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Showing 1 to 20 of 1495 Records
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2021 (12) TMI 1495
CENVAT Credit - by-product - Ammonium Sulphate arising during the course of manufacture of final product, namely, Potassium Cyanides, Sodium Cyanides - Applicability of Rule 6(3) of Cenvat Credit Rules - HELD THAT:- The issue is that whether Ammonium Sulphate is a by-product and whether Rule 6(3) is applicable in respect of clearance of such by-product. This issue has been considered by this Tribunal in the appellant’s own case of M/s Hindustan Chemical Company, wherein the Tribunal has held that The appellant through technical certificates/opinions has fairly established that during the course of manufacture of finished goods, what emerges is Ammonium Sulphate as a by-product and no contrary opinion/evidence adduced by Revenue.
In view of the above decision of this Tribunal since the issue has been settled that Ammonium Sulphate being a by-product arising in the course of manufacture of final product, the demand under Rule 6(3) is not applicable.
The impugned order is set aside - appeal is allowed.
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2021 (12) TMI 1494
Breach of principles of natural justice - Assessment order passed without even considering the submissions in writing submitted and without granting a personal hearing - HELD THAT:- It is one of those blatant cases of breach of principles of natural justice and total non application of mind. In the assessment order, the AO is referring to a show cause notice dated 12th April 2021 by which the DAO proposed modification in returned income and petitioner's initial reply seeking an adjournment of the hearing but conveniently chooses to ignore the reply filed by petitioner on 23rd April 2021 showing cause as to why the modification in returned income should not be made.
We see no reason why we should wait for respondents to file any reply and prolong the agony of petitioner and also waste precious judicial time. If the AO had only considered the file properly and dealt with the reply dated 23rd April 2021, then the need for petitioner to approach this Court would not have arisen. Ignoring the reply and forcing petitioner to approach this Court is again adding to the docket of the already overburdened Court. Hence, it is fit case, in our view, to impose cost on the concerned officer, who shall pay a sum of Rs.5,000/- as donation from his / her personal account to P. M. Cares Fund.
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2021 (12) TMI 1493
Nomination of Judicial and Technical Members for Kochi Bench as well as for Chennai Court No.2 - HELD THAT:- It is relevant to place on record that prior to the order dated 03.12.2021, one Technical Member was working half day for Chennai Bench No.2 and half day for Kochi Bench. However, after the order dated 03.12.2021, both the Benches of the Chennai National Company Law Tribunal are fully functional.
The writ petition has become infructuous, however, it is left open for the petitioner to pursue the matter with regard to Third Bench of the National Company Law Tribunal at Chennai, in due course of time, keeping in mind the pendency of cases.
The writ petition is disposed off.
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2021 (12) TMI 1492
Admission of additional grounds of appeal filed under Rule 11 of Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 - legal issue of jurisdiction u/s 147 challenged - Deduction u/s 80IA - AO noticed that the assessee has claimed excess deduction by including income which would not qualify for deduction u/s 80IA - Revenue has challenged deletion of addition made towards foreign exchange fluctuation claimed by the assessee - HELD THAT:- Before us, by filing petition for admission of additional grounds of appeal filed under Rule 11 of Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, assessee has submitted that the assessee is challenging the legal issue of jurisdiction under section 147 of the Act, since, against the original assessment order dated 26.12.2008, the assessee preferred an appeal and vide order dated 24.02.2012, the ld.CIT(A) has allowed deduction under section 80IA of the Act to the extent of ₹.14,11,72,786/- as against the claim of ₹.14,28,54,064/-, which was confirmed by the ITAT in an appeal filed by the Revenue in [2017 (1) TMI 1830 - ITAT CHENNAI] as well as the Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court vide [2019 (4) TMI 861 - MADRAS HIGH COURT] on further appeal, thereby the issue of eligibility of 80IA relief attained finality.
