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2008 (3) TMI 786
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... ... ..... Ors. v. Mrs Chandrima Das and Ors. 2000CriLJ1473 ). 60. I, therefore, hold that petitioner is liable to get compensation of at least Rs. 50,000/- payable by the State. In case, petitioner thinks he is entitled to anything more, it will be open to the petitioner to move appropriate Court and upon proof if it is found he is entitled to more, the difference may be awarded by the Court against the State. The State, thus, being held liable to pay the damages/compensation, as aforesaid, would be at a liberty to realize the same from the officer responsible and concerned in the manner as it deems fit and in accordance with law. 61. As the vehicle has already been released without payment of fine, as unauthorisedly imposed, no further orders are need in that regard and the fine cannot be realized. 62. The writ application is, thus, allowed. 63. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Secretary-cum-Transport Commissioner, Department of Transport, Government of Bihar, Patna forthwith.
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2008 (3) TMI 785
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... ... ..... the instant case, what has been asked for by the appellant in his RTI application is as follows Tax payable as per the decision of the Settlement Commission in the case of Winprolene Plastics and tax paid by said company. Mere disclosure of the amount determined to be payable by a quasi judicial authority and the amount of tax paid by an assessee as a result of such decision even if it may be categorized as personal information , cannot be said to be unrelated to a public activity or interest. Public Authority may, therefore, withhold other assessment details but should disclose the amount of tax determined by the Settlement Commission and the amount actually paid by the assessee company. 29. The issue is decided accordingly and the CPIO is directed to provide the information in terms of the decision noted above within a period of two weeks from the date of this order. Announced on this the 5th day of March, 2008. Notice of this decision be given free of cost to the parties.
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2008 (3) TMI 784
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... ... ..... e operative. That being so there is no scope for directing reconsideration as was done in Ram Milan's case, though learned Counsel for the respondents prayed that such a direction should be given. As rightly contended by learned Counsel for the State, in matters of policy decisions, the scope of interference is extremely limited. The policy decision must be left to the Government as it alone can decide which policy should be adopted after considering all relevant aspects from different angles. In matter of policy decisions or exercise of discretion by the Government so long as the infringement of fundamental right is not shown. Courts will have no occasion to interfere and the Court will not and should not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the executive in such matters. In assessing the propriety of a decision of the government the Court cannot interfere even if a second view is possible from that of the Government. 12. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
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2008 (3) TMI 783
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... ... ..... w up to the date of death or remarriage and if in case of a son after the death of a retired employee the pension continues to his son till he attains the age of 25 years, then by virtue of the proviso to Rule 75 (b) in case of a disable son who is unable to earn his livelihood, after the demise of the retired Railway servant, the pension shall continue during the lifetime of disabled son who is unable to earn his livelihood. 19. Consequently, the rule is made absolute and the writ petition is allowed holding that the petitioner is entitled for the family pension. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled for family pension during his lifetime. The respondents, in the facts and circumstances should pay the amount of family pension to the petitioner after the demise of his father on 25th December, 2000 and continue to pay family pension to the petitioner during his lifetime. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are however, left to bear their own costs.
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2008 (3) TMI 782
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... ... ..... e order of acquittal. In Swami Prasad v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2007(4)SCALE181, this Court opined 15. However, it is equally true that the High Court while entertaining an appeal against a judgment of acquittal would be entitled to consider the entire materials on records for the purpose of analyzing the evidence. There is a presumption that an accused is innocent, unless proved otherwise. When he is acquitted, the said presumption, becomes stronger. But it may not be correct to contend that despite overwhelming evidence available on records, the appellate court would not interfere with a judgment of acquittal. See Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka 2007CriLJ2136. 43. Which matter, therefore, deserves interference at the hands of the appellate court would depend upon the fact situation of each case. Legal proposition must be applied having regard to the fact of each case. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.
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2008 (3) TMI 781
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... ... ..... were rightly rejected and additions were made by invoking the provisions of Section 145(3) of the Act correctly, as from the manufacturing record maintained by the assessee it is not possible to verify the GPR declared as 25.38 per cent. 7. We have heard learned Counsel for the revenue and perused the record. 8. We find no force in the arguments raised by the learned Counsel for the revenue. While allowing the appeal of the assessee, the Commissioner (Appeals) has given a finding of fact that the additions have been made by the assessing officer without pointing out any specific defect in the books of account. The said finding has been further upheld by the Tribunal.' During the course of arguments, learned Counsel was unable to point out any illegality or perversity in the said finding of fact. Thus, we find no infirmity in the order of the Tribunal. No substantial question of law is arising for determination of this court in this appeal and the same is hereby dismissed.
