TMI Blog2015 (3) TMI 814X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... .S. First Amendment speaks of freedom of speech and of the press, without any reference to “expression”, Article 19(1)(a) speaks of freedom of speech and expression without any reference to “the press”. Third, under the US Constitution, speech may be abridged, whereas under our Constitution, reasonable restrictions may be imposed. Fourth, under our Constitution such restrictions have to be in the interest of eight designated subject matters - that is any law seeking to impose a restriction on the freedom of speech can only pass muster if it is proximately related to any of the eight subject matters set out in Article 19(2). The real rule is that if a law is vague or appears to be so, the court must try to construe it, as far as may be, and language permitting, the construction sought to be placed on it, must be in accordance with the intention of the legislature. Thus if the law is open to diverse construction, that construction which accords best with the intention of the legislature and advances the purpose of legislation, is to be preferred. Where however the law admits of no such construction and the persons applying it are in a boundless sea of uncertainty and the law prima ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hat no part of Section 66A is severable and the provision as a whole must be declared unconstitutional. It will be noticed that Section 69A unlike Section 66A is a narrowly drawn provision with several safeguards. First and foremost, blocking can only be resorted to where the Central Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do. Secondly, such necessity is relatable only to some of the subjects set out in Article 19(2). Thirdly, reasons have to be recorded in writing in such blocking order so that they may be assailed in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, what has been said about Section 66A would apply directly to Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act, as causing annoyance in an indecent manner suffers from the same type of vagueness and over breadth, that led to the invalidity of Section 66A, and for the reasons given for striking down Section 66A, Section 118(d) also violates Article 19(1)(a) and not being a reasonable restriction on the said right and not being saved under any of the subject matters contained in Article 19(2) is hereby declared to be unconstitutional. Conclusion - Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 20 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or received on a computer, computer system, computer resource or communication device including attachments in text, image, audio, video and any other electronic record, which may be transmitted with the message. The genealogy of this Section may be traced back to Section 10(2)(a) of the U.K. Post Office (Amendment) Act, 1935, which made it an offence to send any message by telephone which is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene, or menacing character. This Section was substantially reproduced by Section 66 of the UK Post Office Act, 1953 as follows: 66. Prohibition of sending offensive or false telephone messages or false telegrams, etc. If any person- (a)sends any message by telephone which is grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character ; (b)sends any message by telephone, or any telegram, which he knows to be false, for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety to any other person ; or (c)persistently makes telephone calls without reasonable cause and for any such purpose as aforesaid, he shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding ten pounds, or to imprisonment for a term not excee ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ch blocking for access by the public may be carried out, shall be such as may be prescribed. (3) The intermediary who fails to comply with the direction issued under sub-section (1) shall be punished with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. 3. The Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill which introduced the Amendment Act stated in paragraph 3 that: 3. A rapid increase in the use of computer and internet has given rise to new forms of crimes like publishing sexually explicit materials in electronic form, video voyeurism and breach of confidentiality and leakage of data by intermediary, e-commerce frauds like personation commonly known as Phishing, identity theft and offensive messages through communication services. So, penal provisions are required to be included in the Information Technology Act, the Indian Penal code, the Indian Evidence Act and the code of Criminal Procedure to prevent such crimes. 4. The petitioners contend that the very basis of Section 66A - that it has given rise to new forms of crimes - is incorrect, and that Sections 66B to 67C and various Sections of the Indian Penal Cod ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ights conferred on the citizen under Part-III of the Constitution. There is a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment. Further, the Court would so construe a statute to make it workable and in doing so can read into it or read down the provisions that are impugned. The Constitution does not impose impossible standards of determining validity. Mere possibility of abuse of a provision cannot be a ground to declare a provision invalid. Loose language may have been used in Section 66A to deal with novel methods of disturbing other people s rights by using the internet as a tool to do so. Further, vagueness is not a ground to declare a statute unconstitutional if the statute is otherwise legislatively competent and non-arbitrary. He cited a large number of judgments before us both from this Court and from overseas to buttress his submissions. Freedom of Speech and Expression Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India states as follows: Article 19. Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.-(1) All citizens shall have the right- (a) to freedom of speech and expression; 7. Article 19(2) states: Article 19. Protection ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 00 this Court stated, in paragraph 45 that the importance of freedom of speech and expression though not absolute was necessary as we need to tolerate unpopular views. This right requires the free flow of opinions and ideas essential to sustain the collective life of the citizenry. While an informed citizenry is a pre-condition for meaningful governance, the culture of open dialogue is generally of great societal importance. 11. This last judgment is important in that it refers to the market place of ideas concept that has permeated American Law. This was put in the felicitous words of Justice Holmes in his famous dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 US 616 (1919), thus: But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. 