.
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2008 (10) TMI 643
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... ... ..... rade in the earlier years - it found no difficulty in concurring with the opinion of the CIT(A) that the profit from sale of shares held as investment was liable to be taxed under the head „capital gains‟ in the hands of the assessee. 4. Having heard learned counsel for both the Revenue, as well as, the assessee, we are of the view that the orders of the Tribunal and CIT(A) do not call for any interference. Both the Tribunal and the CIT(A) have returned findings of fact that assessee had sold, in the assessment year under consideration, i.e., 1992-93, shares which were held as investment between 1980 and assessment year 1991-92, and that, these shares had not been treated as stock-in-trade by the Assessing Officer in the earlier assessment years. In view of the said finding, which, undoubtedly is a pure finding of fact, in our opinion, no question of law, much less, a substantial question of law arises for our consideration. In the result the appeal is dismissed.
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2008 (10) TMI 642
Claim of exemption u/s 10BA - income from the business of manufacturing, trading and exporting of handmade wooden handicraft antique furniture - whether the activities tantamount to manufacturing/production - HELD THAT:- We find the contention of the learned CIT departmental Representative contradictory inasmuch with regard to the certification by the customs authorities as to the nature of the export of the disputed articles of being of artistic value, whereas by drawing inferences only, it is argued that no activity was carried out and it was a matter of simple purchases.
Such an approach of the revenue is disapproved. We further agree with the contention of the learned Counsel that the use of the machinery is only to prepare the wood purchased by the appellant with a view to make it fit for further technical steps to be carried out by artisans. It is nothing but a preparatory stage, before handwork is commenced. The machine work is confined to seasoning of wood which normally contains moisture, thickness plaining and cutting. Further the objections as regards the shortfall of workers the required number i.e. 20 u/s 10BA(2)(e) also not factually correct. A perusal of copies of the wages registers submitted to assessing officer (paper book 23-72) clearly show that there were more than 20 workers in any case throughout the year engaged in the manufacturing activities. There apart the other karigars being paid on piece rate basis are also the persons engaged and deserve consideration for this purposes. Even the learned Commissioner (Appeals) has also now recorded a finding that the assessee had employed more than 20 workers as required u/s 10BA.
The heavy reliance placed by the revenue on the decision of Kwal Pro Exports [2006 (10) TMI 193 - ITAT JODHPUR] is also misplaced, the Tribunal placed reliance upon the Third Member decision in case of Arihant Tiles & Marbles (P) Ltd. v. ITO[2006 (6) TMI 157 - ITAT JODHPUR]. However, the same now stands reversed in the case of Arihant Tiles & Marbles (P) Ltd. v. ITO [2007 (5) TMI 132 - HIGH COURT, RAJASTHAN].
Moreover, there is a specific definition of the eligible article u/s 10BA, which is not the case u/s 10B with which Kwal Pro Exports [2006 (10) TMI 193 - ITAT JODHPUR] was concerned. Therefore, the said decision cannot be applied being totally distinguishable. It has been held that an incentive provision has to be construed liberally as held in Bajaj Tempo Ltd. [1992 (4) TMI 4 - SUPREME COURT]. The present case also helps achieving the avowed object. Once the underlying purpose of an enactment is served, there is no reason why the deduction should be restricted on one pretence or order.
Recently in CIT v. Baby Marine Exports [2007 (3) TMI 206 - SUPREME COURT], the Hon'ble Supreme Court strongly advocated for a liberal interpretation. It was held that Section 80HHC was incorporated with the object of granting incentive to earners of foreign exchange. This court is Sea Pearl Industries v. CIT[2001 (1) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT] also observed that the object of selection Section 80HHC is to grant incentive to earners of foreign exchange. In IPCA Laboratory Ltd. v. Dy. CIT [2004 (3) TMI 9 - SUPREME COURT] this court has taken the same view. This court in the said judgment observed that Section 80HHC has been incorporated with a view to provide incentive to export house and this Section must receive liberal interpretation.
Thus, we are fully satisfied that the appellant was engaged in the manufacturing and production of the eligible articles under the provisions of Section 10BA and hence the appellant is fully entitled to get the deductions. The assessing officer is therefore directed to allow the same. Thus ground No. 2 of the assessee is allowed.
Disallowance of interest payment u/s 40A(2)(b) - HELD THAT:- It has been explained that the rate of interest was @ 15 per cent and not @ 18 per cent p.a. The market rate of interest on loan from bank is though 15 per cent p.a. but including several types of other charges and cost the effective rate of interest is 18 per cent p.a. Various other formalities of hypothecation and pledge are also required in the case of bank loan. Moreover, the assessing officer has not brought on record that interest paid is excessive or unreasonable. In the circumstances and facts of the case, the assessing officer is not justified in disallowing the interest. The same is directed to be deleted.
