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FEMA - Case Laws
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2014 (10) TMI 885
Condonation of delay - Held that:- From the perusal of the Impugned Orders that proceedings were held ex parte. The show cause notices were served by affixation. The cause for delay in instituting the appeal after a gap of more than seven years appears to us to be sufficient and convincing. There is no proof on record that the show cause notices or the Adjudication Orders were duly served upon the applicants/appellants. The delay condonation applications are supported by uncontroverted affidavits. In this view of the matter, the applications deserve to be allowed.
Consequently, the applications in all the appeals noted herein above are allowed and the delay in filing the instant appeals is condoned. Registry is directed to register the appeals and list the appeals on 17-12-2014.
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2014 (10) TMI 527
Revocation of appellant's Passport - penalty on the appellant under Section 13 of FEMA for having contravened the provisions of Section 37 of FEMA read with Section 131(1) and 272A(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. - Held that:- officers under the Income-tax Act have the same powers as are vested in a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to try a suit in respect of inter alia discovery and inspection, enforcing the attendance of any person, including any officer of a bank / company and examining him on oath and compelling the production of books of accounts and other documents.
Because the appellant had not appeared before the Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement pursuant to the said summonses, the said Assistant Director had filed a complaint under Section 16(3) of FEMA on 16.09.2010. That complaint has led to a show cause notice being issued by the Directorate of Enforcement on 20.09.2010 and adjudication in respect thereof is pending. So, this much is clear that the written complaint under Section 16(3) of FEMA with regard to the appellant's non-compliance with the summonses is pending before the Adjudicating Authority under FEMA. A show cause notice was also issued by the Adjudicating Authority on 20.09.2010 wherein the appellant was required to appear in person or through legal practitioner / chartered accountant duly authorised by the appellant. This was in consonance with the stipulation contained in Section 16(4) of FEMA which clearly enables the person against whom the complaint has been made to appear either in person or take the assistance of a legal practitioner or a chartered accountant of his choice for presenting his case before the Adjudicating Authority.
On the basis of the material available on record, the complaint under Section 16(3) of FEMA which was registered on 16.09.2010 has been followed by a show cause notice dated 20.09.2010 which essentially requires the appellant to show cause as to why an inquiry should not be held. The matter has not progressed beyond that stage. In fact, nothing has been brought to our notice to indicate that the Adjudicating Authority has formed any opinion that an inquiry should be held and that an inquiry has in fact been held. In any event, it is an admitted position that no adjudication order imposing a penalty pursuant to the complaint dated 16.09.2010 has been passed by the Adjudicating Authority under FEMA as yet.
Revocation of the appellant's passport was based on the letter dated 04.10.2010 received by the Regional Passport Officer from the Directorate of Enforcement to the effect that a complaint dated 16.09.2010 under Section 13 of FEMA had been filed against the appellant and that a show cause notice had been issued against the appellant by the Directorate of Enforcement on 20.09.2010 for non-compliance of summonses issued by them. We may recall that complaint dated 16.09.2010 which had been filed under Section16(3) of FEMA.
At the time the revocation order was passed, the appellant was already abroad in the U.K. The direct consequence of the revocation order was that the appellant could not travel to any country outside of the U.K. He could not attend any conferences or meetings in any other country where he could have expressed his views on cricket or on the organization and administration of cricket. To that extent it can be said that the 'direct and inevitable' consequence of the revocation order was to impinge upon his freedom of speech and expression. Now, this could be legitimate if the revocation order could be said to be in the interests of the general public, of course, limited to the interests of 'public order, decency or morality'. The alleged infraction on the part of the appellant could hardly be stated to fall foul of 'public order, decency or morality'. Therefore, in our view, the revocation order was invalid.
The "public interest" allegedly involved, as evident from the appellate order dated 31.10.2011, was that cricket was the most popular sport in India and a huge public sentiment was attached to it and, therefore, it was in 'public interest' that the case against the appellant was properly investigated for which the "interrogation" of the appellant was considered necessary. This kind of 'public interest' does not fall in the categories of "public order, decency or morality" and, therefore, cannot be used as a shield against invalidity which would naturally follow on account of a restriction on the freedom of speech and expression.
Therefore, the observations of the authorities below with regard to the allegations of FEMA violations against the appellant ought to be disregarded in the context of the revocation order. But, the matter does not end here because, in our view, these allegations had an impact on the decision making process of the Regional Passport Officer as well as the Chief Passport Officer inasmuch as they have both referred to the allegations to indicate that it was in 'public interest' that the passport of the appellant be revoked. In other words, the authorities under the Passports Act, while revoking the passport of the appellant, examined and were influenced by materials which were not relevant or germane and were not specified in the show cause notice dated 15.10.2010. The only 'subject-matter' of the show cause notice was the 'non-compliance of summons' issued by the Directorate of Enforcement, Mumbai.
Since there is a specific procedure and there are specific statutory provisions for any default in non-compliance with summonses under FEMA itself read with relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act and the CPC, the revocation of the appellant's passport for that so-called default (which is yet to be adjudicated upon), on the ground that it was in the interests of the general public, was not lawful - Court set aside the impugned judgment dated 16.01.2013 and, consequently, the orders dated 31.10.2011 and 03.03.2011 passed by the respondent Nos.2 and 3. As a result, the revocation of the appellant's passport is set aside and the passport stands restored. - Decided in favour of appellant.