12. Justice Brandeis i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he probability. Expressions of approval add to the probability. Propagation of the criminal state of mind by teaching syndicalism increases it. Advocacy of lawbreaking heightens it still further. But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy and incitement, between preparation and attempt, between assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind. In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated. (at page 1105, 1106) 13. This leads us to a discussion of what is the content of the expression freedom of speech and expression . There are three concepts which are fundamental in understanding the reach of this most basic of human rights. The first is discussion, the second is advocacy, and the third is incitement. Mere discussion or even advocacy of a particular caus ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 15. It is significant to notice first the differences between the US First Amendment and Article 19(1)(a) read with Article 19(2). The first important difference is the absoluteness of the U.S. first Amendment - Congress shall make no law which abridges the freedom of speech. Second, whereas the U.S. First Amendment speaks of freedom of speech and of the press, without any reference to expression , Article 19(1)(a) speaks of freedom of speech and expression without any reference to the press . Third, under the US Constitution, speech may be abridged, whereas under our Constitution, reasonable restrictions may be imposed. Fourth, under our Constitution such restrictions have to be in the interest of eight designated subject matters - that is any law seeking to impose a restriction on the freedom of speech can only pass muster if it is proximately related to any of the eight subject matters set out in Article 19(2). 16. Insofar as the first apparent difference is concerned, the U.S. Supreme Court has never given literal effect to the declaration that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech. The approach of the Court which is succinctly stated in one of the ea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ters set out under Article 19(2). If it does not, and is outside the pale of 19(2), Indian courts will strike down such law. 18. Viewed from the above perspective, American judgments have great persuasive value on the content of freedom of speech and expression and the tests laid down for its infringement. It is only when it comes to sub-serving the general public interest that there is the world of a difference. This is perhaps why in Kameshwar Prasad Ors. v. The State of Bihar Anr., 1962 Supp. (3) S.C.R. 369, this Court held: As regards these decisions of the American Courts, it should be borne in mind that though the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United State reading Congress shall make no law.... abridging the freedom of speech... appears to confer no power on the Congress to impose any restriction on the exercise of the guaranteed right, still it has always been understood that the freedom guaranteed is subject to the police power - the scope of which however has not been defined with precision or uniformly. It is on the basis of the police power to abridge that freedom that the constitutional validity of laws penalising libels, and those relating to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dium through which such information is disseminated. It is clear, therefore, that the petitioners are correct in saying that the public s right to know is directly affected by Section 66A. Information of all kinds is roped in - such information may have scientific, literary or artistic value, it may refer to current events, it may be obscene or seditious. That such information may cause annoyance or inconvenience to some is how the offence is made out. It is clear that the right of the people to know - the market place of ideas - which the internet provides to persons of all kinds is what attracts Section 66A. That the information sent has to be annoying, inconvenient, grossly offensive etc., also shows that no distinction is made between mere discussion or advocacy of a particular point of view which may be annoying or inconvenient or grossly offensive to some and incitement by which such words lead to an imminent causal connection with public disorder, security of State etc. The petitioners are right in saying that Section 66A in creating an offence against persons who use the internet and annoy or cause inconvenience to others very clearly affects the freedom of speech and expre ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... different freedoms separately and then to specify the extent of restrictions to which they may be subjected and the objects for securing which this could be done. A citizen is entitled to enjoy each and every one of the freedoms together and clause (1) does not prefer one freedom to another. That is the plain meaning of this clause. It follows from this that the State cannot make a law which directly restricts one freedom even for securing the better enjoyment of another freedom. All the greater reason, therefore for holding that the State cannot directly restrict one freedom by placing an otherwise permissible restriction on another freedom. (at page 863) 22. Before we come to each of these expressions, we must understand what is meant by the expression in the interests of . In The Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia, [1960] 2 S.C.R. 821, this Court laid down: We do not understand the observations of the Chief Justice to mean that any remote or fanciful connection between the impugned Act and the public order would be sufficient to sustain its validity. The learned Chief Justice was only making a distinction between an Act which expressly and di ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ] S.C.R. 597, this Court said: This Court had occasion in Dr. Khare's case (1950) S.C.R. 519 to define the scope of the judicial review under clause (5) of Article19 where the phrase imposing reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right also occurs and four out of the five Judges participating in the decision expressed the view (the other Judge leaving the question open) that both the substantive and the procedural aspects of the impugned restrictive law should be examined from the point of view of reasonableness; that is to say, the Court should consider not only factors such as the duration and the extent of the restrictions, but also the circumstances under which and the manner in which their imposition has been authorised. It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, where ever prescribed, should be applied to each, individual statute impugned and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the di ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ous that if the law prescribes five years externment or ten years externment, the question whether such period of externment is reasonable, being the substantive part, is necessarily for the consideration of the court under clause (5). Similarly, if the law provides the procedure under which the exercise of the right may be restricted, the