Thus, ground No. 5 of the assessee is allowed.
As regard the disallowance made, the assessing officer failed to appreciate that the gross profit rate declared by the assessee during the impugned year was 21.35 per cent as compared to gross profit rate of 19.68 per cent in the immediately preceding year. The increase in expenditure on account of firewood expenses and seasoning charges has been duly explained which has not been taken into consideration by the assessing officer. Therefore, the assessing officer is not justified in making addition in the income of the assessee. The same is directed to be allowed.
Thus ground No. 1 of the assessee is allowed.
Disallowance of depreciation claimed on car purchased and delivery - put to use after duly provisionally registered with RTO and deposit of road tax - HELD THAT:- The assessing officer has ignored the explanation given by the assessee that the car was taken in possession on 28-3-2003 as per delivery note on record. The assessee has also provided the copy of the cover note of insurance dated 29-3-2003. The copy of the bill for fuel purchased and used to run the vehicle dated 29-3-2004 was also produced and is on record. In the circumstances and facts of the case, the asset is considered as put to use in the impugned year and the assessee is entitled to depreciation. The assessing officer is therefore, directed to allow the claim of depreciation.
Thus, ground No. 2 of the assessee is allowed.
Disallowance of deduction of interest paid - interest under the head "Income from other sources" - In view of the consistent decision of the Special Bench decision in the case of Dy. CIT v. Allied Construction [2006 (11) TMI 242 - ITAT DELHI-A], the interest income has rightly been treated as income from other sources and the interest paid cannot be allowed as deduction u/s 57(iii) of the Act. However, since whole of the income of the assessee has been to be exempt by us u/s 10BA of the Act, hereinbefore, therefore, no addition under this ground will remain.
Thus, ground No. 6 of the assessee is allowed.
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2008 (10) TMI 641
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... ... ..... assessee. If that be so, we find that the some ingredients would apply for holding the demand to be barred by limitation. 5. Tribunal in case of Punjab Electricity Board Vs. CCE 1989 (44) ELT 340 (Tribunal), Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. Vs. Collr. of C.E., Aurangabad 2000 (125) ELT 477 (Tribunal), has held that setting aside duty under Section 11AC is indicative of the fact that extended period is not invocable in as much as there was no malafide on the part of the appellant. As such, we hold that the demand is also barred by limitation. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order and allow both the appeals filed by the assessee with consequential relief to them. 6. Revenue’s appeal is against that part of the impugned order of Commissioner (Appeals), vide which he has set aside the penalty upon the assessee. In as much as the appellants appeals stand allowed by us, Revenue s appeal is required to be rejected. We order accordingly. (Dictated & Pronounced in Court)
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2008 (10) TMI 640
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... ... ..... the assessee and against the Revenue by the Supreme Court in a case of Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs v. MDS Switchgear Ltd.(2008(229) E.L.T. 485(S.C.)). The said Judgment is pointed out with a view to bring home a position in law which reads thus - “A quantum of duty already determined by the jurisdictional officers of the supplier unit cannot be contested or challenged by the officers in charge of recipient unit”. 2. Similar is the view taken by the Appellate Tribunal. Hence, on the own showing of the learned Counsel for the Appellant no interference with the impugned Order is called for. In the result, the appeals stand dismissed.
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2008 (10) TMI 639
Whether once an appeal is admitted and is placed for hearing i.e. hearing on merits, it can be dismissed for default but cannot be decided on merits in absence of appellant (or his advocate)?
Whether an appellate Court had right to dismiss an appeal on merits if the appellant fails to appear?
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2008 (10) TMI 638
TDS u/s 194LA - compensation paid to the land owners which was arrived at based on negotiated settlements - Compulsory acquisition or not - acquisition of land initiated u/s 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - land owners have executed sale deeds on the basis of negotiations in favour of the petitioner.
HELD THAT:- The sale deeds would constitute sale under the Transfer of Property Act and cannot be treated as a compulsory acquisition under the law for acquisition of immovable property. As already noticed, there was no divesting of the title of the land owners under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, namely, passing of an award, and possession being taken thereunder or by possession being taken earlier under the urgency clause, namely Section 17. The mere issuance of notification under Section 4(1) does not have the effect of divesting of title of the land owner. Only if there were such divesting of the title of the land owner, and amounts were paid either as compensation or as enhanced compensation, could it be said that there is compulsory acquisition under the law for the time being in force. It may be true that when the notification under Section 4 was issued, the choice of action of the land owners became limited. Faced with the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, there are three courses of action, which can be contemplated. Land owner may prefer writ petition challenging the notification itself. Instead if he is so advised, he may decide to transfer his right to the Government. If neither of the two happens and the Government does not decide to withdraw from the notification, the proceedings may be continued under the Land Acquisition Act where it reaches the stage where an award is passed determining the compensation and unless possession is taken under the urgency clause earlier possession is taken and Government becomes the owner of the property.