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2008 (3) TMI 780
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... ... ..... the components. It was also considered, that this judgment was followed in the case of NRC Ltd. and Century Rayon reported in 2001(46) RLT 609, and it was also found, that the departmental representative has not been able to cite any contrary judgment of the Tribunal, or any other High Court. While arguing the appeal, we also did put a specific question to the learned counsel for the appellant, as to whether these judgments in cases of Gujarat Ambuja Cement, NRC Ltd. and Century Rayon had been set aside, or not, and as to whether there is any other judgment of any other High Court, or even Tribunal, taking any contrary view but the learned counsel for the appellant could not point out either. In our view, when the learned Tribunal has followed the consistent practice, as laid down in the various judgments, and there is no contrary judgment, shown, it cannot be said that any substantial questions of law arise, as claimed. The application for reference is, therefore, dismissed.
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2008 (3) TMI 779
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... ... ..... s. M.B. Tea & Allied Products Ltd. Vs. C.T.O., Siliguri Charge & Ors), (2) WPTT 515 of 2006 (M/s. Lochan Tea Ltd. & Anr. Vs. C.T.O., Siliguri Charge & Ors.), (3) WPTT 558 of 2006 (M/s. Ma Tara Tea Packaging Industry Vs. C.T.O., Siliguri Charge), (4) WPTT 519 of 2006 (Dalmia Enterprises & Anr. Vs. C.T.O., Siliguri Charge & Ors.), (5) WPTT 540 of 2006 (M/s. Vikash Packers & Export Vs. C.T.O., Siliguri Charge & Ors.), (6) WPTT 541 of 2006 (M.S.Tea & Agro Co. & Anr. Vs. C.T.O., Siliguri Charge & Ors.), (7) WPTT 549 of 2006 (Pahari Tea Packagers & Anr. Vs. Asstt. Commissioner of Comercial Taxes, Raiganj Charge), (8) WPTT 548 of 2006 (M/s. Modanwal Tea Centre Vs. Asstt. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Raiganj Charge & Ors.), (9) WPTT 565 of 2006 (Shib Shakti Tea Packeters & Anr. Vs. C.T.O., Siliguri Charge & Ors.) and (10) WPTT 566 of 2006 (M/s. Siddhi Vinayak Enterprises & Anr. Vs. C.T.O., Siliguri Charge & Ors.
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2008 (3) TMI 778
Investigation by the CBI without the prior consent of the State - letter in the nature of 'inter-Departmental communication' by the Deputy Secretary to the State of Madhya Pradesh to the Secretary to Central Government - could be treated as valid consent - alleged offences had committed at Bhopal in the State of Madhya Pradesh and CBI had no power, authority or jurisdiction to institute criminal proceedings direction issued by the High Court was ex facie erroneous - HELD THAT:- A notification required to be issued by the Central Government under Section 3 of the Delhi Act specifying offences under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) as also under several other Acts has been issued on September 7, 1989 and has been placed by the respondent on record along with the affidavit-in-reply filed by Superintendent of Police, CBI, Bhopal. The said notification covers inter alia, the offences punishable under Sections 417, 418, 420, 467, 468, 471, 474, 511, IPC.
Likewise, the Central Government passed an order on February 18, 1963 as contemplated by Section 5 of the Delhi Act extending the powers and jurisdiction of the members of Special Police Establishment to various States including the State of Madhya Pradesh for the investigation of offences specified in the Schedule annexed to the said schedule. The Schedule specifies various offences under IPC including the offences referred to hereinabove, offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act and various other enactments. Thus, Section 3 and 5 of the Delhi Act have been complied with.
The counter argument on behalf of the respondent is that such consent has been given by the State Government which is reflected in the order dated February 5, 1957. The learned counsel for the appellant then submitted that all executive actions of the Government of a State must be taken in accordance with and as per the procedure laid down in Article 166 of the Constitution.
Bare reading of Clause (1) of Article 166 of the Constitution makes it clear that all executive actions of the Government of a State should be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. Clause (2) provides for the authentication of the orders and other instructions made and executed in the name of the Governor. Clause (3) enables the Governor to make rules for the more convenient transaction of the Government of the State and for the allocation of business among the Ministers, usually known as 'Rules of Business' or 'Business Rules'.
The Court nonetheless held the consent valid as general consent was all that was required by law. Though it did not remark on the form in which such consent should be given, i.e. the letter, was correct or not, the fact that it could find nothing wrong with the consent raises a strong presumption in favour of the argument that a letter can be a means of granting consent by the State Government under Section 6.
