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2018 (3) TMI 561 - HC - Companies LawWinding up petition - difficulties of non payment of the amount due and payable - Held that:- It is well settled that a contract of guarantee involves principally three parties namely the creditor, the surety and the principal debtor, where liability may be actual or prospective. Thus necessarily the ingredients of a contract of guarantee are clearly present in the option agreement which are reflected from the unambiguous nature of Article II the “Put Option” whereby the appellant has irrevocably, absolutely and unconditionally without demur or protest agreed to make payment of the exercise price to the respondent. If this be the case, then considering the provisions of Section 126 of the Contract Act, it is imperative to accept the 'option agreement' as a 'contract of guarantee'. There can be no other interpretation. Single Judge is correct in observing that the 'option agreement' is required to be considered as a guarantee. By agreeing to Article IV (termination clause) and accepting that the agreement will be terminated only on the happening of said two events, it can certainly be said that the appellant had waived the right if any, to terminate the contract. The submission as urged on behalf of the appellant that by their letter dated 4 March 2015 the option agreement was terminated, if is accepted, then the consequence is that Article IV (Termination Clause) of the option agreement itself would be rendered nugatory and meaningless. Whole intention of the parties to incorporate the termination clause as contained in Article IV is to bind the parties only in the stipulated and agreed mode of termination and in no other form or method. In fact what is pertinent is that the parties had categorically avoided to enter any other form of termination when they agreed to incorporate Article IV. Thus, the appellant's contention that in view of termination letter dated 4 March 2015 the “Put Option” could not have been exercised by the respondent is wholly untenable. The appellant's contention of the validity of the option agreement being considered by the learned Single Judge in the summary proceedings of a winding up petition, hence is wholly unfounded.
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