As contended that no reason was stated by the AO while issuing notice under section 148 of the Act and thus, the reassessment proceedings is bad in law and prayed for suitable directions. The petition filed under Rule 11 of Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 has been admitted. Since the assessee has not raised the legal issue before the ld. CIT(A), we set aside the appellate order and remit the matter back to the file of the ld. CIT(A) to decide the legal issue and thereafter the claim of deductions under section 80IA of the Act, if any, afresh in accordance with law after affording a meaningful opportunity of being heard to the assessee. Appeals filed by the assessee as well as Revenue are allowed for statistical purposes.
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2021 (12) TMI 1491
Refund of the amounts which was deducted by the Chennai Corporation for the Works Contract rendered by the petitioner for the Chennai Corporation.
It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner has rendered works contract for Chennai Corporation and that there was a delay on the part of the Chennai Corporation issuing Form T, as a result of which, the tax which was deducted by the Chennai Corporation and paid to the Revenue which could not be adjusted against the tax liability of the petitioner.
HELD THAT:- Considering the fact that the representations dated 07.11.2018 and 02.07.2021 of the petitioner has not evoked any response from the respondents, this Writ Petition is disposed at the the time of admission without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case by directing the respondents to pass appropriate orders on the representations of the petitioner within a period of forty five days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
Petition disposed off.
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2021 (12) TMI 1490
Fraudulent and unlawful withdrawal from bank account - Unauthorised premature encashment of the two FDRs - whether a case is made out for interference by this Court in the concurrent findings of the Courts below? - whether conviction of the present Appellant for offences Under Sections 409, 420 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code as well as Under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act is sustainable?
Fraudulent and unlawful withdrawal of Rs. 10 Lakhs from Account No. 282 in the year 1994 - HELD THAT:- In order to substantiate the charge Under Section 477-A Indian Penal Code, the primary contention of the Prosecution is that despite passing the three cheques (Ex P25 to Ex P27), the Appellant did not make the relevant entries into the Current Account Ledger (Ex P23) of account No. 282. This was allegedly done to conceal the withdrawals as there were insufficient funds in the account of the Academy. We may note that the expression 'intent to defraud' as given Under Section of 477-A, contains two elements, deceit and injury. So far as the second element is concerned, it has already been noted that no financial injury was caused to the Bank.
It is also alleged that the afore-said amount of Rs. 10 lakh was collected by the Appellant. The prosecution witnesses have deposed that the operating procedure at the Bank entailed that the signature of the person who received the cheque would be recorded on the back side of the cheque. Two incriminating circumstances have come on record in so far as this allegation is concerned. First, as deposed by PW-2, and corroborated by PW-10, the signature on the back of the cheque did not tally with that of Accused No. 3. Second, the signature of the wife of the Appellant- N. Lalitha, appears on the back of Ex. P25. Undoubtedly, this raises a suspicion. But as can also be seen from the record, there are contradictions on this point as well. PW-4 has acknowledged that the payment for the three cheques was received by the Appellant and he subsequently handed over the same to Accused No. 3, who at the relevant time, was waiting in the office room of the Appellant. Further, neither of the courts below have recorded a finding that the Appellant gained any pecuniary benefit nor is there any other adverse circumstance which may lead us to reach such a conclusion.
Unauthorised premature encashment of the two FDRs belonging to B. Satyajit Reddy - HELD THAT:- In the case in hand, the Appellant in his examination Under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure has neither disputed the factum of the premature withdrawal, nor of the subsequent transfer of the amount to account No. 282. On the contrary, he has specifically claimed that he only acted on the written request made by the customer. The Appellant has fortified his assertion by producing two letters (Ex P6 and Ex P7) statedly written by B. Satyajit Reddy and addressed to the Branch Manager. The deposition of the handwriting expert (PW-10) has given some credence to the Appellant's version as according to his opinion, both the letters bear the signature(s) of B. Satyajit Reddy.