In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Om Prakash Gupta [1969 (10) TMI 78 - SUPREME COURT], this Court observed that it had been repeatedly held that provisions of Article 166(1) and (2) were 'directory' and 'substantial' compliance with those provisions was sufficient. In that case, the order impugned was made in the name of the State Government but was signed by the Chief Secretary. The order was held valid.
In the present case, the decision produced by the respondent along with the counter-affidavit filed by the Superintendent of Police, CBI, Bhopal clearly sets out all the particulars required by Section 6 of the Delhi Act. It refers to the file/reference number, name of the department, the authority from whom it was issued and communicated to the concerned department of the Central Government. It, therefore, cannot be said that the State Government had not granted consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Act.
Section 6 which speaks of consent of State Government for the exercise of powers and jurisdiction of the Special Establishment neither refers to 'notification' nor 'order'. It merely requires consent of the State Government for the application of the Delhi Act. Parliament, in our considered opinion, advisedly and deliberately did not specify the mode, method or manner for granting consent though in two preceding sections such mode was provided. If it intended that such consent should be in a particular form, it would certainly have provided the form as it was aware of different forms of exercise of power. It, therefore, depends on the facts of each case whether the consent required by Section 6 of the Delhi Act has or has not been given by the State Government and no rule of universal application can be laid down.
Thus, there is no doubt that the State of Madhya Pradesh has given consent as envisaged by Section 6 of the Delhi Act and prosecution instituted by CBI against the appellant cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. We see no infirmity in the order passed by the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court. The appeal, hence, deserves to be dismissed and we accordingly do so.
Appeal is dismissed accordingly.
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2008 (3) TMI 777
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... ... ..... er, the High Court has interfered with the Catering Policy of 2005 in respect of reservations. By now it is a well settled principle of law that policy decisions of the Government should not be interfered in a routine manner unless the policy is contrary to the provisions of statutory rules or of the Constitution. Nothing has been brought to our notice that the Policy is contrary to the provisions of the statutory rules or the Constitution. For this simple reason, we set aside the order of the High Court impugned herein. The appeals are allowed. In view of the order passed in C.A.NO.1336/2006 and C.A. NO.1362/2006, this appeal is dismissed. No costs.
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2008 (3) TMI 776
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... ... ..... t. The court below committed an illegality in refusing maintenance to the wife without taking note of the difference. The petitioner is entitled to get an order for maintenance allowance from her husband and the order rejecting her claim is unsustainable. In the result, considering the means of the husband, the need of the wife, the long period of the neglect etc., I pass an order directing the respondent-husband to make and pay maintenance allowance at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month from the date of disposal of the maintenance petition by the curt below. It is however, made clear that if the respondent makes any 'offer' as referred to in Section 125(3) of the code, it will be still open to the court below to consider the same at that stage and pass appropriate orders. There will be also no bar for the respondent to apply for cancellation of this order under Section 125(5), if there are sufficient grounds to do so, and if so advised. The Revision Petition is allowed.
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2008 (3) TMI 775
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... ... ..... rocedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. 9. For the reasons aforementioned, we answer the reference thus "No time could be fixed for filing applications under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act for sending the disputed signature or writings to the handwriting expert for comparison and opinion and same shall be left open to the discretion of the court; for exercising such discretion when exigencies so demand, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the each case." In view of answering the reference, post the revision petition before the learned Judge for disposal.
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2008 (3) TMI 774
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... ... ..... concerned, the issue is covered by the judgment of this Court in Income-tax Appeal No.296 of 2001 decided on 29.1.2008 (The CIT V/s. M/s. Hero Textiles & Trading Ltd.,). 3. In the light of the above, Motion alongwith Appeal dismissed.
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2008 (3) TMI 773
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... ... ..... ailway servant must get an opportunity to explain the circumstances appearing against him. In this case he has been denied from the said opportunity. The cumulative effect of the illegalities/irregularities were required to be taken into consideration to judge as to whether the departmental proceeding stood vitiated or not. 27. For the aforementioned purpose, the manner in which the enquiry proceeding was conducted was required to be taken into consideration by the High Court. The trap was not conduced in terms of the Manual; the Enquiry Officer acted as a Prosecutor and not as an independent quasi judicial authority; he did not comply with Rule 9(21) of the Rules, evidently, therefore, it was not a case where the order of the Tribunal warranted interference at the hands of the High Court. The impugned judgment, therefore, cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly and that of the Tribunal restored. The appeal is allowed with costs. Counsel fee assessed at Rs. 25,000/-.
