TMI Blog2010 (9) TMI 498X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s "the Act"), in Chapter IV, a scheme known as "Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998" was introduced. The said scheme came into force from September 1, 1998. As per the said scheme, for settlement of tax payable, an assessee is required to submit a declaration under section 88 of the Act. Section 89 of the Act speaks of the particulars to be furnished in the said declaration. Section 90 of the Act which is relevant for the issues involved in these writ petitions speaks of time and manner of payment of tax arrears. Sub-sections (1) to (4) of section 90 of the said Act read as follows ([1998] 232 ITR (St.) 31, 79, 83) : "90. Time and manner of payment of tax arrear.-(1) Within sixty days from the date of receipt of the declaration under section 88, the designated authority shall, by order, determine the amount payable by the declarant in accordance with the provisions of this Scheme and grant a certificate in such form as may be prescribed to the declarant setting forth therein the particulars of the tax arrear and the sum payable after such determination towards full and final settlement of tax arrears : Provided that where any material particular furnished in the declaration is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ect of the declaration in W. P. No. 22151 of 2001, on February 4, 1999 in respect of W. P. Nos. 22150 and 22326 of 2001. The determined and demanded amounts were paid by the petitioners on March 1, 1999 in respect of the certificates in W. P. Nos. 22151 of 2001 and 22150 of 2001. The demanded amount was paid on February 27, 1999, in respect of the certificate relating to W. P. No. 22326 of 2001. Thus, the petitioners complied with the payment within the time stipulated in the Scheme. 4. While so, the second respondent issued an amendment to the said certificate on June 8, 1999 in respect of the certificate in W. P. No. 22151 of 2001, on May 14, 1999 in respect of the certificate in W. P. No. 22150 of 2001 and on May 18, 1999 in respect of W. P. No. 22326 of 2001. As per the amendment made, various amounts in addition were demanded as against all the three petitioners. The petitioners paid the said amounts on July 19, 1999. 5. After having paid the said amounts, the petitioners have come up with Writ Petitions Nos. 24111, 24112 and 24113 of 2001 challenging the above amendments issued to the original certificates. 6. Subsequently, the first respondent passed individual o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e would point out that in these cases when the original certificates were issued, the payments made under section 140A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, were not adjusted properly by the Assessing Officer. It was noticed later. As a matter of fact, the Chief Commissioner of Income-tax has clarified that such adjustment of the payments made under section 140A should be made. On realising the said mistake and after recording the reasons, the amendments were brought in. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the orders under challenge in these writ petitions are not at all orders of fresh payments made on any reopening. But they are only amendments made on the original certificate issued under section 90(1) of the Act. 10. I have considered these submissions and also perused the records carefully. 11. A perusal of the second proviso to section 90 of the Act would make it abundantly clear that the designated authority, namely, the second respondent has got ample power to amend the certificate after recording the reasons in writing for doing so. In these cases, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents, the amounts paid under section 140A were not earlier ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... anded under section 90(1) of the Act, the designated authority found the mistake later on after getting some clarification from the Chief Commissioner, then has made the amendments. Thus, I do not find any merit in the respondents' challenge made to the amendment orders which are impugned in these three writ petitions. Thus, these writ petitions deserve to be dismissed. W. P. Nos. 22150, 22151 and 22326 of 2001 : 14. Now let me take up the other three writ petitions, namely, W. P. Nos. 22150, 22151 and 22326 of 2001. In these writ petitions, the orders passed by the first respondent declaring that the petitioners are not entitled for the benefit of the claim on the ground that the payments as demanded under section 90(1) of the Act were not made within the period of limitation are under challenge. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that since within 30 days of the original determination order made under section 90(1) of the Act, the payments were made, the petitioners have complied with sub-section (2) of section 90 of the Act. Therefore, they are entitled for the benefit of the scheme. The learned counsel would further point out that in the amend ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... condoned either by the authorities or by the courts. When the matter was taken up to the honourable Supreme Court, the Supreme Court in Hemalatha Gargya v. CIT reported in [2003] 259 ITR 1, has held that the courts have no power to act beyond the terms of the statutory scheme under which the benefits have been granted to the assessee and to extend the time on consideration of equity. Relying on the said judgment, the learned counsel would submit that it is far beyond the jurisdiction of this court to condone the delay so as to hold that the petitioners are entitled for the benefits of this scheme. 17. I have considered the above submissions made on either side. Admittedly, the petitioners have not paid the amounts demanded as per the amendment orders within 30 days of service of the said orders to the petitioners. Hence, the only crucial question is whether on this ground, the first respondent was right in declining to issue a certificate under section 90(2) of the Act thereby declaring that the petitioners were not entitled for the benefits of the scheme. There is no dispute in this case that the petitioners paid the amounts originally determined under section 90(1) of the Ac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... se provisions should be read conjointly and not in isolation. This would only reflect that there can be only one determination order and thus the amendment order cannot be construed as yet another determination order. If it is so correctly construed, then there can be no difficulty to conclude that both limitation periods prescribed in section 90(1) and 90(2), respectively, are not at all applicable to an amendment order. On the passing of an amendment order, no fresh period of limitation commences as contended by the learned counsel for the respondent. When Parliament itself has not prescribed any such period of limitation both for the authority to pass an amendment order and for the declarant to make payment, such period of limitation cannot be assumed as it is sought to be done by the learned counsel for the respondent. At the same time, it cannot be said that the declarant at his free will, can make payment at any time. It can only be said that the payment should be made within a reasonable time or within a time to be stipulated in the order itself. In the cases on hand, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners, in the amendment orders, there was nothing said a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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