same is also for the consideration of the Court, as it has to determine if the exercise of the right has been reasonably restricted. (at page 524) 27. It was argued by the learned Additional Solicitor General that a relaxed standard of reasonableness of restriction should apply regard being had to the fact that the medium of speech being the internet differs from other mediums on several grounds. To appreciate the width and scope of his submissions, we are setting out his written submission verbatim: (i) the reach of print media is restricted to one state or at the most one country while internet has no boundaries and its reach is global; (ii) the recipient of the free speech and expression used in a print media can only be literate persons while internet can be accessed by literate and illiterate both since one click is needed to down ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ost all cases. (ix) In case of other mediums, it is impossible to maintain anonymity as a result of which speech ideal opinions films having serious potential of creating a social disorder never gets generated since its origin is bound to be known. While in case of an internet mostly its abuse takes place under the garb of anonymity which can be unveiled only after thorough investigation. (x) In case of other mediums like newspapers, television or films, the approach is always institutionalized approach governed by industry specific ethical norms of self conduct. Each newspaper / magazine / movie production house / TV Channel will have their own institutionalized policies in house which would generally obviate any possibility of the medium being abused. As against that use of internet is solely based upon individualistic approach of each individual without any check, balance or regulatory ethical norms for exercising freedom of speech and expression under Article 19[ 1] [a]. (xi) In the era limited to print media and cinematograph; or even in case of publication through airwaves, the chances of abuse of freedom of expression was less due to inherent infrastructural and log ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... her agencies, including the private agencies. What is further, the electronic media is the most powerful media both because of its audiovisual impact and its widest reach covering the section of the society where the print media does not reach. The right to use the airwaves and the content of the programmes, therefore, needs regulation for balancing it and as well as to prevent monopoly of information and views relayed, which is a potential danger flowing from the concentration of the right to broadcast/telecast in the hands either of a central agency or of few private affluent broadcasters. That is why the need to have a central agency representative of all sections of the society free from control both of the Government and the dominant influential sections of the society. This is not disputed. But to contend that on that account the restrictions to be imposed on the right under Article 19(1)(a) should be in addition to those permissible under Article 19(2) and dictated by the use of public resources in the best interests of the society at large, is to misconceive both the content of the freedom of speech and expression and the problems posed by the element of public property in, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... which is empowered to enforce, however imperfectly, the right to reply. The print media further enjoys as in our country, freedom from precensorship unlike the electronic media. Public Order 30. In Article 19(2) (as it originally stood) this sub-head was conspicuously absent. Because of its absence, challenges made to an order made under Section 7 of the Punjab Maintenance of Public Order Act and to an order made under Section 9 (1)(a) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act were allowed in two early judgments by this Court. Thus in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 594, this Court held that an order made under Section 9(1)(a) of the Madras Maintenance of Public Order Act (XXIII of 1949) was unconstitutional and void in that it could not be justified as a measure connected with security of the State. While dealing with the expression public order , this Court held that public order is an expression which signifies a state of tranquility which prevails amongst the members of a political society as a result of the internal regulations enforced by the Government which they have established. 31. Similarly, in Brij Bhushan Anr. v. State of Delhi, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed and even disturbed, but the life of the community keeps moving at an even tempo, however much one may dislike the act. Take another case of a town where there is communal tension. A man stabs a member of the other community. This is an act of a very different sort. Its implications are deeper and it affects the even tempo of life and public order is jeopardized because the repercussions of the act embrace large Sections of the community and incite them to make further breaches of the law and order and to subvert the public order. An act by itself is not determinant of its own gravity. In its quality it may not differ from another but in its potentiality it may be very different. Take the case of assault on girls. A guest at a hotel may kiss or make advances to half a dozen chamber maids. He may annoy them and also the management but he does not cause disturbance of public order. He may even have a fracas with the friends of one of the girls but even then it would be a case of breach of law and order only. Take another case of a man who molests women in lonely places. As a result of his activities girls going to colleges and schools are in constant danger and fear. Women going fo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ted in all these cases. We have to ask ourselves the question: does a particular act lead to disturbance of the current life of the community or does it merely affect an individual leaving the tranquility of society undisturbed? Going by this test, it is clear that Section 66A is intended to punish any person who uses the internet to disseminate any information that falls within the subclauses of Section 66A. It will be immediately noticed that the recipient of the written word that is sent by the person who is accused of the offence is not of any importance so far as this Section is concerned. (Save and except where under subclause (c) the addressee or recipient is deceived or misled about the origin of a particular message.) It is clear, therefore, that the information that is disseminated may be to one individual or several individuals. The Section makes no distinction between mass dissemination and dissemination to one person. Further, the Section does not require that such message should have a clear tendency to disrupt public order. Such message need not have any potential which could disturb the community at large. The nexus between the message and action that may be taken b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. Interestingly, the US Courts have gone on to make a further refinement. The State may ban what is called a true threat . True threats encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. The speaker need not actually intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats protects individuals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engenders, in addition to protecting people from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur. Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death. See Virginia v. Black (Supra) and Watts v. United States 22 L. Ed. 2d. 664 at 667 38. We have ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 0, Section 123 (3A) of the Representation of People Act was upheld only if the enmity or hatred that was spoken about in the Section would tend to create immediate public disorder and not otherwise. 41. Viewed at either by the standpoint of the clear and present danger test or the tendency to create public disorder, Section 66A would not pass muster as it has no element of any tendency to create public disorder which ought to be an essential ingredient of the offence which it creates. Defamation 42. Defamation is defined in Section 499 of the Penal Code as follows: 499. Defamation.-Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person. Explanation 1.-It may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased person, if the imputation would harm the reputation of that person if living, and is intended to be hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near relatives. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n Hicklin s case which was whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall. Great strides have been made since this decision in the UK, United States as well as in our country. Thus, in Director General, Directorate General of Doordarshan v. Anand Patwardhan, 2006 (8) SCC 433, this Court noticed the law in the United States and said that a material may be regarded as obscene if the average person applying contemporary community standards would find that the subject matter taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest and that taken as a whole it otherwise lacks serious literary artistic, political, educational or scientific value (see Para 31). 46. In a recent judgment of this Court, Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2014 (4) SCC 257, this Court referred to English, U.S. and Canadian judgments and moved away from the Hicklin test and applied the contemporary community standards test. 47. What has been said with regard to public order and incitement to an offence equally applies here. Section 66A cannot possibly be said to creat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ormation which promotes hate speech i.e. (a)Information which propagates hatred towards individual or a groups, on the basis of race, religion, religion, casteism, ethnicity, (b)Information which is intended to show the supremacy of one particular religion/race/caste by making disparaging, abusive and/or highly inflammatory remarks against religion/race/caste. (c) Information depicting religious deities, holy persons, holy symbols, holy books which are created to insult or to show contempt or lack of reverence for such religious deities, holy persons, holy symbols, holy books or towards something which is considered sacred or inviolable. (viii) Satirical or iconoclastic cartoon and caricature which fails the test laid down in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (ix) Information which glorifies terrorism and use of drugs; (x) Information which infringes right of privacy of the others and includes acts of cyber bullying, harassment or stalking. (xi) Information which is obscene and has the tendency to arouse feeling or revealing an overt sexual desire and should be suggestive of deprave mind and designed to excite sexual passion in persons who ar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... able standards are laid down to define guilt in a Section which creates an offence, and where no clear guidance is given to either law abiding citizens or to authorities and courts, a Section which creates an offence and which is vague must be struck down as being arbitrary and unreasonable. Thus, in Musser v. Utah, 92 L. Ed. 562, a Utah statute which outlawed conspiracy to commit acts injurious to public morals was struck down. 53. In Winters v. People of State of New York, 92 L. Ed. 840, a New York Penal Law read as follows:- 1141. Obscene prints and articles 1. A person who, 2. Prints, utters, publishes, sells, lends, gives away, distributes or shows, or has in his possession with intent to sell, lend, give away, distribute or show, or otherwise offers for sale, loan, gift or distribution, any book, pamphlet, magazine, newspaper or other printed paper devoted to the publication, and principally made up of criminal news, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime; .. 'Is guilty of a misdemeanor, ..' (at page 846) The court in striking down the said statute held: ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ations. No intent or purpose is required-no indecency or obscenity in any sense heretofore known to the law. 'So massed as to incite to crime' can become meaningful only by concrete instances. This one example is not enough. The clause proposes to punish the printing and circulation of publications that courts or juries may think influence generally persons to commit crime of violence against the person. No conspiracy to commit a crime is required. See Musser v. State of Utah, 68 S.Ct. 397, this Term. It is not an effective notice of new crime. The clause has no technical or common law meaning. Nor can light as to the meaning be gained from the section as a whole or the Article of the Penal Law under which it appears. As said in the Cohen Grocery Co. case, supra, 255 U.S. at page 89, 41 S.Ct. at page 300, 65 L.Ed. 516, 14 A.L.R. 1045: 'It leaves open, therefore, the widest conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no one can foresee and the result of which no one can foreshadow or adequately guard against.' The statute as construed by the Court of Appeals does not limit punishment to the indecent and obscene, as formerly understood. When stories of deeds of bloo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... any such guidelines, a substantial amount of innocent conduct would also be brought within its net, leading to its unconstitutionality. 56. It was further held that a penal law is void for vagueness if it fails to define the criminal offence with sufficient definiteness. Ordinary people should be able to understand what conduct is prohibited and what is permitted. Also, those who administer the law must know what offence has been committed so that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law does not take place. 