The title passed to the petitioner only on the strength of the sale deeds executed by the land owners concerned. A perusal of the sale deeds also would appear to clearly support the contention of the petitioner that there was a voluntary transaction entered into by a willing owner to transfer after a number of negotiations, which consumed considerable time. Even if the choice were limited, the question posed before me being whether there was a compulsory acquisition under the law in force, the answer can only be that there was no compulsory acquisition even though it may be true that, but, for the execution of the sale deeds, it may have led to compulsory acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act.
Once a notification under Section 4 is effaced by way of withdrawal, the only way it can restart the acquisition proceedings, if so advised, is to issue a fresh notification. This means, in the facts of this case, that even though Government started out by issuing a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, it became unnecessary to proceed with the acquisition as the land owners had executed sale deeds in favour of the petitioner - There is no provision in the Land Acquisition Act which empowers or enables the execution of the sale deed as done in this case. There is no merit in the contention of the respondents that the sale deeds were executed in exercise of the incidental power. It may be true that the Land Acquisition Act does not prohibit a sale in favour of the Government or authority. In fact even after the notification is issued and till there is vesting of the title with the Government under Section 16 or under Section 17, there is no prohibition against a sale by a land owner. But the absence of a prohibition does not mean that the sale deed is executed in the exercise of incidental powers. There is no warrant or need to trace the right of the landowner to any such incidental power in the matter of an inter vivos transaction as a sale even after a notification under the Act or a declaration is not prohibited.
Thus, invoking Section 194LA of the Income Tax Act in respect of cases where sale deeds were executed in favour of the petitioner was totally without jurisdiction. Ext.P4 palpably has no legs to stand on - petition allowed.
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2008 (10) TMI 637
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... ... ..... provision for the purposes of encouraging exports. Although in this case, there is no doubt with regard to the interpretation or the manner in which the deduction under Section 80HHC is to be computed, even if there were any such doubts, the provision would have to be interpreted to fulfill the objective of giving a benefit to the assessee who indulges in exports. Looked at in any manner, we are of the opinion that the export turnover from the unit in the EPZ is not to be excluded while computing the deduction under Section 80HHC. The deduction that is to be computed is without reference to the total income. Once the deduction is computed in terms of the formula prescribed in Section 80HHC(3), the amount so arrived at is to be deducted from the total income. However, while computing the deduction, reference to ‗total income‘ is not called for. 11. The question referred to us is answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
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2008 (10) TMI 636
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... ... ..... decided by various High Courts wherein the High Courts are of the opinion that there is variation between CPWD rates and PWD rates prevailing in the State and since the building that is constructed is within the State, naturally, the Department is expected to take into consideration the PWD rates prevailing in the State. Having come to that conclusion, as we have already noticed, the Tribunal had remanded the matter to the assessing authority. (11) In view of the settled legal position that it is only the PWD rates that can be taken into consideration for the purpose of valuation of the building, in our opinion, the Tribunal was justified in allowing the assessee's appeal and issuing a specific direction to the assessing authority. (12) We do not find any error in the orders passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, while answering the questions of law framed by the Revenue against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee, we reject this Income Tax Appeal. Ordered accordingly.
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2008 (10) TMI 635
Whether the termination was by way of dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement or whether it was a case of voluntary retirement or resignation or abandonment?
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2008 (10) TMI 634
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... ... ..... making pre-deposit, it would serve ends of justice if the orders dated 27.03.2008 and 16.07.2008 made by Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal respectively are quashed and set aside and the petitioner is granted an opportunity to comply with the order dated 12.03.2008 made by Commissioner (Appeals). Accordingly, in the event the petitioner makes pre-deposit of a sum of ₹ 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty thousand) on or before 14.11.2008 the appeal filed by the petitioner before Commissioner (Appeals) shall stand restored to file of Commissioner (Appeals) and Commissioner (Appeals) shall decide the said appeal on merits, without being influenced by any observations made by the Tribunal in the order of 16.07.2008. Needless to state that Commissioner (Appeals) shall pass the order in appeal after compliance being reported by the petitioner on or before 14.11.2008 and after granting an opportunity of hearing. Subject to the aforesaid modification the petition stands disposed of.
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