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2014 (10) TMI 404
Contravention of Sections 9 (1) (b), 9 (1) (c) and 9 (1) (d) read with Section 64 (2) of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1973 - Remission of amount from abroad - Held that:- ED itself is not clear whether the declaration made by Mr. Sri Chawla in Bangkok could be termed as a statement under Section 40 of FERA. It is not shown that the procedure envisaged under FERA was followed while recording the said declaration. In any event, Mr. Sri Chawla only talks of payment being made to two persons who met him on behalf of Mr. Rakesh Jain. The payment is purportedly made for the purchase of land. The sale deeds show that the purchaser was OEPL and the seller was ACPL. The said statement, therefore, does not help in proceeding only against Mr. Rakesh Jain, if no proceedings had been initiated against ACPL, which is the true beneficiary. While the declaration of Mr. Sri Chawla may, more or less, corroborate the statement of Mr. Rakesh Jain as regards the total amount paid, the statement of Mr. Madan does not corroborate either statement.
AT has relied on material that was not part of the record of the case. In particular, while the AO correctly notes that the Investigation Officer had not conducted any inquiry to ascertain the fair price and has also taken note of the order of the CIT and on that basis held that the SCN is not supported by proper evidence, the AT appears to have not referred to the proceedings under the Income Tax Act, 1961 at all. The conclusion of the AT that there was payment over and above the sale consideration shown in the sale deed, appears to be based on the AT taking 'judicial notice' of the price of agricultural land in the vicinity of Gurgaon on the basis that it is an 'adjacent area'. No such plea was advanced by any of the parties before the AT. The Appellants are, therefore, justified in their criticism of the impugned order of the AT for travelling well beyond the scope of its revisional jurisdiction and adjudicating upon factual matters for which there was no basis in the record.
The Court is unable to sustain the impugned order dated 3rd June 2008 of the AT and restores the AO dated 6th January 2000. The appeals are accordingly allowed, but in the circumstances, with no order as to costs. The amounts deposited by the Appellants shall be refunded to them within a period of eight weeks in accordance with law - Decided in favour of assessee.
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2014 (10) TMI 367
Violation of Section 9(1)(b) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 - Confiscation of seized amount - Imposition of penalty - Appellate Board set aside confiscation and ordered refund of penalty whereas High Court upheld the same - Held that:- There is no doubt whatsoever, that no reliance has been placed on the alleged statement made by the appellant on 20.4.1989 before the officers of the Enforcement Directorate, in the memorandum dated 12.3.1990. Per se, therefore, it was not open to the authorities to place reliance on the aforesaid statement, while proceeding to take penal action against the appellant, in furtherance of the aforesaid memorandum dated 12.3.1990. The mere fact that he was not proceeded against, prima facie establishes, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that the assertion made by the appellant to the effect that he never made such statement, had remained unrefuted.
Even though the aforesaid excuse may have been valid, if the allegation was, that the record of the statement made on 20.4.1989, was not available with the officers of Enforcement Department at the time of the raid on 25.10.1989, yet to state that the aforesaid record was not available when the second statement was made on 26.10.1989 at the office of the Enforcement Directorate, is quite ununderstandable. It is pertinent to mention, that the second statement was recorded by the Chief Enforcement Officer when the appellant – A. - in the absence of having established through cogent evidence, that the appellant had made the above statement dated 20.4.1989, it was not open to the Enforcement Directorate to place reliance on the same, for establishing the charges levelled against the appellant in memorandum dated 12.3.1990.
Had the statements of the appellant and his wife been corroborated by independent evidence of the nature indicated hereinabove, there could have been room for accepting the veracity of the statements made by the appellant – A. Tajudeen and his wife T. Sahira Banu to the officers of the Enforcement Directorate. Unfortunately, no effort was made by the Enforcement Directorate to gather any independent evidence to establish the veracity of the allegations levelled against the appellant, through the memorandum dated 12.3.1990. We are of the considered view, that the officers of the Enforcement Directorate were seriously negligent in gathering independent evidence of a corroborative nature. We have therefore no hesitation in concluding that the retracted statements made by the appellant and his wife could not constitute the exclusive basis to determine the culpability of the appellant.
Charge against the appellant under Section 9(1)(b) of the 1973 Act, cannot be established on the basis of newspaper sheets, in which the money was wrapped. The newspaper sheets relied upon, would not establish that the amount recovered from the residence of the appellant – A. Tajudeen was dispatched by Abdul Hameed from Singapore, through a person who was not an authorized dealer. - impugned judgment passed by the High Court deserves to be set aside. The same is accordingly hereby set aside. Resultantly, the entire action taken by the Enforcement Directorate against the appellant in furtherance of the memorandum dated 12.3.1990, is also set aside. As a consequence of the above, the Enforcement Directorate is directed to forthwith refund the confiscated sum of ₹ 8,24,900/-, to the appellant, as also, to return the amount of ₹ 1,00,000/-, which was deposited by the appellant as penalty - Decided in favour of appellant.
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