There is a serious dispute on the factum of whether or not B. Satyajit Reddy had sought the premature withdrawal and the subsequent transfer of the proceeds of FDRs to the account of Academy. The best person to clear the air and enlighten us would have been B. Satyajit Reddy himself, but neither was he associated during the course of inquiry/audit or the investigation nor was he examined as a prosecution witness in the trial - There was, thus, sufficient time to contact a valuable customer like B. Satyajit Reddy and enquire about the genuineness of those letters. The Chairman of the Bank (PW-1) in his complaint to CBI dated 27.11.1995 (Ex P1) did not make even a bald allegation about genuineness of these two letters which were already in his possession. Unfortunately, CBI too made no effort to contact B. Satyajit Reddy and ascertain the correct facts. There is indeed no quarrel that no financial loss was caused to B. Satyajit Reddy.
The Prosecution has failed to establish the charge of criminal breach of trust against the Appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. We are inclined to agree with the learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant that the non-examination of B. Satyajit Reddy has been materially fatal to the case of the prosecution - in the absence of cogent and unimpeachable evidence to prove that the Appellant has misappropriated the funds of the Bank and/or of B. Satyajit Reddy, it would not be safe to convict him under the provisions of Section 409 Indian Penal Code.
So far as the charge Under Section 420 Indian Penal Code is concerned, once again, the best and the only person who could throw light on whether or not he had voluntarily agreed to transfer his FDR amount in the account of the Academy or there was an element of inducement, cheating or a false promise, was B. Satyajit Reddy himself who has chosen not to enter the witness box. In the absence of even an ordinary complaint by B. Satyajit Reddy regarding misuse of his FDRs, it will be too far-fetched to hold that the Appellant had any mens rea to deceive or to misappropriate or destroy valuable property of B. Satyajit Reddy.
Thus, to conclude, no financial loss was caused to the Bank - no pecuniary loss was caused to B. Satyajit Reddy or to any other customer of the Bank - the material does not disclose any conspiracy between the Accused persons. In the absence of any reliable evidence that could unfold a prior meeting of minds, the High Court erred in holding that Appellant and other Accused orchestrated the transactions in question to extend an undue benefit to Accused No. 3 - the Appellant committed gross misconduct by misusing his position as the Branch Manager. Notwithstanding the final outcome, the Appellant's abuse of powers clearly put the Bank at the risk of financial loss - despite dereliction of his duties, none of the acts proved against the Appellant constitute 'criminal misconduct' or fall under the ambit of Sections 409, 420 and 477-A Indian Penal Code.
Thus, the prosecution has failed to prove the charges Under Sections 409, 420 and 477A Indian Penal Code against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt. As a necessary corollary thereto, his conviction Under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act can also not be sustained. However, the benefit of doubt being extended to him on account of a thin margin between 'strong suspicion' and 'conclusive proof', shall not entitle him to initiate a second round of lis to seek his reinstatement or to claim other service benefits from the Bank.
Appeal disposed off.
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2021 (12) TMI 1489
Violation of principles of natural justice - impugned orders contain no reasons in support of their conclusion (non-speaking order) - Declaration of petitioners as Wilful Defaulter - Company was classified as a Non-Performing Asset (NPA) - petitioners filed their response to the show-cause notice but did not object to the issue of show-cause notice by the DGM - HELD THAT:- The impugned orders in the present case have recorded conclusions without indicating the reasons in support of the same - The reasons must reflect some application of mind to the submissions made in the response to the show-cause notice failing which an impression is legitimately created that there is no consideration of such submissions.
As noted, even para no. 3(b) of the Master Circular provides for consideration of such submissions before making the order declaring a person or an entity as a wilful defaulter and the record of reasons in support of the conclusion - In the precise context of the Master Circular dated 01.07.2015, the Division Bench of this Court in M/S. KANCHAN MOTORS AND OTHERS VERSUS BANK OF INDIA AND OTHERS [2018 (7) TMI 1909 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] was pleased to set aside the orders made by the WDIC and the Review Committee because such orders were found to be non-reasoned or non-speaking orders. The Division Bench did not approve the practice of simply recording conclusions without any reasons to back the same. The Division Bench observed that the absence of reasons in the order of the Review Committee amounts to a denial of justice since it is now well-settled that reasons are live links between the minds of decision taker to the controversy in question and the decision or conclusion arrived at. Reasons substitute subjectivity for objectivity so that the affected party can know why the decision has gone against him.