57. Similarly, in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 33 L.Ed. 2d. 222, the State of Illinois provided in an anti noise ordinance as follows: '(N)o person, while on public or private grounds adjacent to any building in which a school or any class thereof is in session, shall willfully make or assist in the making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of such school session or class thereof. . . .' Code of Ordinances, c. 28, 19.2(a). The law on the subject of vagueness was clearly stated thus: It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not cl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ) Whoever- (1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly- (A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age, or (B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the communication; or (2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity, shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. (at page 860) Interestingly, the District Court Judge writing of the internet said: [i]t is no exaggeration to conclude that the Internet has achieved, and continues to achieve, the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country - and indeed the world - as yet seen. The pl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1939) (alteration in original))). This requirement of clarity in regulation is essential to the protections provided by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See United States v. Williams, 553 U. S. 285, 304 (2008). It requires the invalidation of laws that are impermissibly vague. A conviction or punishment fails to comply with due process if the statute or regulation under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement. Ibid. As this Court has explained, a regulation is not vague because it may at times be difficult to prove an incriminating fact but rather because it is unclear as to what fact must be proved. See id., at 306. Even when speech is not at issue, the void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least two connected but discrete due process concerns: first, that regulated parties should know what is required of them so they may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an arbitrary or discriminatory way. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by the District Magistrate; he is only told about his prejudicial activities on which the satisfaction of the District Magistrate is based that action should be taken against him under s.4 or s. 4-A. In such a case it is absolutely essential that the Act must clearly indicate by a proper definition or otherwise when and under what circumstances a person can be called a goonda, and it must impose an obligation on the District Magistrate to apply his mind to the question as to whether the person against whom complaints are received is such a goonda or not. It has been urged before us that such an obligation is implicit in Sections 4 and 4-A. We are, however, not impressed by this argument. Where a statute empowers the specified authorities to take preventive action against the citizens it is essential that it should expressly make it a part of the duty of the said authorities to satisfy themselves about the existence of what the statute regards as conditions precedent to the exercise of the said authority. If the statute is silent in respect of one of such conditions precedent it undoubtedly constitutes a serious infirmity which would inevitably take it out of the provisions of Art. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hich person fell within the definition. The provisions were therefore held to be uncertain and vague. The real rule is that if a law is vague or appears to be so, the court must try to construe it, as far as may be, and language permitting, the construction sought to be placed on it, must be in accordance with the intention of the legislature. Thus if the law is open to diverse construction, that construction which accords best with the intention of the legislature and advances the purpose of legislation, is to be preferred. Where however the law admits of no such construction and the persons applying it are in a boundless sea of uncertainty and the law prima facie takes away a guaranteed freedom, the law must be held to offend the Constitution as was done in the case of the Goonda Act. This is not application of the doctrine of due process. The invalidity arises from the probability of the misuse of the law to the detriment of the individual. If possible, the Court instead of striking down the law may itself draw the line of demarcation where possible but this effort should be sparingly made and only in the clearest of cases. (at pages 470, 471) 66. Similarly, in Harakchand ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 6) and form part of a single scheme. The result is that clauses (a), (b), (c), (e) and (g) are not severable and the entire Section 27(6) of the Act must be held invalid. Section 27(2)(d) of the Act states that a valid licence issued by the Administrator may contain such conditions, limitations and restrictions as the Administrator may think fit to impose and different conditions, limitations and restrictions may be imposed for different classes of dealers . On the face of it, this sub-section confers such wide and vague power upon the Administrator that it is difficult to limit its scope. In our opinion Section 27(2)(d) of the Act must be struck down as an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on business. It appears, however, to us that if Section 27(2)(d) and Section 27(6) of the Act are invalid the licensing scheme contemplated by the rest of Section 27 of the Act cannot be worked in practice. It is, therefore, necessary for Parliament to enact fresh legislation imposing appropriate conditions and restrictions for the grant and renewal of licences to dealers. In the alternative the Central Government may make appropriate rules for the sa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e (a) relates to committing or instigating any person to commit any offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act, 10 of 1955, or under any other law for the time being in force relating to the control of the production, supply or distribution of, or trade and commerce in, any commodity essential to the community. Clause (b) of the Explanation to Section 3(1) of the Act of 1980 relates to dealing in any commodity which is an essential commodity as defined in the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, or with respect to which provisions have been made in any such other law as is referred to in clause (a). We find it quite difficult to understand as to which are the remaining commodities outside the scope of the Act of 1980, in respect of which it can be said that the maintenance of their supplies is essential to the community. The particular clause in sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the National Security Act is, therefore, capable of wanton abuse in that, the detaining authority can place under detention any person for possession of any commodity on the basis that the authority is of the opinion that the maintenance of supply of that commodity is essential to the community. We co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine which may extend to five lakh rupees or with both. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section,- (a) the word dishonestly shall have the meaning assigned to it in Section 24 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860); (b) the word fraudulently shall have the meaning assigned to it in Section 25 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). 70. It will be clear that in all computer related offences that are spoken of by Section 66, mens rea is an ingredient and the expression dishonestly and fraudulently are defined with some degree of specificity, unlike the expressions used in Section 66A. 71. The provisions contained in Sections 66B up to Section 67B also provide for various punishments for offences that are clearly made out. For example, under Section 66B, whoever dishonestly receives or retains any stolen computer resource or communication device is punished with imprisonment. Under Section 66C, whoever fraudulently or dishonestly makes use of any identification feature of another person is liable to punishment with imprisonment. Under Section 66D, whoever cheats by personating becomes liable to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... end to ten rupees, or with both. 74. If one looks at Section 294, the annoyance that is spoken of is clearly defined - that is, it has to be caused by obscene utterances or acts. Equally, under Section 510, the annoyance that is caused to a person must only be by another person who is in a state of intoxication and who annoys such person only in a public place or in a place for which it is a trespass for him to enter. Such narrowly and closely defined contours of offences made out under the Penal Code are conspicuous by their absence in Section 66A which in stark contrast uses completely open ended, undefined and vague language. 75. Incidentally, none of the expressions used in Section 66A are defined. Even criminal intimidation is not defined - and the definition clause of the Information Technology Act, Section 2 does not say that words and expressions that are defined in the Penal Code will apply to this Act. 76. Quite apart from this, as has been pointed out above, every expression used is nebulous in meaning. What may be offensive to one may not be offensive to another. What may cause annoyance or inconvenience to one may not cause annoyance or inconvenience to ano ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 389, paragraph 8 was cited to show that the expression nuisance appearing in Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was also not capable of precise definition. This again was said in the context of an argument that Section 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was impliedly repealed by the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974. This contention was repelled by saying that the areas of operation of the two provisions were completely different and they existed side by side being mutually exclusive. This case again did not contain any argument that the provision contained in Section 133 was vague and, therefore, unconstitutional. Similarly, in State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 469, the word untouchability was said not to be capable of precise definition. Here again, there was no constitutional challenge on the ground of vagueness. 79. In fact, two English judgments cited by the learned Additional Solicitor General would demonstrate how vague the words used in Section 66A are. In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Collins, (2006) 1 WLR 2223, the very expression grossly offensive is contained in Section 127(1)(1) of the U.K. Commu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... g: Crap1 Robin Hood Airport is closed. You ve got a week and a bit to get your shit together otherwise I am blowing the airport sky high1 None of the defendant s followers who read the posting was alarmed by it at the time. Some five days after its posting the defendant s tweet was read by the duty manager responsible for security at the airport on a general Internet search for tweets relating to the airport. Though not believed to be a credible threat the matter was reported to the police. In interview the defendant asserted that the tweet was a joke and not intended to be menacing. The defendant was charged with sending by a public electronic communications network a message of a menacing character contrary to section 127(1)(a) of the Communications Act 2003. He was convicted in a magistrates court and, on appeal, the Crown Court upheld the conviction, being satisfied that the message was menacing per se and that the defendant was, at the very least, aware that his message was of a menacing character. 81. The Crown Court was satisfied that the message in question was menacing stating that an ordinary person seeing the tweet would be alarmed and, therefore, such messa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bers whereas the Queen s Bench acquitted him. If judicially trained minds can come to diametrically opposite conclusions on the same set of facts it is obvious that expressions such as grossly offensive or menacing are so vague that there is no manageable standard by which a person can be said to have committed an offence or not to have committed an offence. Quite obviously, a prospective offender of Section 66A and the authorities who are to enforce Section 66A have absolutely no manageable standard by which to book a person for an offence under Section 66A. This being the case, having regard also to the two English precedents cited by the learned Additional Solicitor General, it is clear that Section 66A is unconstitutionally vague. Ultimately, applying the tests referred to in Chintaman Rao and V.G. Row s case, referred to earlier in the judgment, it is clear that Section 66A arbitrarily, excessively and disproportionately invades the right of free speech and upsets the balance between such right and the reasonable restrictions that may be imposed on such right. Chilling Effect And Overbreadth 83. Information that may be grossly offensive or which causes annoya ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion was maintainable but on appeal the Court of Appeal held to the contrary. When the matter reached the House of Lords, it affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal but on a different ground. Lord Keith delivered the judgment agreed to by all other learned Law Lords. In his opinion, Lord Keith recalled that in Attorney General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2)[(1990) 1 AC 109 : (1988) 3 All ER 545 : (1988) 3 WLR 776, HL] popularly known as Spycatcher case , the House of Lords had opined that there are rights available to private citizens which institutions of Government are not in a position to exercise unless they can show that it is in the public interest to do so . It was also held therein that not only was there no public interest in allowing governmental institutions to sue for libel, it was contrary to