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2008 (3) TMI 772
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... ... ..... iate Court. The trial will commence from the stage at which it was when the order of stay was passed by this Court. The petitioner who is the son of the deceased in the peculiar facts of the case is permitted to suggest two names to function as public prosecutor. Similarly, two names shall be given by the respondent-State. It shall be for the learned Sessions Judge, Nagpur to appoint a public prosecutor from the names to be suggested. The fees and other expenses of the public prosecutor shall be borne by the State of M.P. It shall be open to the public prosecutor to be appointed to seek recall of any witness already examined in terms of Section 311 of Code. This shall be in addition to PWs. 32, 33 and 34 about whom directions have been given earlier in this order. 19. The Transfer Petition is accordingly disposed of. In view of the orders passed in T.P.(Crl.) 175 of 2007, no further order is necessary to be passed in W.P.(Crl.) 173 of 2006 and same is accordingly disposed of.
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2008 (3) TMI 771
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... ... ..... med on the basis of the internal audit report for the year from 1981-82 and 1987-88 when he was working as Executive Engineer at Ooty and even though time was granted by this Court in the above writ proceedings to conclude the enquiry, the respondents have failed to complete the enquiry and pass final orders. On the other hand, taking into consideration the date of retirement, two days before his retirement once again he was placed under suspension and was not allowed to retire from service on the ground of pendency of departmental proceedings, which is contrary to the above said G.Os. and orders passed by this Court . Therefore, the order passed by the learned single Judge in the contempt proceedings is beyond the scope of the contempt proceedings. Therefore, on the basis of the order passed in the contempt petition, the impugned orders are liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the impugned order is set aside and the Writ appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
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2008 (3) TMI 770
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... ... ..... claration of invalidity of the sale executed in respect of immovable property situate in Village Pataudi, Gurgaon, could not entirely be obtained by personal obedience to the decree by the defendants in the suit. It was further held that applying the test laid down therein, it is clear that the present suit could not be brought within the purview of the proviso to Section 16 of the Code or entertained relying on Section 20 of the Code on the basis that three out of the five defendants are residing within the jurisdiction of the court at Delhi. 23. In view of the above facts and circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the Delhi court would not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide the aforesaid suits. Consequently, we hold that the decision rendered by the learned Single judge cannot be upheld. The same is accordingly set aside and quashed. 24. The appeals are allowed. Accordingly, the plaint be returned to the plaintiff in accordance with law.
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2008 (3) TMI 769
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... ... ..... he proceedings were vitiated, the authorities should be given the option to proceed further by issuing fresh notice. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, submitted that since the convict has admittedly expired in the meantime, issuance of notice at this stage would be redundant. 21.We do not think it is necessary to resolve this question as to whether notice under Section 6(1) can be issued to the legal representatives after the death of the convict. Leaving such question open, we observe that it would be open to the authorities, if they are so advised, to initiate fresh proceedings in accordance with law. However, as already observed, the question as to whether such a notice can be issued under Section 6(1) after the death of the convict is a matter left open to be agitated at the appropriate time if the occasion so arises. 22.Subject to the aforesaid observation, the writ petitions are allowed. No costs. Connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.
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2008 (3) TMI 768
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... ... ..... vidence led in the court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings. See Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar AIR1990SC494a , State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma 1991CriLJ1438 , Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill 1996CriLJ381 , State of Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan 1999CriLJ1623 , State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma 1996CriLJ1878 , Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada (1997)2SCC397 , Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) AIR1999SC3596 and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi 1999CriLJ1833 The above position was again reiterated in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa 2002CriLJ998 , State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta 2004CriLJ598 and State of Orissa v. Saroj Kr. Sahoo (2005)13SCC540 . 9. In view of the position of law highlighted above the impugned order is indefensible and is set aside. The appeal is allowed but without any order as to costs.
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2008 (3) TMI 767
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... ... ..... e deed. Since there is no automatic merger of the interest of a lessee with that of a mortgagee when the same person is the lessee as well as the mortgagee, in absence of proof of surrender of the lease by the defendant, on redemption of the mortgage, the plaintiff is not entitled automatically to recover possession of the leased premises. The defendant's right to continue in possession as a lessee, therefore, continues to subsist. 16. We are concerned here with a converse case. The case as to whether the interest of a lessee merged with the interest of a mortgagee would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case, as indicated in Gopalan Krishna Murti. There cannot be any hard and fast rule for arriving at only one decision as the decision thereupon will depend upon the terms of the document. 17. For the aforementioned reasons, there is no merit in the appeal. The same is dismissed accordingly. In the facts of the case, there shall, however, be no order as to costs.
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