The impugned orders are set aside mainly on the ground that they contain no reasons in support of their conclusion and in that sense are non-speaking orders - The respondents are granted liberty to proceed from the stage of issuance of show-cause notice dated 22.10.2020 and make such orders as may be appropriate in terms of the Master Circular dated 01.07.2015 - petition allowed.
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2021 (12) TMI 1488
Liquidation of the Respondent - liquidation sought on the ground that the Respondent committed a breach of the terms of sanctioned rehabilitation scheme duly approved by Appellate Authority for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (AAIFR) - whether the sanctioned scheme can be treated as the Resolution Plan within the meaning of Section 5(26) of the IBC, 2016? - HELD THAT:- This Adjudicating Authority had never considered the point whether the notification dated 24.05.2017 is valid or not. The judgment of the Hon'ble NCLAT in the case of Pr. Director General of Income Tax (Admn. & TPS) Vs. M/s. Spartek Ceramics India Ltd. & Anr. [2018 (6) TMI 350 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, NEW DELHI] and further the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Spartek Ceramics India Ltd. Vs. Union of India [2018 (10) TMI 1660 - SUPREME COURT] were never placed before this Adjudicating Authority for consideration. This Adjudicating Authority had given the above advisory without considering the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as it was not brought to the notice of the Adjudicating Authority. So, this order of the Adjudicating Authority cannot be relied on - The sanctioned scheme of rehabilitation dated 07.01.2005 cannot be termed as the Resolution Plan within the meaning of Section 5(26) of the IBC, 2016 - the issue answered in negative.
Maintainability of application under Section 33(4) of the IBC, 2016 - HELD THAT:- The sanctioned scheme of rehabilitation is not the Resolution Plan within the meaning of Section 5(26) of the IBC, 2016 - there is no question of the Respondent committing the breach of implementing any of such plan, hence, this application under Section 33(4) of the IBC, 2016 is not maintainable.
Even otherwise, the sanctioned scheme under Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal Act, 2003 cannot be considered as Resolution Plan because the said scheme had not been approved by the Committee of Creditors in terms of sub-section (4) of Section 30 of IBC, 2016 which is the mandate of law - Since the approved Scheme dated 07.01.2005 cannot be treated as the Resolution Plan within the meaning of Section 5(26) of the IBC, 2016, we hold that there is no question of breach of its implementation as alleged by the Applicant herein - Issue answered in negative.
Petition dismissed.
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2021 (12) TMI 1487
Violation of principles of natural justice - registration of F.I.Rs in connection with the matrimonial offences without embarking upon any preliminary enquiry - HELD THAT:- The judgment in THE STATE OF TELANGANA VERSUS HABIB ABDULLAH JEELANI AND ORS. [2017 (1) TMI 1683 - SUPREME COURT] is not applicable in the present case since in that case the F.I.R. was registered under Sections 147,148,149 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The said case, therefore, did not come within the purview of paragraph 120.6 of the Lalita Kumari case - Though paragraph 120.6 does not suggest that preliminary enquiry is to be mandatorily held with regard to the types of cases mentioned therein, the investigating agencies should not be allowed to do away with the preliminary enquiry in such types of cases without any justifiable reason.
The investigating agency in such cases ordinarily should conduct a preliminary enquiry unless it is not shown that immediate registration of FIR would defeat the very purpose of investigation or conducting a preliminary enquiry will be an empty formality.
The State has failed to justify the registration of the F.I.Rs without conducting the preliminary enquiry in both the cases - Accordingly, it is directed that the concerned police shall conduct the preliminary enquiry, in both the cases, within a period of three weeks from the date of communication of this order and upon preliminary enquiry if it is found that there exists sufficient grounds to carry out a fullfledged investigation, they shall proceed with the investigation in terms of Section 156 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The two F.I.Rs shall be kept in abeyance till conclusion of the preliminary enquiry.