the public interest because to admit such actions would place an undesirable fetter on freedom of speech and further that action for defamation or threat of such action inevitably have an inhibiting effect on freedom of speech . The learned Law Lord referred to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in New York Times v. Sullivan [376 US 254 : 11 L Ed 2d 68 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ty were punishable. This Court specifically held that under the Section a wide net was cast to catch a variety of acts of instigation ranging from friendly advice to systematic propaganda. It was held that in its wide amplitude, the Section takes in the innocent as well as the guilty, bonafide and malafide advice and whether the person be a legal adviser, a friend or a well wisher of the person instigated, he cannot escape the tentacles of the Section. The Court held that it was not possible to predicate with some kind of precision the different categories of instigation falling within or without the field of constitutional prohibitions. It further held that the Section must be declared unconstitutional as the offence made out would depend upon factors which are uncertain. 87. In Kameshwar Prasad Ors. v. The State of Bihar Anr., [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 369, Rule 4-A of the Bihar Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956 was challenged. The rule states No government servant shall participate in any demonstration or resort to any form of strike in connection with any matter pertaining to his conditions of service. 88. The aforesaid rule was challenged under Articles 19 (1)(a) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and would, therefore, have to be struck down on the ground of overbreadth. Possibility of an act being abused is not a ground to test its validity: 91. The learned Additional Solicitor General cited a large number of judgments on the proposition that the fact that Section 66A is capable of being abused by the persons who administered it is not a ground to test its validity if it is otherwise valid. He further assured us that this Government was committed to free speech and that Section 66A would not be used to curb free speech, but would be used only when excesses are perpetrated by persons on the rights of others. In The Collector of Customs, Madras v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty Anr., [1962] 3 S.C.R. 786, this Court observed: .This Court has held in numerous rulings, to which it is unnecessary to refer, that the possibility of the abuse of the powers under the provisions contained in any statute is no ground for declaring the provision to be unreasonable or void. Commenting on a passage in the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland which stated: If such powers are capable of being exercised reasonably it is impossible to say that they may not also ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... onal validity of either any expression or a part of the provision, the Doctrine of Severability as enshrined under Article 13 may be resorted to. 94. The submission is vague: the learned Additional Solicitor General does not indicate which part or parts of Section 66A can possibly be saved. This Court in Romesh Thappar v. The State of Madras, [1950] S.C.R. 594 repelled a contention of severability when it came to the courts enforcing the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) in the following terms: It was, however, argued that Section 9(1-A) could not be considered wholly void, as, under Article 13(1), an existing law inconsistent with a fundamental right is void only to the extent of the inconsistency and no more. Insofar as the securing of the public safety or the maintenance of public order would include the security of the State, the impugned provision, as applied to the latter purpose, was covered by clause (2) of Article 19 and must, it was said, be held to be valid. We are unable to accede to this contention. Where a law purports to authorise the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and withou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... provision must fail in its entirety. That is really a decision that the impugned provision was on its own contents inseverable. It is not an authority for the position that even when a provision is severable, it must be struck down on the ground that the principle of severability is inadmissible when the invalidity of a statute arises by reason of its contravening constitutional prohibitions. It should be mentioned that the decision in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras [ (1950) SCR 594] was referred to in State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara [ (1951) SCR 682] and State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd. [ (1953) SCR 1069 at 1098-99] and distinguished. 96. The present being a case of an Article 19(1)(a) violation, Romesh Thappar s judgment would apply on all fours. In an Article 19(1)(g) challenge, there is no question of a law being applied for purposes not sanctioned by the Constitution for the simple reason that the eight subject matters of Article 19(2) are conspicuous by their absence in Article 19(6) which only speaks of reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public. The present is a case where, as has been held above, Section 66A does not fall within any ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hallenge on the ground of Article 14 must fail. Procedural Unreasonableness 99. One other argument must now be considered. According to the petitioners, Section 66A also suffers from the vice of procedural unreasonableness. In that, if, for example, criminal defamation is alleged, the safeguards available under Section 199 Cr.P.C. would not be available for a like offence committed under Section 66A. Such safeguards are that no court shall take cognizance of such an offence except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence and that such complaint will have to be made within six months from the date on which the offence is alleged to have been committed. Further, safeguards that are to be found in Sections 95 and 96 of the Cr.P.C. are also absent when it comes to Section 66A. For example, where any newspaper book or document wherever printed appears to contain matter which is obscene, hurts the religious feelings of some community, is seditious in nature, causes enmity or hatred to a certain section of the public, or is against national integration, such book, newspaper or document may be seized but under Section 96 any person having any interest in suc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... racy is one to which the provisions of Section 195 apply, no such consent shall be necessary. (3) The Central Government or the State Government may, before according sanction [under sub-section (1) or sub-section (1-A) and the District Magistrate may, before according sanction under sub-section (1-A)] and the State Government or the District Magistrate may, before giving consent under sub-section (2), order a preliminary investigation by a police officer not being below the rank of Inspector, in which case such police officer shall have the powers referred to in sub-section (3) of Section 155. 