Application disposed off.
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2021 (12) TMI 1486
Permitting the request of grant of installments of the liability arisen in SVLDRS-3 - Issuance of show cause notice without pre-consultation notice - whether the show cause notices dated 24.09.2020 and 23.09.2021 would require any indulgence? - HELD THAT:- It is quite apparent from the chronology of the events that the petitioner was subjected to the search and afterwards when the respondent has come out with the SVLDR Scheme in the year 2019, the last date of payment of dues by the declarant under sub-section (5) of Section 127 was eventually fixed at 28.02.2021.
When the Court noticed that the outstanding dues from the various government authorities is of more than Rs. 1.22 crores (rounded off) in a period like this, when the request is made for making payment, if in the past the petitioner could not make the same on account of the outstanding dues of the government authorities, which he could not recover due to pandemic, his request could have been considered sympathetically and bearing in mind all these surrounding circumstances. In absence of such consideration on the part of the respondent, the Court needs to intervene.
Issuance of show cause notice without pre-consultation notice - HELD THAT:- The CBEC Master Circular dated 10.03.2017 provides for the preconsultation as a mandatory requirement as can be traced to Section 83 of the Finance Act. The instructions issued by the CBEC as per Section 37(B) of the Central Excise Act would be binding on the authorities of the department. The statutory circulars would be binding upon the department so long as they are not inconsistent with statutory provisions nor mitigate the rigor of the law - In the instant case also, there is no adherence to the said circular by adapting the pre-consultation as contemplated under the circular. This itself is the reason for the Court to quash and set aside the show cause notices. Thus, not only on the ground of absence of pre-consultation before issuance of the show cause notice but also from the discussion held hereinabove in respect of need for the intervention on nongrant of any installment for making payment, the Court is inclined to allow this petition.
The petitioner is permitted to make payment under the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019 within a period of six (6) weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order with statutory interest at the rate prescribed thereon from the first date of his application which he has not abided by - petition allowed.
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2021 (12) TMI 1485
Wilful Defaulters - petitioners are unable to defend themselves as they are not aware about the reasons for such declaration (of wilful defaulters) - opportunity of hearing not provided to the petitioners - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- It is incumbent upon the Identification Committee to provide an opportunity of personal hearing to the borrower and promoter, whole time director or the persons, who are to be considered as willful defaulter and the decision of such Identification Committee is to be reviewed by any other Committee, which is Review Committee as per Clause-3(c) of the Master Circular.
The Apex Court in case of STATE BANK OF INDIA VERSUS M/S. JAH DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD. & ORS. [2019 (5) TMI 862 - SUPREME COURT] while denying the right to be represented by a lawyer in the in-house proceedings contained in Para 3 of the Revised Circular dated 01.07.2015, has held that Revised Circular, being in public interest, must be construed reasonably.
The respondent bank has failed to comply with the aforesaid mechanism provided under the Revised Master Circular as petitioners were never informed by the Identification Committee by issuing show cause notice and the notice was issued by the respondent bank to which the petitioners filed detailed reply but the order passed by the Identification Committee recording that the petitioners have committed willful default was never provided to the petitioners. The petitioners came to know about declaring them as willful defaulter only from the website of CIBIL - the respondent bank while declaring the petitioners as willful defaulter has violated the provisions contained in the Revised Master Circular and has also acted in violation of principles of natural justice. As the impugned action which is penal in nature has been taken causing serious implication to the petitioners without following the basis of principles of natural justice, the impugned action of the respondent bank identifying the account of the petitioners as willful default and subsequent reporting of name of the petitioners to the RBI/CIBIL as willful defaulters are liable to be quashed and set aside.
The impugned action of the respondent bank identifying the account of the petitioners as willful defaulters and subsequent reporting of the names of the petitioners to RBI/CIBIL as willful defaulters is hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Identification Committee of the respondent bank to follow the procedure as prescribed in Master Circular dated 1st July, 2015 by issuing a show cause notice to the petitioners and providing opportunity to the petitioners as per Clause-3 of the said circular.
Petition allowed by way of remand.
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2021 (12) TMI 1484
Violation of a principle of natural justice - no opportunity to explain and tender the proof that at the time of its striking off the Company was in operation, was given to his client - HELD THAT:- Petitioner might approach the Tribunal to contend that impugned order be amended on the Tribunal not having allowed his client to adduce evidence of the company being in operation, in context of the report having said that his client may be put to strict proof. If the Tribunal is satisfied, it may amend impugned order. The amendment can be made within two years from date of order, so there is still time. Petitioner has not preferred appeal and, therefore, still entitled to approach the Tribunal.
The writ petition is disposed of.
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2021 (12) TMI 1483
Refund of the amount deposited being 25% of the auction sale consideration - HELD THAT:- The High Court ought to have allowed the refund of the amount deposited being 25% of the auction sale consideration. Considering the fact that though initially the appellant deposited 25% of the auction sale consideration, however, subsequently she could not deposit balance 75% due to COVID-19 pandemic. It is required to be noted that subsequently the fresh auction has taken place and the property has been sold. It is not the case of the respondents that in the subsequent sale, lesser amount is received. Thus, as such, there is no loss caused to the respondents.
The order of forfeiture of 25% of the amount of auction sale consideration is set aside - the respondent Bank are directed to refund/return the amount earlier deposited by the appellant, deposited as the part auction sale consideration (minus 50,000/- towards the expenditure which were required to be incurred by the respondent Bank for conducting the fresh auction) within a period of four weeks from today - appeal allowed.
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2021 (12) TMI 1482
Validity of Reopening of assessment - non consideration of all the submissions of petitioner as objections to the notice issued u/s 148 - HELD THAT:- As per petitioner if the Court could direct the AO to hear petitioner personally then petitioner could explain to him, before fresh order on objections is passed, and make all submissions before the concerned officer and the Court may then dispose the petition in the above terms.
Revenue leaves it to the Court but states that the Court should not make any observation on the merits of the matter. The request revenue is justified. Therefore, the order dated 20th November 2019 is quashed and set aside.
AO is directed to reconsider the submissions made by petitioner in its letter dated 9th April 2019 in response to the notice issued u/s 148 of the said Act, grant personal hearing to petitioner and thereafter, pass his order in accordance with law within six weeks from today. We clarify that we have not made any observations on the merits of the case.
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2021 (12) TMI 1481
Reopening of assessment - claim made u/s 80IA was rejected for the reason that the conditions laid down by the said provision are not fulfilled - HELD THAT:- Revenue carried the matter in Appeal before this Court and this Court in [2011 (9) TMI 1251 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT], dismissed Revenue’s Appeal relying upon in [2011 (2) TMI 1625 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT]. Therefore, the entire foundation for the proposed re-opening which could, even if considered to be a tangible material, has crumbled. Decided in favour of assessee.
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2021 (12) TMI 1480
Penalty u/s 271(1)(c) - true meaning of concealment of particulars of income and furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income under Section 271 - if, Assessing Officer has accepted the return of income as returned but later it is reassessed based on an order passed under Section 263 of the Act, can a penalty be imposed? - HELD THAT:- The court requested Mr. Madhur Agrawal as Amicus to assist the court. Ms Vissanji stated she will provide a copy of the Appeal Memo to Mr. Agrawal.
Liberty is given to appellant’s counsel to make a photocopy of the order when the substantial question of law was drawn.
The question mentioned above will also be considered as substantial question of law arising out of this Appeal and parties may address on the same on the next date. Stand over to 14th January 2022.