101. Again, for offences in the nature of promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion etc. or offences relatable to deliberate and malicious acts intending to outrage religious feelings or statements that create or promote enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes can only be taken cognizance of by courts with the previous sanction of the Central Government or the State Government. This procedural safeguard does not apply even when a similar offence may be committed over the internet where a person is booked under Section 66A instead of the aforesaid Sections. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ound that the legislation is in substance one on a matter assigned to the legislature, then it must be held to be valid in its entirety, even though it might incidentally trench on matters which are beyond its competence. It would be quite an erroneous approach to the question to view such a statute not as an organic whole, but as a mere collection of sections, then disintegrate it into parts, examine under what heads of legislation those parts would severally fall, and by that process determine what portions thereof are intra vires, and what are not. (at page 410) 105. It is, therefore, clear that the Kerala Police Act as a whole and Section 118 as part thereof falls in pith and substance within Entry 2 List II, notwithstanding any incidental encroachment that it may have made on any other Entry in List I. Even otherwise, the penalty created for causing annoyance in an indecent manner in pith and substance would fall within Entry 1 List III which speaks of criminal law and would thus be within the competence of the State Legislature in any case. 106. However, what has been said about Section 66A would apply directly to Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act, as causing ann ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f so identified, a notice shall issue to appear and submit their reply at a specified date and time which shall not be less than 48 hours from the date and time of receipt of notice by such person or intermediary. The Committee then examines the request and is to consider whether the request is covered by 69A(1) and is then to give a specific recommendation in writing to the Nodal Officer of the concerned Organization. It is only thereafter that the Designated Officer is to submit the Committee s recommendation to the Secretary, Department of Information Technology who is to approve such requests or complaints. Upon such approval, the Designated Officer shall then direct any agency of Government or intermediary to block the offending information. Rule 9 provides for blocking of information in cases of emergency where delay caused would be fatal in which case the blocking may take place without any opportunity of hearing. The Designated Officer shall then, not later than 48 hours of the issue of the interim direction, bring the request before the Committee referred to earlier, and only on the recommendation of the Committee, is the Secretary Department of Information Technology to p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... person i.e. the originator is identified he is also to be heard before a blocking order is passed. Above all, it is only after these procedural safeguards are met that blocking orders are made and in case there is a certified copy of a court order, only then can such blocking order also be made. It is only an intermediary who finally fails to comply with the directions issued who is punishable under sub-section (3) of Section 69A. 111. Merely because certain additional safeguards such as those found in Section 95 and 96 CrPC are not available does not make the Rules constitutionally infirm. We are of the view that the Rules are not constitutionally infirm in any manner. Section 79 and the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2011. 112. Section 79 belongs to Chapter XII of the Act in which intermediaries are exempt from liability if they fulfill the conditions of the Section. Section 79 states: 79. Exemption from liability of intermediary in certain cases.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force but subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), an intermediary shall not be liable for any third party i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... phic, paedophilic, libellous, invasive of another's privacy, hateful, or racially, ethnically objectionable, disparaging, relating or encouraging money laundering or gambling, or otherwise unlawful in any manner whatever; (c) harm minors in any way; (d) infringes any patent, trademark, copyright or other proprietary rights; (e) violates any law for the time being in force; (f) deceives or misleads the addressee about the origin of such messages or communicates any information which is grossly offensive or menacing in nature; (g) impersonate another person; (h) contains software viruses or any other computer code, files or programs designed to interrupt, destroy or limit the functionality of any computer resource; (i) threatens the unity, integrity, defence, security or sovereignty of India, friendly relations with foreign states, or public order or causes incitement to the commission of any cognisable offence or prevents investigation of any offence or is insulting any other nation. (4) The intermediary, on whose computer system the information is stored or hosted or published, upon obtaining knowledge by itself or been brought to actual knowledge by an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t a court order has been passed asking it to expeditiously remove or disable access to certain material must then fail to expeditiously remove or disable access to that material. This is for the reason that otherwise it would be very difficult for intermediaries like Google, Facebook etc. to act when millions of requests are made and the intermediary is then to judge as to which of such requests are legitimate and which are not. We have been informed that in other countries worldwide this view has gained acceptance, Argentina being in the forefront. Also, the Court order and/or the notification by the appropriate Government or its agency must strictly conform to the subject matters laid down in Article 19(2). Unlawful acts beyond what is laid down in Article 19(2) obviously cannot form any part of Section 79. With these two caveats, we refrain from striking down Section 79(3) (b). 118. The learned Additional Solicitor General informed us that it is a common practice worldwide for intermediaries to have user agreements containing what is stated in Rule 3(2). However, Rule 3(4) needs to be read down in the same manner as Section 79(3)(b). The knowledge spoken of in the said subrul ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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