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2021 (12) TMI 1479
Pecuniary (monetary) Jurisdiction - future and pendente lite interest - whether interest claimed in the Statement of Claim can be taken into account for determining the “Specified Value” for the purposes of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court? - HELD THAT:- Merely because Section 12(1)(a) of the Commercial Courts Act specifically provides that the interest claimed till the date of filing of the suit is to be taken into account for determining the “Specified Value”, cannot detract from giving full effect to the “value of claim” in an arbitration for purposes of Section 12(2) of the Commercial Courts Act. It is settled principle of interpretation of statute that words of a statute are first understood in their natural and ordinary sense, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. In Section 12(2) of the Commercial Courts Act there are no reason to restrict the ambit and width of “value of claim” in arbitration from its natural meaning of including interest claimed till the date of invocation of arbitration.
The portion of interest claimed till the date of invocation of arbitration would therefore, have to be taken into consideration under Section 12(2) of the Commercial Courts Act for determining the “Aggregate Value” of the claim. There is no dispute, in the present case, that when such interest is added, the “Aggregate Value” of the claim would exceed ₹2,00,00,000/- (Rupees two crore) making the petition under Section 34 of the Act beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned District Court.
There are no infirmity in the Impugned Order - The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2021 (12) TMI 1478
Validity of Reopening of assessment - HELD THAT:- As Petitioner has chosen not to press this matter at this stage. We have chosen not to go into the merits of the matter. This disposal will not come in the way of the petitioner in pursuing other legal remedies.
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2021 (12) TMI 1477
Preferring an appeal u/s 246A - as argued if the petitioner is relegated to appellate authority, there will be hindrance in petitioner’s way as the limitation for filing the appeal has already passed - HELD THAT:- Present writ petition is disposed of with the direction to the petitioner to prefer an appeal before the appellate authority on or before 15.01.2022.
In case, appeal is preferred by 15.01.2022, the appellate authority shall consider the same, in accordance with law, ignoring the delay as the petitioner was bonafidely pursuing the present writ petition against the assessment order dated 20.07.2021.
Needless to observe that since this Court has not adjudicated on merit of the case, the petitioner will be free to raise all permissible grounds, including the ground in relation to special audit, in accordance with law.
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2021 (12) TMI 1476
Seeking an injunction and restraint order against the defendants from using, divulging, distributing, publishing, revealing or dealing with the proprietary information and trade secrets of the plaintiff - whether the period of limitation for fling of written statement, as contemplated under Order 8 Rule 1 of the CPC got automatically attended, since it is expired during the period of lockdown and to be precise on 09/05/2020?
HELD THAT:- A Similar argument was advanced before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of SAGUFA AHMED & ORS. VERSUS UPPER ASSAM PLYWOOD PRODUCTS PVT. LTD. & ORS. [2020 (9) TMI 713 - SUPREME COURT] qua the limitation for fling of an Appeal before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, on dismissal of the proceedings by the NCLT on 04/08/2020, Section 421 of the Companies Act, 2013 which provide an Appeal to the Tribunal, which shall be fled within a period of 45 days, from the date on which a copy of the order of Tribunal is made available. The proviso, however, permit the Tribunal to entertain an Appeal after expiry of the said period of 45 days, but within a further period not exceeding 45 days, on being satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from fling the Appeal within that period. In the said case, period of 45 days was over on 02/02/2020 and the attended period, which was the discretionary period, also expired on 18/03/2020, before which the Appeal was not fled, but the Appeal came to be fled only on 28/07/2020.
There are no other option is available to me in the facts of the given case. The statutory period of limitation within which the written statement could be fled in the present case came to be attended by the discretionary power of the Court and even the period of 120 days expired on 09/05/2020 and when the lockdown came to be imposed, ‘period of limitation’ having already expired, the benefit of the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court cannot be attended to the defendants. The learned Judge has committed no error in refusing to accept the written statement on record, holding that the defendants have forfeited their right to file the written statement, on expiry of period of 120 days.
Finding no legal infirmity in the impugned order, the same is upheld - petition dismissed.
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